PSCRP-BESA Reports No 16 (November 17, 2023)
Historically, relations with Georgia have been a very significant part of the existence of the Russian state. Since the second half of the eighteenth century to the present, that means for more than two hundred years Georgia as a territory has been a part of the Russian imperial project and Russian political agenda. However, in Georgia’s history, relations with Russia occupy a much more modest place in terms of time — of course, if we do not consider relations with the Great Steppe – from the Khazar Khaganate to the Golden Horde, not to mention relations with peoples of the North Caucasian. Yet there is an important aspect here: Of course, the Russian factor in the history of Georgia was much more important than the Georgian factor in the history of Russia. Although there are nuances that are understandable for people more or less familiar with the history of Russia.
After the collapse of the USSR, it could be expected that Georgia may serve as a “pillar” of the new democratic Russia in the Caucasus – both geography and history were in favor of such an arrangement. However, everything went exactly the opposite way, and the personal factor in both Russia and Georgia played a key role in this. Despite the democratic façade, the new Russia continued to be an imperial entity burdened with a sense of ressentiment. Neither the Kremlin, nor the Foreign Ministry, nor the security services were ready to treat Georgia as an equal partner, or even as a partner at all. The Russian Federation inherited armed conflicts from the USSR on Georgian territory. But it was the authorities of the new Russia that decided to use these conflicts as an instrument of pressure on Georgia instead of promoting their peaceful resolution and building normal partnership relations with Georgia.
The same Russian, or rather former Soviet special services played a key role in the organization of the military coup in December 1991, which led to the overthrow of legally elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the establishment of a military junta, and a civil war. In the spring and summer of 1992, the civil war spilled over into western Georgia and then into the territory of Abkhazia. Eventually, the junta had to invite Eduard Shevardnadze, former Georgian Communist leader, to take the Presidential office. The putschists naively thought that Shevardnadze would be an obedient puppet in their hands. It turned out quite differently: in two years Shevardnadze managed to remove the putschists from power and by 1995 to build a vertical of power, which was very similar to what it was when Shevardnadze was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia.
Even before that the disaster struck in Abkhazia, where, under pressure from Russia, the Georgian government withdrew its troops from the part of the autonomy it controlled, leading to ethnic cleansing of Georgians living in Abkhazia. The country of four million people took in more than three hundred thousand refugees. In the fall of 1993, Moscow made plans to divide Georgia into five parts: Western and Eastern Georgia, Adjara, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. And according to eyewitnesses of these events, this scenario was avoided solely due to personal ties of Eduard Shevardnadze with key Western leaders, because Shevardnadze was considered one of the architects of Perestroika and Gorbachev’s “new thinking” doctrine in international relations.
Despite this, Shevardnadze made very energetic attempts at rapprochement with Russia. Georgia joined the CIS in 1993 and a large treaty was signed with the Russian Federation, according to which two military bases (in Batumi and Akhalkalaki), as well as the headquarters of Russian troops in Transcaucasia, were stationed on Georgian territory. Under this treaty, Moscow committed itself to modernizing Georgia’s armed forces, as well as assisting to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (Russian peacekeepers were deployed in both regions). None of this has been done.
Moreover, attempts to defend Georgia’s interests ended with two assassination attempts on Shevardnadze and several military coup attempts; however, they were unsuccessful. After that, Georgia set a course for cooperation with Western countries. The main argument that should have been interested the West was Georgia’s geographical position as the only alternative to Russia in transportation of energy resources and logistics along the East-West corridor. In 1998, a declaration was signed on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which created conditions for independent oil exports from Azerbaijan bypassing Russia. In 1999, at the OSCE Istanbul summit, Russia was forced to agree with withdrawal of their troops from Georgia by 2008. In response, Moscow supported the “Rose Revolution,” which resulted in Shevardnadze’s ouster and his replacement by a young and energetic leader, Mikhail Saakashvili.
