Dagestan and Northern Caucasus – the first Anti-Semitic pogroms in Post-Soviet Russian History

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 13 (November 1, 2023)

For a long time, it was believed that Jewish pogroms in Russia were a distant relict of the Tsarist past. The Soviet regime, despite its inherent elements of state anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, especially during and after the late Stalin era, could not tolerate anti-Semitic pogroms due to its ideology. In post-Soviet Russia, pogroms and ethnic clashes were usually associated with tensions between Russian-speaking and Muslim (primarily North Caucasian, Chechen, and Dagestani) populations. In this context, one can mention the pogrom in Kondopoga, Karelia, in 2006, which occurred during Putin’s presidency. These pogroms were directed at fomenting enmity between Slavs and Muslims, rather than targeting Jews. This was because there were very few Jews left in post-Soviet Russia, and the residual anti-Semitism from the late Soviet period gradually dissipated at both the state and societal levels.

The monitoring of public opinion in relation to various ethno-national and religious groups that Levada Center has been carrying out since 1992, showed about 10% of respondents are “sympathetic” to the Jews, more than 70% are “positively neutral”, while only a fifth of respondents express a negative attitude to them.

Nevertheless, in late October 2023, events took place in the Russian North Caucasus that can be considered the first anti-Semitic pogroms in post-Soviet Russia. The actions of the rioters were motivated by religious (Islamic), racial, and national hostility towards Jews and Israelis, although, due to fortuitous circumstances, no physical harm came to Jews or Israelis during these events. Israeli President Itzhak Herzog described the pogroms in Dagestan as “pure and controlled anti-Semitism.”

 What events took place in the Russian North Caucasus?

The events in the Russian North Caucasus, as noted by Kremlin-affiliated political analyst Sergei Markov, reminded Russian authorities of the Prigozhin Mutiny, and alarmed them with the absence of real central control over the events in the regions of Russia. “The anti-Jewish pogrom at the Machatschkala airport is important for Russia primarily as a case that reminds everybody of the Prigozhin Mutiny. It had the same suddenness for the authorities but was entirely expected by experts. The same paralysis of local authorities, which have been unable to do anything for a long time, the same confusion in central authority… for most, what happened is one of the indicators of the weakness of Russia’s state political structures.”

Most concerning for Russian authority was the fact that the Dagestani police didn’t even attempt to resist the rioters. The government’s use of force only began when riot police were dispatched from other parts of Russia.

Posts calling for the takeover of the airport started appearing in Dagestani Telegram channels “Morning in Dagestan,” “Dagestan’s Delight,” and “Dagestan Here” on Saturday, October 28. In the evening of October 29, hundreds of young men with shouts of “Allahu Akbar” and Palestinian flags stormed the Machatschkala airport in anticipation of a flight from Tel Aviv to Moscow. Protesters conducted searches in the premises, inspected all planes, and checked passports of passengers leaving the airport by car. They were looking for people who had arrived from Israel.

The passengers on the flight from Tel Aviv, which was the target of the rioters, had the most difficult experience during the pogrom. The bus carrying passengers from this flight was pursued by the rioters for a long time, and they pelted it with stones. Out of the 45 passengers on board, there were 15 Israelis, including children. Many of them were en route to Moscow and had a layover in Makhachkala. The crowd managed to stop the bus, and those who entered it began questioning the passengers to determine if they were Jewish. Most of the Israelis on the bus spoke Russian and had Russian passports, so they claimed to be Russian. Only one Israeli, a 26-year-old named Shmuel who didn’t speak Russian, was mistaken for an Arab-Muslim by his neighbours and was thus saved.

As a result of the disturbances, 20 people were injured, including nine police officers. On the afternoon of October 30, five of them remained in the hospital, with two in critical condition. Up to 1500 people participated in the pogrom.

The pogroms were not limited to the capital of Dagestan. In Cherkessk (the capital of Karachay-Cherkessia), an anti-Semitic rally took place near the government building, where participants demanded that Jews from Israel not be allowed to enter this Russian region. In Nalchik (another North Caucasian region, Kabardino-Balkaria) a Jewish center under construction was set on fire.

