PSCRP-BESA Reports No 37 (February 26, 2024)
France is currently prioritizing two areas in the post-Soviet space: Ukraine and Armenia. These could be called the Eastern European and (extended) Mediterranean directions. Ideally, France could pursue both priorities simultaneously; however, in reality it lacks the resources to do so. Therefore, in practice a certain political choice arises. The choice of Ukraine as a priority will coincide with the general choice of the Western (European) coalition. And the choice of Armenia as a priority (although it does not contradict the goals of the Western coalition in the post-Soviet space to the extent that it is associated with Armenia’s reorientation away from cooperation with Russia and Iran) is related to the traditional semi-autonomous policy of France, taking into account its specific, historically established traditions in foreign policy.
First of all, this refers to France’s traditional policy as a key great power in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this regard, Paris has interests in developing relations with Armenia and Lebanon, as well as in resisting Turkish pressure on Greece and Cyprus. How France responds to these alternatives has now become extremely important in terms of Israeli interests.
After its defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia, which can no longer rely on arms supplies from Russia, is looking for ways to realign itself. France (and India) are among the most obvious directions for such a move. French-Armenian arms deals include armored personnel carriers, future deliveries of Mistral anti-aircraft missiles, and three Thales GM 200 radar systems. In addition, French military personnel will be sent to Yerevan by early 2024 to train Armenia’s armed forces. Economic relations between France and Armenia are also very deep, encompassing both national and regional levels and covering areas such as banking, agriculture and water management. Political relations are already very deep, as France recognized the Armenian Genocide in 2001 and has co-chaired the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh since 1997.
From the perspective of Israel’s security, there are risks associated with French weapons transfers to Armenia. Armenia continues its military cooperation with Iran, which is growing closer to Russia, which, in its turn, continues to exert considerable influence over Armenia. There is a possibility that French weapons (or the technology for their production) could fall into the hands of Iran. From Israel’s perspective, this situation echoes the supply of French weapons to the Lebanese army. This is understandable, given the long-standing ties between France and Lebanon. However, the dominance of Hezbollah in the political system of modern Lebanon could result in the weapons supplied to the official Lebanese army ending up in the hands of this pro-Iranian radical Islamist movement. There is evidence that such a situation has already occurred with some Western arms supplied to the Lebanese army. This coincides with the French president’s rhetoric of on the Gaza war, which is far less pro-Israeli than American.
Nevertheless, France is by far a friendlier country to Israel than Erdogan’s Turkey or, even more so, Iran. Given that Iran and Russia are Armenia’s main partners (or rather, even patrons), Iran is the patron of Lebanon through Hezbollah. Turkey also seeks to become an influential actor in both the Mediterranean and the South Caucasus.
The essence of France’s strategy can be interpreted as an attempt to provide Lebanon and Armenia with additional channels of contact with the West, which would allow these countries to overcome the strategic crisis they are currently facing. If successful, this would also serve Israel’s interests. However, considering France’s actual capabilities and its readiness to project power abroad, its ability to dislodge Iranian and Russian influence from Armenia and Iranian influence from Lebanon now seems doubtful. In recent years, France has failed to contain Russian encroachment even in several countries within its traditional sphere of influence in Africa.
Even France’s ability to limit Erdogan’s Turkey’s influence in the Mediterranean is still questionable. France takes every opportunity to support the Greeks and constrain Turkish influence. This was recently evident in Ukraine, where “Greece, Cyprus and France reportedly blocked the financing for the supply of Turkish-made Bayraktar drones and artillery shells for Ukraine, which were to be purchased with European funds.”
Furthermore, for Israel, particularly with regard to France’s cooperation with Armenia, it is important that this cooperation does not interfere with, but rather contributes to the tendencies towards the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. This is extremely important for Jerusalem, as it has established close economic and military cooperation with Baku. Therefore, if relations between Baku and Yerevan do not normalize, Jerusalem and Paris will find themselves involved on opposite sides of their conflict.
Taking all the caveats into account, France’s political and economic cooperation with Armenia and Lebanon is not contrary to Israel’s interests, and in some respects may even be beneficial to Israel (for example, in terms of Paris’s potential role as a mediator). However, purely military cooperation with Armenia and Lebanon poses a threat to Jerusalem of new military technologies falling into the hands of Tehran and its proxy forces. Therefore, Israel will not welcome such cooperation.
In fact, it is important to emphasize that from Jerusalem’s point of view, the danger is not that France is trying to strengthen its influence in countries directly (like Lebanon) or indirectly (like Armenia) related to the Mediterranean. The danger for Israel is that French influence complicates the situations that are already overly complicated and thus. fraught with new conflicts. In addition, Paris simply lacks the resources to become a truly dominant player in the region and increase the predictability of the situation.
The question of resources also applies to Paris’s policy towards Ukraine (in the Eastern European direction) as an alternative to the Mediterranean one. The issue here is that Ukraine has an obvious shortage of resources. In this regard, Josep Borrell said on February 5, 2024 that EU member states should temporarily halt exports of weapons to countries other than Ukraine. At the same time, “France is doing the most lackluster job in sending arms and ammunition to Ukraine, according to a new calculation of international aid by Germany’s Kiel Institute.” According to their calculations, France has given and pledged 635 million euros to Ukraine, while Germany has given and pledged 17.7 billion euros.
France objects that these figures are incomplete because they are based on publicly announced aid, while France and Poland are doing a lot for Ukraine without publicly announcing it. “A French parliamentary calculation found that France had allocated €1.7 billion” of assistance for Ukraine. France recently announced a new aid package including artillery shells, Caesar self-propelled artillery systems and additional air defense reinforcements.
In any case, in absolute numbers it is far less than Germany has given, and far less in relative numbers than Estonia and Denmark, which have given or pledged to give Ukraine almost 2% of their GDP. Given Israeli fears about the consequences of French military cooperation with Armenia and Lebanon, a concentration of French efforts in the Eastern European direction would be fully supported by almost any government in Jerusalem.
Some experts on Ukraine, in the context of French military supplies to Yerevan, raise the question that France supplying weapons to Armenia at a time when Armenia has not yet fully distanced itself from Russia. Armenia has announced a freeze on its participation in the Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but it remains part of the Moscow-controlled Eurasian Economic Union, and two Russian military bases in Gyumri and Yerevan remain in Armenia under a bilateral security treaty with Russia.
Armenian territory, like the territories of many other countries (post-Soviet states, Turkey, UAE), is used by Russia in circumvention of Western sanctions. Therefore, there is a possibility that Russia may gain access to French systems. From the point of view of Ukrainian experts, it is particularly dangerous because France supplies similar systems to Ukraine.
Thus, it is likely that France does not have enough resources to prioritize both Ukraine and Armenia at the same time. Concentrating on two tracks at once, especially when resources are scarce, may lead to their inefficient allocation across both tracks. So instead of stabilizing the situation in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, France may exacerbate the current situation.