PSCRP-BESA Reports No 142 (June 15, 2025)
by Alexander Shpunt
June is not only the end of the academic year but also the end of the “analytical year” for many research centers. And sometimes—as happened with the report we are presenting, The German Marshall Fund—this is a summary of the research results for several years at once. This report could serve as a model for considering industry issues in the context of political influence.
Interestingly, within a few days of each other, researchers from Armenia and Azerbaijan, two antagonistic countries, published their works on the same topic: preventing demographic challenges from impeding sustainable development.
These and other works that we found interesting are in the proposed issue.
1. Opens our review of the report by Kazakhstani scientists, “Sociological study of religiosity in post-atheist Kazakhstan,” which appeared in the first week of June in “Frontiers in Sociology,” a global peer-reviewed journal based in Lausanne, Switzerland.
Researchers from several authoritative centers of Kazakhstan—Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Institute of Philosophy, Political Science, and Religious Studies; Higher School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Turan University—conducted a deep and well-founded study of the dynamics of religiosity in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, focusing on the changing role and functions of religion in the context of the transformation of the ideological and social foundations of society. Particular attention in the report is paid to the process of Islamization, which, despite its obviousness, is characterized in Kazakhstan, according to the authors’ conclusions, by unique manifestations that differ from traditional ideas about religious practice.
The study is based on a secondary analysis of data from the analytical report “Assessment of state policy in the field of religion by the population of Kazakhstan”, conducted by “MLGroup” in 2024.
The study found a high level of religious self-identification among the population of Kazakhstan: 86.8% of respondents, according to the fourth survey, identify themselves as believers. However, this figure contrasts with the relatively low level of daily religious practice. Less than half of respondents (27.5%) pray daily or weekly, while the share of those who never pray is 27.9%. Only 33.8% attend religious organizations 2–3 times a year.
The analysis showed that traditional rituals associated with key events in the life cycle remain widespread. Thus, 80% of respondents observe circumcision rituals, 73.4% observe rituals associated with the birth of a child, and 70.4% observe funeral rituals. The finding indicates that religion is deeply rooted in cultural tradition. At the same time, more “new” or strictly Islamic norms, such as daily prayers or wearing clothing that complies with Sharia (46.7%), are less popular.
In many ways, according to scientists from Kazakhstan, the decline is due to the fact that religious institutions are not the main source of support in difficult life situations. Only 4.8% of the entire population (and 3.3% of young people) seek help from spiritual leaders, which indicates their peripheral role in solving personal problems among citizens.
The main systematic conclusion of the researchers is that in Kazakhstan, a unique “hybrid religiosity” is forming. This integrates elements of selective secularization (where secular institutions coexist with religion’s increased importance in the private sphere), individualized practice (personal interpretation and observance of religious norms), market-oriented adaptation (religion as a commodity in the “market of ideas,” competing for adherents), and post-secular balance (the coexistence and interweaving of religious and secular values).
Despite the significant level of religious self-identification, the absolute majority of the population of Kazakhstan (84.5%) supports the preservation of the secular status of the state. This indicates the coexistence of religious and secular values in the public consciousness, which confirms the concept of post-secularity.
2. Reports of the German Marshall Fund are a must-read for every analyst; the authority of this institution is extremely high in the professional environment. The German-American Fund dedicates its program to ensuring that democracies collectively emerge victorious in the strategic technology competition against autocrats. The report “Russia and China in Central Asia’s Technology Stack”, published on July 4, investigates how technological rivalry in Central Asia between the West and China, together with Russia, unfolds. Researchers from the Marshall Fund set out to analyze the influence of Russia and China on the information and communications technology (ICT) sector in three Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.
The study uses a “tech stack” framework adapted from two previous GMF Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) reports on the Future Internet and Digital Information Stack, released in 2020 and 2022. This methodology allows for assessing the presence and penetration of one country in another’s technological and regulatory ecosystem, identifying the dependencies that arise. In this analysis, the tech stack framework covers five layers to assess how China and its affiliates penetrate and influence a wide range of the technological landscape in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The report identifies a number of key trends and vulnerabilities in Central Asia.
The authors note that Central Asian states have developed strategic dependencies and vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia and China at all levels of the technology stack. These interconnected weaknesses create greater leverage, disruption, and damage from external actors than any single dependency. Despite these factors, Central Asian governments still have the power to manage their dependencies. They are “sovereign balancers” seeking to avoid dependence on any one actor while maximizing their own interests.
