The Iraqi Pipeline Game: How Cooperating with Iraq and Syria Can Help Israel Compete with Turkey
Summer 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Recent wars involving Israel, the United States, and Iran altered the regional balance of power and severely disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. These developments increased the need for alternative overland oil and gas routes and intensified competition between Turkey and Israel as both seek to become important regional energy and trade corridors. Turkey has a geographic advantage, but it is not absolute. Iraqi and Syrian efforts to diversify their external dependencies present Israel with an opportunity to strengthen its regional leverage. If Israel acts while demand for alternative routes remains high, it could become an important transit hub for Middle Eastern oil bound for Europe.
Israel’s wars with Iran produced two shifts that placed Israel in greater competition with Turkey. First, the Shia Crescent weakened considerably, creating a regional power vacuum. Second, Iranian attacks and severe disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz destabilized energy markets and increased the urgency of finding alternative export routes. These changes are particularly important for Iraq and Syria. Both have grown closer to Turkey while also seeking, with varying degrees of American support, to avoid excessive dependence on any single regional power.
These transformations have so far favored Turkey, but demand for alternatives to Hormuz opens another arena of competition. Israel may be able to expand its regional leverage by cooperating with Iraq and Syria and positioning itself as part of an alternative energy corridor serving European markets.
Turkey’s geography as a land bridge between Asia and Europe gives it a natural advantage and has encouraged its ambition to become a regional energy and logistics hub. This overlaps with Israel’s interest in becoming a central node in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Turkey has criticized IMEC for bypassing its territory while advancing competing connectivity projects of its own.
Instability around the Strait of Hormuz has increased demand among European and Gulf states for alternative oil and gas routes. Europe continues to seek diversified energy supplies, while Gulf producers have strong incentives to reduce their exposure to the Hormuz chokepoint. Turkey has used this environment to promote itself as a transit hub for energy reaching Europe, including gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
Turkey has also promoted electrical, gas, oil, and rail connectivity with Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. These projects could strengthen Middle Eastern and European dependence on Turkish transit infrastructure and compete with Israel’s own corridor ambitions. Its growing connectivity with Syria and Iraq is especially relevant.
Already, Turkey is facilitating the annual delivery of a significant 1.2 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani-sourced gas to Syria, and is planning to build up rail links in the country to connect Turkey to the Gulf countries. While this significantly aids in Syria’s reconstruction, it also has the potential to make Syria’s energy market and foreign trade more dependent on Turkey.
Iraq, meanwhile, is developing the Basra-Haditha oil pipeline to connect the oil-rich south with alternative export routes in the northwest. The project is best understood as part of Iraq’s broader effort to diversify exports away from the Strait of Hormuz rather than as a Turkish project. From Haditha, Iraqi planners have considered multiple possible outlets, including routes toward Turkey, Syria, and Jordan. Turkey could benefit if Iraqi oil ultimately reaches Ceyhan, but the pipeline also gives Baghdad greater flexibility to pursue alternatives. Turkey has separately supported the Iraq Development Road, a rail and road project intended to connect the Gulf with Turkey and Europe.
The United States has also supported efforts to diversify regional energy routes. Iraq and Syria have discussed potential oil connections involving an international consortium that includes Chevron, but these proposals remain at an early stage. Iraq has approved preliminary, non-binding agreements and feasibility work, while a possible route from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Baniyas remains under study. If developed, such a corridor could provide another route for Iraqi oil toward European markets while reducing excessive dependence on Turkey. Although this would not constitute an immediate Israeli advantage, Iraq and Syria’s search for diversified routes creates opportunities that Israel could attempt to exploit.
Syria needs gas, and Iraq needs additional oil-export routes. Both have incentives to meet these needs without becoming overly dependent on one country. Israel may therefore have opportunities to balance Turkish influence and strengthen its own position as a regional energy hub. A direct gas agreement with Syria could also give Israel greater control over the terms of its energy relationship with Damascus.
Israel has already benefited from Syria’s need for resources and autonomy through Jordan’s decision to sell Israeli gas forward to Syria, providing 1.45 billion cubic meters per annum, slightly exceeding the amount delivered under the Turkish agreement. This makes Syria less dependent on Turkey and builds leverage for Israel. However, as pointed out in an analysis by Dr. Elai Rettig, this leverage is shared with Jordan, as Israel does not benefit from the ability to determine its terms in negotiations.
