PSCRP-BESA Reports No 93 (Oct 28, 2024)
by Viktor Denisenko
In January 2024, three Baltic States agree to establish a common defence zone on their borders with Russia and Belarus. It represents concerns about security in the region. The border of Lithuania and Latvia with Russia and Belarus, and the border of Estonia with Russia could be evaluated as a new line of cold confrontation between Moscow and the Western world. Similarly like during the Cold War in the XX century, now this region lives in the shadow of the threat of real (“hot”) confrontation.
Lithuania is taking security threats seriously, and this is part of the new reality the whole region has been living in since 2014 (and especially since February 2022). Vilnius is implementing measures in the borderland near Russia (Kaliningrad district) and Belarus, including stockpiling anti-tank barriers and other fortifications in so-called “counter mobility parks”. Prepared elements of fortifications could be quickly moved from parks to planned spaces in the situation if the armed conflict seemed unavoidable.
In the Global Militarisation Index, Lithuania is marked as a state with an extreme level of militarisation. At the same time, it should be said that it is not a voluntary choice of Lithuania or other countries of the region. During the past decade, the perception of the security situation and reality of military threats changed in Vilnius drastically. Lithuania is reacting to the modus operandi of such neighbour countries as Russia and Belarus. The short historical overview could allow a better understanding of changes in Lithuanian security discourse.
Lithuania joined NATO at the end of March 2004 and a few days later become a member of the European Union too. For Vilnius, both events have not only practical but symbolic meanings. It was the last step of full integration back into the Western World after decades of Lithuania was excluded from it by Soviet occupation (1940-90/91*).
NATO umbrella became for Lithuania the guarantee that the situation of 1940 will not repeat. Especially keeping in mind that the threat of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO seemed unrealistic back in 2004. The Alliance improved the security of Lithuania and other Baltic States by establishing the NATO Air Policing mission in the context of the lack of military air forces capabilities by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It could also be evaluated as a symbolic gesture from the side of NATO.
The low concern about the security situation in the period after joining NATO shows the fact that Lithuania abolished conscription and turned military service only to professional in 2008. The decision was reviewed after Russia’s actions against Ukraine in 2014. Conscription to the Lithuanian army renewed in 2015.
Vilnius was aware of Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008. President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus was between other leaders of the Baltic States, Poland, and Ukraine who arrived in Tbilisi to support Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili on August 13, 2008. For Lithuania, the so-called Five-Day War became proof that Russia was back to very aggressive behaviour toward post-Soviet countries. Unfortunately, the Western World in general not acknowledge this point of view. The political trend was to see Russia’s action in Georgia as an unpleasant accident.
The final turning point (and not only for Lithuania) was the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the escalation of the conflict in the Donbas region. It grew up concerns that Russia pushed its own geopolitical game to a higher level. The main fear contained the scenario that now Moscow could try to implement hybrid aggression against one or another NATO country to see how the Alliance would react (and without the proper reaction it would be a defeat of NATO). Answering the question “Who could be next?”, the Baltic States were mentioned especially often.
NATO’s decision during the summit in Warsaw in 2016 to deploy in the Baltic States and Poland Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) a little bit reduced fears in Lithuania. On the other hand, it was understandable that EFP is more subject to strategic communication. It was the message to Moscow that NATO remembers its responsibilities. At the same time, it was recognised that EFP would be not enough to defend the Baltic States and Poland in case of full-scale Russian aggression.
Lithuania is also afraid that could be a primary target of Russia due to the Suwalki gap. This is an 80-kilometre stretch of land on the Polish-Lithuanian border, squeezed between the territory of Russia and Belarus. Politico.eu even called it “the most dangerous place on Earth” in 2022. Suwalki gap is only one land connection between the Baltic States and other NATO allies. In the situation of conflict with NATO, Russia will try to cut it primarily. On the other hand, the role of the Suwalki gap decreased after Finland and Sweden joined the Alliance respectively in 2023 and 2024.
The discoursive understanding of the security situation in Lithuania one more time changed Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. If the lesson of 2014 was that Moscow could provide covered (hybrid) aggressive actions against sovereign states, practice since February 2022 showed that Russia also does not consider as taboo old-style convention war. It means that even conventional war between Russia and NATO could not be seen as impossible anymore. Lithuania, together with other Baltic States, understood that in that scenario they would be in the first frontline. This understanding importantly affects defence policy.
Since 2022, Lithuania has been preparing for the worst scenario. The preparations have two general pillars: cooperation with allies and building of own capabilities.
NATO is seen as a main guarantee for the security of Lithuania. Vilnius also trying to establish close teas with some members of the Alliance. For example, in 2023 Vilnius and Berlin signed an agreement that Germany will deploy one military brigade in Lithuania. But it is a quite long process in the context of fast geopolitical changes. The so-called “Lithuanian Brigade” should be fully deployed on the ground in Lithuania only in 2027.
Vilnius drastically grows investment in its military capabilities. In 2014 the main political parties of Lithuania agreed that the military budget should gradually grow up to 2 per cent of GDP till 2020. In 2016 were agreed that growth should be faster, and Lithuania should achieve the goal by 2018. In general, Lithuania has kept the military budget of no less than 2 per cent of the GDP since 2019 (in 2021 it was 1.97 per cent of the GDP). There are some political discussions that that is not enough and that the military budget should be even bigger, i.e. 4 per cent of the GDP.
Lithuania also trying to learn lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Of course, not all Ukrainian practices could be adopted directly due to the smaller territory of Lithuania and its population less than 3 mln. people. At the same time, summarizing different discussions and analyses, there are three main lessons Vilnius learned from mentioned war:
- Importance of the air defence and artillery;
- Importance of the drone technologies;
- Importance of total defence (involving civilian capabilities).
The reaction to the first lesson shows new military purchases of the Lithuanian army. At the end of 2022, Lithuania signed with the U.S. contract to buy artillery systems HIMARS. Vilnius also improved the air defence umbrella by buying NASAM and MSHORAD systems.
Russia’s war against Ukraine gives an impetus to Lithuanian military industries, especially in the sphere of drone technologies. Ukraine is already using Lithuanian FPV (first-person view) drones. Vilnius also appointed 200 mln. Euros support for Lithuanian military industries in 2024.
The reaction to the third lesson is the decision to create possibilities for civilians, who are not in military reserve or not participating in activities of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union (a paramilitary organisation involved in the national defence system), to find their place in the paradigm of national defence. In 2024 these civilians got the possibility to register with the military commandant’s office. They will be invited to short military trainings annually. The decision is partly inspired by the Ukrainian practice of territorial defence unions.
This all shows that Lithuania is very serious about the question of security. Consensus about the importance of defence is found on different levels, including politics and society. Keeping in mind its painful historical experience with Russia, Lithuania is preparing for possible direct military aggression from Moscow. At the same time, there is a risk of overlooking other (indirect) threats. Lithuania already has some experience with hybrid action from the side of Belarus and the attempt of the Minsk regime to weaponise processes of migration. There are reasonable suspicions that Russia already implementing some hybrid tactics on the territory of Lithuania too. It shows some acts of possible sabotage, provocations and actions covered as criminal activities. Possibly it is a more topical challenge for the security of Lithuania at present.
*Lithuania officially re-established independence on March 11, 1990, but Moscow did not recognise this decision till the collapse of the coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991.
Viktor Denisenko is a head of the Centre for Communication Influences and Propaganda Research (Vilnius University, Faculty of Communication)