PSCRP-BESA Reports No 103 (Dec 14, 2024)
Western weapons and electronic components continue to surface in Russian military hardware deployed in Ukraine, despite ongoing international efforts to restrict Moscow’s access to advanced technology. Recent reports from both European and Ukrainian investigative sources indicate that key Western-manufactured parts, including microchips and optical systems, have been identified in Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other military equipment used in the war.
According to the recent report by the French intelligence news platform Intelligence Online, Western components have been discovered in the Merlin VR, a Russian experimental intelligence-gathering drone. It appears that the downed UAV contained parts produced by American semiconductor company Analog Devices and Dutch manufacturer Ampleon. The experts note that all of the circuit boards appear to have been acquired from Western sources.
The drone was developed in 2021 by the Smolensk Research Institute of Modern Telecommunications Technologies and is capable of flying at an altitude of over 4,800 meters. It is designed for advanced reconnaissance missions and can stay in the air for almost ten hours. Ukrainian officials reported finding a French-made infrared sensor (Lynred Pico1024) on board when they shot down the first Merlin-VR in 2022.
Russia employs elaborate networks involving multiple intermediaries and shell companies to obscure the final destination of procured components. Russia often routes goods through several countries, altering their documentation to conceal their origin and end use.
At the moment, it is still unknown where exactly these components came from, but since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the main bypass routes have been the countries of the former USSR, with Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan being the most frequently mentioned.
The strategic partnership between Belarus and Russia in procuring Western microchips has significantly bolstered Russia’s military capabilities. Investigations revealed that Belarusian companies exported over $125 million worth of microchips, including Western-made ones, to Russia between September 2022 and June 2024. Russia received around 10,000 microchips of American and European origin. These include Intel products used in the operation and navigation of aerial bombs, Su-35S and Su-34 fighter jets, Korsar UAVs and Kalibr missiles.
Complex schemes involving companies connected to the close allies of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made these supplies possible.
The largest supplier of Western microchips from Belarus to Russia is Pervy Kontinent, a company established just two months after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From January to June 2024 alone, Pervy Kontinent sold 1,665 microchips to Russian firms, valued at $155,000. BIC identified the company’s owner as Ilya Tarasyuk, who has nearly 20 years of experience working in Belarus’s defense industry. The company’s primary buyer in Russia is Staut, a firm under U.S. and E.U. sanctions.
In response to Belarus’s support for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, the United States and the European Union have implemented a series of sanctions targeting tens of Belarusian individuals, entities, and economic sectors.
Armenia also stands out from the «blacklist» of those circumventing sanctions, as it is openly distancing itself from the Kremlin regime. However, the actions bear greater weight than mere words. A joint statement by the U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, and U.S. Treasury identified Armenia as among “third-party intermediaries or transshipment points to evade Russian- and Belarusian-related sanctions and export controls.” The New York Times revealed a 2023 document from the Bureau of Industry and Security that Armenia witnessed a staggering 515% surge in the import of chips and processors from the United States in 2022 compared to 2021, and a 212% increase from the European Union during the same period. Furthermore, Armenia subsequently exported 97% of these products to Russia.
Russia also used Armenia to circumvent sanctions by purchasing through it items classified as dual-use—intended for civilian applications but also applicable in military contexts. Armenia can legally acquire certain technologies, which are later diverted to military use by the Russians.
According to Ukrainian sources, Armenia actively utilized the maritime route connecting the ports of Batumi (Georgia) and Novorossiysk (Russia) to re-export sanctioned goods to the Russian Federation. Consequently, the Armenian Shipping Company was responsible for the weekly transportation of 600 containers along the Batumi-Novorossiysk sea route. Despite all this, the United States and the European Union failed to impose sufficient sanctions on Armenia.
Kazakhstan also emerged as a significant conduit in the process of circumventing the sanctions. In 2022, Kazakhstan’s imports of microchips more than doubled, exceeding $75 million. Subsequently, exports of these microchips to Russia increased seventyfold, from $245,000 in 2021 to $18 million in 2022.
Also, Kazakhstan imported nearly $5 million worth of drones, primarily from China, and re-exported $1.23 million worth to Russia. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s drone imports were negligible.
A recent joint investigation by The Insider, Investigace.cz, IrpiMedia, and Vlast.kz revealed that companies from the EU, the US, and Türkiye have increased weapon exports to FSU countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan over the past three years. The weapons were re-exported to Russia, enabling sanctions circumvention.
The export of sniper rifles and shotguns from Italy to Armenia has increased almost 30 times over four years. Kyrgyzstan did not purchase any weapons from Italy in 2020 and 2021, but it received 882 units in 2022 and 4,434 in 2023. Weapon exports from Turkey to Georgia rose from 8,426 units in 2019 to 18,843 in 2023.
The investigation also discovered links between the Luxembourg-based branch of the Beretta holding company and Russian firms. Journalists highlighted that the holding remains the majority owner of a Russian arms importer despite sanctions, directly violating both US sanctions and the EU Council’s 2014 resolution.
Such findings highlight multiple layers of concern. They point to the incomplete efficacy of current sanctions and export controls. Despite wide-ranging restrictions designed to prevent Russia from acquiring advanced components, loopholes and less-scrupulous intermediaries appear to be undermining those efforts. Companies in Europe, North America, and Asia may inadvertently supply parts that end up in Russian military hardware, often through opaque supply chains.
These revelations call for more stringent international cooperation to tighten technology transfer controls. Governments and industry stakeholders need to conduct more thorough vetting of end-users, impose mandatory “end-use certificates” subject to verification, and implement advanced monitoring of supply chains. To quickly detect and thwart any suspicious procurement attempts, institutions overseeing global trade must strengthen their intelligence-sharing frameworks.
PSCRP team