Monthly Monitoring of Analytical Publications on Post-Soviet Conflicts

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 172 (December 19, 2025)

Selecting an overarching frame for the academic works we chose for the December issue of our monitoring bulletin, we noticed that all of them, in one way or another, touch upon the civilizational influence of the Soviet Union—an influence that has not ended even today, 34 years after the USSR ceased to exist, in December.

The post-Soviet space—and, more broadly, the post-Soviet perimeter of geopolitical influence—is not merely a historical shorthand for the past. It remains an operative category, a geopolitical reality today—already, in just a few days, in the second quarter of the twenty-first century. This makes our work—researching conflicts in the post-Soviet space—ever more relevant.

The article “University-industry collaboration in post-Soviet states: A bibliometric study with implications for educational policy and practice”  caught our attention as a rare example of an objective, quantitative analysis of humanitarian and social processes. Its authors are Kairat Moldashev, Assylbek Nurgabdeshov, and Sanat Kozhakhmet, and it was published in the Journal of Pedagogical Research, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp. 37–57. The article was submitted on August 4, 2025, revised on November 5, 2025, and published online on December 9, 2025.

The journal’s emphasis on interdisciplinary approaches to education and pedagogy makes it an appropriate platform for this work, given its focus on how university–industry collaboration intersects with curriculum reform and pedagogical practice.

Kairat Moldashev works at SDU University in Kazakhstan. His conclusions are grounded, in part, in personal experience of Central Asia’s transitional period, where the post-Soviet legacy continues to shape higher education and innovation systems. Assylbek Nurgabdeshov, the second author, is based at Edinburgh Business School, Heriot-Watt University (United Kingdom), enabling him to bring a global perspective to regional issues. Sanat Kozhakhmet of Oxford Brookes University (United Kingdom) contributes expertise in business and management in transition economies.

In their work, the authors combine Kazakhstan’s local specificities with international academic rigor, making their analysis especially relevant for understanding the dynamics of the post-Soviet space.

The article argues that in post-Soviet states the university–industry collaboration (UIC) mechanism has become an important instrument for innovation, economic development, and educational reform, yet its development remains constrained by the historical legacy of centralized planning, state dominance, and systemic transition.

The authors’ central claim is that, whereas in the West UIC often follows market-driven models, in post-Soviet settings it operates within a “state-centered” Triple Helix model, where government remains the dominant actor, limiting the autonomy of universities and industry. This creates structural barriers but also opens opportunities for education-oriented reforms—such as curriculum modernization and workplace learning—that can improve graduates’ competitiveness in the labor market and contribute to broader societal stability.

The study fills a gap in the literature by presenting what the authors describe as the first comprehensive bibliometric synthesis of UIC research in post-Soviet states from 1991 to 2024, supplemented by a thematic analysis of 37 selected studies.

It argues that inter-university communication systems do more than configure academic roles and student engagement. Persistent problems—state dominance, weak demand from industry, underdeveloped infrastructure, constraints in human capital, and cultural barriers—continue to hinder effective collaboration. In the authors’ view, aligning UIC activity with pedagogical reforms directly affects the development of a knowledge-intensive economy. They therefore argue that future research should prioritize longitudinal, multi-level studies to inform policy and practice, especially in transitional environments prone to instability.

In the context of conflict dynamics, this claim is persuasive: the economic vulnerability of post-Soviet states—stemming from severed Soviet-era linkages and slow market transformation—often fuels conflicts over resources, jobs, and influence. By presenting UIC as a bridge for human-capital development, the authors indirectly suggest a path to reducing such tensions, aligning with broader debates on how innovation ecosystems can stabilize fragile regions.

The authors ground their argument in the Triple Helix framework (Etzkowitz, 2000; Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 1996), adapted to post-Soviet realities. They argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union forced universities to rethink their role, transforming from state-subordinate entities into active partners in a market economy; yet path dependence—such as the high share of state R&D and weak business demand—produced a state-centric configuration (Ranga & Etzkowitz, 2013).

Methodologically, the study uses a two-stage design: (1) bibliometric mapping of 223 Web of Science publications (1991–2024) using VOSviewer and Bibliometrix to analyze co-citation, bibliographic coupling, and thematic mapping; and (2) a thematic analysis of 37 purposively selected articles focusing on national innovation systems.

