PSCRP-BESA Reports No 46 (March 30, 2024)
On March 6, Armenia said it had asked Moscow to withdraw Russian border troops from the international airport in Yerevan. This is another sign of weakening Russian influence in the country. This development raises Iran’s concerns that the vacuum left by Russia’s departure will be filled by other forces hostile to the ayatollah regime. As Russia’s influence in Armenia wanes, Iran becomes increasingly interested in replacing Russia in the South Caucasus. Will Armenia turn into another Iranian client state, posing additional threats to Israel?
A New System of Alliances in the South Caucasus: Contradictions in the Projects of Tehran and Yerevan
After Yerevan stopped seeing Russia as a reliable security guarantor, it is attempting to form a new system of alliances. The problem for Yerevan is that it currently enjoys good relations with several countries (France, the U.S., Iran, India), but it is impossible to form a reliable bloc that includes them all. All these countries have only one common interest in the South Caucasus: support for Armenia. In many other key aspects they diverge.
The France-USA-Armenia-India axis is quite possible and would mean a definitive shift of Armenia towards a pro-Western orientation. The Tehran-Delhi-Yerevan axis, while suffering from many contradictions, is also quite realistic in several dimensions. However, this axis inevitably implies Armenia’s abandonment of its Western orientation and restoration of relations with Russia. Moreover, it may create a risk of Armenia becoming another Iranian proxy, which would be terrible from the point of view of Armenia’s own development and modernization.
The most acceptable solution for all parties in the situation of contradictions between the Iran-West and Russia-West axes is India. Therefore, cooperation with India may take a somewhat compromise character for Armenia.
“Armenia needs to diversify its foreign and defense policy to adapt to the evolving security architecture of the South Caucasus which has more Turkish and Azerbaijani influence and less Russian presence. Meanwhile, Armenia should be careful not to antagonize Russia and not to create concerns in Iran by moving too close to the West and far away from Russia. In this context, India is a natural choice for Armenia, as India has a strategic partnership with Russia and the US and cultivates close cooperation with Iran. Thus, geopolitical and geo-economic factors are here to transform Armenia-India friendship into a strategic partnership.”
Some Armenian political thinkers (e.g., Vladimir Pogosyan) indeed seek to create an ideal alliance for Armenia that would involve all of Yerevan’s friends at once. Obviously, given the relations between the West and Iran, this is not feasible.
What are Iran’s interests in this geopolitical configuration?
- Iran does not want the West’s influence in Armenia to increase. If Russia’s influence in Armenia (which was the last country in the region that Russia had influence over, apart from Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) diminishes, Iran aims to replenish that influence either on its own or through a system of friendly alliances.
- Iran wants to further strengthen cooperation along the Tehran-Moscow-New Delhi-Yerevan axis. This cooperation involves both economic aspects, such as the creation of the North-South transport corridor from India to Russia, and military-political aspects, such as through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. India has become an instrument of Iran’s influence on Armenia. The new supplies of Indian arms are facilitated through Iran, and without good relations with Tehran, Yerevan will not receive them. Yerevan does not want to rely only on France and to a lesser extent on the U.S., as Western countries did not provide significant support during the conflict with Azerbaijan.
- Iran seeks to weaken or entirely destroy the strategic link between Baku and Jerusalem. Iran is concerned about Israel’s use of Azerbaijani territory. Tehran is also deeply worried about the spread of separatist sentiments among the Azeris and more generally Turkic peoples of Iran, who make up a large part of its population. Iran once experienced attempts by the Soviet Union to organize the independence of South Azerbaijan, and it fears a repeat of this experience. In addition, Iran has serious disagreements with Baku over the use of the Caspian Sea, although these have been mitigated by Russian-brokered agreements involving all Caspian littoral states. Finally, Iran seeks to replace the Baku-Jerusalem link with two interlocking triangles. One involves non-regional players (Turkey, Russia, Iran), reminiscent of the Astana format on Syria. The other triangle involves three regional countries (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan).
- For Iran, the strengthening of Turkey’s position in the South Caucasus and Central Asia is dangerous, as it would entail facing Turkish dominance of the entire northern border of the country. Meanwhile, Turkey and Iran have historically competed for dominance in the Middle East. In addition, Turkey remains a member of NATO and therefore a U.S. ally. Hence, Tehran would not want the establishment of the Zangezur corridor and especially the trans-Caspian routes. The Zangezur corridor would cut off Iran from Armenia and the Black Sea. Tehran calls the Zangezur corridor the “Turan-NATO corridor” and perceives it as a “conspiracy” of the West. Together with Russia, Iran strongly opposes the trans-Caspian routes. If these projects are realized, Iran will witness a full-scale strengthening of Turkey’s influence on all of its northern borders. It will also be forced to abandon hopes of keeping non-regional powers out of the Caspian and selling its energy resources to Turkey and possibly to Europe. Tehran also fears the displacement of Russian influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus by the West and/or Turkey, especially if Turkey retains its NATO membership, albeit with friction on many issues. Improving relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan is also dangerous for Tehran. In this case, objections to the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, envisaged by the “zero problems” policy pursued by Erdogan’s party immediately after coming to power, are removed. And the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations destroys Armenia’s interest in seeking regional allies and gives Yerevan the opportunity to completely reorient itself towards the West.
