Konstantin Pakhaliuk
PSCRP-BESA Reports No 3 (September 21, 2023)
On August 23rd, a plane crashed, carrying Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch and the founder of the private military corporation “Wagner.” Among the victims was Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian officer who played a pivotal role in the formation of this semi-public, semi-private army. His call sign, “Wagner,” lent its name to this organization, which, over the course of nine years, transformed into a tool of Russian power politics. Regardless of who was responsible for the plane’s destruction, this event aligns with an overarching trend: the diminishing influence of Z-propaganda radicals, who perceive the Russian government’s actions as passive and advocate for a more assertive policy towards Ukraine. This call also encompasses the notion of mobilizing Russian society on a comprehensive scale.
Emerging from the shadowy depths of power
Yevgeny Prigozhin’s persona beckons the scrutiny of researchers. He hails from the enigmatic realm of Russian authority, a space lying beyond the confines of legality, which forms the nucleus of the “deep state.” This sphere is constructed by personal connections, ideologies, and an extreme level of cynicism.
Born in 1961 in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Prigozhin spent approximately seven years in prison during the 1980-s for robbery. He was released during the peak of the “perestroika” era. Putin himself, in late August 2023, acknowledged his longstanding relationship with Prigozhin, dating back to the 1990-s. During that period, Prigozhin was involved in the restaurant and retail business in St. Petersburg, eventually forming Concord Management and Consulting holding. Meanwhile, Putin was the head of the external relations committee. Prigozhin’s New Island restaurant evolved into a gathering place for the elite. In 2000-s, he got contracts to cater to international events attended by the new president, including joint dinners with Jacques Chirac and George W. Bush, as well as hosting private functions.
During the 2010s, opposition media dubbed him “Putin’s Chef,” a moniker that seemingly did not sit well with him, based on his recent pronouncements. Nevertheless, Prigozhin’s enterprises played a significant role in numerous government contracts, including the provision of food to the Ministry of Defense, hospitals, and schools. In 2019, opposition politician Navalny’s team accused Prigozhin of being responsible for a dysentery outbreak in Moscow schools[1].
Hard and soft power
In 2018, answering to questions from Western journalists, Putin denied any connections between Prigozhin and the state but drew a comparison to George Soros. This parallel carry significant meaning: the billionaire philanthropist is renowned for championing the ideals of an “open society,” whereas Prigozhin was instrumental in fostering the “conservative shift” in Russian politics. This shift was characterized by the curtailment of civil liberties, pressure on political opposition, and the propaganda of nationalistic and imperialistic rhetoric.
Prigozhin’s business was built on the capacity to market two critical resources: media manipulation and power-driven entrepreneurship. These resources were employed both within Russia and as export abroad. While Prigozhin may not have been a central figure in domestic politics, he played a role in shaping systemic processes. He contributed to crafting the ideological underpinning of the post-Crimea consensus among Russian elites and played a part in the apparatus of manipulation and repression directed at the “non-system opposition.”
Journalists have traced Prigozhin’s involvement in exerting pressure on the opposition back to the period of 2011–2012, when protests erupted in response to corrupt parliamentary and presidential elections. Surveillance and the gathering of compromising materials gradually evolved into the establishment of the Internet Research Agency in 2013, famously known as the “troll factory.” This agency specialized in disseminating pro-government and anti-opposition content across social media platforms. Given that many bureaucrats were unfamiliar with operating in this digital landscape, Prigozhin emerged as the figure who aided the repressive state in developing a relatively effective strategy.
Prigozhin’s endeavors did not stop there; he ventured into establishing his own media outlets. In 2014, the Federal News Agency (RIA FAN) was founded, which served as the flagship of a media conglomerate comprising 16 websites. By 2017, these outlets reached an audience of 36 million people (with RIA FAN accounting for 11 million). In 2019, the Patriot media group consolidated the four largest media outlets.
Although the troll factory and media empire often espoused the rhetoric of “official patriotism” and anti-Westernism, they primarily functioned tactically, addressing situational political objectives, whether it involved discrediting figures like Navalny or supporting preferred candidates in elections. Independent media sources have also reported physical assaults on political activists, opposition members, and their families as part of these tactics[2].
Forceful entrepreneurship
The involvement of Prigozhin in Russian foreign policy is increasingly conspicuous. His “private” status allowed official representatives to distance themselves from him when necessary, even as he provided them with media and power technologies. For instance, in 2016, these capabilities proved instrumental in orchestrating manipulations during the American elections in favor of Donald Trump. Meanwhile, his Wagner group assisted the achievement other goals.
The Private Military Company (PMC) “Wagner” was established in late 2013 and swiftly became involved in events such as the annexation of Crimea and the instigation of conflicts in Donbass. Within a few years, Wagner mercenaries were actively engaged in combat alongside the government forces of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. To this day, Wagner group glorifies its role in the capture of Palmyra in 2017, an achievement that was heavily promoted by state media within Russia as a victory for the Russian regular army, sidelining the contributions of the Wagnerites.