However, this did not work either. Saakashvili expected practical assistance from Russia in solving the problem of territorial integrity. Moscow demanded to keep its military bases, as well as to have the railroad and the Georgian ports of Batumi and Poti handed over. This without any guarantees that the territories would be returned. As a result, Georgia’s policy, despite external factors, was completely reoriented towards the West with complete disregard for Russia’s interests. Georgia’s development strategy under Saakashvili looked as follows: with the United States as a strong ally, an open economy with investments and European integration as a source of income, and with armed forces complying with NATO standards. In theory this model looked flawless, but in practice, it led to Russia’s aggression against Georgia in August 2008, which left Georgia politically isolated. Until 2008, Tbilisi was supported by a group of American neocons, including Vice President Dick Cheney. At that time, Georgia was able to modernize its armed forces, albeit on a limited scale, with supplies from countries such as Ukraine, Israel, and the Czech Republic. But after 2008, military cooperation was closed, and in the White House came to power the administration of Barack Obama, plotting a reset of relations with Russia.
In the end, because of an electoral revolution, with the blessing of the United States and Europe and the support of the Russian Federation, the only local Georgian oligarch at the time, Bidzina Ivanishvili, came to power. The algorithm of relations with Russia for the new authorities was quite simple: do not irritate politically, cooperate economically, ignore diplomatically. And it should be said that for almost a decade this policy was supported by both the US and the EU. The situation changed after February 2022. The Georgian authorities, and Ivanishvili himself, found themselves stretched between the Western foreign policy and years of established business relations with Russia with minimal political content. I think it was at this point that the idea of involving China arose. We are not talking about a complete reorientation of the foreign policy course towards Beijing. The idea is to make Georgia a consensus zone between Beijing and Brussels and thus cement Ivanishvili’s power with external elements of democracy (the same ruling party can be replaced by another or a coalition of parties).
As for the source of income, there is a high probability (or rather, danger) that Georgia will be loaded with Chinese loans. It is well known how China works in this matter, but in the short term it will create an illusion of prosperity. Plus, the possibility of unhindered use of Russian assets (being in the ecosystem of the Russian Federation) and certain technical assistance from the EU. As far as I understand, not much development is envisaged for the armed forces. It’s a kind of “rational” approach: we can’t win a head-on confrontation with the Russian Federation, but what we have is quite enough for the return of the territories when the Russian troops will be gone. At the same time, Beijing will not pressure Moscow on the issue of the occupied territories at all and will not allow to violate the status quo.
The question arises as to where Russia stands in this scenario. Moscow’s capabilities are determined by its resources, which are now rapidly depleting because of the military hostilities in Ukraine. The Russian Federation has entered a period of systemic weakening in virtually all spheres: military, political, economic, and humanitarian. At the same time, the main goal of the Russian Federation in its relations with Georgia is to keep Georgia in the ecosystem of Russia’s survival under sanctions. Of course, Georgia is not the central element of this ecosystem, which includes such countries as China, India, Turkey, and others. But two important points should be noted here. In logistical terms, Georgia is a very important element of Russia’s connection with the global South, and in informational terms, working relations with Georgia are an extremely convenient element for Russian propaganda, unlike relations with Ukraine.
Besides, Moscow still has tools to maintain and even strengthen its influence in Georgia.
- Offering cheap supplies of raw materials and preferential treatment in doing business with Russia for companies directly linked to the authorities.
- Participation in super-profitable schemes to circumvent sanctions with subsequent exposure and inevitable inclusion in the sanctions list.
- Activation of agents of influence in government, political, media and public structures.
- Work with ethnic minorities of Georgia in the directions of anti-Western propaganda
- Opening of a railroad through Abkhazia and use of the port of Anaklia, if it is built by the Chinese, as a replacement for the sub-sanctioned Novorossiysk.
- Use of the factor of migration of Russian citizens, from agent network to spreading the influence of the “Russian world” in Georgia in all spheres.
- In Georgia, the dangling carrot of settling relations with Abkhazians and Ossetians.
- Threats of destabilization and, in extreme circumstances, direct military aggression.
In the end, there are insurmountable contradictions between Georgia and Russia (occupied territories), which have gotten worse as a result of recent events. Georgian public opinion is overwhelmingly negative towards Russia as a state, but at the same time it is quite loyal to Russian citizens, Russian business, and Russian culture. Besides, the Georgian authorities are interested in making super-profits from relations with Russia and are not ready for a political settlement on Moscow’s terms, while the Russian side, in turn, is not ready to make any concessions. Finally, Moscow considers the strengthening of Chinese influence in Georgia as a desirable alternative to the West.
It is very likely that this situation will continue until Russia’s place and role in the modern world radically change.
Gela Vasadze is a Georgian political analyst and broadcaster based in Tbilisi and Batumi. He is the Head of Regional Programs at the Georgian Strategic Analysis Center.