The thematic analysis identifies five core issues:

1. State dominance and path dependence: Governments prescribe innovation rather than facilitate it, producing “innovation by coercion” and formal compliance. In Russia and Kazakhstan this appears as dependence on state budgets, inconsistent policy, and top-down implementation.
2. Weak industry demand and low absorptive capacity: Firms prioritize imports over R&D and lack the capacity to absorb academic knowledge. Cross-sector distrust confines partnerships to informal ties, reducing joint-innovation potential.
3. Underdeveloped infrastructure: University-to-economy technology transfer mechanisms are bureaucratic and ineffective; unclear IP legislation and outdated infrastructure impede commercialization.
4. Human capital and cultural barriers in academia: Scholars, detached from economic needs, focus on basic research and often lack entrepreneurial motivation. High teaching loads and risk aversion further reduce engagement.
5. New opportunities: Despite obstacles, UIC can reform curricula through co-design, internships, and employability programs. Funding diversification and digital tools open new developmental pathways.

These arguments are supported with concrete illustrations: publication trajectories showing growth, collaboration networks highlighting transatlantic ties, and thematic maps classifying trends. The authors contend that the educational consequences of UIC—restructuring teaching through the integration of industry into pedagogy—remain underexplored, but are promising for transition economies.

They conclude that post-Soviet innovation mechanisms remain guided by state logic, limiting market-oriented transfer, yet enabling interventions that are primarily education-focused. They synthesize patterns: state dominance constrains absorptive capacity; infrastructure lags; but educational opportunities can have short-term impact through curriculum reform and workplace learning. Theoretically, this supports “capacity governance” models and calls for multi-level analysis incorporating motivational constructs. Practically, they recommend longitudinal research, study of digital innovation hubs, and policy alignment to balance teaching, research, and “third mission” objectives.

For conflict processes, the implications are substantial: across post-Soviet spaces where economic inequality is a driver of conflict (for example, competition for resources in Central Asia or rivalry among post-Soviet republics in the South Caucasus), strengthening university–industry collaboration may contribute to stability.

This article enriches our understanding of post-Soviet dynamics by reminding us that conflict resolution often begins with expanding educational opportunities and practices. We encourage readers to consult the full text for a deeper exploration of the subject.

 

The next publication we selected for our monitoring bulletin engages with ongoing debates about far-right populism, Russian influence in Europe, and Germany’s persistent political divide.

The study offers a timely—and therefore unexpected—perspective on how historical materialism shapes pro-Russian sentiment within Germany’s “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), especially in the context of post-socialist transformations in Eastern Europe.

Our analysis is based exclusively on the text provided, highlighting the study’s contribution to understanding conflict dynamics that resonate across the former Soviet bloc, including economic discrimination, the resurgence of nationalism, and geopolitical transformation.

The article “From Ostpolitik to Putinpolitik: The AfD’s Affinity for Russia”  was written by Rachel Orse, a researcher at the University of Kansas, and published in the Kansas Undergraduate Journal of International Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1.

Orse’s work combines quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze contemporary German politics through a historical lens. Positioned as a case study of AfD’s pro-Russian sentiment, it contributes to broader debates on populism and extremism in Germany after reunification.

Rachel Orse’s affiliation with the University of Kansas underscores the work’s academic grounding and suggests it may form part of a wider research project—an inference supported by the study’s methodological rigor and its unusually extensive use of primary sources.

The publication’s core claim is that pro-Putin or pro-Russian sentiment is disproportionately common among AfD members from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), which the author explains through the distinctive historical and material conditions of East Germany.

This argument frames AfD’s eastern wing as a particular form of right-wing populism rooted in post-socialist sentiment, generating sympathy for Russia as a counterweight to Western liberalism—arguably the study’s main innovation. The article contends that these attitudes arise from a combination of economic stagnation, cultural alienation, and historical ties between the GDR and the Soviet Union, preserving a Cold War-era divide that continues to shape European conflicts.

Using historical materialism as her theoretical framework, Orse argues that material conditions—such as deindustrialization and unemployment after German reunification—shaped an East German identity in opposition to the West, making a pro-Russian stance a logical expression of that identity.

