PSCRP-BESA Reports No 19 (December 10, 2023)
In February 2022, launching a full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the top military and political leadership of the Russian Federation was counting on a blitzkrieg. However, by now the war has been going on for almost two years. Heavy losses on the front required the Russians to carry out large-scale mobilization efforts. It is no secret that the Russian authorities mobilized mostly people from the provinces for the war in Ukraine in an effort to avoid growing discontent in the capital cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. But a number of other population groups experience the feeling of disproportionate use of their human resources for military purposes.
War and the narrative of Russian ethnic minorities
National movements of a number of non-Russian ethnic groups of the Russian Federation have repeatedly accused the federal authorities of attempting to deliberately reduce the demographic potential of ethnic minorities by sending their representatives to the front in much larger proportions than ethnic Russians.
For example, emigrant website Idel.Realia tracks the number of people from the Volga-Ural region killed at the front, whose death is confirmed by official Russian authorities or organizations. According to their data, among those who died in the war in Ukraine were 596 mobilized in the Nizhny Novgorod region (more than 3 million inhabitants, 95.15% Russians) and 348 mobilized in the Republic of Chuvashia (1 million 173 thousand inhabitants, 30% Russians). At the same time, a disproportionate share of the mobilized are rural residents, among whom the share of non-Russian population is even higher.
On November 19, 2023 the movement “Free Udmurtia” published a statement, which, in particular, says: “According to various estimates since the beginning of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, from 24.02.2022 to November of this year, the losses of the Russian army amounted from 200 to 300 thousand people. The absolute majority of the dead are residents of the provinces, mainly national republics. Having taken away freedom, local self-government, revenues, subsurface resources, land and property from the regions, Moscow has put ordinary people from the hinterland on the brink of survival. Indigenous peoples, whose fate is absolutely unimportant to their Moscow masters, were the first to suffer.”
There is no point in arguing whether the Russian authorities are in fact purposefully seeking to use members of national minorities as “cannon fodder”. What is important is that this issue per se is a factor in the growing potential for inter-ethnic conflicts in the Russian Federation.
In addition, the practice of creating regional and national volunteer battalions to participate in the war in Ukraine, which is actively encouraged by the federal authorities, places local authorities of federal member states in charge of certain military formations (the function not previously assigned to them), which may eventually lead to a change in the relationship between the federal government and the national republics that are part of the Russian Federation.
Until recently, the Chechen Republic, headed by Ramzan Kadyrov, was the only one with national military structures at its disposal. Now such “local armed forces” may also be available to the heads of other national republics. And these are military formations that have real experience in the battlefield. This is how the Yakut volunteer unit “Baatur”, the Tatarstan volunteer battalions “Alga” and “Timer”, the Bashkortostan volunteer battalions “Minigali Shaimuratov” and “Alexander Dostavalov”, the Chuvash volunteer battalion “Atal”, etc. all came into being. At the same time, we are talking not just about territory-based, but to a large extent “ethnic” military units. In this sense, the fact that, according to a report in the Moscow newspaper Kommersant, “when enrolling in the Chuvash battalion […] “Atal” […], which is also open only to residents of the republic, the knowledge of the Chuvash language is considered an advantage” is telling.
The republican authorities consider it their duty to support “their” servicemen financially and institutionally, and even make official statements in the media about their participation in the war. In this sense, the statement made by the head of the Chuvash Republic Oleg Nikolaev in early November 2023 in connection with heavy losses among Chuvash servicemen and published by many Russian media[a] is indicative.
The leadership of the Republic of Tyva (Tuva) behaves in a similar manner towards “its own servicemen”. One of the most high-profile inter-ethnic conflicts related to the Russian troops involved in the war against Ukraine covered by the Russian media is connected with Tuvinian servicemen. In February 2023, mobilized servicemen from Tuva recorded a video message to Vladislav Khovalyg, the current head of Tuva, and Sholban Kara-ool, the former head of Tuva and current deputy speaker of the Russian State Duma, in which they complained about bullying and beatings by servicemen of the self-proclaimed DNR and military police. The video, recorded in Tuvinian and translated into Russian, was published by the “Asians of Russia” Telegram channel. After that it went on to be widely discussed by both Russian opposition emigrant media and pro-government media of the Republic of Tuva.
