Monthly Monitoring of Analytical Publications on Post-Soviet Conflicts

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 176 (January 09, 2026)

Not only the events and news of the newly begun year have their roots in 2025. The research and academic publications from December that we present to our readers in the January monitoring issue are also grounded in the past—but have a clear projection into the future.
As usual, this issue offers readers unexpected research methods, new academic centers, authors whose work we have not previously covered, and other substantive discoveries.

In preparing our monitoring, we always pay special attention to unconventional methodologies used by scholars to generate humanitarian knowledge in political science. The article “Enhancing Cultural Identity through Music following Independence: The Case of Kazakhstani Musicians” by Meruyet Mukhsiynova, Abdullah Akat, Zulfiya Kassimova, and Gulmira Mussagulova (Zhurgenov Kazakh National Academy of Arts and Kurmangazy Kazakh National Conservatory, Kazakhstan, and Istanbul University State Conservatory, Türkiye) fits squarely within this category.

This truly unique analysis of the construction of cultural identity through the sphere of musical production, published in Musicologist 9(2):404–417 (Dec. 2025), focuses on the Republic of Kazakhstan, where, following the attainment of independence in 1991, the challenge of overcoming the legacy of Soviet cultural policy and forming a sovereign cultural code came sharply to the fore. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s theory of cultural identity, the authors examine how professional musicians, acting as agents of cultural memory, employ elements of traditional Kazakh music within the pop industry to revitalize national self-awareness and resist the lingering postcolonial influence.

The study is based on a qualitative methodology that includes interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), aimed at exploring personal experience and meaning-making in a social context. Observation and case-study methods were also applied, allowing for an in-depth examination of musicians’ practices. The theoretical framework incorporates concepts of cultural memory (Jan Assmann), cultural capital (Pierre Bourdieu), as well as the critical theory of the “culture industry” (Theodor Adorno), applied to the analysis of the Soviet phenomenon of estrada.

The authors emphasize the profound traumatization of the Kazakh cultural field during the Soviet period. Collectivization, the repressions of the 1930s (including those against the national intelligentsia and epic storytellers—the zhyrau), demographic catastrophe, and nuclear testing led to the marginalization of traditional art. Soviet cultural policy, centrally managed from Moscow, according to the authors, pursued a course of unification and the creation of a “new Soviet person.” This was embodied in the estrada system—an instrument of propaganda in which music was subject to strict regulation, while improvisation, a key element of Kazakh tradition, was effectively banned. As a result, traditional culture was not merely suppressed but systematically displaced from the public sphere, creating a long-term deficit of cultural continuity.

With the attainment of independence, a process of cultural revival began. Pop music, as a mass and accessible genre, became an important cultural aggregator for rethinking the past and engaging in dialogue with tradition. The authors note that despite formal sovereignty, Kazakhstan continues to face challenges to national identity: the dominance of the Russian language in the media sphere, economic difficulties, and the need for mental decolonization. Under these conditions, music becomes a field of symbolic struggle for consciousness—a means of “restoring” a historical line of development interrupted by colonial intervention.

The study, in particular, provides a detailed description of a three-stage methodology for teaching traditional songs in educational institutions:

1. historical and intonational immersion;

2. textual analysis with an emphasis on allegory;

3. performance with attention to diction and structure.
   Special importance is attached to mastering improvisation skills, which become possible only after a full understanding of the rhythmic, melodic, and dynamic foundations of a song. This approach demonstrates institutional efforts to transmit the cultural code and to cultivate “cultural competence” (Bourdieu) among new generations of musicians.

The research situates musical practices within a broader socio-political context:
• Cultural memory: Music functions as an institution linking different historical periods through symbols and sound codes, actualizing the past within the contemporary cultural field (Assmann).
• Cultural capital: Mastery of the language of traditional music and the ability to decode it become forms of cultural capital associated with education and access to national heritage.
• Identity formation: The use of traditional elements is interpreted as an attempt to respond to the Soviet past and to construct a desired future, fully consistent with Hall’s dialectic of cultural identity.