Several secondary claims develop this foundation. Orse argues that AfD leverages eastern resentment by aligning with illiberal figures such as Vladimir Putin, potentially undermining Germany’s role in the EU and NATO. She emphasizes that eastern German populism is marked by cynicism toward democracy and nostalgia for authoritarian stability. The article also proposes a synthesis of Western and Central–Eastern European populist styles within AfD, where economic nationalism intersects with anti-Western narratives to advance pro-Russian policy.

Orse structures her argument around historical, economic, and sociocultural dimensions, drawing on a literature review, methodological discussion, and empirical analysis. Beginning with historical context, she argues that German reunification in 1990 exacerbated rather than resolved the East–West divide. Citing surveys and studies (e.g., Köpping, 2019), Orse notes that nearly 60% of East Germans after reunification felt like second-class citizens, viewing the process as an “annexation” by the West. This resentment stems from rapid deindustrialization, mass privatization, and job losses, producing cycles of poverty and unemployment (Weisskircher, 2020; Lazzo & Gabriellcic, 2020). Economically, East Germany continues to lag behind the West, feeding a sense of cultural opposition to “Western liberalism” and European integration. Orse argues that this material deprivation pushes eastern voters toward right-wing populism, with AfD emerging as a key beneficiary, campaigning under slogans of economic nationalism and phrases such as: “Our country first—we are on your side!” (Alternative für Deutschland, 2023).

Her claims are supported through both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitatively, Orse collected demographic data on all 80 AfD Bundestag members (2021) using publicly available sources such as Bundestag.de and social media. She coded positions using keywords such as “Putin” and “Russia”: pro-Putin (explicit praise or defense), neutral (ambiguous or absent), or anti-Putin (condemnation or pro-NATO views). A regression analysis in STATA found a strong correlation: members from eastern states scored 0.62 units more pro-Putin (p = 0.00), while other variables—age, gender, or education—were statistically insignificant (p > 0.05). Notably, all seven anti-Putin members were from western states, underscoring geography as a key predictor.

Qualitatively, Orse examined historical events such as GDR–Soviet alliances, the economic consequences of reunification, the 2008 crisis, and the impact of anti-Russian sanctions. She coded statements thematically—“economy,” “history,” and “sociocultural identity”—translating them into English for consistency. This revealed recurring patterns in which eastern representatives invoke an “Ossi” identity—resentment of perceived Western “predatory” dominance—to portray Russia as an ally. By casting Russia as a victim of Western aggression, AfD rhetoric reinforces the East–West divide and frames pro-Putin positions as a form of cultural resistance.

In the analytical section, Orse integrates these strands to argue that sociocultural factors—especially the distinctive “Ossi” identity—help drive pro-Russian sentiment. She claims AfD politicians draw on historical tensions to depict Russia as a “like-minded country from the East” opposed to Western liberalism. The regression analysis supports this, showing eastern origin as the dominant factor, implying that post-GDR material conditions foster a populist alignment with Putin. Orse warns that this may intensify conflicts in the post-Soviet space by weakening European unity against Russian actions, such as the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Orse concludes that pro-Putin sentiment within AfD in East Germany is driven by interconnected historical and economic conditions. She argues that reunification’s failures—economic stagnation and cultural marginalization—perpetuated Cold War legacies and left East Germans more receptive to Russian narratives. Through a historical-materialist lens, the article concludes that material foundations shape populist ideology, and that pro-Russian sentiment functions as an identity-building tool against the West.

In the context of our research on post-Soviet conflicts, Orse’s work highlights parallels between East Germany’s experience and that of other former Warsaw Pact states, where economic nationalism intersects with Russian influence. It underscores the importance of analyzing how Soviet-era linkages persist in shaping contemporary geopolitics.

This study stands out for its rigorous application of historical materialism—a method unfortunately rare today—to a contemporary case, avoiding excessive simplification by integrating regression analysis with thematic coding. Its strengths include statistical data that quantify the German East–West divide and a contextualization of populist styles that enriches debates about the drivers of the “rightward turn” in the politics of post-Soviet states and post-socialist Eastern Europe as a whole.

 

The interconnection between geopolitics, transport infrastructure, and regional rivalry in the Black Sea–Caspian region—a region central to post-Soviet conflicts, energy disputes, and great-power competition—has always been at the core of our attention. As always, our goal is to provide an in-depth analysis of how academic research illuminates the dynamics of instability, cooperation, and shifting balances of power in this volatile zone.