Unrest also occurred in another Dagestani city, Khasavyurt, located on the border between Dagestan and Chechnya. A crowd of rioters gathered outside the “Flamingo” hotel, claiming to be looking for Israeli Jews who had allegedly checked into local hotels. The police’s role was limited to helping the rioters check the passports of all the hotel guests, and they did not find any Jews. Afterward, an announcement appeared on the doors of the “Flamingo” with the text: “Foreigners, citizens of Israel (Jews) are strictly prohibited from entering! (And do not live here!)”.

Why did these events happen?

It seems that the reasons behind these events can be divided into two different groups. The first group pertains to how the conditions were created that formed a favorable environment for the pogroms. This question is widely discussed by opinion leaders in Russia, and most experts agree that the current Russian government has created the conditions in which even a minor spark, whether from within Russia or from outside of it, could lead to a Jewish pogrom. The second question is which specific actor could have organized these events, if they didn’t happen spontaneously at all. This question is discussed less actively in the public sphere, although there are some interesting hypotheses presented in the media and among experts that deserve further research.

Let’s focus on the first set of explanations: how the conditions were created to form a favorable environment for the pogroms.

1. Anti-Israeli propaganda in Russian media. The Russian authorities, both in official rhetoric from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in unofficial media propaganda, did not strongly condemn the mass terrorist attack committed by Hamas on October 7. They, in general, did not acknowledge Israel’s right to self-defense and to combat this terrorist organization. This could have been interpreted by some Islamic radicals in the North Caucasus as cautious public support for the actions of Hamas and might have encouraged them to replicate similar actions. Russian media, like left-leaning Western and Arab media, place significant emphasis on the casualties in Gaza resulting from the actions of the Israeli army. This could have prompted those in the Caucasus who sympathize with the Palestinians to seek revenge against Israel. This type of propaganda of Russian authorities made aggression against Jews and Israelis socially acceptable. Prominent Russian political technologist Abbas Gallyamov has pointed to this as one of the most obvious reasons for the events.
2. Propaganda against Ukraine emphasized the Jewish origin of President Zelensky. Equally significant were the constant remarks by representatives of the Russian government, describing President Zelensky and some other leaders of Ukraine (whom they hold responsible for the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine) as Jewish. For instance, a propagandist and military correspondent close to the Russian authorities and a member of the Human Rights Council under the President of Russia, Alexander Kotz, wrote the following addressing to the Caucasus people: “Are you so brave and want to kill Jews? Go to Gaza. Or to Kiev. I know the address of one; I can provide it: Bankovskaya, 11 [i.e., office of the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky]”. Thus, the Russian authorities suggest the existence of a hidden reason for the war in Ukraine, linked to a certain “Jewish conspiracy.”
3. The Myth of the “New Khazaria.” What type of “Jewish conspiracy” could representatives of the Russian government have hinted at? In a series of provocative rumors that led to pogroms in the North Caucasus, elements of the so-called “Khazar Myth”[1] were used, which were widely employed by far-right circles in Russia to explain the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The essence of this myth was that a supposed “Jewish conspiracy” led to the war in Ukraine. According to the proponents of this absurd theory, this conspiracy aimed to recreate a “New Khazaria” in the Ukrainian steppes, clearing these territories of Slavic inhabitants. The alleged plan was to relocate to this “New Khazaria” either American Jews due to an impending eruption of the Yellowstone volcano and the geological destruction of America or Israeli Jews due to the pressure from the Arabs. President Putin himself, the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Security Council of Russia hinted at various elements of this myth in some of their speeches. This myth, as noted by its main researcher, anthropologist Victor Schnirelmann, has undergone many modifications. For the purpose of organizing unrest in the North Caucasus, it was adapted in various publications on Telegram channels such as “Dagestan’s morning” as follows. Now the threat of creating a “Khazaria” was seen in the North Caucasus (which is, incidentally, closer to the actual location of this medieval state than the Ukrainian steppes). The establishment of such a state was described because of the “imminent exodus of Jews from Israel”. Local residents of the North Caucasus were frightened by the idea that Jews would allegedly take over their lands and expel them. This is why, at some rallies, there were demands from the local population not to allow Jews from Israel into their territory.

