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Turkey

Iran, Turkey, and Russia are building a new model of bilateral ties. Unshackled by formal alliances, the trio is showing it can work together to limit Western influence while avoiding an overreliance on one another. This mixture of correlating and contradictory interests, which characterizes the new Eurasianist model of bilateral relations, is a product of the changing global order.
President Joe Biden’s use of the word “genocide” on Armenian Remembrance Day was not a game-changer in US-Turkish relations, which are plagued by more fundamental problems. But it enhances Turkey’s political isolation, weakens its arguments on whether a genocide did or did not occur in 1915-24, and further destabilizes whatever is left of Ankara’s soft power.
Turkey’s official COVID-19 numbers reveal the government’s efforts to combat the pandemic as worthy of a commedia all’Italiana. As of mid-April, Turkey was the second-worst performer in the world, with 710.46 cases per million people. This is despite the country’s possession of a strong health infrastructure.
The emerging Islamic bloc of three Muslim states—Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan—seems feasible in theory, but its growth is constrained by the realities. Azerbaijan is still more Russian turf than Turkish, and Pakistan remains Chinese territory. The new Islamic bloc resembles three kids playing cowboy while their parents smile and watch. The parents will stay on the sidelines only until such time as they sense danger to their interests.

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