Beyond the Missiles: Another Strategic Opportunity for Israel
Summer 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The India-Israel relationship has evolved from limited diplomatic engagement into a durable strategic partnership centered on defense cooperation. India’s post-Cold War diversification away from Russian arms created an opening for Israeli systems, while joint development, technology transfer, and India’s “Aatmanirbhar” defense policy have deepened bilateral military ties. Israel has consequently become a major supplier of missiles, air-defense systems, UAVs, and advanced military technology to India. The relationship also carries broader geopolitical significance. India’s strong ties with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, combined with its central role in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), could give it an important role in facilitating deeper Israeli-Saudi economic cooperation and, potentially, future normalization. For Israel, therefore, ties with India provide not only defense revenues and strategic depth in Asia, but also a possible avenue for strengthening its position in the emerging Middle Eastern regional order and counterbalancing Iran.
Israeli weapons are known to be some of the best in the world. The successes of defense firms such as Elbit Systems, Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI), and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems reflect tens of billions of dollars in investment by the Israeli government and foreign governments alike. However, India has become a particularly consistent procurer of Israeli weapons, creating one of Israel’s strongest strategic and economic partners on the globe. Israel’s friendship provides more than just revenues for its defense firms, however. To a lesser degree, opportunities in the India-Israel relationship include, but are not limited to, potential normalization with Saudi Arabia and creating a stronger axis against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The India-Israel relationship has greatly evolved from its surface-level beginnings. On September 17th, 1950, India recognized the State and government of Israel. Although it took 28 months for India to do so, it had a concise statement that said, “The Government of India have decided to accord recognition to the Government of Israel.” This is reflective of India’s attitude toward Israel at the time. As a newly independent state itself, India wanted to position itself as a neutral entity in South Asia. With a reliance on Arab oil, India stopped short of developing further diplomatic relations. In fact, until 1992, India had no embassy, diplomats, or any interaction with Israel on the world stage. To understand why India changed in 1992, it is important to understand the Soviet-Indian defense relationship. Between 1950 and 1992, India had strong relations with the Soviet Union (USSR). Through the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, signed in 1971, India established a long-term strategic relationship with the USSR. It stated that both India and the USSR would agree to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial claims, develop a “sincere” friendship consisting of comprehensive cooperation, and establish “most-favored nation” status between the two nations in terms of economic, scientific, and tech cooperation.
Notably, the document hailed India’s policy of neutrality as essential toward peace. The treaty had a 20-year lifespan. Its most evident effect was the Soviet arms provided to India. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 1980 and 1990, the USSR provided over 28,000 units of military equipment to India and helped to build up India’s domestic defense capabilities through licensed production. The arms mainly consisted of anti-tank missiles, naval ships, and armored vehicles. India, in turn, cooperated with the USSR at the UN and remained a mutual military ally in case of any threat. The two nations maintained close allyship throughout the Cold War. By 1991, however, the Soviet Union was collapsing, and India realized it needed to diversify its defense imports. Acquiring spare parts, equipment, and maintenance became extremely difficult for the Indian military. According to S. Samuel and C. Rajiv at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), India turned to Israel because of its major economic reforms that had just occurred. They deregulated industry and removed nearly all restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, opening the state up to major foreign investments for the first time in its history.
In addition, Israel had an already established export-focused defense ecosystem that consisted of cutting-edge Western military technology. Itzhak Gerberg at the University of Haifa remarks that Western arms had also been proven to have an advantage over Soviet arms during the Gulf War between the United States of America (USA) coalition and Iraq. With a Western-aligned, militarily capable state wanting to create more ties in the region, India saw potential. In 1992, bilateral relations between India and Israel were established. By 2010, the two countries had already signed 48 bilateral agreements, ranging from agricultural to counter-narcotics cooperation. The 2020s have been a historic milestone in the relationship; 26 bilateral agreements were signed between 2021 and 2026, with 17 cooperation efforts on artificial intelligence, higher education, and commodities in February of 2026 alone. The decade represents 36% of all agreements between Israel and India, reflecting a relationship that is continuing to gain depth. What has defined the relationship has not been economic or cultural cooperation, although those aspects have been important; rather, it has been defense.
Imported Israeli Arms
Israel has provided India with some of the most cutting-edge weapons and technology they have to offer. Starting in 1999, Israel supported India in the Kargil war against Pakistan, supplying 20 “Harpy” kamikaze drones and 12 “Searcher” reconnaissance drones. In 2000, Israel sent 36 “Heron” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 180 M-465 artillery guns, 50 Barak-1 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 140 SAM systems, and many maritime radar systems as well. The Barak-1 SAMs were equipped on nearly all Indian naval vessels upon acquisition. The late 2000s represent the most units ordered, mainly due to the jointly developed Barak long-range SAM. During that time, India also ordered an array of missiles, numbering 1800 units. Models included SPICEs, Derbys, Python-5s, and Griffin laser-guided bombs. By 2012, India returned to order 500 more Griffins. Major purchases continued throughout the 2010s, with the most significant purchases of the decade occurring in 2018 and 2019. These orders consisted of 131 Barak-1 SAMs, 260 Spike-MRs, and 100 SPICE missiles. According to the Times of Israel, these deals totaled around $150 million. In 2020-2024, 34% of Israel’s arms exports were sent to India, worth nearly $20.5 billion. In 2025, 35% of all Indian UAVs and 25% of Indian air defense systems came from Israeli firms. In addition, in February 2026, an $8.7 billion arms agreement between Israel and India was signed, with India reportedly purchasing 1000 SPICE missiles, dozens of aircraft radars, and drones. Israel has gone above and beyond to meet the needs of the Indian military.