Iraq has also pursued a crude oil pipeline toward Aqaba in Jordan. This route would provide another outlet distinct from possible connections to Ceyhan or Baniyas. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stated in March that $1.5 billion in future oil revenues had been allocated for Chinese companies interested in the project, demonstrating Baghdad’s interest in developing additional export options.
If Iraqi oil reaches Aqaba, it could be shipped through the Red Sea toward the Suez Canal, Egypt’s SUMED system, or Asian markets through the Bab el-Mandeb. However, renewed Houthi-Saudi hostilities have again increased security risks surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea shipping routes. During periods of heightened instability, selling oil at Aqaba for onward movement to nearby Eilat could therefore become an alternative. Iraqi politicians have previously opposed the Aqaba pipeline partly because of concerns that it might ultimately supply Israel, so such a route would remain politically sensitive. Private companies purchasing oil at Aqaba and reselling it onward could nevertheless provide a possible commercial mechanism.
Infrastructure already exists in Eilat to move oil directly to Israel’s Mediterranean coast. The Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline has a reported capacity of roughly 1.2 million barrels per day. Its potential as a regional transit route drew attention in 2020-2021 through an agreement involving the movement of Gulf oil through the Eilat-Ashkelon system, although the arrangement encountered major environmental and regulatory opposition and did not develop as initially envisioned. Any renewed large-scale use would therefore still have to address environmental, regulatory, and commercial constraints. In July 2026, Energy Minister Eli Cohen proposed a roughly 700-kilometer pipeline linking Saudi Arabia to Eilat, where oil could enter the existing Trans-Israel Pipeline and continue to Ashkelon and European markets. Also in July, Israel’s Government Companies Authority began an early-stage review of possible privatization of the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company. Together, these developments suggest renewed government interest in the corridor’s commercial potential.
An Aqaba-Eilat route would avoid Suez Canal tolls and require no tanker transport until the oil reached Ashkelon. From there, crude could be refined domestically or exported to Europe. Such a route could diversify Israel’s oil supplies and reduce Iraq’s future dependence on Turkish or Syrian export routes. It could also strengthen Israel’s role as a transit hub in Europe’s import-dependent oil market.
One potential issue is competition for pipeline capacity with Saudi Arabia, a more secure investment location and a central participant in IMEC. Saudi Arabia has not normalized relations with Israel, however, and reports have indicated limited Saudi interest in routing its oil through Israel. In July 2026, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, but President Trump subsequently stated that its implementation was contingent on Saudi normalization with Israel. With no guarantee of an imminent normalization breakthrough, Israel may have reason to pursue Iraqi oil through Aqaba while leaving room for a future Saudi arrangement. Doing so could allow Israel to develop the corridor without making its viability dependent on Saudi participation.
A second issue is that this plan would deepen Israeli dependence on Jordan. Jordan already plays an important intermediary role in regional energy arrangements. According to an analysis by Dr. Elai Rettig, a direct Israeli gas agreement with Syria could therefore be beneficial by allowing Israel to negotiate terms directly, limit indirect benefits to hostile actors, and gain diplomatic credit for contributing to Syrian reconstruction.
A direct agreement with Syria could also support broader Israeli diplomatic goals. A future Israeli government will face the challenge of repairing strained relationships and improving Israel’s international standing. If political conditions permit, publicly contributing to Syrian reconstruction through an energy agreement could complement Israel’s larger effort to become a trade and energy link between the Middle East and Europe.
The regional crisis has strengthened Turkey’s position, already supported by its geographic advantage. At the same time, it has increased the urgency of Iraqi and Syrian efforts to develop energy corridors that do not rely on a single transit state. Israel cannot match Turkey’s geography, but it can make itself useful to states seeking diversified routes. By pursuing a direct gas relationship with Syria and positioning the Eilat-Ashkelon system as a possible outlet for Iraqi oil reaching Jordan, Israel could strengthen its diplomatic and strategic position while advancing its ambition to become an important trade and energy corridor between the Middle East and Europe.
Tom Yaakov Mühlethaler-Zamir is an undergraduate at Bard College Berlin
and a Summer 2026 intern at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.