PSCRP-BESA Reports No 40 (March 7, 2024)
The policies of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, as well as their foreign policy orientations, play a key role in shaping regional security and stability in the region. The problem is that the South Caucasus has never been a unified geopolitical space throughout its modern history. However, this has rarely happened in the past, most recently as part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. However, over the past thirty years, both the new Russia and the West have had many chances to monopolize influence in the South Caucasus. Neither of them took those chances.
Georgia in search of balance between East and West
Most citizens of Georgia see their country’s future in the European Union not only because of the benefits that come with membership in the world’s largest market. This is closely linked to their self-identification as Europeans, which is firmly rooted in the collective consciousness of the nation. Therefore, for the Georgian authorities, who have been criticized for deviating from the European path, gaining the status of EU candidate was a key achievement.
Georgia did not obtain this status through the actions of the authorities, but in spite of them. Brussels demanded democratization, fair elections and an independent judiciary from Tbilisi. The authorities refused, fearing the loss of power related to control over the economy and physical security. The past government’s track record clearly demonstrated this.
Georgia gained candidate status because of the strategic importance of its position as the key to Central Asia and the northern part of the Greater Middle East. By tacit agreement between Tbilisi and Brussels, Georgia pretends to follow EU recommendations and Brussels pretends to see the effort and wants to support them in their good cause.
Once the candidacy issue was settled, Brussels and Washington began to demand that Tbilisi fulfill its obligations. The Georgian authorities needed a counterweight to the West’s collective power. China has become or is trying to become such a counterweight. China has shown interest in the development of a logistics corridor between Europe and Asia, in particular in controlling the construction of the port of Anaklia, which is important for access to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The course of developments is clearly leaning in favor of China, which has been seeking to acquire the port for more than twenty years.
Russia, hamstrung by its occupation of Georgian regions and lack of diplomatic relations with Georgia, supports China in its quest to gain control of the port of Anaklia. For Russia, the port could be a substitute for Novorossiysk, whose situation has become increasingly troublesome due to hostilities in the Black Sea.
Moscow has improved relations with Tbilisi in recent years by abolishing visa regulations, restoring air travel, softening rhetoric and setting an example of establishing good neighborly relations. Georgia joined the ecosystem of parallel imports of Western goods into Russia, attracting Russian investment. This has provided economic growth comparable to the times of Mikheil Saakashvili. This relationship suits Moscow at this stage, but over time may require new concessions from Georgia.
Georgia’s relations with the West, especially with Ukraine, look bleak. In an effort to justify their policies, the Georgian authorities position themselves as a right-conservative force, gaining support from Orban but displeasing Washington and European capitals. The Ukrainian situation has become part of Georgia’s domestic politics, perceiving Kiev as the office of the opposition United National Movement. Saakashvili’s return and arrest only worsened relations, and a major war only exacerbated mutual distrust and contradictions, making the justifications for unilateral friendship with Ukraine laughable.
Georgia and Azerbaijan are geopolitically linked by extensive treaties and regional projects. Despite the deepening of their ties, the current situation does not allow them to reach the previous level of foreign policy synchronization. For Azerbaijan, the Russian factor remains a constraint, while in Georgia it is the lack of understanding of national interests and the prevalence of personal interests over state goals.
The unresolved Karabakh conflict
The decades-long Karabakh conflict remains unresolved even after the settlement of the territorial issue. For Azerbaijan, the return of sovereignty over its recognized territory turned a tragic page of national humiliation, when a significant part of the country’s territory had been under the control of the armed forces of hostile Armenia and about one million IDPs could not return to their homes. However, in September 2022, the Azerbaijani military took over strategic heights on the border with Armenia, controlling communications and the Syunik region.
With conflict resolution on hold, Azerbaijan is adopting a wait-and-see attitude. However, increased participation in the European Union energy market is necessary for the country’s development. Due to Armenia’s actions and the unresolved status of the conflict, these conditions create an unfavorable background for Azerbaijan’s increased activity in the European market. The resolution of the conflict requires the settling of border issues, the Zangezur corridor and the return of refugees with compensation, but so far, the parties have not reached agreement on these issues.
It would seem that the issue of borders is simple, based on the Alma-Ata Declaration signed by Azerbaijan. However, Armenia made reservations by not recognizing the 1991 border, especially with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, which, according to Armenia’s Declaration of Independence, was not considered part of Azerbaijan, in contradiction with international law. And since Armenia did not recognize Azerbaijan’s 1991 border, the border is conditional and is determined on the basis of negotiations between the parties. At the same time, there are suspicions in Armenia that Azerbaijan, having liberated its territory, seeks to seize Zangezur (Syunik), which divides central Azerbaijan and its autonomous republic. Thus, despite seeming clarity, the real border is determined through negotiations between the parties.
It is believed that Azerbaijan does not want a precise border until it receives full guarantees of Armenia’s renunciation of its claims to Karabakh, including legislative obligations. Azerbaijan is not ready to give up the strategic heights that allow it to control Armenia’s communications. This will continue to be the case at least until the conflict is finally resolved.
