In July 2024, the research conducted by the BESA PSCRP analysts was thematically dominated by the events in the Caucasus, both South and North.
The “North Caucasian” block comprised the materials by Velvl Chernin and Alex Greenberg.
A violent terrorist attack against two churches, a synagogue, and a police station in the cities of Makhachkala and Derbern (Dagestan, Russia) prompted Chernin to provide an overview of the overall ethnopolitical situation in Dagestan. This region of the Russian Federation is populated by numerous ethnic groups, the largest of which are Avars, Dargins, and Kumyks. The geographical distribution of these groups is uneven; there are districts populated by certain ethnic communities. Interethnic relations in the region are characterized by the struggles for leadership in security and power structures. Jewish dimension is also present on the local ethnic map: Mountain Jews are considered one of the groups indigenous to Dagestan, however, the trend of diminishing their share in the population (because of emigration) is obvious. The author does not observe any specific nationalist drive behind the 23 June attacks; he supposes that their purpose was the intimidation of non-Muslim religious groups.
The same attack has inspired Alex Greenberg to analyze the roots and present state of antisemitic discourse in Dagestan. He supposes that radical Islamism might fill the lacuna of ethnic cohesion and create an alternative community. Dogmatic anti-Judaism can be targeted only toward deeply religious individuals and might cause tensions with the traditional clergy and the authorities (since it is justified on the grounds of Salafist Islam). On the contrary, anti-Zionism, as another dimension of antisemitism, is acceptable both for the broad Muslim population (because of the solidarity with the Ummah) and for the Russian political establishment (because of the traditions of the Soviet propaganda). Greenberg underpins his hypotheses with the results of content analysis of several Islamist Telegram channels widely read in Dagestan. They spread antisemitic conspiratorial narratives with clearly Salafist roots, but also the traditional tropes about the “almighty Chabad” and Freemasons. The openly pro-Hamas channels combine popular and official Russian antisemitic clichés with violent Islamist propaganda.
Velvl Chernin has also shed light on another issue of North Caucasian ethnic politics, namely, the politicization of Circassian unity. He has provided an overview of significant groups constituting the Adyghe people (Kabardians, Circassians, Adyghes, and Shapsugs) in the republics (ethnic regions) of the Russian Federation. The pan-Circassian movement within Russia is accused of “Russophobia” and “separatism”; that is why many ethnopolitical activities in this direction take place in the diaspora. The most visible Circassian diaspora is to be found in Turkey (however, the local Adyghes are largely assimilated and not officially registered), Syria (where many of the Circassians have left after the civil war erupted), Israel (where the Circassians enjoy a very high level of preservation of national language and culture), and Kosovo (most local Adyghes have managed to repatriate to the Russian Adyghea after the war on the Balkans started).
The South Caucasian internal and external political dynamics were covered by Gela Vasadze, Ze’ev Khanin, and Alex Greenberg.
Gela Vasadze presented his vision of the political protests in Georgia against the bill on “foreign influence” initiated by the ruling party that has caused harsh reactions in the EU and the US. Apart from the political ambitions of Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the “Georgian Dream” party, the bill may be part of Russia’s strategy to establish political control over Georgia. After February 24, 2022, it became critical for Moscow to develop an independent logistical ecosystem. The weakening of Russian influence over Azerbaijan and Armenia has probably led to Moscow’s attempts to shape the political crisis in Georgia. The Kremlin’s short-term goals in this direction might include causing the country to break off relations with the West, political isolation of Georgia, expansion of Russian-Georgian economic ties, withdrawal of the country from the Ramstein group, changing public opinion about the war against Ukraine, and creating an alternative “enemy” by stimulating Turkophobia and Islamophobia. Mid-term goals comprise forming a monopoly over Georgia’s gas supplies, making the country officially reject European integration, and restoring Russian-Georgian diplomatic relations. Long-term Moscow’s goals might be infrastructural concessions, the return of Russian military bases to Georgia, the country’s accession to EAEU and CSTO, and turning Georgia into a (con)federation.
