PSCRP-BESA Reports No 22 (December 26, 2023)
The IDF’s (Israel Defense Forces) Operation Swords of Iron against Hamas in Gaza Strip, which comes in response to the massacre carried out on October 7, 2023 by the terrorist group’s militants in Israeli communities adjacent to the Strip, has been going on for two and a half months. And as it progresses, the question of international support for Israel’s actions is becoming more and more pressing. This subject has occupied a significant place in the ideological and political discourse of the armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space, both in terms of comprehending the realities of this confrontation between Israel and Hamas and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in general, and in the context of geopolitical interests and ambitions of specific USSR successor states.
Russia and Ukraine as parties to the conflict
There are quite a few elephants in the room, so to speak. The positions of Moscow and Kyiv (which have been in a state of heavy armed conflict since 2014) toward the Jewish state’s war with “Hamastan”, is one of the most corpulent of the allegoric beasts. It all started with Russia’s annexation of the Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2014 and its active support for pro-Russian separatists in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” in eastern Ukraine, which were simultaneously trying to secede from Kyiv. Another 8 years later, on February 24, 2022, Russian troops openly invaded Ukraine, thus launching the first full-scale war in Europe since 1945, which continues to this day.
As the fighting in Gaza develops, Russia’s position is becoming increasingly clear: Moscow almost openly supports Hamas as a satellite of Iran, Russia’s closest partner in the Middle East. This significantly sets the current situation apart from the relatively balanced approach demonstrated by Moscow during, for instance, the IDF’s Operation Protective Edge in 2014, and Russia’s subsequent policy of presenting itself as an “impartial mediator” between all participants in the Middle East conflict.
Russia’s interest lies in the possible slowing down, thanks to the war between Israel and Hamas, of the process of normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations, which would not only effectively end more than a century of Arab-Israeli conflict in its classic forms. It would largely remove the last obstacles to the formation of an alliance between the United States, Israel and the Saudi bloc countries, which would pose a serious challenge to the interests of Russia, Iran and China in the region.
Such fears of Moscow are well within the paradigm characteristic of a significant and influential part of the Russian foreign policy elite: Russia’s strategic partner in the region is Iran, which supplies it with critical weapons for use on the Ukrainian front and covers the “southern rear” of Russian geopolitical interests. Accordingly, the survival of the Iranian proxy, Hamas, which Russia considers a decent organization, is in line with Russia’s Middle East agenda. In light of this logic, from the Russian viewpoint, the same cannot be said about the interests of Israel, a strategic ally of Russia’s adversary, the United States.
It is not surprising that Moscow’s stance on the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel is reduced to the traditional call for both sides to “de-escalate the conflict”, which in the current situation is de facto support for the aggressor. The Russian Federation’s lobbying of the interests of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank, whose leaders sided with Moscow from the very beginning of the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, fits into the same paradigm. Voices in Russia calling on its political and military leadership to reconsider its position in the context of a new Middle East war have been very muted, although they exist not only among “moderate pragmatists”, but even among some “conservative Russian imperialists.” In these circles, the Israeli experience of confronting Arab aggression and Islamist terror, especially after 2014, is also a sought-after brand, understandably with their own allusions to it. (When comparing Israel to Russia, they believe that Ukraine should be viewed as part of the historical homeland that was expropriated.)
This is the assessment of the current situation provided by Gevorg Mirzayan, a political scientist close to the Kremlin, employed by the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, who in his article gave five reasons why it makes sense for Russia to support Israel rather than Hamas. His main point is that Israel, regardless of its affiliations, “has been and remains a huge breakwater for Islamic terrorism,” and if it fails in this war, “inspired by its success, terrorists will move to new fronts, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Where not Israeli, but Russian soldiers will be killed in the fight against them.” At the same time, the author of the article expressed bewilderment at the position of Russian patriots who support Hamas, saying that the Islamist-controlled “Gaza Strip is, in fact, the Middle East’s Ukraine. A territory that a group of radicals has turned into a hotbed of terrorism… which, for the sake of the security of the country and its citizens, must be denazified.”
One way or another, supporters of backing Israel in its confrontation with Hamas are a clear minority in the Russian establishment. It is dominated by the exact opposite stance, which explains the long list of pro-Hamas demarches by official Moscow. From the official reception held in Moscow for the terrorist group’s leadership and accusations of “war crimes” against Israel to loud anti-Israeli diplomatic steps and Russian economic aid to the Hamastan. As well as the pronounced pro-Palestinian and, accordingly, anti-Israeli policy pursued by the Russian state media.
Vox Populi
The impact of this trend on the “party of television” was quick to manifest itself. A poll of the Russian population conducted by the Levada Center in late October of this year showed that although two-thirds (66%) of respondents do not support either side in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the share of those sympathizing with the Palestinian Arabs (in this case Hamas) is 3.5 times higher than the share of those sympathizing with Israel. (Sympathizing with the Israeli side was more often declared by representatives of the “party of the Internet” — young people aged 25-39 and residents of large cities) . Overall, compared to the 2007-2010 measurements, the share of supporters of Palestinian Arabs in their conflict with Israel doubled (from 9-14% to 21%), while the share of supporters of the Jewish state halved (to 6%).
All this would seem to contradict the fact that the past decade and a half has seen a marked improvement and diversification of relations between Jerusalem and Moscow. After all, a mere 8-10 years ago, according to the same Levada Center, about 70% of Russians declared their positive attitude to Israel and did not consider it an enemy, while the list of opponents, in addition to the United States, Georgia and the Baltic States, included Moscow’s current closest ally, Iran.