The article featured in this issue is titled “Black Sea-Caspian Region in Global Context: International Transport Corridors” (in Turkish: “Küresel Bağlamda Karadeniz-Hazar Bölgesi: Uluslararası Ulaşım Koridorları”). It was published in Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi (GABD), Volume 19, Issue 37, in December 2025.

Elena Savicheva, a professor at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University) in Moscow, specializes in international relations with particular attention to regional cooperation and Eurasian geopolitical configurations. Erman Tatlıoğlu is a PhD holder and independent researcher based in Moscow. His work often intersects geo-economic analysis and transport logistics.

Both authors, connected to Russian academic circles, offer a perspective that is broadly balanced yet sensitive to regional specifics, supported by bilingual (English–Turkish) abstracts and footnotes referencing a range of sources.

This article is especially relevant to our bulletin because it analyzes how international transport corridors (ITCs) in the post-Soviet space function both as instruments of cooperation and as flashpoints of conflict. The Black Sea–Caspian region—encompassing former Soviet republics such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, as well as Russia, Turkey, and Iran—has, since the USSR’s dissolution, been an arena of ethnic conflicts, frozen disputes, and external interventions. The authors argue that international transport corridors such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) are reshaping these conflict processes by altering trade flows, alliances, and centers of power against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia.

The article opens with an abstract outlining its main focus: the role of the Black Sea–Caspian region in international relations and global politics, with special attention to international transport corridors and the factors shaping regional stability and security. Since 2013, the Trans-Caspian transit corridor (also known as the Middle Corridor) has been presented as a potential driver of increased freight movement between Central Asia and Europe. It aligns with the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, which invests in logistics links with Asia as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Although the Caspian Sea is landlocked, it functions as a transport junction, a trade hub, a platform for regional cooperation, and a theater of intense competition. The authors emphasize that the conflict in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia pushed formally neutral Central Asian states to promote TITR as an alternative to the Russia-dependent Northern Corridor, bypassing Moscow. The region is thus depicted as integral to emerging geopolitical configurations—potentially a zone of interaction or an “apple of discord” among rivals. The comparative advantage of competing logistics projects may reshape trade across vast territories and shift power centers in an evolving world order. Keywords include the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, ITCs, the Middle Corridor, and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia).

The authors’ key thesis is that the war in Ukraine (since 2022) and Western sanctions accelerated a shift from Russia-controlled routes toward alternatives such as TITR, in the name of autonomy and neutrality. This, they argue, may change global trade patterns and the structure of power. A second thesis highlights the Caspian Sea’s dual role: a source of cooperation (through energy and transit) and competition (over resources and routes). The authors also claim that privileging one corridor over another—such as EU-backed Global Gateway projects versus China’s BRI—can produce transformational change in socio-cultural flows, political alliances, and conflict resolution trajectories across the post-Soviet space.

They develop their argument using historical, geopolitical, and economic approaches, drawing on the region’s post-Soviet evolution. The paper shows how the region’s location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East makes it vital for global trade and energy flows. The authors argue that international trade routes—TITR, the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, and Caspian maritime links—are indispensable for goods transit, intensifying great-power competition. Regional security problems—rivalries, territorial disputes, and external pressure—complicate infrastructure development, as illustrated through investment patterns in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan. The broader claim is that the region’s strategic significance will grow, shaping post-Soviet conflicts by either strengthening or undermining state sovereignty.

Additional arguments focus on specific corridors:

• The Caspian–Black Sea Corridor: announced in 2018, connecting Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Romania via ports such as Turkmenbashi, Baku, Poti/Batumi, and Constanța. It fits the EU “Global Gateway” concept as a counter-project to BRI, reducing cost and transit time. A 2019 meeting in Bucharest (foreign ministers’ declaration) emphasized sovereignty and multimodal transport. The authors highlight national interests: Turkmenistan (LNG export diversification), Romania (Constanța as an EU hub, potentially for NATO cargo), and Azerbaijan (market access and cross-border projects: East–West, North–South, Southwest).
• The Lapis Lazuli Corridor: linking Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, providing Afghanistan direct access to Europe while bypassing Pakistan/Iran. The authors stress the economic and political gains of integration—especially for Afghan sectors—and its strategic relevance to stability in the Caspian region and the South Caucasus amid post-Soviet ethnic tensions.

