PSCRP-BESA Reports No 38 (March 4, 2024)
Factors shaping the positions of Central Asian elites in the Arab-Israeli conflict
Central Asian countries lack access to the world’s oceans, which is necessary for successful economic development. Meanwhile, these countries are surrounded by conflicts that not only hinder their development, but pose a threat to Central Asia. To the north and west is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia and NATO; to the west is the Azerbaijani-Armenia conflict, which that impedes direct communication between Central Asia and Turkey; to the east is the tension between China and the United States; to the south — hostilities between India and Pakistan along with the ongoing war in Afghanistan. The Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the confrontation between Iran and Israel, Iran and the U.S., is perceived as yet another threat in this context.
Many Central Asians with whom I have spoken believe that the outside world is not particularly interested in Central Asian issues. This is evident in Afghanistan, abandoned by the global community to its fate. Poor by world standards, the Central Asian states now find themselves financially burdened with the need to help Afghanistan, which is not only experiencing a humanitarian catastrophe but also poses a terrorist threat to its neighbors. Therefore, the general position of the Central Asian states on many global problems, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, is: “This does not concern us directly.” It is seen as a foreign war. Central Asian countries have no specific interests in this conflict. These countries would benefit from the resolution of this conflict as it has the potential to expand and somehow impact them.
The article in The Diplomat rightly points out[1] that the countries in the region maintain close cooperation with Israel (for example, Kazakhstan supplies oil to Israel and receives military technology, Uzbekistan actively develops trade and medical-technological cooperation with Israel, etc.). As the author of the article notes, even while making official anti-Israeli statements in connection with the situation in Gaza, the Central Asian countries do not intend to curtail this cooperation.
As my conversations with Central Asian experts and leaders have shown, the attitudes of the Central Asian states towards the war in Gaza are driven by a complex web of overlapping considerations.
First, Israel is perceived as an important part of the Western, American-centric world. Consequently, relations with Israel are seen as a component of an intricate set of strategies in the multi-vector foreign policy of Central Asian governments. This policy aims to maintain a delicate balance, primarily in the triangle of relations among the three key powers in Eurasia: China, Russia and the West. The current rapprochement between China and Russia, as well as their conflict with the West, has created a challenging strategic situation for the Central Asian countries, as they have become dependent on Moscow and Beijing. The collective influence of Russia and China in Central Asia is such that it could potentially strip the region’s countries of their independence. Therefore, the Central Asian states are interested in developing relations with the West in order to balance their dependence on Russia and China.
The two key countries in the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are now actively pursuing political and economic reforms. Strengthening their Western orientation is part of their strategy of reform and enhancing their independence. The other three smaller countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) are preoccupied with internal issues and are generally not ready to invest their resources in supporting any of the forces in the Middle East.
Central Asian political elites realize that the West is divided on the Palestinian issue due to the activism of leftist and liberal forces opposed to Israel’s policies. As humanitarian problems worsened during the Gaza war, the sympathies of many Central Asians leaned towards the Arabs. This aligns with the general perception of the Gaza conflict in a number of Western countries among left-liberal circles. In addition, the pro-Western orientation in Central Asia has historically, since the 1990s, been linked to an alignment with Turkey. In Turkish public opinion, heavily influenced by the Erdogan’s government propaganda, condemnation of Israel is prevalent. Turkey’s example also shows that a country can be an ally of the U.S. and still condemn the Israeli government. Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia demonstrate many of the potential nuances in dealing with Israel while maintaining good relations with the United States.
However, in the opinion of Central Asian elites, Western support for Israel remains fundamental. Judging from my conversations with Central Asian experts and political figures, they consider Israel to be a crucial country in contemporary world politics and economics. Israel’s influence is tied not only to its economic, technological and military potential, but especially to Israeli lobbying in the Western world, primarily in the United States. Therefore, Central Asian elites are reluctant to seriously strain relations with Israel.
