Ukraine, Russian Identity and Prospects for Its Evolution

PSCRP-BESA Reports No 48 (April 9, 2024)

The term “Russian World” is today closely associated with the ideology of Russian imperial chauvinism of the 21st century. This perception will persist as long as the current generations are alive, and perhaps long afterward. Theoretically, the “Russian World” could have become an analogue of such international organizations as the Francophonie (since 1970) or the Community of Portuguese Language countries (since 1996). But this did not happen, because the Russian Federation in the beginning relegated the concept of “Russian World” to the role of revanchist tool, unlike France and Portugal, which sought to strengthen their linguistic positions and develop cooperation with their former colonies. This approach was reminiscent not of the strategy of the colonial powers of Western Europe contemporary to it, but of Germany after World War I, when many Germans found themselves in a minority role in the new nation-states.

In 2008, the Russian authorities created the World Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots (WCCRC) with an ideology of “Russian World” supported by Vladimir Putin, who explicitly positioned the concept of “Russian World” as the state ideology of modern Russia[1]. This was reminiscent of the role of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle[2] organization for the Nazi regime. The annexation of Crimea, the occupation of parts of Donbass in 2014, and the pro-Russian forces’ protests in a number of cities in Eastern and Southern Ukraine (notably Kharkiv and Odessa) were held under the slogan of the “Russian Spring.” In the same year, a popular Russian propaganda news site with the same name was created, which is still operating today[3].

Ukraine is not the only example of the Russian authorities using “Russian compatriots” as a “fifth column” abroad. One example is the mass riots in Tallinn[4] in 2007, organized by ethnic Russians affiliated with the Nashi movement. “Russian compatriots” are also active not only in post-Soviet states, but also in EU institutions[5].

Alongside the protection of the rights of “Russian compatriots” abroad, including their right to use Russian in education and communication with the authorities, Russia is pursuing a policy of restricting the linguistic rights of national minorities and liquidating their autonomies. This is manifested in the abolition of the position of presidents of national republics (because, as Ramzan Kadyrov stated, “in a unified state there should be only one president”[6]) and the introduction in all schools of the United State Exam in Russian language only[7] (in practice, this affected only Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Tuva and Yakutia, where school education in national languages was still preserved), and then the abolition of compulsory teaching of national languages in schools of national autonomies (in addition to the above-mentioned republics, such teaching was carried out in the Komi Republic, Chuvashia and North Ossetia[8]). The goal was Russification and the transformation of Russia into a unitary state.

Since the onset of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022, Russian authorities and propagandists have been actively exploiting the great-power chauvinistic sentiments of ethnic Russians and Russified representatives of national minorities. “Russian national idea” has acquired an archaic appearance reminiscent of the doctrine of “official nationality”[9] of Sergei Uvarov dating back to 1833. The slogan of the supporters of this theory was “Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Nationality”, which remains relevant in modern Russia.

In the situation of Russian aggression, the Russian identity becomes an instrument of suppression of non-Russian peoples or is perceived as such. This leads to confrontation between parts of the Russian opposition: some advocate democratization of Russia, preserving its unity[10], while others propose its division into independent states based on ethnic or regional principles[11].

The media landscape is heavily dominated by oppositionists who advocate the unity of Russia in the context of democratization. They have certain resources, support of the intellectual elite and ties with Western states. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war creates challenges for Europe and weakens their influence. Outside Russia, identifying oneself as Russian becomes unpleasant because of associations with a chauvinistic regime. This can lead to a rapid change in the ethnic identity of Russians outside of Russia, as is happening in Ukraine.

As for Russia itself, there are two possible main directions for the development of the population’s ethno-political identity:

1. If Russia avoids a devastating defeat in the current military conflict, the totalitarian regime is likely to persist regardless of the leadership. The restoration of the Iron Curtain and the development of the idea of a “Russian world” in the image of North Korea is possible. The policy of Russification will be tightened, in accordance with the ideology of the “triune Russian nation”[12], which has received state character, suppressing the ethnic identity of Ukrainians and Belarusians. Russian authorities are actively changing the self-identification of Ukrainian children[13], reminiscent of the Germanization carried out by Nazi Germany[14].
2. If Russia suffers a military defeat, humiliating and obvious to Russians, it could trigger a process of disintegration. Regional elites may try to retain power by relying on local resources and discontent with the center. Refusal to identify with Russia could be used to avoid reparations. The Ukrainian president’s decree on “development of relations”[15] may support this idea. Regions with strong identities, such as Khabarovsky Krai and Primorsky Krai[16], may call Moscow an “enslaver”.