Throughout, the paper links corridors to conflict mitigation or escalation: they increase resilience to shocks (e.g., the war in Ukraine) yet provoke rivalry as powers compete for control. The authors argue that regional interconnectivity promotes the autonomy of transit states, potentially easing frozen conflicts through economic incentives, while simultaneously creating risks of new disputes over routes.

The authors conclude that the Black Sea–Caspian region is an integral element of geopolitical structures, capable of becoming either a zone of convergence or an arena of conflict. In the emerging world order, prioritizing projects such as TITR over Northern corridors may transform trade, shift power centers, and realign alliances. They emphasize that Central Asia’s pivot toward TITR is presented as a bypass strategy designed to preserve neutrality on Ukraine while strengthening ties with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the EU. Their concluding warning is that such prioritization may trigger broader shifts in the global architecture of power, with international trade hubs acting as catalysts of post-Soviet conflict evolution.

From the standpoint of conflict processes, this article shows how infrastructure becomes an instrument of power struggle in the post-Soviet space. The emergence of alternative transport corridors against the backdrop of the Russia–Ukraine war illustrates a form of “geo-economic war,” where sanctions compel route changes—potentially thawing frozen conflicts (for example, in the South Caucasus) through economic interdependence, while risking new rivalries (for example, Russia versus the EU in Central Asia).

This article deepens our understanding of how transport corridors mediate conflict, urging policymakers to treat logistics as an instrument of stability.

In this issue, we also could not ignore a topical—and in academic terms, even provocative—article devoted to the transformation of Russia’s nuclear policy against the backdrop of its ongoing invasion of Ukraine. As an editor, I am pleased to present a detailed analysis of this study, which sheds light on how strategic military doctrines adapt to protracted conflicts—a relatively new phenomenon in the political landscapes of both Europe and the Middle East. Our review is based exclusively on the text provided and offers a comprehensive analysis of the authors’ contribution to understanding nuclear deterrence in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war.

The article under review is titled “Russia’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine in the Shadow of Its Invasion of Ukraine”, which immediately sets an advocacy-tinged tone for how the topic of strategic deterrence is framed. This advocacy may be treated as a weakness of a work aimed at a different task—analyzing the transformation of nuclear deterrence models—but the authors, Ayşegül Ketenci and Kahraman Süvari, produced a genuinely strong analysis, and the framing does not dilute their results. Ayşegül Ketenci is affiliated with İstanbul Kültür University (Republic of Türkiye). This work was published as a preliminary study in Connections: The Quarterly Journal, Volume 24, No. 2 (2025), issued by the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. Connections is a respected peer-reviewed journal that supports scholarly dialogue on security issues, particularly in Euro-Atlantic and post-Soviet contexts.

In the abstract, Ketenci and Süvari present their main thesis: Russia’s revision of its nuclear doctrine in 2024 was driven by the Russia–Ukraine war that began in 2022, which disrupted the regional and global balance of power.

They argue that this pushed Moscow to lower the threshold of nuclear deterrence and expand the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. The revised doctrine, in their view, is an attempt to demonstrate a tougher nuclear posture rhetorically, while in practical terms adapting to a changing security environment.

Their core argument is that, although Russia’s nuclear rhetoric intensified after the invasion, doctrinal changes—however partly rhetorical—reflect a strategic adaptation. They challenge interpretations emphasizing continuity in Russian nuclear policy (citing Lydia Wachs), arguing instead that the revisions represent a meaningful shift aimed at signaling resolve to the West and consolidating domestic support. They stress that doctrinal evolution is not merely empty threats, but a response to stalemate in the war, failure to achieve military goals, and threats to centralized authority.

Since the Cold War, Russia has periodically updated its military doctrines to match global changes, often in connection with major historical events. The authors review these documents chronologically, noting that the ongoing war has had a systemic impact on the 2024 update.

Key arguments include:

• External pressure: Strong opposition from the EU and the US, including sanctions, pushed Russia toward tougher policy, such as lowering the nuclear threshold. The authors cite Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov describing the changes as a “signal to the West.” They also reference Rishi Paul and Nicole Grajewski, who characterize the changes as manipulative instruments rather than operational plans, aimed at deterring Western support for Ukraine.
• Domestic objectives: The authors argue nuclear rhetoric serves a dual purpose: deterring external actors and mobilizing the Russian public (citing Michal Smetana and Michal Onderko, drawing on public opinion data).
• Strategic maneuvering: Russia uses nuclear threats as a bargaining chip, creating room for maneuver by expanding conditions of use and enhancing the credibility of its threat posture.