 It is worth noting that the Russian authorities engaged in certain elements of provocation among the population of the North Caucasus in favor of this myth. Moreover, it’s not just about hints from propagandists or government representatives. For anyone familiar with real Israeli life, the question of evacuating Israelis to the Russian North Caucasus and, even more so, the creation of some “New Israel” there is complete nonsense. Nevertheless, it was the Russian authorities themselves, who operated within such a logic. A week before the pogrom in Dagestan, an announcement appeared on the Russian social network VKontakte, stating that volunteers from an organization close to Rossotrudnichestvo (the official Russian organization working with compatriots abroad) would organize an online conference for Israeli citizens with representatives of the government of Dagestan and Makhachkala, where they would be told about the possibility of relocating from Israel to Dagestan. The project organizer is a non-profit organization called “The Way Home,” which was established on June 5, 2023. The list of participants in the meeting includes representatives from the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Dagestan Customs, and the Medical Insurance Fund. It was this supposed meeting that sparked online rumours, leading to the unrest. In this context, an obvious question arises, for which there is no answer yet: was it the result of foolishness of Rossotrudnichestvo and the Dagestani authorities who did not know the prevailing sentiments in the North Caucasus, or was it a deliberate provocation by Russian special services (clearly, Rossotrudnichestvo is controlled by them)?

4. Channeling popular dissatisfaction based on socio-economic factors. Many commentators point to general discontent with social and political conditions that is growing in various regions of Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus. Sergei Danilov, a Middle East specialist from Ukraine, believes that Russian security services are attempting to redirect the accumulated social aggression, caused by social issues, into anti-Jewish pogroms similar to those of the early 20th century. According to Victor Shenderovich, a well-known Russian public figure, instead of addressing the socio-economic causes of public discontent, Russian authorities are constantly looking for various external or internal enemies to channel this dissatisfaction toward.

The majority of Russian commentators agree that the events occurred as a result of mounting mass dissatisfaction in the North Caucasus, with the Jews and Israelis as a formal pretext for the events. However, there are also attempts to determine the actions of specific players who may have intentionally organized  pogroms in the Northern Caucasus. Some of these hypotheses are of a propagandistic nature, while others require more in-depth analysis if sufficient supporting arguments can be found.

1. The official Russian version is formulated in precise alignment with the anti-Ukrainian conspiracy theory. Its essence is that pogroms are not in Russia’s interest but may be beneficial to Ukraine. Putin, during a meeting with the heads of security agencies in Novo-Ogarevo, stated: “The events in Makhachkala last night were inspired, in part through social networks, and not least of all from the territory of Ukraine. By the hands of agencies of Western intelligence.” This version is intended for domestic consumption within Russia to shift responsibility from Russian authorities, in an external political context this version is specifically designed to tarnish the authorities of Ukraine and the Western countries supporting them. This aspect is emphasized by the well-known pro-Kremlin political analyst Sergey Markov. “…with a high degree of probability, these pogroms were organized through an active campaign on social media from the territory of Ukraine, where the local intelligence agencies are involved in this. And they are led by Zelensky, who is Jewish by nationality. It turns out that Zelensky, an ethnic Jew, becomes the active organizer of anti-Semitic pogroms in Dagestan. Moreover, Zelensky’s interest is absolutely straightforward and clear: he very much needs anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia. This allows him to achieve the ‘bonding’ of Israel and Ukraine, thereby automatically ensuring the ‘bonding’ of U.S. tranches of support for Tel Aviv and Kyiv. Zelensky is very concerned that, under new conditions, Ukraine’s financing from external sources will be significantly sequestered.” Markov completely absolves the Russian state of responsibility: “The Russian state passed the exam on anti-Semitism… Not a single Jew died at the hands of the rioters.” He also notes that anti-Semitic pogroms could undermine Russia’s foreign policy position: “The safer the Jews are in Russia, the more critical Russian government’s actions against Israel could be. And if there were anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia, the words of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would ring hollow.”