The authors’ second conclusion concerns the risks to democratic development. The era of rapid digitalization, driven mainly by Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Russian technologies, has created several risks to individual freedoms and national sovereignty in the region. All three countries mentioned in the report have adopted Chinese “smart city” surveillance technologies and have received training from Chinese security forces in digital policing and crowd management. In parallel, they have also adopted, and in many cases directly copied, Russian laws regulating both civil society and cyberspace. The cumulative effect of Chinese technologies and Russian governance styles has increased the ability of regional governments to monitor citizens, regulate speech, and reduce the ability of independent observers to assess the country’s digital sector and practices. The authors even use the term “digital authoritarianism,” although we believe this is an overly emphasized view of the processes.
The authors do not limit themselves to monitoring the situation but also identify the reasons for the dominance of Sino-Russian interests in the region. Since 2011, the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has financed nine projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for a total of just over US$17 million, without major investments in regional network infrastructure. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has invested a total of €175 billion in the three countries under study since 1996, but none of this has been in the telecommunications, media or technology (TMT) sector. Despite Ursula von der Leyen’s announcement in April 2025 of the EU’s allocation of €100 million for satellite internet in Central Asia, these investments are modest compared to the billions of dollars that China has invested in the region’s tech stack.
3. Article “Current Trends in Demographic Processes in the Context of Sustainable Development of the Republic of Azerbaijan“, published at by Shovkat Mustafazade, a Doctoral Student at the Academy of Public Administration, Baku (Azerbaijan), in the Turkish journal “Uluslararası Yönetim Akademisi Dergisi,” only touches on political processes to a small extent. It is mainly devoted to specific topics of demography research. But the way Shovkat Mustafazade integrated migration policy issues into a purely demographic review could not fail to interest us.
The study is conducted in the systemic context of the sustainable development paradigm, focusing on the relationship between demographic indicators and the socio-economic well-being of the country. As noted in the article, Azerbaijan, like many other post-Soviet states, is experiencing a multidimensional demographic transition, which, while reflecting global trends, has unique national characteristics due to historical development and regional conflicts.
Migration plays a significant role in the demographic development of Azerbaijan. The period of the 1990s-2000s was characterized by maximum levels of international migration caused by the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the collapse of the USSR and the economic crisis, which led to the emergence of more than 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons. The migration balance during this period reached 49 units. Since 2020, after the liberation of the occupied territories, a new stage has begun – the gradual return of the population to their native lands within the framework of the State Program “Great Return” (2022-2030), aimed at the reintegration of more than 500 thousand internally displaced persons. Factors contributing to the acceleration of this process include intensive restoration of infrastructure, significant public investment, the creation of agricultural and industrial parks, ensuring security, and creating new jobs (including through the construction of hydro and wind power plants, industrial clusters, smart cities, and the development of transport infrastructure).
The main sources of immigration to Azerbaijan in the period from 1995 to 2022 have traditionally been the Russian Federation, Georgia and Kazakhstan. However, since 2015, there has been an increase in the share of migrants from non-CIS countries. The reasons for immigration include: a relatively stable economy, a favorable business climate, the repatriation of ethnic Azerbaijanis, as well as educational and employment opportunities, the country’s strategic geographic location and relatively low tax rates.
The article concludes that Azerbaijan is actively and strategically managing complex demographic shifts, seeking to align national trends with global sustainable development goals. The Great Return program, in the author’s view, exemplifies a comprehensive and strategic approach to population recovery in conflict-affected areas and highlights the importance of integrated measures to achieve long-term sustainability and development.
4. The other side of the Karabakh conflict, Armenia, faces the same challenges of sustainable development in a difficult demographic situation. In an article published in the “Journal of Yerevan University. Economy”, researcher of demographic processes Amalya Galstyan, Associate Professor at the Chair of Management and Business of YSU Faculty of Economics and Management, analyzes the development trends of the labor market of the Republic of Armenia, identifies key indicators of tension, and offers recommendations for its optimization. The author, as in the article by Shovkat Mustafazade, which we discussed above, emphasizes the critical role of public policy in regulating the labor market to ensure sustainable development and economic growth.
The article pays special attention to the relationship between the labor market and demographic shifts and migration processes. The interaction of educational institutions and the business environment is recognized as the most important aspect, contributing to the development of human capital, increasing productivity, and leveling imbalances in the labor market. Detailed statistics provided by Professor Amalya Galstyan points to the accelerated reduction in employment in science (72.5%) in Armenia ( compared to the overall figure for all sectors of 22.5% ) in the period from 1990 to 2001. Moreover, 17% of the employed population of the Republic of Armenia during this period were classified as “working poor”, and scientists constituted a significant portion of them.
