PSCRP-BESA Reports No 77 (August 23, 2024)
During an official visit to Ukraine on 13 August 2024, Lithuanian Defense Minister Laurynas Kasčiūnas said against the backdrop of the AFU offensive in Russia’s Kursk Region: “We are now seeing them (Russians — Author) redeploying their troops to Kursk. I say to the Lithuanian people: ‘Look how the Ukrainians are fighting for you, because their fight forces Russia to pull back its troops from Kaliningrad’. We actually call it the ‘demilitarization’ of Kaliningrad, which is happening thanks to the bravery of your (Ukrainian — Author) military, thanks to your decisions.”
This statement indicates, among other things, that the military and political leadership of Lithuania, which directly borders on the Russian Federation’s Kaliningrad region, regards this Russian exclave as a real threat. Indeed, since the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, there has been constant speculation about the possibility of a Russian attempt to seize the so-called Suwalki Gap, a strip of land about 100 kilometers long on the border between Poland and Lithuania, which separates the Kaliningrad region from Russian-controlled Belarus. It should be noted that even before the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, Russia used the Kaliningrad region for military blackmail against the EU countries that did not recognize the “new political reality” created by Russia in the form of the annexation of Crimea and the establishment of the puppet regimes of the DNR and LNR in Donbass. The Russians then publicly announced the deployment of tactical missile systems “Iskander” (SS-26 Stone) with a range of up to 500 kilometers in Kaliningrad Oblast.
The discussion of the Suwalki Gap issue was used by the Russian Federation as part of its hybrid warfare against the EU and NATO after the EU sanctions imposed in 2022 left the Russian exclave in a de facto transportation blockade that dealt a heavy blow to its economy.
Ethnic political heritage
Kaliningrad Oblast, the central region of the former East Prussia acquired by the Soviet Union following World War II, shares land borders only with EU member states Poland and Lithuania. The region covers an area of 15,100 square kilometers (according to Rosstat as of the beginning of 2024). A distinctive feature of the current population of the Kaliningrad region (in 2020 it totaled 1,033,914 people), which survived the almost complete deportation of the indigenous German and Lithuanian population in 1945-1951, is its relatively weak rootedness. According to the last Soviet census in 1989, only 359,173 (41.22 %) of the inhabitants of Kaliningrad Oblast were born there. Ethnically, more than 80 % of the region’s population, according to the 2020 census, are East Slavic peoples (78.6 % Russians, 1.22 % Ukrainians, 1.1 % Belarusians).
The geographical remoteness from the Russian mainland, coupled with the relatively weak roots of the Russian and, in general, immigrant population in Kaliningrad Oblast, is combined with the existence of claims to it by German and Lithuanian ethno-political projects, based on the strong historical ties of the respective ethnic groups with the region. These projects have been a tangible factor in the life of Kaliningrad Oblast over the past decades, although neither Germany nor Lithuania have made any territorial claims to the Russian Federation.
Germans have lived in East Prussia for 700 years. Königsberg, now called Kaliningrad, was an important political and cultural hub of Germany. Hundreds of thousands of modern German citizens are natives of East Prussia or their descendants. There are organizations in Germany that have shown interest in the territories lost after World War II, including East Prussia. Against this background, at the end of the 1980s, during the Perestroika period, non-aggressive German penetration into Kaliningrad Oblast began. It manifested primarily in the development of economic and cultural ties, tourism and participation in humanitarian projects.
The German-Russian House, sponsored by Germany, for many years was the most powerful national-cultural organization in Kaliningrad. In 1989, the first Lutheran congregation after World War II appeared in Kaliningrad Oblast, and at the end of the 1990s the number of Lutheran congregations was already about 20. Almost all of their pastors were German citizens. At the same time, there were political conflicts in the 1990s connected with the activities of organizations seeking to restore the German character of Kaliningrad Oblast. Ethnic Germans from Russia living in the territory of the region play a special role in the activities of these organizations. Until 1990 their number in the region was stable and did not exceed 1500 people. After that, the influx of German migrants from the eastern regions of the former USSR intensified.