Russian authorities provide one piece of evidence in favour of their version. Among the Telegram channels whose posts led to the pogrom, the Islamist channel “Dagestan’s morning” should be specifically mentioned. According to Russian authorities, this channel is administered from the territory of Ukraine. They also point to the former deputy of the Russian State Duma, Ilya Ponomarev, who supports Ukraine. Ponomarev himself confirmed that he provided support to this channel in the past but denied any current involvement. “Once, a group of Islamists from Dagestan approached me and asked for support in their fight against the war and mobilization. I helped them (organizationally and financially), and we initiated a full-fledged popular armed uprising and halted the mobilization at that time. The authorities backed down. After that, in the autumn of 2022, the creators of this and other regional ‘Utro Fevralya’ channels went their own way, and my support to them ceased. I don’t personally read “Dagestan’s morning” he stated. Ponomarev also expressed his personal support for Israel.

According to Galliamov, the Russian authorities’ version is unacceptable because if the Dagestan pogrom can be explained by the influence of the propagandist Telegram channel ““Dagestan’s morning”,” then this channel does not affect the other two regions, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria, where similar events occurred.

2. Some experts suggest that the pogroms could have been organized by the groups inside Russia’s security forces interested in imposing a state of emergency across the entire country and transferring power entirely into the hands of the intelligence agencies. Russian authorities might have also attempted to create a pressure tool on Israel, aiming to prevent it from reconsidering its Ukraine policy in favor of a more pro-Kyiv stance, given Russia’s friendly approach to Hamas. Provocative actions related to attempts to relocate Israelis to Dagestan through Rosotrudnichestvo can be explained by this. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that even if such a conspiracy took place, overall, the current unrest in the hinterland is rather disadvantageous for Russian authorities. Therefore, reducing everything to such a simple explanation is not advisable. An interesting hypothesis by Konstantin Eggert is that there was a deliberate provocation by Russian security forces that got out of control.
3. Other experts propose the idea that local groups in the North Caucasus may have had an interest in the unrest. Such disturbances lead to the weakening of federal authority and an increase in the influence of local players. These local actors, with the exception of Chechnya, have largely lost their autonomy in recent decades, which fuels their desire to resist the Kremlin’s centralizing policies using any available means. This can explain passive behavior of local police and authorities, who didn’t oppose pogroms.
4. Among external actors who could have incited the unrest, radical Sunni Islamists, predominantly from Arab countries or from Turkey should be noted. In some North Caucasian republics, particularly in Dagestan, there are active processes of Islamic revival. The youth are studying the Arabic language, and many are receiving Islamic education, including abroad. A significant portion of the youth follows Arabic-language social media, and, naturally, this audience has been exposed to anti-Israeli propaganda, which intensified after the beginning of the IDF’s operation in Gaza. In Dagestan and other North Caucasian republics, various radical Islamist cells are also actively operating, some of which are affiliated with Al-Qaeda and even ISIS. After Russian security forces shifted their focus to the conflict with Ukraine, their struggle against these groups of radical Islamists significantly weakened. Therefore, these groups could have independently organized the anti-Israeli pogrom, utilizing their Telegram channels and sleeping cells, taking advantage of the mistakes of Russian authorities, with the aim of increasing their influence in the region. This assumption was put forward by the well-known Israeli specialist on Islamic radicalism, Dina Lisnyanskaya.
5. Iran is theoretically interested in the radicalization of Russian Muslims and promoting anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic tendencies within Russian Islamism. This could increase pressure on Russian authorities in favor of a more pro-Iranian and anti-Israeli stance. However, Iran has never had direct influence over radical Sunni Islamists in the North Caucasus. Therefore, it could only contribute to such unrest indirectly, through Arab Sunni organizations.