Russia and China in general, according to Central Asian elites, are interested in reducing U.S. influence in the Middle East. Consequently, they are interested in weakening Israel as one of the key allies of the U.S. The influence of China and Russia on the Central Asian countries is significant. Therefore, it makes no sense for Central Asian countries to quarrel with them. This leads sometimes to a formally pro-Palestinian position (supporting the position of the official Abbas administration rather than Hamas) of the Central Asian governments.
However, these countries do not want a conflict with Israel and the West. They want to guarantee Western support for their independence in case of increased pressure from the joined effort of China and Russia. Therefore, they try to emphasize the pragmatism and moderation of their position.
Islam, society, and the state as factors defining attitudes towards the war in Gaza
An important aspect of the problem of the Gaza war is related to the Shia-Sunni split in the Middle East and the confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In this confrontation, even Tajikistan, which is culturally close to Iran, leans more toward Saudi Arabia than the Islamic Republic. None of the Central Asian countries wants to enter the orbit of Iran’s foreign policy, which is considered, first, too radical and, second, based on the Shiite version of Islam that is alien to Central Asian Sunnis.
The difference in attitudes toward Israel between the pragmatism of the ruling elite and the emotional sentiments of the masses in Central Asia is not as significant as in the Middle East, so there is no such phenomenon as the Arab street here. The issues of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism hold no importance for the Turkic population of the region.
The concept of pan-Islamic solidarity does exist among some Central Asians, but it has been weakened by decades of Soviet secularism. This is evident when one compares it to Islamic solidarity in neighboring Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, societies and states have taken a sharply anti-Israeli stance, while Iran can be considered a party to the conflict.
The issue of religious extremism plays a crucial role in the perception of the Gaza war in Central Asia. For more than 30 years, Central Asian elites have combated the orientation of local Muslims toward the Arab world and the rejection of local, more moderate Islamic traditions in favor of those prevalent in the Middle East. This is referred to as the “struggle against Wahhabism.” Hamas is perceived as a radical extremist organization that Central Asian elites will not tolerate in their countries. Orientation toward the version of Islam advocated by Hamas is considered extremist by the political elites of Central Asia. Therefore, any openly pro-Hamas statements in Central Asia are suppressed and will continue to be suppressed.
Anti-Israeli groups in Central Asian societies and the recruitment of fighters for the war against Israel
Nevertheless, there are small but visible pressure groups in Central Asian Societies that would like to see more pro-Arab and anti-Israeli action on the part of Central Asian states.
In Kazakhstan, for example, a petition calling for an end to oil exports to Israel has appeared on the Internet, and attempts have been made to boycott global brands that support Israel. In Kyrgyzstan, Muslim and Orthodox Christian activists initiated a collection of aid for the residents of the Gaza Strip. Interestingly, this initiative found informational support from Rossiyskaya gazeta, which is officially owned by the Russian government.
Governments in the region are trying to suppress any violent or informal activity regarding support for Hamas. In Uzbekistan, authorities banned activities in support of Palestine. More than 100 individuals who tried to hold a pro-Hamas rally in Amir Temur Square were prosecuted.
Andrei Serenko, a well-known Russian orientalist and an expert in Central Asia and Afghanistan, noted in his Telegram channel that on November 18, 2023, two citizens of Tajikistan attempted to set fire to a Jewish educational center in Almaty, Kazakhstan. On November 20, four individuals from various Central Asian countries (including Tajikistan) attempted to carry out a pre-planned attack on the office of the Jewish Agency in Almaty. In both cases, the attackers were detained by the police. There are rumors that the detainees confessed to being linked with Iran. Andrei Serenko writes, citing a Kazakhstani source: “Almost all the agents were Tajiks, and they admitted that they carried out these sabotage activities under the guidance of Iranian curators.”
The Israeli ambassador noted the increase in anti-Semitism among the population of Uzbekistan in connection with the war in Gaza, manifested in particular in an increase in anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli discussions online, as well as in attempts to resort to violence. In Tashkent, an attempt was made to set fire to a synagogue.