Another key issue in the dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the Zangezur corridor, a transport link connecting the mainland of Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan, as well as another important East-West corridor. Azerbaijan promotes free access through this corridor for goods bound for Nakhichevan, which has caused concern in Armenia. Control of the corridor is being discussed with the participation of third parties, such as Russia, the security guarantor, according to the November 2020 trilateral statement. Despite the document being outdated, no party has yet withdrawn from it.
The issue of refugees’ return is a point of contention between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan offers Armenians to return to Karabakh as citizens of this country, but Baku also expects the return of Azerbaijanis expelled from Zangezur, with the possibility of them obtaining Armenian citizenship. Yerevan insists on international control over the return of Armenians to Karabakh, but is unwilling to discuss the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Armenia.
This does not mean that a peace treaty is impossible. It is just that the right moment has not yet come, and it probably will not come until the parties resolve the issue of Russian influence over the conflict. This is directly related to how Russia will emerge from the war with Ukraine.
Azerbaijan and Armenia: solving different, but similar problems
The Karabakh conflict, while still ongoing, is already becoming history. Azerbaijan and Armenia are facing not only the continuation of the conflict, but also the reformatting of their space and public conscience.
In the field of foreign policy and security, Azerbaijan is reconsidering its relations with allies and strategic partners. Turkey is becoming the main ally, and the creation of a unified army is becoming crucial for Baku. The Shusha Declaration formally guarantees Turkey’s intervention in case of an attack on Azerbaijan, but the unified army will become a concrete deterrent, especially against Russia and Iran.
The next level of partnership is with Israel and Pakistan, both nuclear powers. Israel provides access to unique technology, including military technology, while Pakistan is an important resource partner, especially in light of its close relationship with China. This creates a balance in Sino-Iranian relations, which is crucial for Baku. Pakistan’s role in transportation corridors, especially in the west-south direction, is undoubtedly important, especially in view of the possible construction of the trans-Afghan railroad.
The Russian factor plays an important role in ensuring Azerbaijan’s security. There is a legal and contractual framework between the countries, including a declaration on allied interaction, which ensures a high level of cooperation. Despite strategic differences, Baku and Moscow seek forms of interaction, minimizing confrontation and sometimes ensuring mutual benefit. This is a tactic, but it is relevant here and now.
Strategic partnership relations with Georgia are established and institutionalized. The struggle for influence over that country is important to Baku. The construction of the port of Anaklia is critical for Azerbaijan, as it is a key point on the route to Central Asia and China.
The next level of relations is with European countries, especially those that rely on Azerbaijani energy resources, including gas, oil and green energy. The European Commission, especially its economic bloc headed by Ursula von der Leyen, is a situational ally of Baku, as its functions include taking care of Europe’s energy balance. There is already a serious basis for the development of such projects as the BTC oil pipeline, the Southern Gas Corridor, the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, the Alyat port, the Black Sea Energy submarine cable and the construction of the Rasht-Astara railroad. The UN Climate Change Conference in Baku in November this year may become an additional incentive for their development.
Yerevan, in its turn, is building its security system together with France, India, Greece and Cyprus, with the active participation of Russia and Iran. Its public dealings with Moscow are sometimes confrontational, but are quickly replaced by mutual understanding given the depth of integration between the two countries. The Kremlin may take an emotional dislike to the Pashinyan government but refrains from acting harshly toward Armenia on a general basis. Russia cannot return to the pre-September 2020 format of Armenia’s security guarantor, so Armenia is looking for other options.
France became Armenia’s first choice due to the authorities’ anti-Turkish stance, historical ties, the Armenian diaspora in France, the personal relationship between President Macron and Prime Minister Pashinyan, and France’s desire to assert its global status. Yerevan and Paris are ready to conclude a political-military alliance, but the main obstacle is Armenia’s alliance with Russia. The possibility of such an alliance depends on Russia’s successes or failures on the Ukrainian front. Greece and Cyprus have joined this construct because of its anti-Turkish orientation.
Iran sees Armenia as a key geopolitical component for balanced relations with Turkey and especially Azerbaijan. Unlike other countries, Iran has a direct presence on the ground in an effort to maintain a balance of power in the region. India, focused on logistics for getting its goods to European markets, has good relations with Azerbaijan, but hostile relations between New Delhi and Islamabad orient it toward Armenia. This shift takes into account the historical ties and mutual attraction between the Indian and Armenian nations.
The period of Irakli Garibashvili’s premiership saw an upswing in Georgian-Armenian relations. Before his resignation, Prime Minister Garibashvili signed a memorandum of strategic partnership with Armenia, the details of which remain unknown. Armenia seeks to utilize Georgia’s potential in regional projects, such as Nikol Pashinyan’s Crossroads of Peace initiative, and strengthen its geopolitical position through greater involvement of the West in regional affairs.
The situation in the region is so dynamic that things can change momentarily, like the weather in April. So — stay tuned.