 Among the measures taken by the Russian authorities, the following can be noted:

1. Attempts to somehow accommodate the demands of anti-Semitic rioters (such as document checks in the Hasavyurt hotel and announcements that foreigners and Jews cannot stay there). This was, in fact, the initial response of the police, which tried to persuade the rioters that they understood them and requested that they not disrupt order. This trend poses a security threat to Jews in Russia as it essentially legitimizes the rioters’ demands and introduces restrictive (albeit temporary) measures for Jews and Israelis in the Russian North Caucasus.
2. Suppression of pogroms. The Investigative Committee of Russia classified the events at the Mahachkala airport as mass riots and initiated a criminal case. The head of Dagestan called on the rioters to join the active army in Ukraine (apparently, some of those detained will indeed be sent by the authorities to the war). Many of those who participated in the unrest at Mahachkala airport were identified and detained through surveillance cameras. As of October 30th, 83 people have been arrested in connection with the events in Mahachkala.
3. Personally, Putin blamed Ukraine and Western intelligence agencies. On the other hand, federal TV channels largely ignored the mass riots in Dagestan. None of the final news broadcasts on federal channels broadcasting to Russia mentioned the anti-Semitic pogroms in the North Caucasus. The seizure of the airport in Dagestan and the attempted hijacking of an aircraft were not deemed worthy of coverage. Television propagandists did not even notice the arson of the Jewish cultural center in Nalchik. RT pays more attention than others to anti-Jewish actions in the North Caucasus (it is intended for broadcasting to foreign countries and generally provides extensive coverage of all anti-Israel actions related to the war in Gaza, placing these events in a somewhat different, non-Russian context). Some propagandists broadcasting to the domestic audience described the pogroms with sympathy. For example, Mikhail Zvinchuk, the administrator of the Z-channel “Rybar” and a former employee of the Ministry of Defense’s press service, referred to what was happening as “protests” on the main Russian propaganda internet channel “Soloviev LIVE.”
4. Strengthened control over online media. In particular, access to Telegram has been temporarily restricted in the South of Russia. Pavel Durov, the owner of Telegram, who pursues a policy independent of the Russian authorities, blocked the “Dagestan’s morning” channel.
5. Statements by the Muftis of the North Caucasus regarding the events. They expressed their support for the people of Palestine but called for not extending this issue to all Jews and opposed the expulsion of Jews from the North Caucasus. Similar statements were made by Ahmed Dudaev, the Minister of National Policy in Chechnya. He stated that the actions of the Israeli leadership are “criminal,” but this should not be projected “onto all Jews in the broadest sense of the word.” It’s worth noting that such statements from muftis and local authorities have always been a traditional tool for managing the Caucasus for Moscow. However, it should be emphasized that these statements demonstrate unequivocal support for Hamas and, therefore, are unlikely to make a significant contribution to combating the spread of anti-Semitism in the Northern Caucasus.

It can be noted that the measures taken have reduced the intensity of the crisis, but they do not address the problem of the growing mass and state-sponsored anti-Semitism in Russia as a whole.

The Israeli National Security Council and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have assigned the highest, 4th level of threat to Russia’s North Caucasus. Israeli citizens are recommended to immediately leave the territories of the following regions of the Russian Federation: Chechnya, Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, as well as Krasnodar and Stavropol regions. This decision will temporarily reduce the level of danger for Israelis and help alleviate fears among the local population, which were created by the combined efforts of Russian and Islamist propaganda suggesting that Israelis would start mass resettlements in these territories. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that the threat of anti-Semitic pogroms may begin to spread from the North Caucasus to other parts of Russia and post-Soviet countries.

Conclusions. The first anti-Semitic pogroms in post-Soviet Russian history have occurred. While the question of who directly organized them remains unresolved, the question of responsibility for creating a situation leading to the pogroms is quite evident. This responsibility lies with the Russian authorities. The measures they have taken after the start of pogroms have reduced the immediate threat, but the underlying causes of the rise in anti-Semitism in the North Caucasus persist. There is a risk of the pogroms spreading to other parts of Russia and to other post-Soviet countries.

Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman (PhD, Dr.Sc.), is a research fellow at the PSCR Program, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. He specializes on contemporary Central Asia and Afghanistan, Russia’s foreign and security policy, and energy policy.

Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin is the Head of the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program (PSCRP) and teaches Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University. In 2009-2022 he also served as Chief Scientist (chief scholarly expert and Deputy Director-General for research) of the Israeli Ministry of Aliya and Integration.

[1] Schnirelmann Victor.  Khazara myth: ideology of political radicalism in Russia and its sources, Moscow, Gesharim, 2012. (in Russian)