Especially serious anti-Israeli sentiment is observed among the citizens of Tajikistan, which is associated with Iranian influence. In particular, attempts to attack Jewish buildings in Kazakhstan were linked to citizens of Tajikistan. The relatively easy recruitment of Tajik citizens by Iranian intelligence services is attributed to three factors: a shared language and culture, challenging socio-economic conditions for both residents of Tajikistan and Tajik labor migrants, and the factor of religious solidarity with Palestinian Arabs.
From the point of view of Israel’s strategic interests, the situation among some groups of Tajiks in Central Asia is a new and dangerous development. Andrei Serenko, citing various sources, talks about the recruitment of hundreds, if not thousands of militants from Central Asia by Iran. Many of them are Tajiks, but there are also Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. Iranian intelligence services send these militants to the conflict zone with Israel. Central Asian militants typically travel to Palestine via two routes. The first is Iranian (directly from Central Asia to Tehran, then to Syria and then to the conflict zone). The second is the Afghan-Iranian route (first to Afghanistan, then to Iran, then to Syria, and then to the conflict zone). There is also a third route, via Russia and Turkey (from Central Asia to Russia, then to Turkey, then to Syria and further into the conflict zone).
Iranian special services seem to have discovered a new source of recruitment among some vulnerable social groups in Central Asia. Previously, recruiting fighters against Israeli interests was mainly limited to one of the Afghanistan’s predominantly Shia minorities, the Hazara people. They constitute the Fatemiyoun militia, which is mainly sent to Syria to fight for President Assad. In Afghanistan, the Fatemiyoun militia is closely intertwined with Hezbollah Afghanistan, which is a Shia Islamist political party supported by Iran. Fatemiyoun usually has very complicated relations with the Taliban (a Sunni and Pushtun organization) and not-so-friendly relations with Sunni Afghan Tajik groups. Currently, due to the politically motivated emigration of Afghan and Central Asian Sunni Tajiks to Iran and the very poor socio-economic situation in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Iranian influence among the Tajiks has increased.
Conclusion: Positions of elites and social groups in relation to the war in Gaza
The three points discussed above (the complex geopolitical relations in the Russia-West-China triangle, the Shia-Sunni conflict in the Middle East, and the problem of religious extremism) lead to a rather complex equation defining the positions of Central Asian elites regarding the Gaza conflict.
Overall, the official position of the Central Asian states is closer to the Palestinian than to the Israeli side. It is not a question of supporting Hamas, but rather of recognizing Abbas’s Palestinian administration. However, these countries have no intention to sever relations with Israel. They do not want to give up cooperation with Israel. They do not intend to damage relations with Israel’s allies, primarily the United States. For reasons of maintaining good relations with Israel and the West, and to avoid radicalization of society, Central Asian governments do not allow mass anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic incidents on their territory. Being diplomatically closer to the Palestinian position, Central Asian governments also strive to employ peaceful and humanitarian rhetoric. They carefully avoid making any bellicose statements against Israel or its Western allies in the Middle East.
To maintain balance in their multi-vector foreign policy, Central Asian elites try to fulfill commitments to pan-Muslim and humanitarian solidarity with Arabs. At the same time, they try not to spoil relations with crucial neighbors and partners such as Russia, China, Turkey, the Arab states and Iran. All these states put pressure on the positions of the Central Asian countries in favor of an anti-Israeli stance.
Both for the sake of balance in statements and because of concerns about the rise of religious extremism, elites in most Central Asian countries are eager to condemn terrorism, hostage-taking, and religious extremism. Leaders in the region call for nonproliferation of the conflict, its peaceful resolution, and the avoidance of further civilian casualties.
The majority of the region’s population remains fairly indifferent to the Middle Eastern conflicts, not considering them “their own.” However, there are anti-Israeli activist groups associated with various countries, primarily Iran. The latter actively recruits militants to fight Israel, especially among ethnic Tajiks.