The authors conclude that the integration of traditional Kazakh music into the pop industry represents a complex, multi-layered system that contributes to the strengthening of cultural identity. This process includes:

1. the preservation of oral singing techniques;

2. the adaptation of global pop genres to the local context through rhythms and vocal techniques;

3. a deep synthesis of traditional techniques with contemporary genres (jazz, rock, fusion).

The fundamental criteria for the successful preservation and reinforcement of identity within the global musical landscape are identified as: the use of the state (Kazakh) language, the incorporation of folklore, the preservation of cultural and spiritual values, and the purposeful cultivation of cultural memory through artistic practices.

The presented study is relevant not only for cultural studies but also for the political analysis of post-Soviet societies. Using a concrete case, it demonstrates how culture becomes an arena for the soft yet persistent assertion of national sovereignty, the overcoming of colonial trauma, and the formation of a competitive national brand under conditions of globalization. Kazakhstan’s experience, as shown in the article, forms part of a broader trend observed in many post-Soviet countries, where music has become one of the key instruments for the reconfiguration of collective identity.

The next work selected for the December monitoring issue offers readers a theoretically grounded perspective on Iran’s relations with the countries of Central Asia in the context of transformations in Eurasian geopolitics, using a realist–constructivist theoretical approach that combines material interests and ideational factors. The article “Iran and Central Asia: Eurasian Geopolitics in a Changing World Order” (The International Spectator, 2025, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 138–155) demonstrates that Central Asia has occupied an important place in Iran’s regional and international policy since the collapse of the USSR. In a changing world order characterized by the strategic reorientation of many states toward the “East,” the conflict in Ukraine, and the rise of China, the Eurasian space is acquiring critical importance. For Iran, long subject to international isolation, Central Asia and cooperation with leading Eurasian powers (Russia, China, India) become strategic resources for overcoming this isolation and realizing its potential as a Eurasian power.

The authors’ main research question (Aigerim Altynbek, Edward Wastnidge, and Adilbek Yermekbayev of al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, and the Open University, Milton Keynes) concerns how to decompose Iran’s approach to Central Asia and how the evolution of Eurasian geopolitics affects these relations.

As an analytical framework, the authors propose a realist–constructivist synthesis. This approach allows them to overcome the binary logic of traditional international relations theories. In their methodology, realism explains Iran’s engagement in Central Asia through material interests—securing energy routes, developing economic ties, and creating counterbalances to the influence of other powers (Russia, China, the United States)—while constructivism emphasizes the role of immaterial factors: shared cultural-historical, and to a limited extent religious, ties that shape Iran’s geopolitical imagination and identity.

The authors argue that in the case of Iran–Central Asia relations, material and ideational factors are interconnected and jointly construct policy. Iran uses narratives of shared history and culture to advance concrete material interests such as infrastructure projects and market access.

Key events of the 21st century (the September 11 attacks, the war on terror, the rise of China, the creation of BRICS) contributed to the institutionalization of Eurasian cooperation and the transition from unipolarity to an emerging multipolarity. For Iran, the study notes, this shift created opportunities for alliances with other “anti-hegemonic” actors (Russia, China) that share its desire to challenge Western—particularly U.S.—dominance. The tightening and globalization of sanctions mechanisms further brought Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran closer together.

However, the authors note that, contrary to expectations, the religious factor (Shi‘ism) did not become the foundation of Iran’s policy in the region, given the secular and predominantly Sunni character of Central Asian states, which are largely unreceptive to Iran-style political Islam. Instead, Tehran emphasizes shared cultural heritage (the Persian language, literature, the celebration of Nowruz) to develop relations. These efforts are implemented through cultural initiatives, exchanges, and institutions such as the ECO Cultural Institute in Tehran. At the same time, Iran faces serious competition in the sphere of “soft power” from Russia (the Russian language) and Turkey (Turkic linguistic and cultural kinship, the Organization of Turkic States).

To consolidate its positions, the study shows, Iran actively uses new Eurasian institutions, reflecting both material and ideational interests.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): Full membership obtained in 2023 became Iran’s most significant diplomatic achievement in reducing its isolation. The SCO is viewed as an anti-Western alliance and a platform for promoting multipolarity. Iran is already proposing initiatives within the SCO, such as the creation of a common settlement currency and a regional electricity market. Membership has contributed to the growth of Iran’s non-oil trade with SCO countries.

Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU): Although Iran is not a member, the signing of a free trade agreement with the EAEU in 2023 (entering into force in 2025) opens access to a market of nearly 200 million people. The agreement is expected to potentially triple trade turnover, especially with Kazakhstan. This serves Iran’s material interests as a transit hub and export market.

Bilateral mechanisms: Iran is also developing ties with other regional states: a visa-free regime with Tajikistan has been introduced, a joint investment committee with Kyrgyzstan established, and major agreements signed with Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is regarded as a key partner due to its EAEU membership.

A key conclusion of the authors—one that primarily convinced us to single out this study—is the convergence of material infrastructure projects and anti-hegemonic ideology.

International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC): A joint project of Russia, Iran, and India, enabling Russia to gain access to the Indian Ocean bypassing Suez, and allowing Iran to strengthen its logistical role. The project gained renewed momentum after the 2022 sanctions.

Port of Chabahar: India’s strategic project in Iran, providing access to Central Asian markets while bypassing Pakistan. It competes with the Chinese–Pakistani port of Gwadar. India received an exemption from U.S. sanctions for investments in Chabahar.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Iran and Central Asian states seek to integrate into China’s mega-project. China, in turn, is interested in Iran as a partner, as evidenced by the 25-year cooperation agreement and its mediation in the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

These projects are reinforced by ideological solidarity on issues of sovereignty and non-interference. Russia, China, and Iran mutually support each other in the UN, rejecting criticism related to internal conflicts and human rights violations, reflecting a shared rejection of Western liberal interventionism.

Relations between Iran and Central Asia serve as a productive example for applying the realist–constructivist approach. It shows how material interests (transit, trade, security) intertwine with ideational factors (historical-cultural narratives, anti-Western rhetoric, the concept of multipolarity) in shaping foreign policy.

Iran’s policy in Central Asia is predominantly pragmatic in nature, despite the ideological foundation of the regime. Cultural and historical ties are used as instruments to achieve concrete material and strategic goals. For Iran, Central Asia is a key space for overcoming international isolation and realizing its ambition to become a Eurasian power. Membership in the SCO and the FTA with the EAEU are important steps along this path.

Central Asia remains a region where the interests of major powers (Russia, China, India, Iran) intersect. The countries of the region, in turn, use this competition and convergence of interests to diversify their foreign ties and attract infrastructure investment. The authors argue that the “Look East” policy and the deepening of ties with Eurasian partners are likely to remain stable directions of Iran’s foreign policy amid high confrontation with the United States and Israel in the Middle East. Infrastructure projects and institutions alternative to Western ones (SCO, BRICS, EAEU) will play an increasingly important role in Eurasian geopolitics.

The transformation of Kazakhstan–Russia relations after the events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan and the outbreak of the conflict in southeastern Russia and Ukraine is the subject of the article “Kazakhstan–Russia Relations After 2022: Sources of Contention, Points of Pressure” by Nargis Kassenova (Director of the Program on Central Asia at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies), published in The Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst.

Until 2022, Kassenova notes, relations between Kazakhstan and Russia were characterized by stability based on Astana’s multi-vector foreign policy, which combined deepening ties with Moscow and diversification of partnerships. However, the events of January 2022 (“Qantar”) and the Russia–Ukraine conflict fundamentally altered the status quo. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s government has been forced to balance between strengthening global ties and preserving relations with Russia, requiring constant recalibration and difficult compromises.

The existence of a long (4,000 km) and effectively undefended border, as well as a significant Russian-speaking population (15% in 2024), creates potential risks to territorial integrity. At the same time, Russia remains Kazakhstan’s leading trading partner (a record trade turnover of $28 billion in 2024). The economies are closely integrated within the EAEU, making Kazakhstan vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks originating in Russia. Western sanctions against Russia have complicated the use of northern transport routes for exporting Kazakh oil, uranium, and grain, stimulating accelerated development of the Middle Corridor, which, however, cannot yet serve as a full-fledged alternative.