A substantial portion of the article addresses historical context, arguing that Russian doctrines evolve in response to geopolitical developments. The authors describe four iterations since 1993:

• 1993 Doctrine: a transitional document after the USSR’s collapse, focusing on defense against large-scale strikes, sustaining nuclear deterrence, and managing local conflicts; it emphasized democratic reforms and a new international system (citing the Federation of American Scientists and Charles J. Dick).
• 2000 Doctrine: adopted after Putin’s election; aligned with national security concepts, prioritized nuclear capacity for deterrence, lowered thresholds, expressed readiness for arms reductions while keeping nuclear weapons central (citing lessons from Kosovo and Chechnya via Jyotsna Bakshi and Alexei G. Arbatov).
• 2010 Doctrine: amid budget surpluses and global influence; promoted partnerships (e.g., BRICS, SCO), adhered to international law, preserved great-power status, and addressed emerging threats without major policy shifts (citing Michał Pietkiewicz).
• 2014 Doctrine: revised amid rising tensions in Ukraine; refined terminology and responded to challenges from the US and EU. Putin described it as defensive but firm, emphasizing post-1990s security threats (again citing Pietkiewicz).

The authors argue these doctrines reflect shifting threat perceptions within the Kremlin, with each update tied to events such as NATO expansion or regional wars. They connect this tradition to the Putin era, in which documents like the “Security Concept” and “Foreign Policy Concept” codify priorities. This historical context supports their claim that the 2024 revision continues a pattern of adaptation.

Their analytical framework compares the 2020 “Basic Principles of State Policy… in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” (approved June 2, 2020) with the 2024 version (approved November 19, 2024). The authors use a selective textual analysis focused on substantive changes.

Key points include:

• Overall shift: the 2024 doctrine expands conditions for nuclear use to include conventional attacks threatening Russia’s (or Belarus’s) sovereignty/territorial integrity. Putin called this an “extreme measure” adapted to new threats (as quoted via RBC radio). The 2020 version clarified ambiguities without major change (citing Nikolai Sokov).
• Article 5: in 2020 nuclear weapons are described “exclusively” as a deterrent tool; in 2024 the word “exclusively” is removed, implying broader scope.
• Article 9: the 2024 document defines adversaries as states/coalitions possessing WMD or capable military forces, including those providing territory/resources for aggression (implicitly Western support for Ukraine).
• Articles 10–11: aggression by coalitions or by non-nuclear states backed by nuclear powers is treated as joint attack.
• Articles 15/16: “minimally sufficient” nuclear forces become “sufficient,” and references to arms control compliance are removed, signaling weaker attachment to international agreements. “Military threats” broaden into “military risks and threats,” enlarging room for adaptation.
• Articles 17/18: the 2020 text limits nuclear use to WMD attacks or existential conventional threats; the 2024 text adds Belarus and “critical threats” to sovereignty/territorial integrity.

The authors argue these changes reflect a “sharper and more assertive” discourse that lowers deterrence thresholds amid a stalemated war in Ukraine. They interpret the revision primarily as perception management—deterring Western assistance and preserving strategic maneuver space—rather than signaling imminent nuclear use. This supports their thesis that external and internal drivers produced a doctrine that demonstrates resolve without fundamentally rebuilding strategy.

In their concluding remarks (based on the provided text), Ketenci and Süvari argue that Russia’s doctrinal changes, while presented as defensive, enable more flexible nuclear positioning.

 

The final article featured this month offers, in our view, a subtle and elegant perspective on Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet challenges, emphasizing the link between inherited infrastructure and contemporary state-building efforts. The article “Baikonur and Kazakhstan’s Sovereignty Dilemma: Security, Environment, and International Law”  was written by Sofia Bari (The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.).

Although the work was not formally published in a peer-reviewed journal, it represents a rigorous academic study typical of international relations scholarship.

Drawing on historical, legal, and environmental dimensions, Bari’s analysis contributes to a growing literature on post-Soviet securitization trends—specifically, how Soviet-era assets perpetuate unequal power relations.

