PSCRP-BESA Reports No 152 (September 20, 2025)
The South Caucasus is regarded by Russia as its domain—a territory of the former USSR and the former Russian Empire, which, in Moscow’s view, must remain within its sphere of influence. Therefore, Russia automatically perceives any events in the region that diminish this influence as a threat.
Since the initialization of the peace treaty text between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as the signing of the joint declaration by the two countries’ leaders in Washington on August 8, 2025, Russia has been escalating its information warfare in the South Caucasus. Using a “carrot and stick” approach, Moscow seeks to portray itself as a wronged party supposedly striving to improve relations, while simultaneously fueling escalation and preparing its population for the possibility of conflict in the south.
Azerbaijan
The conflict between Russia and Azerbaijan, which began in December 2024 after Russian air defenses shot down an Azerbaijani passenger plane, intensified because of Moscow’s actions. Russia was displeased that Baku refused to let the scandal fade away. These actions included restrictions on Azerbaijani exports, belligerent statements by Russian lawmakers and experts (including threats of a tactical nuclear strike, as well as hacker attacks on Azerbaijan’s infrastructure).
In late June, mass repressions were launched against members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, including the torture and killing of two brothers during their arrest in Yekaterinburg on trumped-up charges related to a 24-year-old murder case. After returning their bodies to Azerbaijan, forensic examination revealed postmortem mutilation. At the same time, Russian media circulated openly racist publications, accusing the Azerbaijani community of widespread involvement in criminal activities.
In response, Azerbaijan canceled Russian cultural events, revoked invitations, and suspended the work of several Russian media offices. Journalists from pro-Kremlin outlets and Russian citizens suspected of being hackers were detained. Azerbaijan’s president also refused to attend the annual Victory Day Parade in Moscow on May 9. Meanwhile, Baku continued to insist that Russia must acknowledge responsibility for the tragedy of shooting down a plane that had sparked the conflict, viewing such action as the main step toward resolving it.
Yet in Russia, these entirely logical and measured counteractions triggered a duplicitous response. Hate campaigns in the press and false accusations by State Duma deputies and “experts” continued. The dominant narrative became Azerbaijan’s alleged hostility toward Russia, its pro-Western or pro-Turkish policy, and even talk of NATO membership—a well-known trigger for Russians. Some of these messages were deliberately spread on Azerbaijani social media to stoke public discontent, but in vain.
At the same time, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov claimed that “sometimes it happens that there are difficult periods in the relations between the two countries. This is one such period, and we hope that this period will pass.”
It should be noted that the continuing wave of disinformation in Russian media coincided with Iran’s anti-Azerbaijani campaign. Tehran alleged that Israel had carried out strikes on Iranian territory from Azerbaijan, presenting fake evidence that was later refuted by Iranian officials themselves, once they realized the campaign had no effect on Azerbaijani public opinion.
The Washington agreements, signed under the auspices of Donald Trump between Baku and Yerevan, were perceived in Moscow as yet another pretext for escalation: Russian analysts described them as the ousting of Russia from a region it considers critical to its interests. YHowever, it appears that neither Russia’s leadership nor its expert circles undertook even a basic analysis.For decades, Baku has pursued a multi-vector policy, avoiding conflicts with neighbors while resisting external dominance. Close relations with both Turkey and Israel—ties that even enabled negotiations on Syria—are a testament to this.
Azerbaijan developed its relationship with the U.S. in the same vein, making sure not to use it as leverage against Russia. The fact that President Trump saw an opportunity to present himself as the sponsor of reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, at a time when both had worsening relations with Russia, does not in any way imply a change in Baku’s foreign policy. The conflict in the South Caucasus largely benefited Moscow, and by taking a step toward resolution, Trump was simply pursuing U.S. interests.
It should be emphasized that it was Azerbaijan’s president who acted as the “driving force” of the peace process, recognizing the need to anchor it with an economic component—namely, the Zangezur transport corridor. Stronger than Armenia in their standoff, Azerbaijan promoted the corridor as an additional route between Europe and the East. Trump, with his sharp sense for economic opportunities, recognized the potential of the route and rebranded it as TRIPP. Another factor may have been that since early 2025, Israeli and American analysts had identified Azerbaijan as a potential participant in Trump’s “Abraham Accords,” given Baku’s longstanding status as a reliable ally of Jerusalem. None of these factors, however, can reasonably be held against Azerbaijan by Moscow.