In the case of the second scenario, Russia will experience not only a “parade of sovereignties”, as in the 1990s[17], but also a “parade of building new identities”. In different subjects of the Russian Federation this process will proceed differently due to differences in ethnic composition, religion and language. According to these criteria, the following groups of subjects can be distinguished:

1. National republics in which the titular nation constitutes the absolute majority of the population (figures are, unless otherwise specified, based on data for 2020): Chechnya (Chechens — 96.42%), Ingushetia (Ingushis — 93%), Tuva (Tuvinians — 88.7%), Chuvashia (Chuvashians — 67.7%, 2010 data), North Ossetia-Alania (Ossetians — 65.6%), Kalmykia (Kalmyks — 57.4%, 2010 data), Yakutia (Yakuts — 55%), Tatarstan (Tatars — 53.6%). The same group includes nominally duo-ethnic Kabardino-Balkaria, where Adygs make up 58.53% of the population, while the second titular people, the Balkars, make up only 13.37%.
2. Polyethnic republics in which Russians are a minority: Dagestan (Russians — 3.3%), Karachay-Cherkessia (Russians — 27.17%) and Bashkortostan (Russians — 36.89%).
3. The Finno-Ugric republics, whose titular peoples, culturally close to Russians, are in the minority, and a significant part of the nominally Russian population is made up of assimilated descendants of the titular peoples: Mari-El (Mari — 38.47%, Russians — 47.69%), Mordovia (Erzya and Moksha — 40.06%, Russians — 53.36%, 2010 data), Komi (Komi — 17.22%, Russians — 54.01%). In the Komi Permyak Okrug (a territory with special status within Perm Krai) bordering the Komi Republic, whose population is three times smaller, the Komi make up 59% of the population. Udmurtia (Udmurts, including Besermyans — 28.14%, Russians — 62.22%, 2010 data) and Karelia (Karelians, Finns and Veps — 6.72%, Russians — 86.4%).
4. Siberian republics, where titular peoples, culturally and racially very different from Russians, constitute a minority: Altai (Altaians, including Telengits, Tubalars, Chelkans, Kumandins, Shorians and Teleuts — 34.52%, Russians — 56.63%. Data of 2010), Buryatia (Buryats, including Soyots — 30.6%, Russians — 59.4%) and Khakassia (Khakasses and Shorians — 12.37%, Russians — 81.66%. Data of 2010).
5. Adygea is a distinct case, the titular people of this region, being a minority (Adygs — 23%, Russians — 57.91%), considers itself a single entity with the Adygs of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia and has a large and active diaspora outside the Russian Federation (primarily in Turkey)[18].
6. The subjects of the Russian Federation, whose population is largely composed of Russified descendants of Ukrainians, can be singled out in a separate group. In addition to the already mentioned Krasnodar Krai, where separatist pro-Ukrainian organizations are active against the background of a full-scale war[19], we are talking primarily about the Belgorod Oblast and bordering areas of Kursk and Voronezh Oblasts – a historical and cultural region known in Ukrainian regional studies and publications as “Eastern Slobozhanshchina”[20]. There is currently no information about the activities of any Ukrainian cultural or political organizations in this region, but just a few years before the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, they were still quite active[21].

In the regions of the first group, state-political identity is formed on the basis of the ethnicity of the titular people. The regions of the second group require the creation of a modus vivendi for all major ethnic groups. Without such an agreement, active interethnic conflicts and disintegration of the state are possible. In the regions of the third group, the share of the titular people in the population is expected to increase due to changes in ethnic self-consciousness. Separation from Russia for the regions of the fourth and fifth groups is possible only within the framework of a broader political body, for example, the Siberian Republic. For the regions of the sixth group, sovereignty arises in close interaction with Ukraine and a change in the ethnic identity of the population to Ukrainian.

[1] For more on this see: Igor Zevelev, “The Russian World in Moscow’s Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 22.8.2016: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-world-moscows-strategy.

[2] For more on this see: Valdis O. Lumans, ”Himmler’s Auxiliaries: the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe 1933–1945”, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1993.