Analyzing the results of a 2016 survey on the level of anti-Semitism and tolerance among Russians, experts from the same center concluded that “the image of Israel in Russia has a very positive coloring and is rather improving over the years, becoming more distinct and attractive. The greatest interest and sympathy for Israel is shown by wealthy, young and educated respondents, as well as Muscovites.” Public opinion in Russia “reacted calmly, if not indifferently” to Israel’s response to radical Arab groups and its actions to suppress terrorist infrastructure in Palestinian Arab enclaves in 2006-2008.
Finally, two years later, in September 2018, 52% of Russians surveyed by the Public Opinion Foundation also viewed Israel as a friendly state, with only 16% thinking otherwise; 34% viewed the Jewish state “well,” 58% “indifferently,” and only 4% “badly.” The cooperation between Israel and Russia was seen by 57% of respondents as equally beneficial for both countries.
The metamorphosis in the moods of Russians, which occurred virtually overnight, suggests that Russia is experiencing a scenario that sociologists, noting that latent antisemitic attitudes persist in the Russian practically unchanged during the whole post-Soviet years, considered unlikely just a short time ago. Namely, the return of “state antisemitism”, i.e., provoking anti-Semitic statements and actions carried out by media, bureaucratic and other resources controlled by the Government, that at the certain point may revitalize some almost forgotten patterns of the Soviet-style anti-Zionism. Without an intended propaganda the probability of this development was low, but if such signals appear, they will find an echo in the mass consciousness[1]. Which, as can be seen, is gradually happening, although not yet on such a scale as in Soviet times.
Unsurprisingly, similar changes in Israeli public opinion followed almost immediately. Thus, according to regular global polls by the respected Pew Research Center, in 2007-2018, between one-fifth to one-third of Israelis surveyed declared a positive attitude toward Russia, and in 2019 this share rose to 45%. But after the invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops on February 24, 2022, this share fell sharply again to 19%. More than half (53%) of Israelis in June 2022 viewed Russia extremely negatively, and another 25% viewed it rather negatively. We must assume that the events of the last two months have only reinforced this trend.
The behavior in Ukraine
It should be noted that certain concerns were also voiced about Ukrainian society, which is also not devoid of residual anti-Semitic stereotypes. However, the realization of such a scenario in Ukraine was considered even less likely, not least because the authorities, who had embarked on a course of European integration and were therefore interested in maximally disavowing the traditional perception of Ukrainians as an anti-Semitic people, could not create such an anti-Zionist and, even less so, anti-Semitic request.
It is also worth considering that in Ukraine, especially in the last 10 years, it has become trendy to compare itself with Israel as a positive example of a country that was able to build a full-fledged liberal democracy, ensure the flourishing of high-tech economy and social sphere, form a strong strategic alliance with the United States and an optimal model of relations with the EU. And it has especially succeeded in building a national security system and fighting terror. After February 24, 2022, the public vision of Israel as the optimal “role model” for Ukraine has not changed much, despite some frustration with the lack of support from Jerusalem, according to official Kyiv and part of the public, in their opposition to a Russian invasion.
Thus, according to polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS), compared to December 2021, i.e., before the Russian invasion, by January 2023 the share of Ukrainian citizens who considered Israel a friendly country declined slightly — from 55% to 52%. At the same time, the share of those who held the opposite viewpoint also decreased — from 17% to 12.5%. As a result, the balance of positive-negative assessments for two years has remained almost unchanged, amounting respectively to +38% and +39%. The same poll showed almost 1.5-fold growth compared to December 2021 (64% and 27% respectively) of the share of Ukrainians who support the Jewish state in the conflict between Israel and Iran.
It makes sense that this time, too, Ukraine’s leaders expressed unequivocal support for Israel and harshly condemned Hamas and its patrons in Tehran. Apart from the moral side of the issue, Kyiv’s obvious interest is to maximize diplomatic isolation of Iran, which supplies Russia with attack drones widely used in the war in Ukraine. It also seeks to promote in the international media discourse a comparison between the attack, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky put it, by the “terrorist organization” Hamas on Israel and the “terrorist state” of the Russian Federation on Ukraine.
Such allusions were enthusiastically embraced by Ukrainian society, which was virtually overwhelmed by a wave of solidarity and sympathy for Israel and Israelis. A public opinion poll conducted in late November and early December 2023 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) showed that two-thirds (69%) of Ukrainians surveyed support Israel in the current conflict, 18% sympathize with both sides equally, and only 1% sympathize with the Palestinian Arabs (another 12% have no opinion on the issue).
Are we dealing with a situational alignment and misalignment of Israeli interests with those of Kyiv and Moscow, respectively, which some, let’s call them “skeptical realists,” still believe could shift if the geopolitical context changes? Or, as other observers believe, are Russians’ and Ukrainians’ attitudes toward Israel’s war on Palestinian terrorists shaped by their civilizational and value choices between the “democratic West” and the “authoritarian East”? Opinions differ, but the relevance of finding an adequate answer to this question for Israel is undeniable.
[1] See Lev Gudkov, “Sociological Aspects of the Phenomenon of Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia in Modern Russia”. In: Antisemitism, Tolerance and Historical Memory in the Post-Soviet Space, ed. by Haim Ben Yaakov. Herzliya and Tel-Aviv: Academic and analytical reports series. Issue No. 4 (October 2021)