Despite the fact that Kaliningrad Oblast became a transit point for some of them on their way to Germany, the German community began to grow rapidly: they quickly moved from the 13th position among the region’s ethnic groups to the fifth, behind only Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. The relocation of Russian Germans was an organized process and led to the emergence of relatively compact German settlements in rural areas. The relocation of Russian Germans and further development of the network of German cultural, social, educational and religious institutions functioning in the region were financed primarily by non-governmental German organizations.
The lack of territorial autonomy for Russian Germans and the fact that the republic of Volga Germans, abolished in 1941, could not be restored led to the popularization in the German movement in Russia of the idea of creating a Baltic German Republic within Russia in place of Kaliningrad Oblast. In June 1993, this idea was openly expressed at the first conference of the Russian German society “Freiheit”, held under the slogan “The German state of Königsberg is our historical homeland”. Its appeals in February 1994 to the UN Secretary General and other international organizations with a statement calling for the establishment of German autonomy in the territory of Kaliningrad Oblast led the Oblast administration, which began to perceive the growth of the German population as a potential threat to stability, to close down the “Oisroysen” society operating in Kaliningrad, which openly called for the restoration of East Prussia. However, the “Freiheit” society (officially registered in Moscow) continued its activities for some time.
In a poll conducted in Kaliningrad Oblast at the time, on the willingness to support the right of the Germans deported to Germany after the war to return to their historical homeland, 56% of respondents answered ‘no’, 27% found it difficult to answer, and 17% said ‘yes’. That is, for a very significant minority of the non-German population of the region, the idea of the return of Germans did not seem undesirable. The growth of the German population was tangible, despite the fact that the resettlement in the region and natural increase were compensated to a considerable extent by the continuing emigration to Germany. In 1997 the number of ethnic Germans in Kaliningrad Oblast reached 5.2 thousand people, the 2002 census showed that there were already 8,340 of them, but by 2020, according to the census, it dropped to 4,118.
Over the past 20 years, the Russian authorities have been gradually and increasingly restricting the activities of German organizations in the region. In 2017, the “German-Russian House” was closed down; soon afterwards, the Cultural and Business Center of Russian Germans in Kaliningrad was established, which still operates today with no political agenda whatsoever.
Lithuanian factor
The territory of Kaliningrad Oblast also occupies an important place in the Lithuanian national narrative, being part of the historical Lithuania Minor, which also includes the Klaipeda Region (Memelland), which now belongs to Lithuania. The claims of the Lithuanian national movement to the territory of the present-day Kalinigrad Oblast are based on the following provisions:
- Linguistic and cultural kinship of Lithuanians and Prussians, the autochthonous population of the region, which Lithuanians tend to regard as one of the Lithuanian tribes.
- The presence of a significant Lithuanian ethnic minority in Prussia in the modern times, primarily in its eastern regions. The latter circumstance led to the term “Lithuania Minor” as opposed to “Lithuania Major”, i.e. the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
- The important role played by Lithuania Minor in the formation of Lithuanian literature and culture.
From the territory that later became Kaliningrad Oblast, the vast majority of local Lithuanians, together with the German population, fled to Germany during the Soviet Army offensive at the end of World War II, or were deported later. The majority of modern Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Oblast are immigrants from the Lithuanian SSR and their descendants. However, this circumstance does not prevent them from considering themselves an indigenous population.
Throughout the post-war period, Lithuanians have been the fourth largest people in Kaliningrad Oblast (after the three East Slavic peoples). The 1959 census recorded 21.3 thousand Lithuanians in the region (3.48% of the population), in 1970 their number reached its maximum level (23.4 thousand), after which there was a downward trend. By 1997 the number of Lithuanians in Kaliningrad Oblast was 18 thousand, by 2010 there were 9769, and only 4279 according to the 2020 census. The main reason for the rapid decrease of the Lithuanian minority in the Russian exclave was their departure to Lithuania or — using Lithuanian passports — to other EU countries.
The Lithuanian (as well as German) community of the region is marked by a high degree of organized community infrastructure. As early as 1993, local Lithuanian cultural societies were organized in the cities of Kaliningrad, Sovetsk, Chernyakhovsk, Gvardeisk, as well as in the districts of Gusev, Krasnoznamensk, Nemanovsk and Slavsk. In 1996 the Kaliningrad Regional Society of Lithuanian Culture “Birute” was registered, and in 1998 the Kaliningrad Regional Association of Lithuanian Language Teachers was registered. The museum of the outstanding Lithuanian cultural figure Vidūnas (1868–1953), operating in the town of Sovetsk, where he lived, not only plays a cultural and educational role, but also symbolizes the autochthony of the Lithuanian community and its continuity with the culture of Lithuania Minor of the pre-war period.
