PSCRP-BESA Reports No 36 (February 15, 2024)
In his interview with Tucker Carlson, President Vladimir Putin provided justification for his policy toward Ukraine. In particular, considerable attention was paid to Putin’s interpretation of history, according to which Ukraine is a historical part of Russia and the Ukrainian people (at least its eastern part) are part of the Russian ethnos.
It is quite obvious that Putin’s interpretation of the events in Ukraine was enthusiastically supported by the official Russian press. It is equally obvious that in Ukraine itself, as well as in the opposition Russian émigré press, it was received extremely negatively. The perception of this interview in other post-Soviet countries is somewhat more complicated.
Alexander Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus is closely tied to Moscow and supports President Putin’s policies. Therefore, it is not surprising that the official Belarusian media supported Putin’s statements. It is equally obvious that the Belarusian opposition abroad expressed negative views on the matter. Among the opposition to Lukashenko’s regime, Putin’s interview is perceived in the context of documents published in the German and Russian opposition press, according to which Russia is trying to absorb Belarus by 2030 through gradual integration into the Union State of Russia and Belarus.
In Moldova, whose government has condemned Putin’s policy toward Ukraine, his interview is perceived in the context of the possibility of Russian troops invading the country. In March-September 2022, there was a flare-up in Transnistria, which threatened to spill over into Moldova. However, this did not occur. According to a number of documents published in the media, Russia seeks to absorb Moldova using not only military but also non-military means. The issue is perceived in a similar way in neighbouring Romania, historically linked to Moldova. In particular, of Romania’s chief of staff shared earlier this year his belief that Putin will target Moldova if he is not stopped in Ukraine.
The most complex and acute reaction to Putin’s interview has been observed in Kazakhstan. There, the border issue with Russia periodically intensifies, as a number of Russian politicians and media personalities constantly raise the question of ownership of the northern territories of Kazakhstan. The issue has now resurfaced in connections with two recent events in the Russia media that are not directly related to Putin’s appearance.
First, Tina Kandelaki, a Russian TV host and deputy director of Gazprom-Media, stated that the language rights of Russian speakers in Kazakhstan were being “suppressed.” This provoked a strong reaction in Kazakhstan. A representative of the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that she would be banned from entering its territory. An interesting flash mob emerged in Kazakhstan — ethnic Russians made videos objecting to Tina Kandelaki’s claims about their alleged language “oppression” in the country.
The second event that triggered a harsh negative reaction in Central Asia was a statement made by historian Mikhail Smolin on the Russian TV channel NTV that “Kazakhs and Uzbeks did not exist as nations before the 1917 revolution.” He thus echoed Putin’s consistent argument, also present in his interview with Carlson, that “Ukrainians did not exist.” Smolin’s statements on Russian television further fueled fears in Kazakhstan that the country could become a new target of the Kremlin. These fears are exacerbated by persistent rumors that Russia may organize a hybrid military operation in either the Baltics or in northern Kazakhstan before the war in Ukraine is over, as recently voiced by former MGIMO professor Valery Solovey. Tensions are also heightened by the fact that the Russian-controlled media continue to actively criticize President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev for his (as they believe) “liberal” and “pro-Western” policies.
On the other hand, Kazakhstan, within the framework of the multi-vector foreign policy pursued by its authorities, seeks cooperation with Russia and depends on it to a large extent. Therefore, the authorities of this country and the media under their control try to maintain a balance and not to criticize Putin too harshly, occasionally focusing on secondary figures such as Tina Kandelaki.
As the blog of the propagandist Russian TV channel Tsargrad noted with indignation, the official media in Kazakhstan pretended not to notice Putin’s interview at all. This was the best option, given the urgency of the issue, on the one hand, and Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russia, on the other.
If we turn to independent media outlets, the reaction to the interview varies from sharply critical to neutrally friendly. For example, the Kazakhstani weekly Ak Zhaik published an article saying that even in propagandist Russian Telegram channels Putin’s interview elicited as much as a smirk. Ulus Media noted that Putin had once again retold all the narratives of Russian propaganda. Arasha Kz reported on the critical reaction of the Western press to Putin’s interview. Forbes Kazakhstan simply summarized the content of the interview. Among the relatively positive opinions for Putin is the publication in Kazakhstan Expert, where the interview is considered from the perspective of finding common ground between Russia and the West.
In other Central Asian countries that do not have concerns about possible territorial claims from Russia, government-controlled media also chose to follow Kazakhstan’s example and ignore Putin’s interview. Russian media outlets broadcasting in Kyrgyzstan tried to launch an information campaign criticizing the way Putin’s interview was perceived in the West and praising his rhetoric. Interestingly, they sought commentary from an expert specializing on Belarus.
In Kyrgyzstan, Putin’s interview and the international discussion that followed were overshadowed by the conflict between Kyrgyzstan and the United States regarding the pressure of the Kyrgyz authorities on civil society. In particular, President Japarov responded to a relevant appeal by US Secretary of State Blinken with a statement that the US should not interfere in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs. This is taking place against the backdrop of active persecution of independent media in the country. In principle, against the background of these events, Putin’s interview looks positive in the eyes of the authorities, who are also closely linked to Russia.
In Uzbekistan, only pro-Russian media such as Vesti.Uz gave positive coverage to Putin’s interview. The independent Tajik news agency Asia-Plus made a fairly neutral publication about the interview and the reaction to it.
In Armenia, Putin’s interview with Carlson was sidelined on the news agenda because of Pashinyan’s comment on whether Putin could enter Armenia after it ratified the statute of the International Criminal Court, and because of Armenia’s gradual distancing from its military alliance with Russia. Russian propaganda in Armenia emphasized that Putin’s interview had many viewers across the globe, a point echoed by Armenian media.
In Georgia, media focus is dominated by discussion of the change of government, while discussions about Putin’s interview tend to be neutral or critical. The Georgian government tries to maintain good relations with the Kremlin; however, Putin’s anti-Ukrainian statements are perceived in the context of Russia’s support for separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in this country.
In Azerbaijan, the media mainly focused on issues related to the recent presidential elections and the country’s relations with Armenia. Therefore, the press did not pay much attention to Putin’s interview, and the tone of references was generally neutral.
Overall, Putin’s interview with Carlson did not bring anything fundamentally new for post-Soviet countries. Regardless of whether they view Putin’s Russia favorably or unfavorably, political elites and even ordinary residents of post-Soviet countries are well acquainted with all of Putin’s relevant rhetoric. Each post-Soviet country has its own information agenda. To the extent that this agenda concerns Russia, the issue of Putin’s interview with Carlson arises in the local media.
Putin’s opponents emphasize the artificiality of his interpretation of history and the inconsistency of his arguments. Putin’s supporters focus on the high viewership of the interview, the problems with the functioning of right-wing journalism in the West, and the issue of dialogue between Russia and the West. Even Putin’s supporters in some post-Soviet countries try to describe the interview in a more or less balanced manner, without lavish praise for Putin that is characteristic only of the press controlled by the Russian government.
In some countries with close relations with Russia, the Russian media used the interview to launch a propaganda campaign; however, this campaign did not generate much enthusiasm. Putin’s interview provoked particularly negative emotional reactions in countries where it coincided with existing informational-propagandistic pressure from Russia and where there were fears that the countries in question could become the next target of Russian territorial expansion.