PSCRP-BESA Reports No 119 (March 15, 2025)
“Azerbaijan is an important strategic ally of Israel in the Caucasus region, with relations encompassing cooperation in security, trade, technology, and energy sectors. Israel will continue to strengthen cooperation with Azerbaijan and the US, and will stand firmly against any attempt to undermine it,” Israel’s Prime Minister’s office said on March 5th, announcing that Jerusalem was in active talks with Washington to advance a three-way alliance, according to The Jerusalem Post.
A week later, on March 14th, Steve Witkoff, the special envoy of US President Donald Trump, landed in Baku after an overnight visit to Moscow, in what appears to be a well-coordinated diplomatic move between Israel, the US, and Azerbaijan. “Sources involved in Israeli-Azeri relations reveal that coordination for the visit became particularly intensive after March 5, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized his commitment to the trilateral partnership between the countries in the Knesset,” The Jerusalem Post reported.
For the last month, numerous US and Israeli publications mulled the initiative to integrate the Republic of Azerbaijan into the Abraham Accords. In our two previous papers on the issue, we described how deep the relations between Baku and Jerusalem are and brought up several recommendations on how to effectively engage Azerbaijan in Trump’s regional plans and for the sake of Israel’s interests.
But there are some skeptics who attempted to argue the alleged impracticality of the idea. Their main counterarguments are:
- This initiative is irrelevant in the context of Azerbaijan, as the Abraham Accords are signed exclusively between Israel and Arab countries.
- These agreements are signed between Israel and Arab states that were previously in a state of war with the Jewish state. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has never been at war with Israel and established diplomatic relations with it more than 30 years ago.
- The Abraham Accords are strictly a Middle Eastern initiative and therefore have no direct relevance to Azerbaijan.
Conceptual Clarifications
· It must be noted that our policy papers did not merely discuss Azerbaijan’s accession to the Abraham Accords, but rather its inclusion in the “club“ of signatory states (“Azerbaijan should be included in the ‘Abraham Accords Club’”). Later, during his address in the Knesset, the MP from the SHAS party, Simon Moshiashvily, similarly stated not only the necessity for Azerbaijan to sign the accords but also that “it would be appropriate to integrate Azerbaijan itself into the Abraham Accords framework.” In both cases, the rationale was based on the fact that following the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, the Negev Forum [1] was established in 2022, bringing together the United States, Israel, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and Bahrain as a functional mechanism for implementing the agreements. The forum was designed with a structured institutional framework, including a presidency, a steering committee, and working groups focusing on key areas such as: food security, water technologies, clean energy, tourism, healthcare, education, regional security.
Steering Committee meetings were held in Bahrain (June 2022) and the UAE (January 2023), while the first working group seminar took place in Washington (June 2023). However, under the Biden administration, this mechanism did not develop substantial momentum. Now, with the Trump administration’s anticipated expansion of the Abraham Accords, this mechanism is expected to be restructured and relaunched in an updated format. The goal is to establish a formalized platform for multilateral regional cooperation, backed by financial support from the United States and the UAE. When discussions arise about Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the “club” or “framework” of the Abraham Accords, the reference is specifically to this institutional mechanism, just ahead of its planned restructuring.
· The claim that the Abraham Accords are intended exclusively for normalizing relations between Israel and Arab countries is contradicted by numerous publications in leading Israeli media (December 2024 – February 2025), citing sources within the Trump team. According to their information, there are plans to expand these agreements to 14 Muslim-majority countries, including non-Arab nations in Africa and Southeast Asia.
· The assertion that these agreements are signed only by countries that were or still are de jure in a state of war with Israel is refuted by the precedent of the UAE. The United Arab Emirates did not participate in any Arab-Israeli war, never declared war on Israel, and therefore, prior to signing the Abraham Accords in 2020, were not in a state of war with the Jewish state.
There are also skeptics in Azerbaijan, who undermine the initiative, claiming it has no real value for Baku. But they have missed at least three obvious points:
1) The idea of integrating Azerbaijan into the Abraham Accords framework reshapes the prevailing perception of Azerbaijan in the U.S., which has been largely confined to the Armenian issue and the limited geopolitical scope of the South Caucasus.
2) The initiative brings out the following issue: other Muslim-majority countries that have merely signed the Abraham Accords receive political, military, and economic assistance from the U.S. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, which has been Israel’s most reliable Muslim-world ally for decades, remains subject to U.S. sanctions under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Israeli politicians and Jewish leaders are already calling Trump’s administration to repeal it, as it is outdated and unjust.
3) “Azerbaijani model” of relations with Israel can be set as a precedent for other Muslim-majority countries, that wish to join the Abraham Accords. The essence of this approach is as follows: the Abraham Accords risk becoming ineffective because every time Israeli-Palestinian tensions escalate, Arab signatories immediately freeze all regional partnership initiatives outlined in the accords. This enables Hamas (and Iran) to sabotage the implementation of the Accords, as seen on October 7, 2023: Hamas’ attack derailed the imminent signing of the agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. As for Azerbaijan, it continues to strengthen its partnership with Israel regardless of the Israeli-Palestinian relations, and despite external pressures from Iran and Turkey. If accepting Azerbaijan’s approach to its partnership with Israel turns to be the prerequisite condition for the future Abraham Accords members, it might not only enhance Azerbaijan’s image in Israel and the U.S., but also strengthen its strategic position in the eyes of Muslim-majority countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia that are looking to advance their own lobbying efforts in Washington.