The weakening of the influence of former president Nursultan Nazarbayev and his entourage (the “family-clan system”) has created a new point of pressure. The split of elites into a conditional “old” and “new” Kazakhstan potentially opens space for Moscow’s interference in domestic politics. Despite the decisive role of Russian assistance through the CSTO in suppressing the January 2022 unrest, Tokayev later adopted an independent position on Ukraine, provoking sharp criticism in Russia. At the same time, close personal ties between segments of the Kazakh elite (for example, Imangali Tasmagambetov) and Moscow remain, which can be instrumentalized to influence intra-elite competition.

Kazakhstan’s decision to build its first nuclear power plant, approved by a 2024 referendum, became a new area of pressure. Despite significant risks (increased dependence on Russian technology, Rosatom’s problems due to sanctions, negative public opinion), the contract was awarded to the Russian state corporation. This decision was accompanied not only by the economic advantages of the offer but also by the implicit threat of a serious deterioration in relations in the event of refusal. A historical precedent—the 2009 arrest of the head of Kazatomprom, Mukhtar Dzhakishev, who linked it to his resistance to expanding Russian control over Kazakhstan’s uranium assets—illustrates the long-standing nature of this confrontation. At the same time, Astana seeks diversification by developing cooperation with China (a joint uranium enrichment venture) and leaving open the possibility of building a second nuclear power plant with the participation of China’s CNNC.

Kazakhstan’s active efforts to rethink its own history, including the rehabilitation of victims of political repression (the State Commission completed its work in 2023) and the creation of new national historical narratives, have come into conflict with Russia’s official historical policy. Russia, which is revising rehabilitation decisions of the 1990s–2000s and glorifying the Stalinist period, perceives Kazakh initiatives as “Russophobic” and threatening to its national security. This has led to restrictions on Kazakh researchers’ access to Russian archives on “sensitive” topics (collectivization, famine, repression). Under pressure, Kazakh authorities were forced to curtail the activities of the State Commission and issue recommendations to scholars to avoid discussing colonial themes and repression in the media.

The events of 2022 marked the end of the “Nazarbayev era” and the post-Soviet order in relations. Kazakhstan and Russia are moving along diverging trajectories: Kazakhstan seeks to strengthen national identity and sovereignty and diversify its ties, including cooperation with the West, while Russia is becoming increasingly anti-Western, autarkic, and imperial-revisionist. A “security dilemma” emerges, in which Moscow’s assertiveness pushes Astana toward greater distancing, which in turn intensifies irritation on the Russian side. Tokayev’s administration’s approach consists of maximum possible adaptation to Russian interests while simultaneously defending its own sovereignty—requiring constant, complex, and risk-laden balancing. The three areas examined—intra-elite relations, nuclear energy, and historical policy—are the most representative examples of this new, more tense dynamic.

Comparative analysis between post-Soviet processes and those in “old” Europe remains extremely rare.
The article by Georgian–German researcher Kristine Margvelashvili (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Göttingen, Germany), “Contested national and digital space, the Orthodox Church, and the new forms of religious engagement: comparative insights from Georgia and Greece” published on 18 December 2025 in Frontiers in Political Science, Sec. Politics of Technology, Volume 7 – 2025, belongs to this rare category.

In the context of revisiting the secularization thesis and the growth of desecularization processes in Orthodox societies, the article focuses on the role of Orthodox Churches in shaping national identity and using digital space for religious–political mobilization.

The empirical analysis centers on Georgia and Greece—two countries where Orthodoxy is closely intertwined with national self-consciousness, but where institutional and political contexts differ significantly. The aim of the study is to identify how the digitalization of religious discourse transforms church–society–state interaction practices, and how Orthodox Churches participate in discursive struggles over defining national identity in conditions of a contested national space.

The study draws on concepts of desecularization (P. Berger) and the post-secular society (J. Habermas), as well as theories of religious nationalism linking national identity to a specific religious tradition. The key theoretical tool is critical discourse analysis (N. Fairclough), applied to examine how church and political elites construct narratives of national belonging (“Georgianness” and “Greekness”).

