PSCRP-BESA Reports No 2 (September 13, 2023)
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked the completion of a series of changes that gradually reshaped the balance of power and diplomatic relations that had established in the post-Soviet space since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This event created a considerable strategic uncertainty.
Using the methodology employed by the U.S. National Intelligence Council and some other parties, we identify the trends currently observed in different parts of the post-Soviet space and assess the possible interactions of these trends, which gives the opportunity to formulate various scenarios.
The key trends that form the basis for the scenarios include the following:
– Russia, facing significant international isolation and sanctions, is intensifying its efforts to build an alliance with anti-Western states, including China and Iran. Simultaneously, Russia’s strategic dependence on China is growing.
– Currently, the main debates among military and political analysts revolve around the issue of the ongoing Ukrainian offensive, in particular whether Ukraine will be able to inflict a serious military defeat on Russia and reach the state border, or if there will be a “freezing” of the front line.
– Russia is experiencing growing domestic political and economic instability amid sanctions and a grueling war.
– Russia is gradually losing its potential as a regional hegemon in a number of regions of the post-Soviet space under the conditions of a difficult war, which leads to the strengthening of alternative powers such as China in Central Asia and Turkey in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
– The Ukrainian state has demonstrated its strength, but it has suffered heavy military, economic and human losses in its confrontation with Russia. There is considerable debate about how much support Ukraine can receive from its allies.
– Amid growing tensions between Russia and the West, as well as between China and the West, the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia are striving to maintain their independence and pursue a multi-vector foreign policy.
– Some countries in the South of the former Soviet Union still face serious challenges including state fragility, poverty, religious extremism and terrorism, organized crime, etc., however, as opposed to the period of global anti-terrorist coalition, international (especially, Western) interest and assistance to these countries is very limited.
– A number of countries in the South of the former Soviet Union, primarily Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are undergoing significant economic and political reforms. The economic and human potential of these countries is on the rise. They are actively seeking cooperation with each other and support each other in the face of growing risks.
Separately, Russia’s relations with non-Western countries, such as China, Iran, India, and others, can be considered as factors influencing Russia’s position and the dynamics of post-Soviet conflicts. Russia hopes to form a global anti-Western alliance that will help Putin win a “new Cold War”.
Second, Putin’s regime is pinning its hopes on the rise of ideologically aligned forces in Western countries, such as Trump in the United States. However, these issues related to ideologically motivated views of the Russian elite on global trends should be analyzed separately from factors related to the post-Soviet space.
How can the combinations of trends described above develop? Five different combinations of existing trends are proposed, which define five scenarios for the development of post-Soviet conflicts. In the first three scenarios, the main events reshaping the conflicts in the post-Soviet space will take place in relation to the dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian war, while in the other two scenarios, Central Asia and the South Caucasus will take center stage. In our analysis, we will also indicate, where possible, what implications each scenario would have for Israel’s interests.
Scenario 1: Cold War 2.0. There is a certain probability of a military freeze of the acute phase of the conflict with a full or partial military victory for Ukraine, with the continuation of the conflict through other hybrid instruments rather than military ones. A full victory would mean the liberation of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. A partial victory would mean that Ukraine has defended its independence against a stronger opponent.
The military freeze of the conflict may be formalized by a ceasefire agreement or occur de facto as a result of exhaustion on both sides. In any case, unless there are significant changes within Russia, the political confrontation will continue, covering the entire post-Soviet space and negatively impacting the system of international relations. On a global scale, Russia will push its non-Western partners toward aggressive policies, and the threat of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons will increase.
In the Middle East, Russia’s alignment with Iran will continue. It is possible that Russia will encourage Iran to take more active actions in an effort to divert the attention of the United States from the post-Soviet countries. Also, destabilization of the Middle East would weaken the U.S. and European economies and drive up oil prices, which is important to the Russian economy. This could pose a significant threat to Israel. In addition, Iran will seek to obtain essential technologies from Russia, such as those related to the production of weapons of mass destruction in exchange, for example, for drone production technology.
The Russian leadership, in an attempt to justify its failures, will continue to prepare for an escalation of the war in Ukraine or prepare surprise strikes against Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan or other countries.
Russia’s strategic dependence on China will inevitably increase due to its exhaustion under war and sanctions. Ukraine will become increasingly integrated into the Western world militarily and economically.
All other post-Soviet countries will have to choose between continental and Western blocs. Most likely, during a lull on the front, pressure on them from Russia will only increase. Central Asian countries and Armenia have a very limited choice due to their geographical location. The Central Asian countries are sandwiched between Russia and China. Armenia is in a difficult position, sandwiched between hostile neighbors Azerbaijan and Turkey, while being wooed by both Russia and Iran seeking influence in the region.
Of course, it is possible to consider the scenario of the “Ukraine’s collapse”, which the Russian leadership may still be hoping for. However, in 2022, the Ukrainian state and its army demonstrated their viability even in the face of Russia’s overwhelming superiority, which makes this scenario unlikely for now. Moreover, it is not fundamentally different from the scenario described above, as confrontation with the West and complete international isolation of Russia would not cease, and might even intensify. The only difference is that the front line of this confrontation would shift closer to EU territory. Additionally, the collapse of Ukraine is likely to increase the subservience of the leadership in the Caucasus and Central Asia to Putin.
Scenario 2: The Collapse of the USSR 2.0. Fragmentation of Russia and Regional Conflicts in the Territories of Its Former Dominance. In this scenario, Ukraine, with broad international support from allies, inflicts a significant military defeat on Russia, which could lead to the regime’s collapse, disorder and fragmentation within Russia itself. Alternatively, the disorder and fragmentation in Russia may escalate into a retreat from the frontlines reminiscent of the World War I situation on the Eastern Front.