[3] https://rusvesna.su/

[4] See: ‘Liberation Warrior Monument dismantled in Tallinn’, BBC, 27.4.2007: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/international/newsid_6598000/6598145.stm.

[5] See for example: “First Russian MEP Tatiana Zhdanok celebrates anniversary”, Stoletie, 8.5.2020: https://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/pervyj_russkij_deputat_jevroparlamenta_tatjana_zhdanok_otmechajet_jubilej_195.htm

[6] Musa Muradov, Maxim Ivanov, Zaur Farniev, “Ramzan Kadyrov does not want to be president”, Kommersant, 13.8.2010.

[7] “USE only in Russian language”, website of the Russian University of Transport, 21.4.2009: https://miit.ru/news/4049.

[8] “Putin signed the law on studying native languages”, RBC, 4.8.2018: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5b65173f9a7947ce4b36855a

[9] See R. Wortman, “‘Official Nationality’ and the National Myth of the 19th Century Russian Monarchy”, RUSSIA / RUSSIA. Issue 3 (11): Cultural Practices in Ideological Perspective, Moscow, OGI, 1999, pp. 233-244.

[10] This ideology is supported, among others, by the FBK, founded by the late Alexei Navalny; the Open Russia organization, founded on the initiative of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and continuing its activities in exile; and, to a lesser extent, the Free Russia Forum, founded by Garry Kasparov.

[11] Supporters of this concept are represented by the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum, established in 2023: https://www.freenationsrf.org/.

[12] In December 2017, Russian President Putin stated during a press conference that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. See “Putin: Russians and Ukrainians are one people”, RT, 14.12.2017: https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/460092-putin-russkie-ukraincy-odin-narod. For more on the concept of the “triune Russian people” see: Alexei Miller, The Ukrainian Question in the Russian Empire, “Lavr”, Kiev, 2013, pp. 39–50.

[13] See for example: “‘Meduza’ told about methods of ‘re-education’ of Ukrainian children”, Radio Liberty, 11.3.2024: https://www.svoboda.org/a/meduza-rasskazala-o-metodichkah-po-perevospitaniyu-ukrainskih-detey/32856620.html.

[14] See for example: N.S. Pilko, Slovenia during the years of occupation, “Aleteia”, St. Petersburg, 2009, pp. 70-71.

[15] “Decree of the President of Ukraine N 17/2024 On territories of the Russian Federation historically inhabited by Ukrainians”, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky. Official website, 22.1.2024: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/172024-49513.

[16] The Far Eastern Republic existed as a legally independent state in 1920–1922. For more on it, see: Ivan Sablin, The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Far Eastern Republic, 1905–1922, Routledge, London, 2018. The idea of restoring the Far Eastern Republic was openly discussed in the early 1990s. See for example: “Will there be a Far Eastern Republic”, Interfax, 24.11.1991: https: https://www.interfax.ru/30years/797091. The author came to the conclusion that the idea of restoring the Far Eastern Republic enjoys a certain popularity even now based on his personal experience — repeated trips to the mentioned subjects of the federation and contacts with the Far Eastern creative intelligentsia as a member of the editorial board of the almanac “Birobidzhan”.

[17] See Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Stanford University Press, 1993.

[18] On the current state of the Adyg diaspora in Turkey see: Alikhan Mamsurov, “Diaspora Activists Announce Creation of ‘Circassian Committee’“, Kavkaz Uzel, 7.6.2023: www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/389428.

[19] See for example: “FSB detained Kuban resident for attempting to join the AFU”, Interfax, 5.9.2023: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/919269; “Ukrainian Kuban and free Circassia. Changes in the Caucasus”, Svoboda, 17.3.2024: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kk1qY3Avygc.

[20] See for example: Petro Kraliuk, “Eastern Slobozhanshchina – Ukrainian land. Why was it not included in the state of Ukraine?”, Argument, 20.7.2021: https://argumentua.com/stati/vostochnaya-slobozhanshchina-ukrainskaya-zemlya-pochemu-ona-ne-voshla-v-gosudarstvo-ukraina

[21] See for example: “‘Pereveslo’ in Voronezh actualized the dispute between Slavs Viktor Masko and Andrei Markov”, Bloknot, 11.5.2017: https://bloknot-voronezh.ru/news/pereveslo-v-voronezhe-aktualizirovalo-spor-slavyan-843423