The methodology includes qualitative discourse analysis of social media (Facebook, X, YouTube) and official church resources for the period 2024–2025. The author also uses in-depth semi-structured interviews (28 interviews) with political and religious elites and experts in Georgia and Greece (2021–2022). This dataset forms the basis for a comparative analysis of the two cases, with an emphasis on differences in institutional memory, state capacity, and the degree of church involvement in politics.

The Georgian case is presented as one of digital mobilization and religious nationalism. The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) is the most trusted institution in the country (CRRC data, 2021), possessing significant cultural capital (P. Bourdieu). The study shows high religious self-identification with low levels of practice: 99% believe in God, but only 17% regularly attend services. At the same time, 81% consider Orthodoxy the most important marker of national identity. Margvelashvili notes the active use of Facebook (≈95% population coverage) to mobilize and promote a narrative of the inseparability of Orthodoxy and “Georgianness.”

The canonization of secular national figures (Ilia Chavchavadze) to sacralize the national narrative and the promotion of the triad “Homeland, Language, Faith” as the basis of national identity are examined as successful strategies of the Georgian Orthodox Church, though not deeply internalized. In 2024, young protesters against the “foreign agents law” transformed it into “Homeland, Language, Unity,” provoking resistance from both church and state.

At the same time, cooperation between the church and right-wing populist and ultraconservative groups (“Alliance of Patriots,” “Alt-Info,” “Georgian March”), which use religious discourse for legitimation and mobilization, is presented by the author as an example of a strategically unsuccessful line of activity.

The author highlights the unique political role of the Georgian Orthodox Church: it acts as a veto player, influencing electoral processes (support for the “Georgian Dream” party in 2012) and blocking liberal reforms (e.g., anti-discrimination legislation). At the same time, Margvelashvili notes that many GOC hierarchs were educated in Russia, and discourse on “traditional values” often coincides with Russian narratives.

The Greek Orthodox Church (GOCr) holds the status of a state religion and is deeply integrated into the political system. Greece is also characterized by high levels of religiosity: 92% believe in God, 76% associate Orthodoxy with national identity, but only 16% regularly attend services.

There are, however, notable differences compared to Georgia. For example, the use of social media is more limited: only 65% of the population are active on Facebook, and official church accounts are minimally involved in political debates.

The discursive strategies of the Greek Orthodox Church focus on promoting ethno-religious nationalism (“Greekness” = Orthodoxy) through historical narratives about the church’s role in preserving identity during Ottoman rule. At the same time, the church avoids direct political debates, concentrating on religious issues. Its mobilizational potential becomes visible in crisis situations (e.g., protests against the removal of the “religion” field from identity cards in the 2000s).

The political role of the Greek Orthodox Church is shaped by close ties with the ruling New Democracy party and far-right forces (“Greek Solution,” historically—“Golden Dawn”). The church’s role is especially prominent in issues concerning national identity (e.g., the dispute with North Macedonia over the country’s name). Institutional memory and state stability reduce the intensity of discursive struggle compared to Georgia.

The author concludes that desecularization in Orthodox societies manifests itself through the strengthening of the church’s role in constructing national identity, with digital space becoming a key arena of this struggle. Discursive strategies of Orthodox churches depend on institutional context: in Georgia, the church actively uses digital platforms for mobilization in conditions of a weak state; in Greece, it acts more cautiously, relying on traditional institutions. Religious nationalism remains a powerful force fueling conservative-populist movements and complicating democratic transformations (especially in Georgia).

The study demonstrates that even within a shared Orthodox tradition, variations in the political influence of the church are determined by historical experience, state capacity, and the degree of digitalization of the public sphere.

The article contributes to desecularization theory by offering a comparative analysis of cases beyond the contexts traditionally studied by scholars. Empirically, it shows how digitalization transforms religious practices, creating new forms of political mobilization and competition over the definition of national identity. The study also underscores the necessity of accounting for institutional and historical specificities when analyzing the interaction between religion and politics in Orthodox countries.

The study “International North–South Transport Corridor: Boosting Russia’s ‘Pivot to the South’ and Trans-Eurasian Connectivity” can serve as a rare contemporary example of effective academic collaboration.