The global issues associated with this scenario are that the world would have to deal with fragmentation and instability in Russia, which would create serious threats similar to those feared during the collapse of the USSR. The issue of control over nuclear weapons will be of particular concern to the Western world. Israel and the EU countries will face a new huge wave of refugees.
Russia’s retreat from its former position as a regional hegemon in Central Asia and the Caucasus could give rise to a new series of bloody wars, ethnic cleansing and conflicts, reminiscent of those that occurred after the collapse of the USSR.
Scenario 3: ‘Perestroika’ 2.0: Reforms in Russia, Mutually Beneficial Peace with Ukraine. Against the backdrop of failures in the war with Ukraine or due to changes in the configuration of the Russian elite, reforms begin in Russia. Russia makes peace and withdraws its troops. It compensates Ukraine for the losses and destruction suffered during the war in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions.
With reduced risks, conditions will be created for continued reforms throughout the post-Soviet space: in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other countries. In the absence of Putin’s influence, Belarus and possibly Georgia may experience the change of regimes towards more liberal and pro-Western ones. The westernmost post-Soviet countries and possibly some South Caucasus countries will join NATO and seek EU integration.
Most post-Soviet countries, while building partnerships with the West, are unlikely to antagonize China. Therefore, they will try to build bridges between Europe and China, creating prerequisites for the development of investment projects, especially in the field of infrastructure.
This scenario would be the most favorable for the international community as a whole, including Israel. However, the likelihood of its realization is currently not very high. In particular, it is not quite clear which social and political forces could become the main drivers of reforms in Russia.
Scenario 4: Central Asian Explosion. After the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, all key players forgot about the threat of radical Islamism. International assistance to Central Asian countries, and especially to Afghanistan, has sharply decreased. Moreover, Central Asian countries are under serious international pressure amid the “new Cold War”. In this situation, one or two failed states may emerge in the region due to internal political explosions. This will lead to significant transnational threats, including radical Islamism, terrorism, and refugees.
Initially, this threat will impact Russia’s and China’s policies. To ensure its security, Russia will be forced to move troops from Ukraine to Central Asia. China will have to intensify its military assistance to Central Asian countries and somewhat divert from the confrontation with the United States in the Pacific.
However, in the context of a globalized world, these threats will eventually jeopardize other countries, including Europe, Israel, Turkey, and indirectly, as the experience of 9/11 showed, the United States. This could create conditions for a return to a global anti-terrorist coalition similar to the one that was in place in the early 2000s.
Unlike in the Middle East, where Iran can form alliances with Sunni groups like Islamic Jihad because of shared anti-Israeli sentiments, in Central Asia and Afghanistan Iran generally doesn’t get along with Sunni Islamists. This is evident even in Tajikistan, which shares a similar language and cultural heritage with Iran. Therefore, the strengthening of Islamist groups in Central Asia is unlikely to lead to positive results for Iran. It may increase the influence of the Taliban, as well as Saudi Arabia and/or Qatar in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Scenario 5: Networked Self-Organization of Central Asian and Caucasian Countries or the Turkic World. The eastern and southern parts of the post-Soviet space are undergoing active processes of demographic growth and economic development that have gone relatively unnoticed by the outside world. These countries are establishing bilateral and multilateral network relations among themselves.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are actively pursuing reforms. Given the imperfection of national statistics in the post-Soviet countries, we can assume that Kazakhstan currently has the highest per capita income and the second-highest absolute GDP among all post-Soviet countries after Russia. Uzbekistan, taking into account the depopulation of war-torn Ukraine, apparently has the second largest population after Russia. Azerbaijan has significantly strengthened its armed forces. According to a number of expert assessments, the Azerbaijani army is the most modernized in the post-Soviet space, if we exclude the armies of Ukraine and Russia from the analysis. The modernization of the Azerbaijani army is in the interests of Israel, partly because Azerbaijan is confronting Iran on the division of the Caspian Sea, and there is an old issue with Iranian Azerbaijan.
It can be assumed that the trend toward the formation of a network of bilateral relations between countries in the south of the post-Soviet space will continue. This process may also find its basis in Central Asian integration or in Turkic organizations. In the latter case, Turkey plays the role of a mediator. The Turkic format could become the most common institutional framework for such self-organization. Turkey lacks economic resources, so the degree of self-organization of Turkic states will be very high.
Various forms of interaction with Turkic structures may become attractive for Georgia and Tajikistan. It is possible that such network self-organization will interact with Turkic regions of Russia, with the Tatars in Crimea and the Gagauz in Moldova.
This group of states, within the framework of their traditionally pursued multi-vector foreign policy, will be open to cooperation with both China and the West, but will seek to build this cooperation on their own terms. Additionally, in the interests of self-preservation, the elites of these countries will be motivated to jointly limit Russia’s opportunities for expansion. The countries of the south and east of the post-Soviet space demonstrate a serious interest in the development of the Trans-Caspian route even in wartime. This is particularly evident in the policy of Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan also show interest in the development of this route. This contradicts the interests of Russia and Iran, although China’s position on this route is rather neutral, if not positive.
For Israel, since this primarily concerns the rise of post-Soviet Muslim countries with secular and fairly friendly regimes, such developments would open a window of diplomatic and economic opportunity.
These scenarios were developed after the author discussed these issues with a few experts from post-Soviet countries. Further development of scenario analysis on this topic will require the involvement of a broader range of experts.
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman (PhD, Dr.Sc.) is affiliated research fellow, the PSCR Program at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University; formerly Professor at the Moscow Higher School of Economics and Visiting Scholar at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies