Dr. Elina Bardach-Yalov
PSCRP-BESA Reports No 4 (September 20, 2023)
Azerbaijan’s current military mission in Karabakh has been portrayed in Baku as an anti-terrorist operation in response to a series of subversive actions, including the killing of 6 Azerbaijanis by Armenian separatist paramilitaries on September 19. As for Armenia, further developments may depend on how the current government in Yerevan plays its cards and whether it survives if the Karabakh separatists are defeated (as seems to be the case now). The most intriguing, among other questions, is this: will this exacerbate Yerevan’s dependence on Moscow? Or could this be Armenia’s path to independence from Russia?
To understand the situation, it is necessary to consider several important points.
- The Karabakh separatist enclave in Azerbaijan, populated exclusively by ethnic Armenians as a result of the mass expulsion of the Azerbaijani population 30 years ago, is not controlled by Yerevan in any way. Actually, the opposite is true: the unrecognized entity known as NKR, or “Artsakh” as Armenians call it, exerts an unparalleled influence on Armenia. This influence stems from the long-standing expansionist rhetoric of Miatsum (“unification”), which played a pivotal role in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War of 1992–1994. If we draw a comparison with the Ukrainian situation, it would be akin to Donetsk Republic’s “officials” not only controlling the narrative but also shaping the Kremlin’s policy towards Kyiv.
- The enclave in Karabakh – “Artsakh” or NKR – is not recognized by any state in the world, except for its “twins” – unrecognized Russian proxies in Georgia (Republic of Abkhazia and Republic of South Ossetia) and in Moldova (Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic). Armenia and France have not recognized the NKR. Moreover, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly stated that Karabakh is officially recognized Azerbaijani territory. The NKR is controlled by Moscow on many levels. Russian “peacekeeping” military units provide its security based on the accords of November 2020 (the end of the Second Karabakh war). All leaders of the enclave are vehemently pro-Russian, starting with Ruben Vardanyan, whom leading Western publications call “Putin’s wallet“.
- On September 9, the NKR leadership staged a “presidential election” of Samvel Sharamanyan in a secret ballot conducted by 23 “members of parliament”. Sharamanyan is a protege of the previous “president”, Araik Arytynian, who is known for his staunch support of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and his opposition to direct negotiations with Baku. The EU criticised the so-called “presidential elections”, reiterating that it “does not recognise the constitutional and legal framework within which they have been held.” “The EU believes that it is important for the Karabakh Armenians to consolidate around de facto leadership that is able and willing to engage in result-oriented discussions with Baku”, the message reads.
- According to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement, the only armed units that may be stationed in the enclave are Russian peacekeepers (whose mission is authorised by a trilateral agreement). Three years later, in September 2023, according to Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Europe, there is at least 5000 strong separatist militia with heavy armaments. According to the footage from the Azerbaijani UAVs on September 19, an expensive SA-15 Gauntlet system (which costs at least $20 million) belonging to the separatists was destroyed.
- Russia’s peacekeepers, at the very least, did not prevent the separatists from obtaining such weaponry, if not directly assisted in obtaining it. The very availability of such weapons to the separatists on its territory is a casus belli for Azerbaijan.
- The timing of the anti-terrorist operation is strange from the point of view of Azerbaijan’s PR interests. First, the UN General Assembly is taking place in New York. Secondly, the day before, two roads were opened to deliver humanitarian supplies to the enclave from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Prior to that, the separatists, without presenting any evidence, claimed that the population of the enclave was “starving to death”, creating a PR disaster for Baku that could lead to sanctions. The dispute between Baku and local Armenians mainly revolved around the issue of which road to use to deliver humanitarian supplies. Armenians demanded that the goods be transported only via the Lachin road leading to Armenia. Baku insisted on using the Agdam road leading from Azerbaijan. The problem was solved, and humanitarian aid started flowing through both roads, but immediately two terrorist attacks followed, to which Azerbaijan had no other choice but to react. Both terrorist acts – planting extremely powerful landmines on the roads – took place in the area controlled by Russian troops. The official goal of the Azerbaijani operation is to remove all the militants from Karabakh and ensure security in the region – which is exactly what the Russians were supposed to do.
- On September 19 Pashinyan clearly stated that the Armenian armed forces are not and will not participate in the conflict. He added that “for Armenia involvement in large-scale military operations with Azerbaijan is unacceptable.” This sparked outrage in Yerevan, where a series of mass protests with slogans calling for the overthrow of the government took place. Strange as it may seem, on September 16 Yerevan was practically covered with posters with the symbols of the ruling party of Armenia, Pashinyan’s portrait and the phrase “Artsakh is Azerbaijan, period”. It looked like someone was preparing for anti-governmental rallies.
- On May 22nd Pashinyan was also quoted as saying that his country could withdraw from the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a new manifestation of discontent over the lack of support from its ally Russia. “I am not ruling out that Armenia will take a decision to withdraw from the CSTO,” if the bloc fails to respect its treaty obligations, he told a news conference in Yerevan. While acknowledging the necessity to end reliance on its old ally Russia, Pashinyan acknowledged that there was a long way to go before Western countries could be seen as providing their full support for Armenia’s needs. “Our partners, the EU and the United States, are also supporting us when it comes to democratic reform agenda,” he said, and then added: “I cannot say that the support and the help that we are receiving is sufficient to serve our objectives and our agendas,” he stated on September 13.
- “The Kremlin has sanctioned a coup d’état in Armenia”, the Armenian pro-government Telegram channel Baghramyan 26 claimedon September 19. It noted that Russia wants to oust Pashinyan with the help of former fighters of PMC Wagner who arrived in the country. According to the channel, the number of “Wagnerites” in Armenia has reached 12,000 people. The reason for the coup is Pashinyan’s pro-Western stance and his alleged desire to withdraw from the CSTO. “The bet is on destabilization in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border,” the channel claims. Nikol Pashinyan himself, speaking in parliament, did not confirm the rumors about Wagner militants in Armenia.
- The comments of the Russian political elite on this issue are somewhat contradictory. Most official commentators on Russian television and in the state-controlled press blame Pashinyan for all the problems. A Telegram post by former President Medvedev, who is currently deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, made an open threat Pashinyan[1]. However, some commentators pondering the strategic implications of Armenia’s defeat have a more sympathetic view of the Armenian cause. “What is happening now threatens not only the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, but it also threatens Russia in the Caucasus. Because Azerbaijan is shooting at Armenians but wounding Moscow and Russia. Because this is part of a developing plan to expel not only Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh but also Russia from the Caucasus,” Russian State Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin statedon September 19th.
Apparently, a successful anti-terrorist operation in Karabakh will benefit primarily the Armenian government, which claims to have chosen the West over Russia. Eliminating the “Russian tail” wagging Armenia will definitely increase its chances of switching sides. Unless there is a coup that removes Pashinyan and his team from power. Pashinyan’s government could be overthrown not only by alleged saboteurs sent from Moscow, but also by mass unrest. Currently, the Armenian population is divided into two parts, as evidenced, for example, by the geography of protest actions in the capital on September 19-20, 2023. In particular, opponents of Pashinyan (among whom supporters of Russia predominate) came to protest at the government building located in Republic Square. At the same time, opponents of Russia (among whom Pashinyan’s supporters predominate) organized protests near the Russian embassy.
Dr. Elina Bardach-Yalov, former Israeli Knesset Member, holds her Ph.D. in mass communication from the University of Leeds, UK. In the past she also served as an advisor to Israeli Prime-Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and as press secretary of the Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman. She currently teaches at the David Yellin Education College in Jerusalem and is a Research Associate at Ariel University of Samaria.