Since the Washington agreements were signed, Russian media have intensified their disinformation efforts, copying Iranian propaganda and accusing Azerbaijan of being “complicit” in Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian territory. These fabrications were used to justify targeted Russian strikes on facilities owned by Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR in Ukraine. “Poll results” were also published, claiming that a quarter of Azerbaijanis supposedly hate Russians while an overwhelming majority fear them. Naturally, these narratives were also circulated in Azerbaijan via social media.
From mid-September 2025, however, a somewhat different trend emerged: numerous Russian media outlets reported that Moscow had initiated preparations for high-level talks with Azerbaijan in an attempt to normalize relations. According to these reports, the talks were to take place in October in Baku and would cover issues such as investigating the downing of the Azerbaijani plane and halting repressions against Azerbaijanis.
No official confirmation has been provided, and the only upcoming talks between the parties will be a meeting in Baku of their border service representatives on September 23–25. During these days, Russia’s FSB border patrol ship Rasul Gamzatov will dock at Baku port, and Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that this “demonstrates the mutual commitment of Russia and Azerbaijan to continue cooperation in the field of security and strengthen practical cooperation in the Caspian region.”
Thus, reports of imminent reconciliation—amid the ongoing anti-Azerbaijani propaganda campaign in Russia—can only be regarded as part of the broader information war.
Armenia
The best illustration of how Russia conducts its information war against Armenia was the statement made by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova on September 18. She denied claims that Moscow was interfering in Yerevan’s internal affairs, citing Armenian media reactions. “The primitive discourse we have recently observed in Armenian media and in the information space as a whole… We have seen even stranger things, for example, claims that Armenia is under hybrid attacks, that Moscow prevents the development of the republic as a sovereign state, views it merely as a province, a bargaining chip, and so on… I have never, anywhere, encountered such fabrications in the vocabulary, rhetoric, written or spoken, public or behind closed doors, of Russian officials. Why would anyone in Armenia’s information field need to make such injections and invent things on behalf of Russia? This has never been said by Russian officials,” Zakharova stressed, adding, “Moscow has always respected the republic’s choice, consistently paid close attention to the arguments of our Armenian friends, taken their independent decisions into account, while having its own perspective on events.”
This rhetoric looks odd given how, in recent months, Russia’s information war against Armenia has taken on a particularly aggressive character, turning into a targeted campaign to discredit Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Moscow uses propaganda to undermine his authority while supporting pro-Russian opponents—most notably the oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, who holds a Russian passport, and the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) as key levers of influence. The strategy combines media disinformation, social networks, and diplomatic pressure to provoke internal chaos in Yerevan and pull Armenia back into Moscow’s orbit.
Similar to Azerbaijan, the escalation occurs in stages. In June–July 2025, Russian television openly called Pashinyan an “absolute psycho” and an “illegitimate Turkophile” supposedly brought to power by Britain to “destroy Russia’s presence in the Caucasus”. Armenia officially protested against this “hostile propaganda,” accusing Russian state TV of undermining its sovereignty. According to analysts, Moscow also coordinates bots and trolls on social media, spreading fakes about Pashinyan’s “betrayal of Karabakh” and “anti-Christian policies” to incite domestic protests.
A central element of this war is Moscow’s support for the Armenian Apostolic Church, led by Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II, who has long criticized Pashinyan for “surrendering” Karabakh and promoting “secularism.” As noted by Polish experts at OSW, Russia amplifies this by using the clergy as proxies: Russian propagandists praise the AAC for “defending traditions” while accusing Yerevan of waging a “war on the church.” In June 2025, Pashinyan accused the church of “anti-Azerbaijani propaganda” and attempted to remove Karekin II—an act Moscow labeled an “anti-Christian coup.” Social media was soon flooded with posts portraying Pashinyan as leading a “satanic mafia” burning crosses, echoing Russian rhetoric about “Western Satanism.” Analysts at OSW emphasize that the Kremlin exploits Armenians’ deep emotional connection to the church to mobilize mass opposition to Pashinyan.
At the same time, Russia backs pro-Russian candidates such as Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan—revanchists who accuse Pashinyan of “capitulation.”