Lithuanian governmental and public organizations until relatively recently actively cooperated with Lithuanian organizations in Kaliningrad Oblast. In a number of cases, conflicts occurred between the Russian authorities and Lithuanian government structures and public organizations, which, in the opinion of the Russian side, de facto ignored Russian sovereignty in the region. After the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine and Lithuania’s severe restriction of Russian transit to the Kaliningrad region, Lithuanian organizations in the exclave started to face persecution. In particular, the Association of Lithuanian Language Teachers was closed down by court decision[1].
New Kaliningrad identity
A significant part of the Russian-speaking population, numerically dominant in the Kaliningrad region, has also formed its own local-patriotic narrative. This narrative is based on an attempt to appropriate the pre-Russian history of the region. It is quite clearly articulated on the Russian-language website “Our Homeland — East Prussia” dedicated to the history of Kaliningrad Oblast: “The landscape of East Prussia is unchanging. There is no point in denying that the country, which has become our homeland, is an integral part of 700 years of German history and the whole European culture. In the post-war half-century, three generations of people have grown up in the north of East Prussia, forming a new Prussian ethnos. The ambiguity of the concept of “homeland” is an obstacle for many people to realize it. But hopefully, soon the natural territorial identification will be strengthened in the minds of those born on this land after the war, and its fate will be in the hands of people who are proud of and love their homeland — East Prussia”.
In search of a new local identity, some Kaliningrad activists would even show interest in attempts to revitalize the Prussian language, which died out in the 18th century, and in neo-paganism, based on the reconstruction of the religion of the ancient Prussians and promoted through modern music.
However, the construction of a new “East Prussian” local narrative manifested itself not only in local history and youth subculture, but also in the purely political sphere. At the end of 1993, the Baltic Republican Party (BRP) was founded, which proclaimed its goal to upgrade the status of Kaliningrad Oblast to the level of a republic within the Russian Federation, although it did not seek to restore the German character of the region.
In the 2000 elections, the BRP won one seat (out of 31) in the Kaliningrad Regional Duma. However, the BRP was banned after Russia adopted the law “On Political Parties” in 2001, which outlawed all regional political parties. Some of its activists emigrated to the West. BRP leader Sergei Pasko (1951–2015) unsuccessfully tried to have the ban overturned through the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.
After his claim was rejected in 2005, the remaining activists in Kaliningrad Oblast established the public movement “Respublika” (“Republic”), whose program contained the same demands as those of the BRP. Over time, this movement has more and more come under the influence of the authorities. Thus, in 2010, activists of the “Respublika” movement picketed consulates of Western European countries in Kaliningrad under the slogan “Kaliningrad is a hostage of Europe”, demanding to ease the visa regime for the residents of the region. This action was supported by the governor. After the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the BRP members abroad became more active. They began to demand the creation of an independent Baltic Republic instead of turning Kaliningrad Oblast into a republic within the Russian Federation. The BRP joined the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum and even held an online referendum on independence.
It is not ruled out that in the conditions of a serious domestic political crisis in the Russian Federation, the question of the political status of the Kaliningrad region will become a pressing issue in the foreseeable future. On the one hand, for its population, free economic interaction with Poland, Lithuania and other EU countries will literally become a matter of survival as soon as the government subsidies for ferry crossings cease. On the other hand, for EU countries, the continued existence of a Russian exclave in Europe will be a constant source of danger. The BRP currently operating outside the Russian Federation and the existing “Respublika” movement in the region are the vehicles of the idea of self-determination of Kaliningrad Oblast – Baltic Republic – East Prussia in one form or another, but necessarily in close contact with the EU countries. In the cultural and social aspect, this contact will also be facilitated by the still existing social structures in the region, which are connected with the German, Lithuanian and Polish national projects.
[1] Yulia Paramonova, “‘There is no Nazism at all’. How Kaliningrad is waging war on Lithuanian culture”, LRT, 25.7.22.