Bari’s central idea is that the Baikonur Cosmodrome—a Soviet-era relic leased to Russia until 2050—embodies Kazakhstan’s “sovereignty dilemma”: a multi-layered conflict in which economic dependence, geopolitical pressure, and environmental degradation undermine national autonomy. She frames Baikonur as a dual-threat site: a traditional security issue tied to erosion of sovereignty and territorial control, and a non-traditional issue encompassing human security and environmental harm. This classification aligns with broader models of securitization in the post-Soviet Central Asian context, where inherited infrastructure sustains asymmetric interstate dynamics.

The author argues that fragile post-Soviet sovereignty in Kazakhstan emerged during the transition from the USSR, when economic dependence and external pressure compelled the maintenance of Russian control through the 1994 lease treaty (extended in 2004). While the treaty increases Kazakhstan’s geopolitical significance, it simultaneously constrains independent space capabilities and heightens tensions in scientific development, legal compliance, and regional cooperation. Bari introduces the concept of “sporadic sovereignty” (citing Kopack, 2019), whereby Kazakhstan exercises intermittent authority over Baikonur, undermined by Russia’s jurisdictional dominance over the city, launch sites, and surrounding areas (Shatalov, 1997).

A key argument revolves around cultural and narrative dimensions. Baikonur symbolizes Soviet technological pride, yet perpetuates a Soviet hierarchy of territorial power within the former USSR. Bari argues that selective memory—celebrating Soviet triumphs while excluding the ecological and social costs borne by Kazakh communities—marginalizes local experience and reinforces Russia’s soft power (Hunter & Nelson, 2021). This curated narrative positions Kazakhstan as a passive backdrop, diminishing agency and linking security to foreign-policy inertia.

Politically, Bari argues that Kazakhstan’s domestic legislation—such as the 2012 “Space Activities” Law and the 2015 National Space Law—remains merely aspirational for Baikonur because of Russia’s extraterritorial control. These laws emphasize peaceful space use, legalize state functions in space development, and codify principles of growth (Musinovich et al., 2015). Yet the mismatch undermines enforcement, rendering Kazakhstan’s membership in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space largely symbolic and weakening diplomatic leverage. Globally, Bari argues, the ongoing “space race” positions Baikonur as an exploited frontier within colonial-capitalist projects, risking future commercial conflicts over asteroid mining (Hunter & Nelson, 2021).

In the context of regional autonomy, the author highlights the technopolitics of space as a motivating factor for Kazakhstan’s nuclear and space programs (Bekus, 2022). She describes this as an instance of “environmental authoritarianism,” where sacrifice zones are justified in the name of progress, activism is suppressed, and strategic imperatives take precedence (Kernanen, 2024).

Geopolitically, Bari argues that long-term consequences include agricultural degradation, biodiversity loss, and pollution. Major incidents (1999, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2013) caused significant damage, while compensation (for example, after the Proton incident in 2013) failed to trigger reform (Porter, 2017). Safer alternatives exist, such as kerosene and liquid oxygen mixtures in Soyuz and Angara rockets, but institutional inertia slows transition. This hinders Kazakhstan’s diversification of partnerships with China, the EU, and the US.

Bari develops her argument both chronologically and thematically, beginning with historical background. Baikonur, founded in 1955 as a secret missile range, launched Sputnik in 1957, symbolizing Soviet dominance. After 1991, Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia produced lease arrangements that preserved the status quo despite rising costs. She supports this with evidence of dual pressure: economic necessity to maintain existing arrangements and geopolitical inertia constraining development.

In addressing non-traditional threats, Bari details what she describes as “environmental injustice.” Russian operational practices create exclusion zones, while crises are obscured by euphemism. Contractors such as “Garysh Ecology” operate under strict isolation and lack the ability to publish data independently.

Bari concludes that Baikonur has evolved from Soviet ambition into a reminder of incomplete sovereignty, dependence, and vulnerability—a site of enduring contradiction. At the same time, multipolar competition, environmental civil-society pressure, and the democratization of space create openings for restoration.

The article captures persistent post-Soviet processes, where Soviet legacies such as Baikonur maintain hierarchical dependence. Bari’s dual-threat framing underscores how traditional sovereignty erosion intersects with non-traditional ecological conflict. Her discussion of environmental authoritarianism shows how opacity and secrecy suppress dissent—echoing similar techno-ecological conflicts across the Caspian and Aral basins.

Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.