The entry of the Wagner group into African countries represents a successful example of power-driven entrepreneurship, often in collaboration with the Russian Foreign Ministry and intelligence services. It provided services such as training troops and ensuring security to heads of state in exchange for financial gains and control over specific natural resources. In certain instances, Prigozhin provided funding for political analysts who played a role in assisting local presidents in securing their re-elections. According to media accounts, this collaboration yielded success in certain cases, such as Guinea and Zimbabwe, while in others, like Madagascar, it did not bear fruit[3]. Journalists associated with the “Project” publication asserted that Prigozhin’s political strategists were active in as many as 20 African nations[4].
One of the most well-known episodes involves the arrival of the Wagner group in the war-torn Central African Republic (CAR) in 2018. This notoriety is partially linked to a tragic incident when a group of Russian journalists, dispatched to investigate the situation on the instructions of the Investigative Management Center—funded by opposition oligarch Mikhail Khodarkovsky—was killed. As revealed by journalists from Novaya Gazeta, it is highly likely that the group was intentionally led into an ambush by a “fixer,” a local resident who volunteered to act as their guide. His contacts were received from Kirill Romanovsky, an employee of Prigozhin’s Federal News Agency. Romanovsky passed away in early 2023, but have compiled a collection of memoirs detailing the Wagnerites’ participation in various conflicts.
In the CAR, approximately 1,000 Wagner mercenaries provided support to President F. Touareda and government forces in exchange for control over mining resources. While acknowledging their role in bolstering the government’s position, it’s crucial to recognize the involvement of international peacekeeping forces and the Rwandan military. In 2019, CAR officials entered into an agreement with leaders from 14 armed groups, although this accord failed to bring about lasting peace. The northern and eastern regions of the country remain challenging to govern from the capital, and the most recent clashes, occurring at 2022-2023, were instigated by the government decision to provide Wagner group the control for the development of gold mines in the Vakada province[5].
The CAR is not the sole nation where the Wagner Group have a presence. In Libya, it provides support to Khalifa Haftar’s forces, who hold sway over the majority of the country. In 2021, Mali saw the arrival of approximately 1,000 Wagner mercenaries, at the invitation of the military junta that had seized power. Mali rulers had been dissatisfied with the transitional government’s ability to confront Islamist insurgents and separatists in the northern regions of the republic. Furthermore, during the autumn of 2022, the Wagner group played a role in yet another military coup in Burkina Faso, a nation where the authorities at that time had control over less than 40% of the territory.
Wagner achieved success in terms of trading military services for financial resources. However, if the cessation of internal conflicts is considered as the benchmark, the Wagner Group wasn’t successful in any of the four aforementioned countries. Moreover, its efforts in 2018–2019 to offer services to the Mozambican government to combat Islamist insurgents were even less fruitful. These mercenaries also provided training to the Sudanese armed forces during President Omar al-Bashir’s regime, which was toppled in 2019. While there is no definitive information regarding the group’s involvement in gold mining activities in the near of the CAR border, it’s noteworthy that in the spring of 2023, amidst escalating conflict between the government of al-Burkhan and the special rapid reaction forces of Muhammad Baglo, Prigozhin attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to mediate. In cases where official authorities accuse the rebels of receiving assistance from Wagner, they, in turn, distance themselves from such affiliations. Both sides employ these statements in an attempt to sway Western perceptions.
In August 2023, “Wagner’s ghost” also loomed over Niger, where a military coup unfolded. The ousted president stoked Western fears that his defeat might pave the way for the establishment of Wagner’s presence in Africa, alongside greater Russian influence. Conversely, protesters unfurled Wagner flags, expressing hope that they could negotiate assistance from the group in the near future.
Aggression Against Ukraine: Prigozhin’s Profitable Ventures
As the aggression against Ukraine began, Yevgeny Prigozhin had already been a prosperous businessman, overseeing a conglomerate of over 150 companies within the Concord holding. In 2021, his companies secured contracts to supply products to the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, with a total worth of 70 billion rubles (approximately $958 million)[6]. Additionally, they participated in construction projects valued at a more modest 11 billion rubles (around $150.6 million) [7]. While precise figures for foreign income remain elusive, estimates by the Financial Times suggested it could be as high as $250 million (18.2 billion rubles)[8].
For Prigozhin, the war in Ukraine proved to be a lucrative enterprise. The Russian authorities and propagandists have only recently begun disclosing these figures, ostensibly to discredit them, so it is advisable to approach them with caution. According to President Putin, since May 2022, Prigozhin’s entities secured contracts to supply the Ministry of Defense with foodstuffs worth 80 billion rubles ($1.19 billion) over the course of a year. Moreover, the state supported the Wagner Group, with the Russian president asserting a total of 196 billion rubles ($2.9 billion). On top of this, Prigozhin’s companies received an additional 5.4 billion rubles ($80 million) from construction projects[9]. Russian propagandists went further, claiming that the total value of these contracts, though not specifying the time frame, allegedly reached 1.7 trillion rubles ($25.3 billion at the 2022 exchange rate). This sum was roughly divided equally between the Concord holding and Wagner group. Independent journalists, spanning the years 2011–2019, once estimated the total at only 200 billion rubles.