Researchers from India—Sandeep Tripathi and Urvashi Singh—are working as visiting researchers at Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia, and publish their findings in Yerevan State University (YSU Journal of International Affairs 2025, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 141–159). In the context of transformations in global political and economic alliances, as well as the fragmentation of the international order, trade and economic relations between India and Russia are acquiring renewed strategic significance.

Tripathi and Singh conduct a comprehensive analysis of the potential of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as an instrument for strengthening bilateral trade and as an important geopolitical lever. The study seeks to answer key questions: how the INSTC can redefine the scale, efficiency, and structure of economic exchange between the two countries, and how it can influence the regional balance of power amid increasing global fragmentation and the use of trade as a tool of political pressure.

Despite a long history of cooperation, the authors note that after the collapse of the USSR, economic ties between India and Russia remained underdeveloped, with a significant trade deficit in Russia’s favor. One of the key problems is the mutual lack of awareness among business communities about market opportunities. Diplomatic efforts and formal agreements have yet to realize the full potential of trade connectivity. In this situation, both sides view the INSTC as a strategic project for expanding commercial opportunities. It is telling that in 2022, Indian Prime Minister N. Modi, speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum, emphasized the importance of the corridor, alongside other initiatives, for the future development of relations, noting India’s growing presence in the Russian Far East.

Established in 2000, the International North–South Transport Corridor is a multimodal transport network linking the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf via Iran with the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe. The corridor includes three main routes: Western (via Russia and Azerbaijan, ~5,100 km), Eastern (via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, ~6,100 km), and Trans-Caspian (using ferry crossings, ~4,900 km). Its primary goal is to ensure faster, more efficient, and cost-effective movement of goods and passengers. According to studies, the INSTC can reduce transport costs between India and Russia by about 30% and cut transit time from 40 days to 23–25 days, serving as an alternative to the traditional route via the Suez Canal.

In the context of the globalization of Western sanctions against Russia and the new tariff policy of the Trump administration toward India, this transport corridor acquires new geo-economic significance as a viable alternative logistics artery.

For Russia, the corridor represents an instrument for diversifying exports beyond Europe and an “economic path to salvation.” For India, it has strategic value by providing access to Central Asian and Afghan markets while bypassing Pakistan, and by serving as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly its component—the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which New Delhi views as encroaching on its sovereignty (as it passes through disputed Kashmir).

The study shows that the use of the INSTC is already demonstrating positive effects. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian crisis, bilateral trade has grown, reaching $11.9 billion between April 2021 and February 2022 (an increase of approximately 46%). The corridor is expected to further boost trade volumes, including in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, agricultural products (onions, spices, tea), diamonds, and coking coal. The development of the corridor also stimulates institutional cooperation: negotiations are underway on a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), interbank links have been established, and business forums are being held.

The study examines the INSTC in detail as India’s strategic response to China’s expansion. Unlike the BRI, which the authors criticize for its “debt trap” and lack of transparency, the INSTC is presented as a transparent, multilateral, and fair model of regional integration based on consensus. It allows India to project soft power, strengthening its image as a responsible leader of the Global South. India’s investments in the port of Chabahar (Iran) are a key element of this strategy, ensuring control over a critical node of the corridor.

Despite optimistic forecasts, the implementation of the INSTC faces serious challenges, the article notes. These include the consequences of the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions, instability in Afghanistan following the Taliban’s return to power, complex relations among corridor participants, and the growing rapprochement between China, Iran, and Russia, which complicates the strategic landscape. The success of the project will depend on diplomatic flexibility and the ability of participants to overcome geopolitical disagreements.

The authors conclude that the INSTC represents not merely a trade route, but a transformational geopolitical instrument capable of reshaping Eurasia’s economic landscape. It offers India and Russia a path toward reducing dependence on conflict-prone routes and asserting their roles in the emerging multipolar world. The corridor can provide India with energy security and Russia with economic resilience. However, its full operationalization remains contingent on the resolution of existing regional conflicts and the consolidation of efforts by all interested parties.

Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.