Sholban Kara-ool reacted immediately, writing, in particular, in his Telegram channel: “I am interrupting my business trip to Siberia and flying out to clarify the circumstances. The army always means order and discipline. Without degrading the human dignity of the subordinates, and at the same time with conscious obedience to commanders. Our soldiers have always been diligent in training and brave in battle. We’ll figure it out.” It should be emphasized that by the term “our soldiers” the deputy speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federation does not mean the servicemen of the Russian army in general, but specifically Tuvinian servicemen.
In this case, we are not talking about an isolated verbal expression that does not reflect a certain trend. Thus, Vladislav Khovalyg said in an interview with the TASS agency on January 20: “Last December, I visited the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics and met with our servicemen [emphasized by the author]. Since the very beginning of the special military operation [SMO], we have been in close contact with them. Now, according to general estimates, there are about three thousand of our fellow countrymen there — almost 1% of Tuva’s population. In the near future, on the eve of Shagaa (the Tuvinian New Year, which in 2023 will be celebrated on February 21 [note by TASS]), we plan to hold a teleconference, at which our lamas will hold a festive prayer ceremony for the servicemen, and their relatives and friends will be able to communicate with fighters of the SMO.”
Potential for resistance
Against this background, anti-war sentiments are developing in Tuva, as well as in a number of other national republics that are part of the Russian Federation. According to the pro-Ukrainian website “Crimea.Realia” dated 12.7.2022, “the anti-war “women’s movement” is particularly active in Buryatia and Tuva, where the statistics of war dead in proportion to the population of the republics shows the highest figures in the country.” Anti-war petitions, such as this one, can be found on social media:
“I, as a mother and a Russian citizen, call for a ban on sending Tuvinians to the SMO. My sons are draft-aged, and I fear for their lives. They are becoming pawns in a game they did not choose. Despite the fact that they are Russian citizens, their opinion is not taken into account — they are brainwashed that they are warriors of Russia and must defend their homeland.
“Tuvinians are a small ethnic group in Russia. According to the 2010 census, the number of Tuvinians was only about 300,000 (Source: Federal State Statistics Service). Due to the high level of mobilization into the SMO, this number continues to decline.
“We want to live like all Russians — without fear for our future and the future of our children. We want to enjoy life, not fear it. Therefore, I ask you to support this petition and prohibit sending Tuvinians to the SMO”.
According to the above-quoted report of the “Crimea.Realia” website, which refers to Tuvinian activist Vasily Matenov, from the very beginning of the full-scale war there have been refusals of Tuvinian servicemen to stay at the front in Ukraine.
Such sentiments shared by Tuvinian elites cooperating with the federal government (it is fitting to mention the curious fact that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is also a Tuvinian), the tiny Tuvinian active opposition, and the majority of Tuvinians, indirectly contribute to the development of separatism and the growth of inter-ethnic tension in the Republic of Tuva. Both are deeply rooted in this South Siberian republic.
Located between Russia and Mongolia, Tuva is the last territory that became part of the USSR. Until 1944, it was a nominally independent state, the Tuvan People’s Republic. It was part of the Qing Empire until 1911, and then came under the protectorate of the Russian Empire under the name Uryankhay Krai. At that time, with the influx of sizeable groups of Russian settlers, the foundation for inter-ethnic conflicts between them and the indigenous inhabitants was laid. Initially, these conflicts were based on land disputes. In 1919 they resulted in an anti-Russian uprising accompanied by massacres and expulsion of Russians[b], who by that time made up about 20% of the region’s population[c].
In 1921 Tuva declared independence but remained dependent on Soviet Russia (and later the USSR). The Russian population with Soviet citizenship lived on the territory of Tuva. After the accession of Tuva to the USSR, the Russian population increased dramatically. In 1959, the share of Russians in Tuva reached a maximum of 40.1%, but then began to decline due to the natural increase of the indigenous population. In 1989, Russians accounted for 32.3% of Tuva’s population.
In the early 1990s Tuva became a zone of severe inter-ethnic tension[d], accompanied by violence against Russians and Russian-speaking residents of the republic and their mass migration from Tuva.
As a result, the 2021 census recorded only 31,927 Russians in the Republic of Tuva, which amounted to 9.48% of the total population. As for “Russian-speakers”, there were less than 0.1% of the total population.