Particular attention should be paid to oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, through whom Moscow coordinates much of its pressure on Pashinyan. Karapetyan is the second wealthiest ethnic Armenian in the world. Ranked 44th among Russian businessmen by Forbes and 969th globally, he nearly closes out the list of the planet’s richest. Though his Russian passport prevents him from directly seeking power in Armenia, this is unnecessary: his brother Karen has a political background in Yerevan. In June 2025, Karapetyan was arrested and charged with publicly calling for the seizure of power. Armenia’s Investigative Committee requested his detention, and the court approved it.
Even while under arrest, Karapetyan announced plans to create a “fundamentally new political force” in Armenia. He declared his “great respect” for politicians still “fighting against the anti-national policies of Nikol Pashinyan’s government,” but insisted he had his own vision for Armenia’s future. Soon afterward, the Kremlin hinted that it would “support its citizen”.
The Washington summit of August 8, 2025—where Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev signed the “Joint Declaration” on TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity)—was the catalyst for the escalation of Russia’s hybrid war against Armenia. This U.S.-backed transport corridor, leasing Armenian land for 99 years and bypassing Russia, confirmed Moscow’s fears of losing influence.
Disinformation quickly emerged as the preferred weapon following the summit. Russian media and bot networks launched a campaign portraying TRIPP as a U.S. “colonial grab” and Pashinyan’s “betrayal.” As EVN Report highlighted on September 5, 2025: “To mitigate for the collective failure of the disinformation campaign, at least in Armenia, and to maintain the ‘misinformation virus,’ Russian-aligned actors shifted to amplifying narratives of ‘Western betrayal’ and ‘loss of Armenian sovereignty’ via social media bots and pro-Russian influencers.”
Russian outlets Sputnik and RT spread fake stories about “secret NATO bases” in Armenia, citing “anonymous sources” in Yerevan. On X (Twitter), pro-Russian accounts accused Pashinyan of “selling out the homeland”: one viral post from September 15 read, “Pashinyan signs away Armenian land to Trump for gas money while Russia offers real security—wake up, Armenia!” According to the Lansing Institute, this was part of psyops: “Russian disinformation networks, including troll farms, flooded Armenian Telegram channels with manipulated images of U.S. troops in Yerevan, aiming to stoke anti-Western sentiment and bolster pro-Russian opposition.” The result was a surge of protests in Yerevan, where opposition forces, backed by the church, took to the streets on September 10, chanting “No to American occupation!”
EMoscow simultaneously exerted economic pressure on Yerevan through gas supplies, a key lever. Armenia depends on Russian gas for 87.5% of its needs. After the summit, Gazprom announced “technical breaks.” On September 16, 2025, supplies were suspended for 10 days due to “repairs” on a pipeline in Stavropol, which Anadolu Agency described as “timely pressure amid Yerevan’s pivot to the West.” Gazprom Armenia stated:
“Using internal reserves and additional imports from Iran, the company said natural gas transit to Armenia will be suspended from Sept. 16 to 26. However, it added that there will be no restrictions on the ‘uninterrupted and reliable gas supply to consumers.’”
In essence, Moscow is weaponizing gas to pressure Yerevan into revisiting TRIPP. Yet Armenia has managed to diversify with imports from Iran and Azerbaijan, reducing its dependency.
After August 8, Kremlin diplomacy has focused on “soft” pressure through intermediaries and veiled threats. On August 21, SVR head Sergei Naryshkin visited Yerevan, offering an “alternative” to TRIPP. Naryshkin’s overtures were a diplomatic jab, warning of “consequences” if Armenia deepened ties with the U.S., while dangling economic iincentives,such as the resumption of gas flows.
On August 28, Pashinyan raised the possibility of Armenia leaving the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), stressing that it is impossible to be a member of both the EU and the EAEU. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk responded that any decision on withdrawal “must be made by the Armenian people.” He added: “If such a decision is ever made, I am confident that the widest variety of factors will be weighed in one direction or another”—a clear hint at Moscow’s leverage.
Thus, the situation for Armenia is considerably more serious than for Azerbaijan: the likelihood of Russian interference is far higher, given Moscow’s control over all of Pashinyan’s key opponents. In these circumstances, the most optimal course of action for Armenia’s leadership today appears to be accelerating both the implementation of TRIPP and the conclusion of a final peace treaty with Azerbaijan. This process would strengthen both countries while simultaneously providing them with a security guarantee in the form of U.S. economic interest.