While the Wagner group did not directly take part in the full-scale offensive that began on February 24, 2022, it played a role in forming distinct detachments. Prigozhin himself openly emphasized that Putin had personally requested his involvement in Ukrainian affairs, enlisting his assistance in helping the Russian army contend with Ukrainian resistance. This was not merely posturing; a Telegram channel called Grey Zone, which acted as an unofficial mouthpiece for the Wagner group, echoed this sentiment throughout 2022. It portrayed the Wagner group as a highly professional force coming to the aid of the less capable Russian military.
By the fall of 2022, it had become evident that the conflict in Ukraine was persisting. It lacked popularity among citizens, as the readiness of people to openly support the situation had not translated into a widespread volunteer movement. The frontline setbacks during the summer and autumn, on the contrary, sparked significant frustration among the radical faction of the pro-war Z-agenda. However, even with the partial mobilization that occurred alongside the official annexation of four Ukrainian regions, enthusiasm remained limited and evolved into mass discontent.
The authorities faced a dilemma: either to forcefully pursue total mobilization of the economy and society or, conversely, to maintain the illusion of peace and temporary challenges on the home front, without jeopardizing stability in favor of the frontline. The prolonged conflict provided space for varying positions to emerge. It was in this context that Prigozhin, who began to escalate his public involvement, aligned himself with the Z-radicals. This shift occurred when Pridzhin had a conflict with both the overseer of domestic policy, Sergei Kiriyenko, and the Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu. This clash with civil and military bureaucracy allowed Prigozhin to present himself as a truth-teller in the eyes of radical Z-activists.
The capture of Popasna in autumn 2022 and Bakhmut by May 2023, despite the losses, was portrayed as significant triumphs. In his interviews, Prigozhin indicated his willingness to guide Russia along the path of mobilization and totalitarianism, akin to “building North Korea,” as he put it. Even sociologists began to observe a rise in trust towards Prigozhin. By the end of 2022, he ranked among the top ten most frequently mentioned politicians[10]. In May, the independent sociological service Levada Center assessed that 4 % of Russian trust him, most federal politicians are trusted less[11]. By mid-June, Romir research agency positioned Prigozhin in fifth place among all media figures trusted by Russians[12].
However, in May 2023, Prigozhin’s adversaries achieved a significant victory. Putin decreed that all Private Military Companies must enter into direct contracts with the Ministry of Defense by July 1, effectively stripping Prigozhin of his private army. Following the capture of Bakhmut, the Wagner Group was withdrawn for rest, and on June 23–24, Prigozhin embarked on an ill-fated military campaign to capture Moscow. Putin accused him of betrayal. Prigozhin’s actions were not thoroughly planned, and as a result, he ultimately abandoned the assault on the Russian capital. Consequently, he lost control of his media empire (the Patriot group was dissolved), the Wagner group was partially relocated to Belarus and partly to African nations, while Prigozhin’s structures retained some government contracts. It appeared that he remained a part of the state system, albeit having descended a few rungs. However, history took an unexpected turn.
After the Demise: Questions Arise
The death of Prigozhin and the leadership of Wagner bring forth a host of inquiries. The notion of Putin seeking vengeance, on the one hand, severely erodes trust in agreements with him, while on the other hand, it serves as a warning to Russian elites: criticism of the authorities, even if cloaked in Z-rhetoric, is impermissible. The ongoing purging of individuals within the media landscape who could potentially serve as “points of attraction” for dissatisfied individuals under any banner, continues. Notably, both the infamous nationalist and leader of the “Russian Spring 2014” Igor Strelkov (Girkin), and the left-wing politician and sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky, were arrested, ostensibly for “discrediting the army”.
It is possible that Putin has opted against pursuing total mobilization of Russian society. Instead, a protracted strategy is in play, with the ultimate objective being the gradual restructuring of the socio-economic system. A conflict with Ukraine, whether hot, simmering, or frozen, will play a pivotal role. The loyalty of security forces, the maintenance of economic stability, and the reshaping of the balance of elite interests stand as key benchmarks.
The sustainability of this system is to be debated, but the Kremlin’s approach might be akin to the fable of the wise Khoja Nasreddin. Once he promised a sultan that he would teach a donkey the Quran in twenty years for a substantial sum. If he failed, he would be killed, but Nasreddin did not worry: in twenty years, either the donkey would perish, or the sultan would meet his end. Likely, this very idea underpins a new balance of elites around Putin.
[1] Reference link
[2] Reference link
[3] Reference link
[4] Reference link
[5] Reference link
[6] I use an average exchange rate of 73 rubles per dollar in 2021 and 67 rubles per dollar in 2022.
[7] Reference link
[8] Reference link
[9] Reference link 1 and Reference link 2
[10] Reference link Евгений Пригожин по итогам января впервые вошел в “десятку” самых медийных персон // Интерфакс. 2023. 1 февр.
[11] Reference link Одобрение институтов, рейтинги политиков: май 2023 года // Левада-центр. 2023. 31 мая.
[12] Reference link «Ромир» рассказал, кому доверяют россияне // РБК. 2023. 20 июня.