Ze’ev Khanin analyzed the role of Azerbaijan as a potential mediator in the Middle Eastern conflict(s). In July 2024, “Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jaihun Bajramov sent an Israeli colleague a message from Lebanese Minister Abdullah Bu Habib assuring that Beirut wants to avoid war”, which sparked speculations about the new role Baku might assume in the region. Azerbaijan indeed might be regarded as an ideal mediator. First, it is not directly involved in Middle Eastern affairs. Second, unlike the US (because of its open alliance with Israel) or Saudi Arabia (because of its ongoing rivalry with Iran, Hezbollah’s main patron), it is not a problematic mediator for Lebanon. Also, Beirut needs publicity in negotiating efforts to place Hezbollah in binding conditions; Saudi Arabia, because of internal and external pressure, is not ready to publicly act as a mediator between Israel and Arab nations. Third, unlike France (because of its unwillingness to coordinate initiatives with Jerusalem), it is not a problematic mediator for Israel. Azerbaijan itself might need this role for several reasons. The first is the strategic partnership between Jerusalem and Baku. Secondly, Tehran’s ambitions for the worldwide influence and export of the “Islamic revolution” are a threat to Azerbaijan, which at the same time is unwilling to play a secondary role in the “Turkic alliance” with Ankara. Thus, strengthening the partnership with Israel is a strategic resource that allows Baku to counterbalance the ambitions of Iran and Turkey. Thirdly, Azerbaijan’s readiness to act as a mediator in the Middle East might be seen as a way to demonstrate its ambitions against France which openly sided with Armenia in the recent escalation over Nagorno Karabakh.
Gela Vasadze has shared his view on how the election of Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran’s new president would affect the political sphere in three South Caucasian nations. The public emotions in Azerbaijan are satisfied because Pezeshkian is an ethnic Azerbaijani; he does not hide it and even takes pride in his “Turkicness.” Allowing such a candidate to run for the presidency, let alone to be elected, might demonstrate the Tehran elite’s willingness to settle relations with the northern neighbor. For Armenia, Iran is an important military and economically (see below for details), thus the election of an Azerbaijani as a president has raised concerns in Yerevan. Nevertheless, Iran will continue supplying Armenia with necessary resources, even though further escalation between Tehran and Baku is unlikely. In Georgia, Iranian affairs evoke little interest. However, Tehran succeeded in ideologically influencing a significant part of Azerbaijanis who live in Georgia: for these “religiozniks,” Shiism became a priority marker of identity, and this minority is widely represented in the country’s politics, journalism, and teaching. Also, the visit of Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, to President Raisi’s funeral, was portrayed by oppositional Georgian media as another sign of the country’s U-turn from the West.
Alex Greenberg draws attention to yet another facet of Iranian foreign policy, namely, the cooperation with Armenia. A number of sources, both independent and state-supported, have reported on the secret arms deal between Tehran and Yerevan. The deal is said to include not only the supply of UAVs and air defense systems but also strengthening cooperation in security and intelligence and even the establishment of Iranian military bases on Armenian soil. Indeed, the weapons supplied necessitate the presence of Iranian experts and instructors. The MFA and Ministry of Defense of Armenia, as well as Iranian officials, have vehemently denied the deal’s existence, which however does not give sufficient ground to exclude it. One of the reasons Iran needs cooperation with Armenia is Azerbaijan: apart from being Israel’s ally, Azerbaijan is a secular Shiite state with a pro-Western orientation. Also, roughly 40 million ethnic Azerbaijanis live in Iran, experience linguistic discrimination, and support their external ethnic homeland. The Iranian presence in Armenia would facilitate terrorist and sabotage operations against Azerbaijan and Israel, and Armenia is a good testing ground for Iranian weapons. The military importance of Armenia to Tehran is also demonstrated by the figure of Iran’s ambassador to Yerevan, Mehdi Sobhani, who is presumably a senior Revolutionary Guard officer. In short, “Armenia must choose between the West and Tehran” because the Iranian regime presents a real threat to Western security.
In this month’s single piece not focused on the Caucasus, Russell A. Berman provides his assessment of the importance of supporting Ukraine for the US foreign policy. He estimates that a (not impossible) Russian victory may lead to turning the Black Sea into a Russian-Turkish condominium, leading to stronger ties between Ankara and Moscow, and therefore loosening Turkey’s ties to NATO”; to strengthening Moscow’s hand in Central Asia and accelerating partnerships with Iran and China; to Russia pursuing interests in the Balkans. Berman asserts that “Conquering Ukraine is a steppingstone to undermining NATO and the Atlanticist security structure.” Nevertheless, the US support to Ukraine seems to have been insufficient: “for all the American verbal willingness to support Ukraine, the arms provided have been sometimes too late, sometimes too little, and sometimes too old. For a while it seemed that the Biden administration was only providing sufficient support for the Ukrainians to keep them fighting but not enough to achieve victory.” The author concludes that “losing in Ukraine – like the loss in Afghanistan – would represent an enormous blow to American credibility as a force for security and stability across the world”, and “it is vital for the proxy forces of the West in Ukraine to prevail, just as they must in Gaza.”
The BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program will continue updating our readership on the conflict developments in various subregions of the post-Soviet area in the coming months.