PSCRP-BESA Reports No 49 (April 15, 2024)
Armenia, like other post-Soviet countries, particularly in the southern region, traditionally pursues a multi-vector foreign policy. The aim of such a policy is to utilize different options to maximize foreign assistance and support. This often involves addressing unconventional tasks to balance conflicting foreign policy vectors. Armenia faces a similar task of balancing in the new configuration.
Previously, Armenia’s main challenge was balancing the Russian and Western vectors. The corrupt “Karabakh clan” led by Kocharian and Sarkisian considered relations with Russia a priority. At the same time, relations with the West were developing in parallel. Despite being bound to Russia by a bilateral military agreement, the presence of a Russian military base in Gyumri, and membership in the pro-Russian military organization CSTO, Armenia successfully ignored Russia and Kazakhstan’s initiated economic integration within the framework of the EAEU.
Armenia, like Ukraine, attempted to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Putin successfully pressured Armenia, presenting it with a dilemma: cessation of Russian military aid or joining the EAEU and rejecting association with the EU. Armenia attempted to maneuver, joining the EAEU while simultaneously attempting to partially sign the Association Agreement with the EU (solution, which the EU categorically refused to accept at the time). Unlike Ukraine, where Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU led to the Euromaidan revolution, in Armenia, the revolution and overthrow of the Karabakh clan were prompted more by internal political reasons related to corruption.
Armenia’s new leader, Nikol Pashinyan, although initially distrusted by Putin as a Western-associated revolutionary leader, continued to declare the idea of strategic partnership with Russia. Nevertheless, inside Russian ruling elite, the desire to “punish” Armenia grew. Several sources indicate that during the Second Karabakh War and the subsequent events, Russia deliberately avoided providing real assistance to Armenia in hopes of a change in the domestic political regime.
After this, Armenia can no longer rely on Russia for its security. Moreover, in the conditions of a growing โnew Cold Warโ, this would mean conflict with the West and alignment with the Chinese-Russian-Iranian axis. Pro-Western sentiments are strong in Armenia, and this alliance is not desired in Yerevan. In February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan named France and India as Armenia’s main partners for arms supplies and stated that Armenia can no longer rely on Russia in this matter. In particular, French-Armenian military cooperation involves the supply of “Mistral” air defense systems made by MBDA to Armenia.
Another important direction of Armenian-French cooperation is in the field of nuclear energy. Armenia closed the Metsamor nuclear power plant in the late 1980s due to seismic activity in the region and public concerns following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. This measure was taken as part of broad efforts to enhance the safety of nuclear installations. Due to the transport blockade during the Karabakh conflict, which resulted in energy shortages, Armenia resumed the operation of one of its units in 1995. Plans for the construction of a new nuclear power plant with French participation have been around since 2011. Currently, plans for construction are being finalized, with the French option not being the only one; there are competing projects, including South Korean and Chinese ones.
India is reorienting towards partnership with Armenia and France, gradually moving away from its cooperation with Russia. Due to its orientation towards China, Russia has become closely tied to the Chinese-Pakistani bloc, which is hostile to India. India is even reducing its military attachรฉ staff in Moscow, transferring it to Armenia. However, India still has residual cooperation with Iran and Russia in terms of building a north-south transport corridor, and cooperation with Armenia is currently perceived in this context.
Russia is trying to exert pressure on Armenia using ideas of Armenian nationalism. The Union of Armenians of Russia calls on all prominent representatives of Armenia and the diaspora to openly express their position on the “intention of the Armenian authorities to surrender territories in the Tavush region.” “Only the resignation and departure from the political arena of the current government can give Armenia a chance, led by a new leadership that loves its country and people, to move towards peace, a dignified life, and regain the lost trust of the international community,” the organization’s statement notes. The Union also highlighted the need for “urgent demarcation of the border between Pashinyan’s team and the Armenian people and statehood.”
Likewise, Iran is exerting pressure on Armenia. Moreover, Iran is still critically important for ensuring Armenia’s security in its standoff with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia’s Secretary of the Security Council Grigoryan stated, “…We highly appreciate relations with Iran and its position on many issues of our strategic priorities.” [7] Asked whether deepening ties with the West could harm relations with Iran, he noted that Armenia is having talks with both sides. Military cooperation with this country also continues. A meeting between the Iranian Defense Minister Ashtiani and the Armenian Defense Minister Papikyan took recently place in Tehran. Cooperation in defense and the situation in the South Caucasus were discussed.
Iran demands that Armenia either does not cooperate with the West and returns to cooperation with Iran and Russia, or that such cooperation “does not lead to geopolitical competition,” that is, takes into account Iran’s interests. The Armenian authorities must consider this pressure. During a speech in parliament, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that Yerevan is not developing cooperation with Brussels at the expense of relations with Tehran. “Relations with this neighbor of ours are based on natural benefits, which gives them a special character. We have not opposed, do not oppose, and will not oppose relations with the West to relations with Iran,” he added.
Theoretically, Iran could demand compensation from Armenia for cooperation with the West, such as handing over weapons samples or important technologies. Avoiding such a situation and continuing the reorientation towards the West is a crucial task of Armenian foreign policy at this stage.
The Armenian-Franco-Indian bloc aligns well with the idea of Armenia’s Western reorientation. If we consider the interests of the United States and Israel, it does not directly threaten them. However, the complex task of Armenian foreign policy at this stage is how to balance close contacts with Iran in the context of Iran’s growing conflict with the United States and Israel.
Essentially, France, India, and Iran have no other common interests besides supporting Armenia. The French Ambassador to Armenia stated recently: “Over the past few years, the neighboring state of Armenia, Iran, has repeatedly expressed concern about Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We disagree with Iran on many issues, but this is the one issue on which we are unanimous.”
In the context of the emerging strategic triangle of Yerevan-Paris-New Delhi having a very specific connection to Tehran through Yerevan (and New Delhi), there is a real possibility of French weapons, missile, or nuclear technologies reaching Iran through Armenia. Especially considering the ongoing open conflict with Iran following Iranian missile-drone attacks, Israel is concerned about the possibility of nuclear technology reaching Iran. Similar concerns exist in the United States and its Western allies. Avoiding such a situation is one of the tasks that must be addressed by Armenia’s multi-vector foreign policy if Armenia wants to fully reorient its foreign policy to the West.