PSCRP-BESA Reports No 20 (December 13, 2023)
After the Second Karabakh War (2020) and especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2022), France saw a number of new diplomatic opportunities opening up for it in the southern post-Soviet space as Russia’s traditional influence waned.
Primarily, this window of opportunity arose as Armenia, Russia’s key ally in the South Caucasus, increasingly felt abandoned by Moscow. An attempt to reorient Armenia toward France (as well as the United States) became evident after the Second Karabakh War (2020). These efforts gained momentum during Armenia’s confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey over the Zangezur transport corridor. This trend peaked after Azerbaijan finally regained control of Karabakh in 2023. Throughout these periods, despite its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia has not received allied assistance from Russia.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, all countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia faced the threat of increased Russian military pressure. Consequently, France has found yet another opportunity to strengthen its influence in this region.
Let us take a closer look at the reasons for the intensification of French policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
The escalation of conflicts in the modern world has led to the intensification of what has been called the “new Great Game” for Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region. As part of this “New Great Game”, Russia uses organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while China leverages the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Turkey, on the other hand, engages various Turkic integration organizations, primarily the Turkic Council. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan (2021) has led to a sharp decline in Western influence and interest in Central Asia and the Caspian region, prompting European countries to look for ways to compensate for this problem.
European nations typically employ a neighborhood policy, of which the Eastern Partnership is an element. In Europe, France competes for influence over the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries primarily with Great Brittan and Germany. Germany is currently experiencing a serious crisis regarding the concept of its foreign policy in the post-Soviet space. For years, Germany has pursued a “Russia first” policy, prioritizing cooperation with Russia. However, Russia’s conflict with Ukraine since 2014, and especially the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army in 2022, have negated this fundamental German strategy. Consequently, France seized the opportunity to surpass its main partner and rival in influencing European foreign policy.
This comes at a time when the United Kingdom retains an interest in the Caspian Sea region but lacks substantial means to influence it, especially since it is already outside the European Union. Therefore, France has a chance to become a European leader in formulating policy toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
In recent years, France has been losing its traditional sphere of influence in Africa, particularly under pressure from Russia and China. Strengthening French influence on the borders of Russia and China could be a strong response to this challenge.
What specific areas of French activity can be noted?
One of the key focal points of France’s intensified policy in the South Caucasus has been Armenia. France has traditionally supported Armenia and “by the end of 2020 almost officially sided with it in the conflict with Azerbaijan”.
The reasons for the intensification of contacts with Armenia can be listed as follows: the influence of the large Armenian diaspora in France, the desire to find new markets for French weaponry, and the search for new niches of geopolitical influence for France. As Ze’ev Khanin notes, “due to the shift of US foreign policy priorities to confrontation with China and Russia, these niches were left unoccupied. These include the Greater Middle East, including the Caucasus, which is a direct and natural extension of France’s long-standing strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Paris is quite nervous about Turkey’s increased geopolitical activity in this region in 2016–2020.”
The second area of French activity in the southern post-Soviet space is concentrated in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
With the energy crisis unfolding in Europe, caused primarily by Russia’s policy, France is interested in expanding energy cooperation with Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have significant uranium reserves. In Europe, against the backdrop of the crisis with Russian oil and gas supplies, there is a growing tendency to reconsider the policy of abandoning nuclear power, even in those countries that initially followed this path. In France, more than 60% of electricity is traditionally generated by nuclear power, so the interest in importing this resource is growing. French authorities aim to increase uranium imports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan after losing a major supplier in Niger. The European Union imposed sanctions on Niger after the military junta came to power, leaning toward alternative centers of power, notably Russia, rather than following the traditional alliance with France as a former colonial master.
France is also seeking to expand cooperation with Central Asian countries on importing minerals needed for the green energy transition.
On November 1, 2023, the French president visited Astana and met with Kazakh president Tokayev. On November 2, Macron held talks in Samarkand with Uzbek president Mirziyoyev. This is the first official visit by a French president to Uzbekistan in 30 years.
During his meetings with Central Asian presidents, Macron supported the Central Asian countries’ multi-vector policy, as evidenced by their neutrality on the Ukrainian issue. He also sought to reinforce the Western-oriented policies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Macron thanked Tokayev for his efforts to comply with Western sanctions against Russia and urged him to strengthen the fight against circumventing sanctions against Russia through Kazakhstan (a fight complicated by Kazakhstan’s participation in the common market with Russia within the EAEU). Kazakhstan expressed readiness to increase crude oil exports to France. Tokayev also said that “there is enormous potential for cooperation” regarding uranium supplies to France. Following the French-Uzbek talks, Mirziyoyev met with Claude Imauven, head of the French company Orano, and discussed increasing uranium production. Orano has been developing a uranium deposit in Uzbekistan since 2020.
Overall, France has a broad set of political and economic considerations prompting its intensified policy in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. French diplomatic efforts in these directions can be expected to continue. This poses certain challenges for Israeli foreign policy in the same region. The intensification of French contacts with Central Asian states suits Israeli’s interests. However, France’s contacts with Armenia, given Israel’s unofficial alliance with Azerbaijan and Armenia’s still incomplete departure from its former alliance with Russia and, most importantly, Iran, are potentially a challenge for Jerusalem. The optimal solution would be to maintain the unofficial alliance with Azerbaijan (this is very important in terms of Israel’s potential in confronting Iran), while avoiding a complete alienation of Armenia and subsequent clash with French interests (especially given that the U.S. is also extremely interested in changing Armenia’s political orientation from Russia and Iran to the West). However, this depends on the ability of the Armenian leadership 1) to finally resolve the remaining issues with Azerbaijan (primarily transportation), 2) complete the process of strategic reorientation toward the West and 3) control the anti-Semitic movement in the country. Otherwise, Jerusalem is likely to prioritize relations with Azerbaijan, and French and Israeli interests will also clash in the South Caucasus, which will benefit neither Paris nor Jerusalem.