- Iran, given its strong political and economic ties with China and the fact that China represents a growing geopolitical alternative to the United States, does not object to the expansion of Chinese influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Thus, the ideal scenario for Tehran regarding the situation in the South Caucasus would be the following: Russia maintains its position in Armenia, while China strengthens its position in the region as a whole. Iran forms the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran-Yerevan axis with them. At the same time, the New Delhi-Tehran-Moscow-Yerevan axis develops alongside it. Tehran hopes that these two axes will be able to balance the influence of the West and Israel and limit Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus. It is clear that such an ideal scenario for Tehran is full of contradictions, as is the US-France-Iran-India combination ideal for Armenia.
- Iran is interested in fully developing cooperation with Armenia to compensate for the weakening of Russian influence. In other words, it seeks to become Armenia’s new patron. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran, signed at the end of 2023, offers an opportunity to triple the trade turnover between the EAEU and Iran in the near future. This creates significant opportunities for Armenia, as it is the only member state of the EAEU with a land border with Iran. Armenia’s dependence on external energy supplies is particularly high. Previously, this dependence led to economic disaster after the Turkish-Azerbaijani transportation blockade. Today, a large portion of Armenia’s gas is supplied from Russia at a price of $165 per 1,000 cubic meters. In recent years, Russian gas supplies through Georgia have been temporarily halted for various reasons. Iran can supply Armenia with about 1 billion cubic meters of gas per year, which is more than half of its annual consumption. Regional investment programs are also being developed, such as the opening of the new Agarak-Kajaran highway. Armenia is involved in such projects as the North-South transport corridor and the Persian Gulf-Black Sea transport corridor with the participation of Iran. From Armenia’s perspective, these projects play a crucial role in overcoming the Turkish and Azerbaijani transportation blockades.
From a security perspective, Iran has consistently stated its willingness to guarantee the current regional configuration of borders in the South Caucasus, which implies preserving Armenia’s borders as they are. This is particularly important for Armenia, as Western countries have shown sympathy for Armenia in a number of critical situations, but nothing more than sympathy. In September 2022, Iran reportedly exerted pressure on Azerbaijan to avoid a new armed conflict between Baku and Yerevan. Diplomatic cooperation is also growing, including the opening of a consulate in Kapan. Armenia does not fear Western sanctions for expanding cooperation with Tehran, as neither European states nor the U.S. have so far expressed serious concern about it.
Recent diplomatic developments around the South Caucasus
Let’s examine recent diplomatic events around the South Caucasus through the prism of cooperation and conflict between Iran and Armenia.
“Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit Russia’s focus on its invasion of Ukraine to increase their influence in the Caucasus.” Therefore, Tehran seeks to coordinate its positions with Russia to the fullest extent. In July 2023, Iranian Supreme Leader’s foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati argued that Russia should not forget about the South Caucasus in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, otherwise the situation would be exploited by the US and NATO to create a pan-Turkic alliance from Istanbul to Xinjiang, which would “surround Iran from the north and Russia from the south.”
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the security situation in the Caucasus during a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 19, 2024. Russia’s official statements about the conversation between Raisi and Putin did not specifically mention discussing the Caucasus. According to Russia’s official information, the talk focused mainly on the situation in Gaza and cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. Nevertheless, various sources say that Raisi told Putin that Iran is ready to “ensure stability” in the region and protect Iran’s strategic interests in the Caucasus.
Iran actively pursues this line in its contacts with Armenia. In October 2023, Iranian Foreign Minister Abdollahian at a meeting with Armenian National Security Council Secretary Grigoryan called the 3+3 cooperation format (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, plus Turkey, Russia, and Iran) an “effective mechanism for resolving regional issues without the intervention of foreign powers.”
On March 6, 2024, Armenian Defense Minister Papikyan visited Iran and met with Iranian Defense Minister Ashtiani. The Iranian minister confirmed Iran’s position aimed at preserving Armenia’s current borders. Iran supports the emerging trend towards direct negotiations between Yerevan and Baku. However, the Iranian defense minister warned Armenia against the involvement of “external players” in the region, referring to Western countries.
Papikyan also met with Iranian President Raisi. The Iranian president emphasized the importance of “non-interference of external forces in regional affairs” and called for cooperation exclusively with regional countries.
On March 9, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vagan Kostanyan visited Tehran and held talks on similar topics with Iranian Foreign Minister and his deputy.
According to a publication by Russian expert Stanislav Tarasov, who is close to the Russian authorities, Moscow supports the Iranian game plan. Tarasov also called for preventing external (Western) players from entering the region. He emphasized that if both Tehran and Moscow stand against Armenia simultaneously, its existence will be in question. This message, as Tarasov points out, is being conveyed to Armenia by the Iranian side.
Conclusions and perspectives from the point of view of Israeli interests
Iran and Russia are currently trying to coordinate their actions in the South Caucasus in order to prevent the diminishing Russian influence from being replaced by Western influence. In this case, the diminishing Russian influence will be replaced by Iranian influence. Iran would become Armenia’s new patron and it could eventually join the ranks of pro-Iranian proxies, with dire consequences for the country. In this scenario, Iran would also gain new arguments and resources in its interaction with Russia, Turkey and India, which it could exchange for something else. This could create new threats to Israel.
Therefore, the reverse situation would be favorable to Israel. Armenia and Azerbaijan settle their differences peacefully. Turkey establishes a transportation corridor through Zangezur and the Caspian Sea, ensuring maximum independence of Central Asian countries from Iran and its allies. A bloc of states supporting Armenia’s security and preventing Iranian influence in the South Caucasus is created, which includes the U.S., France and India. Israel continues to maintain good relations with Azerbaijan and uses its support for Turkic integration projects as an argument for rapprochement with Turkey. Furthermore, the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan also improves relations between Israel and Armenia.