Joint Development and “Aatmanirbhar”
Some of India and Israel’s most successful agreements have resulted in joint development of missile systems, radars, and improvements to existing systems. The most notable success of joint efforts has been the Barak long-range SAM (LR-SAM). In January 2006, the Indian and Israeli governments signed a $350 million deal to develop LR-SAMs for their respective navies. The standard Israeli-made Barak-1 missiles that both countries used had only a range of 9-10 km; these newer rockets would have a range up to 70 km. An official from the Defense Research & Development Organization of India stated in 2014 that this was a “milestone in cooperation between the two countries in developing advanced weapons systems.” In 2017, the LR-SAMs were deployed by both navies. In 2009, a $1 billion contract between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) created a plan to develop medium-range SAMs (MR-SAMs) that, different from the LR-SAMs, were land-based and designed to take down helicopters and missiles. These also entered service in both Israel and India in 2017. Dual use of these weapons ensures continued cooperation between the two nations and reflects mutual strategic interests in terms of weapons needed. Since 2014, an Indian long-term strategic goal is to dramatically increase domestic production in all economic sectors, including defense. Dubbed “Aatmanirbhar,” this policy requires defense companies to produce 50% to 60% of all products “indigenously,” although the exact percentage depends on the category of capital acquisition. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is allowed up to 74%. This policy has led to a slow but steady decline in Indian arm imports, with India’s global share of defense imports shrinking from 12.4% in 2014 to 10.1% in 2024. Joint development with Israel has boosted India’s own economy, most recently being seen through India’s purchase of Elbit Systems’ PULS rocket launcher. Elbit Systems describes the PULS rocket launcher as a mobile, cost-effective launcher capable of firing at targets up to 300km away. This type of agreement lays the groundwork for Indian domestic production of this Israeli product, through the transfer of technological knowledge. Technology transfers and shared strategic inventories show an understanding of a mutually intertwined future. For India, it means working toward parity with China, maintaining an advantage over Pakistan, and having a similar arsenal to the United States. For Israel, the relationship solidifies its role in the world and its own hemisphere as a serious defense exporter, and continues to provide needed funds for a constantly utilized defense sector.
The India-Israel relationship has shown deep security cooperation not seen by many nations in the world. The depth of intent and significance behind the bilateral relations, however, is not obvious. On closer look, bilateral relations with India are not just about gaining influence in South Asia but could be part of a broader strategy to solidify a place in the Middle East order. The strategy involves the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), a proposed and partially completed transcontinental trade corridor between India and Europe. In September of 2023, the corridor was announced at the G20 summit and backed by the United States, European Union, Saudi Arabia, and India, among other influential states. The proposed route would begin in Mumbai and end in Greece, with stops in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel. Construction began in 2025. Every state, except Saudi Arabia, with stops on the route, recognizes Israel and collaborates in various ways, whether it be Jordan’s water agreements or defense cooperation with the UAE and India. Today, Yoel Guzansky from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) explains that Saudi Arabia is one of 15 Arab nations to still not recognize Israel, and that their support of normalization is only possible through the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Cooperation through IMEC would be a large step in tying Israel and Saudi Arabia economically, potentially speeding up the normalization process. India, which has an essential role in supplying the IMEC, has strong ties to Saudi Arabia. Over 2.7 million Indians live in Saudi Arabia, fueling the Saudi workforce. The nations also enjoy a rich trade relationship, with $42 billion of bilateral trade occurring in FY 2025. In addition, almost 20% of oil imports to India originate from Saudi oil fields. India holds great importance to Saudi Arabia, and vice versa. Israel’s strategic relationship with India could be a force in furthering Saudi-Israel relations. Existing Israeli-Indian ties make the IMEC an extremely important opportunity for Israel to engage with Saudi Arabia on a baseline economic level, even without immediate normalization. Eventually, however, India’s outsized role in both the corridor and strong ties with Saudi Arabia could come to help the Jewish state. Prior to Hamas’ attack on October 7th, Guzansky mentions that Saudi Arabia had been “creeping [toward] normalization” with Israel. A strong enough relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia, even if initially purely economic, could be the base for future diplomacy with the oil-rich kingdom. The success of the IMEC and Indian influence will directly determine if Israel can gain Saudi Arabian recognition.
In summary, India and Israel have a vast defense network that continues to meet the needs of each military respectively. India’s reduction of Russian arms left room for Western arms to enter South Asia. The billions of dollars spent over the past three decades indicate a shared belief in national security and interests and gave Israel a critical place in geopolitics. India’s network, established through being a non-aligned state, also makes it a valuable ally to Israel. When focusing on Israel’s current environment, that network will be crucial in warming relations with Saudi Arabia and hence mitigating risk from Iran. The IMEC will be the launching pad from which these relations will arise.
Adam Bachrach is an undergraduate at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and a Summer 2026 intern at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.