Despite the fact that the acute phase of inter-ethnic conflict in Tuva has passed, inter-ethnic tension in the republic persists. The following are the main contributing factors:
- Low standard of living in Tuva against the background of a large gap in the standard of living between the indigenous population and immigrants, primarily due to the higher educational level of the latter.
- The actively developing process of migration of rural Tuvinian youth to the cities, where the majority of the Russian population is concentrated.
- High level of ethnic consolidation of Tuvinians, which is translated into a high level of preservation of the national language and national traditions, low level of migration of ethnic Tuvinians outside their republic[e], etc.
In 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Tuva ASSR adopted the “Declaration of State Sovereignty”. Some provisions from it were included in the Constitution of the Republic of Tuva in 1993. However, this Constitution was recognized by the federal authorities as contradicting federal legislation, and similar claims were made against other republics. In 2001, the Republic of Tuva was one of the last republics to yield to the pressure of the federal government and amend its Constitution. With the weakening of the federal government in Tuva, there is a high probability of separatist tendencies, especially with the return of Tuvinian servicemen from the front. They could become the backbone of the republic’s armed forces, which would increase the risk of inter-ethnic tensions in the event of an attempt to secede or “sovereignize” Tuva.
Within the narrow context of the national interests of the State of Israel, the Republic of Tuva as such is of little concern. Besides its geographical remoteness and lack of trade links, Tuva has an almost non-existent Jewish population. The closest organized Jewish community to Tuva (140 people) is in Abakan, the capital of the bordering republic of Khakassia. In addition, anti-Semitic sentiments are not widespread in the Republic of Tuva, whose population has traditionally practiced predominantly Buddhism. A sociological survey in 2017 showed that the greatest antipathy among Tuvinians is caused by Kyrgyz (20.2% of respondents stated their dislike for representatives of this nationality), followed (in descending order) by Armenians (16.3%) and Ukrainians (15.8%)[f].
The situation in Tuva is important in the general Russian context. If separatist tendencies manifest themselves in the republic, this could affect other national republics of Russia, causing a deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and destabilization. It may also affect the interests of the State of Israel, both in terms of foreign policy and the situation of the Jewish minority in Russia. Thus, monitoring of inter-ethnic relations in Tuva is key to predicting the situation in the Russian Federation.
[a] See https://pravdapfo.ru/news/glava-chuvashii-prokommentiroval-soobshheniya-o-gibeli-bojczov-v-zone-svo/; https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6312071; https://lenta.ru/news/2023/11/02/vlasti-chuvashii-nazvali-lozhnoy-informatsiyu-ob-atake-na-boytsov-svo-iz-regiona/ etc.
[b] V.A. Shuldyakov, “Siberian Cossacks in the Uryankhay region (1918–1919): an unknown page of the Civil War”, Modern Scientific Research: Theory, Methodology, Practice: Collection of scientific papers of the faculty on the basis of reports of the Department of Social Sciences on research and development for 2007. Issue 2. Publishing house of Omsk Economic Institute, 2008, vol. 3, pp. 114-132.
[c] See: V. A. Grebneva, Geography of Tuva, Kyzyl, 1968.
[d] For more details see: Z.V.Anaiban, Ethno-social bases of inter-ethnic tension in the Republic of Tuva in the 90s. Dissertation abstract for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 1999: https://www.dissercat.com/content/etnosotsialnye-osnovy-mezhetnicheskoi-napryazhennosti-v-respublike-tuva-v-90-e-gody
[e] According to a survey conducted in 2017, only 5.9% of Tuvinians considered leaving their republic permanently. See: Choduraa Tenzin, “The Republic of Tyva: Inter-ethnic and Inter-confessional Relations”, p. 92: https://www.imbt.ru/upload/docs/publisher/2018/08/%D0%A2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D0%A7.-%D0%9C.-%D0%A5..pdf
[f] Choduraa Tenzin, “The Republic of Tyva: Inter-ethnic and Inter-confessional Relations”, p. 92: https://www.imbt.ru/upload/docs/publisher/2018/08/%D0%A2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D0%A7.-%D0%9C.-%D0%A5..pdf
Dr. Velvl Chernin, a social anthropologist and ethnographer, is Affiliated Research Fellow, Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program at the BESA Center
Illustration: a flag of Republic of Tyva (Tuva)