The analysis of tension in the labor market is supplemented in the study by prof. Galstyan by considering such indicators as the average duration of unemployment and the workload per temporary job. At the same time, from the author’s point of view, the situation has not just stopped at a negative point but has a critical negative trend. In 2022, the average duration of unemployment in Armenia exceeded 34 months, which is more than twice the figures of the early 2000s, while the share of unemployed remained at about 75% for more than a year.
Another indicator of the tense situation is the high share of unemployed people with higher education in the total number of unemployed. If in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the transition period this figure was 2-8%, then in Armenia in 1996-2000 it varied from 11.8% to 12%, reaching 14.8% in 2010 and decreasing to 10.7% only in 2023, with the arrival of a new generation.
Inefficient use of the labor force, the article argues, stimulates emigration, especially labor migration and “brain drain”. At the next stage, “brain drain” leads to irreparable losses for the donor country, as it is deprived of its most valuable human capital. In this context, from the author’s perspective, the key indicator of tension is the share of unemployed with higher education. In Armenia, the share of unemployed individuals with higher education varied from 11.8% to 12% between 1996 and 2000, reached 14.8% in 2010, and decreased to only 10.7% by 2023. For comparison, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 2023 the corresponding figures were significantly lower: the Czech Republic and Poland—1.3%, Hungary—1.6%, Bulgaria—1.9%, and Slovakia—2%. A typical example: going abroad for the purpose of obtaining an education is also a significant reason for emigration; however, only 1.0% of migrants from Armenia who left for this purpose returned in 2023.
The article concludes by emphasizing that tripartite cooperation between universities, industry and government is key to narrowing the gap between higher education and the labor market, stimulating economic growth, reducing youth unemployment and labor migration (including the brain drain), and addressing demographic issues.
5. A brief publication, “Post-War Ukraine: Healing a Traumatized Nation”, published in June 2025 in the journal “CSS Policy Perspectives” (volume 13, issue 4) by Roman Horbik and Jeronimus Perovich, could not fail to attract our attention, first of all, by the topic of scientific interest of the authors from the University of Zurich.
Research rarely explores the theme of a post-war society that has been traumatized and deformed by years of conflict, not when the guns have fallen silent, but when the fighting is at its most intense.
The text examines the key domestic political and social challenges that Ukraine will face after the cessation of active hostilities. Despite Ukraine’s demonstrated unity in the face of a full-scale Russian invasion, the authors argue that this will severely test national cohesion.
The authors identify three main areas in which Ukraine will face serious challenges: political divisions, civil-military relations, and social cleavages.
Despite high praise for Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership during the war, Zurich researchers note that there is growing public criticism of the country’s lack of preparedness for the 2022 invasion (81% of Ukrainians, according to a February 2025 poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, believe the country is unprepared, 41% blame the government) and the unpopular mobilization policy. Polls also show that 86% of Ukrainians consider forced mobilization a violation of human rights, and 77% believe that the government is misusing foreign aid.
The war has significantly increased the prestige of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), which has become one of the most trusted institutions (90% of Ukrainians trust the UAF as of March 2025). This high status, Horbik and Perovic expect, will lead to increased political ambitions among the military—veterans’ participation in major parties is supported by up to 70% of Ukrainians. However, it could also pave the way for the emergence of new populist or radical movements that pose as veterans’ organizations.
The war has created new social cleavages. War fatigue and unresolved traumas related to life-threatening losses and experiences are widespread. Up to 90% of Ukrainians exhibit at least one symptom of PTSD (official Ukrainian government data).
Tensions are building between the military and civilians, between those who stayed and those who left. A September 2024 poll by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology found that 70% of Ukrainians “understand” the draft dodgers, but 43% dislike them. Among military personnel, these sentiments are likely even stronger. Although only 13% report negative attitudes toward refugees, media and social platforms often censure those who left, especially men. And the outcome creates another line of dissonance within Ukrainian society—this time between the population and the national media.
But the demographic crisis caused by war casualties, low birth rates, and the reluctance of millions of refugees to return may be the biggest challenge, according to the authors from the University of Zurich. It is the desire to keep children that drives immigration, despite the political and social sensitivity of the issue. At the same time, the economically sound idea of replacing lost generations with foreign migrants could provoke a backlash and fuel far-right populism through the narrative of “population replacement.”
In conclusion, the authors emphasize that Europe plays a vital role in supporting Ukraine. Reconstruction should be understood not only as rebuilding infrastructure but also as healing a nation traumatized by years of war.
Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.