PSCRP-BESA Reports No 233 (September 27, 2026)
Iran is becoming increasingly isolated. Under pressure from the United States, countries that for years had maintained a relatively neutral stance are beginning to sever their remaining ties with the Islamic Republic. The latest development has been the suspension of air links with Iran. As U.S. sanctions against Tehran expand, more countries are closing their airspace to aircraft operated by Iranian airlines. The process began with the UAE and Iraq, but it has not stopped there.
The main external factor behind the current aviation restrictions is the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions package of September 8, 2026, which targeted 36 individuals and entities linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including Iranian airlines and the companies that service them. Washington has also warned foreign businesses about the risk of secondary sanctions.
On September 22, Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) announced that flights by Iranian carriers to Azerbaijan would be suspended from that date. The airline said the decision was linked to the new U.S. sanctions package against Iran, particularly the restrictions affecting the aviation sector. Iran Air initially said that it had received no notification, but Azerbaijani authorities later confirmed that the flights would remain suspended until further notice.
Georgia’s Civil Aviation Agency also announced that it would comply with the sanctions regime. Five of the 27 Iranian airlines targeted by the U.S. Treasury sanctions operate flights to Georgia. They will no longer be permitted to serve those routes.
Although the government of Turkmenistan has made no official statement on the issue, a Tehran-Dushanbe flight that had been due to cross Turkmen airspace was forced to return to the Iranian capital. The Civil Aviation Organization of the Islamic Republic said the pilots learned only after takeoff that Turkmen authorities had closed their airspace to Iranian aircraft. They attempted to reroute through Azerbaijan, but permission was denied there as well. The aircraft ultimately turned back.
The broader picture is that the South Caucasus and Central Asia are increasingly isolating Iran due to U.S. sanctions. Tehran appears to have largely lost its ability to persuade neighboring countries to maintain relations with it, whether by appealing to mutual economic interests or by resorting to threats. Iran’s setbacks in the 2025 war with Israel and the 2026 war with Israel and the United States exposed weaknesses in its military capabilities. At the same time, irrational and aggressive actions by the Iranian authorities, including strikes on Azerbaijani and Turkish territory without justification, have further undermined the argument that maintaining close ties with Tehran can help neighboring states avoid security problems. Recent decisions by Georgia, Azerbaijan and, apparently, Turkmenistan show a growing willingness to align with U.S.-led financial and economic pressure on the Iranian government.
There are, however, exceptions. Armenia continues to cooperate with Iran and is even entering into new agreements with Tehran. On September 14, Armenia and Iran signed a protocol establishing a “facilitated customs corridor,” effectively easing the movement of freight between the two countries. Passenger traffic between Armenia and Iran also continued in late September.
Ten days later, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The two discussed strengthening bilateral relations. Pashinyan expressed satisfaction with the development of Armenian-Iranian cooperation and noted that joint programs were being implemented across a range of sectors.
At almost the same time, Armenian National Assembly Deputy Speaker Ruben Rubinyan received Iran’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Yerevan, Khalil Shirgholami.
During the meeting, the two sides discussed the development of Armenian-Iranian relations and ways to deepen cooperation in a number of areas. They also considered opportunities to expand interparliamentary ties and exchanged views on regional issues.
Meanwhile, Armenian Ambassador to Iran Grigor Hakobyan called for broader cooperation between Yerevan and Tehran in the railway and trade sectors. Hakobyan discussed prospects for expanding rail links with Iran’s Deputy Minister of Roads and Urban Development and CEO of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, Jabbar Ali Zakeri. The two sides reviewed the state of railway infrastructure in both countries and discussed opportunities to expand regional transport and economic links. One of the principal projects under consideration is the construction of a railway connecting the two countries through Armenia’s Syunik Province. For Iran, the project has particular strategic significance: the proposed route would cut across the planned TRIPP transport corridor, an initiative pushed by President Trump that Tehran strongly opposes.
More recently, during a visit to Iran, Chairman of Armenia’s State Revenue Committee Eduard Hakobyan met Iran’s Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance and head of the country’s customs administration, Foroud Asgari. The two signed a protocol establishing an exchange of advance information on goods and vehicles moving through Armenian and Iranian territory under the framework of the “Facilitated Customs Corridor.”
Armenia therefore remains one of the few countries bordering Iran where Tehran’s pressure and incentives still appear to retain some influence. Yerevan continues to expand its cooperation with the Islamic Republic, although it is unclear how long Armenia will be able to move against the broader regional trend. At some point, Yerevan’s potential role in helping Iran circumvent sanctions may find its way onto the agenda in the White House and on Capitol Hill. If that happens, the question will ultimately be put directly to the Armenian authorities.