BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,305, September 18, 2024
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The US has spent months trying to pressure Israel into a long-term ceasefire with Hamas that would serve American interests by reducing the danger of regional war that could drag in the US. But Washington’s view of a ceasefire in Gaza and subsequent regional de-escalation fails to address three of Israel’s critical security needs: to ensure the IDF’s freedom of operation in Gaza to prevent Hamas from regrouping; to counter Hezbollah’s massive military-terrorist infrastructure and stop its 11-month-long assault on northern Israel; and to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which are intended to provide a protective cover to the entire jihadist Iranian axis.
Despite claims to the contrary, a significant divergence between the security interests of Israel and the United States has developed in recent months.
President Joe Biden and his top aides have spent months relentlessly trying to bring Israel and Hamas to a long-term ceasefire via a hostage release agreement and to push for an “end to the war.” Despite the US’s official position, the motivation for this intense effort is broader than a desire to bring the hostages home. The US wants to bring Israel to a ceasefire because it views Gaza as the key to deescalating tensions between Hezbollah and Israel. Washington wants to avert a war that could draw in Hezbollah’s sponsor, Iran, as that conflict could in turn draw the US itself into the fighting.
The White House administration therefore perceives Gaza as the key to regional de-escalation – but that view fails to address Israel’s need to ensure sustained freedom of operation in Gaza to prevent Hamas from regrouping. It also ignores Hezbollah’s massive military-terrorist infrastructure in southern Lebanon and 11-month assault on Israel as well as the alarmingly advanced Iranian nuclear program, which is intended by Tehran to provide a nuclear umbrella to protect the whole of the jihadist Iranian axis.
While the US has played a vital role in coordinating and taking part in defensive operations that have greatly benefited Israel, particularly during the April 14 Iranian missile and UAV attack on Israel, and has played an essential role in supplying Israel with war munitions, it has no desire to be drawn into sustained offensive operations against Iran. It is operating accordingly in line with this strategic agenda.
American efforts are therefore far from fully aligned with Israel’s interests, as they apply a “band-aid” approach that would leave festering threats in place. The ongoing threat from Lebanon would be allowed to continue, and an Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza would all but guarantee a Hamas regrouping and a renewed Iranian-backed force build-up in Gaza.
It is perfectly legitimate for close allies to have divergent interests and to manage these disagreements, but some transparency regarding this situation would be beneficial.
For example, CNN reported on September 5 that a prospective hostage and ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas was 90% completed, citing senior US administration officials. These statements minimized the large gaps that remain between the two sides and the fact that Hamas continues to demand a full Israeli withdrawal from all of Gaza.
(This essay will not go into the hostage deal proposals themselves, which warrant a separate analysis).
In the same report, a senior Biden administration official stated, “We still see this deal, this very complex but necessary arrangement, as really the most viable, perhaps the only viable option for saving the lives of the hostages, stopping the war, bringing immediate relief to Gazans, and also making sure we fully account for Israel’s security.”
On September 1, the Washington Post cited a US official as stating, “You can’t keep negotiating this. This process has to be called at some point.”
The US fears that a failure to reach a ceasefire in Gaza will tip the Lebanese arena into full-scale war, which in turn could activate Iran via missile and drone attacks. This series of events could draw the US into the conflict. US bases in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere are vulnerable to attack by Iran and its proxies, and a Middle Eastern war involving the US military is deemed by Washington to be a political negative (whether it is an election year or not).
This concern is likely a primary motivator for US policy in the region and a significant reason behind American impatience over the stalled talks.
In a reflection of this motivation, American officials have released statements at almost every step of the war in Gaza designed to cast doubt on Israel’s ability to deal with Hamas, as well as Israel’s ability to militarily take on Hezbollah.
For example, US officials were quoted by CNN on June 20 as expressing “serious concerns” that in the event of a full-blown war between Israel and Hezbollah, the latter could overwhelm Israel’s air defenses in the north. “We assess that at least some Iron Dome batteries will be overwhelmed,” said a senior administration official.
This assessment is largely self-evident and not in serious dispute. There appears to be no purpose to its release to the public by American officials other than the overall goal of pressuring Israel into a Gaza ceasefire.
In May, the IDF announced that it had succeeded in evacuating around a million Palestinians from Rafah. This was despite a major American pressure campaign designed to avert the Rafah operation that included the withholding of American arms shipments to Israel (including 2,000-pound bombs, which affects Israel’s posture against Hezbollah).
On May 12, CNN reported that top American officials “offered stark warnings” against an Israeli invasion of Rafah, predicting that a major ground offensive in the southern Gaza city “would lead to widespread civilian casualties, spark a Hamas insurgency and create a power vacuum the terror group would later seek to fill.”
Going “headlong into Rafah” could have dire consequences, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned prior to the offensive. “Israel’s on the trajectory, potentially, to inherit an insurgency with many armed Hamas left, or, if it leaves, a vacuum filled by chaos, filled by anarchy and probably refilled by Hamas,” Blinken told NBC at the time. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan also warned at the time that the Israeli operation would lead to “really significant civilian casualties” while still being unlikely to eliminate Hamas. President Biden issued similar warnings prior to the Rafah operation.
Yet the extreme consequences they warned about failed to materialize due to Israel’s ability to evacuate the Gazan population from Rafah. And in any case, how leaving Hamas intact in Rafah would have solved the concerns raised by the US remains unclear.
The goal behind all these statements appears to have been the same: to create pressure on Israel to enter into a ceasefire, even if that meant leaving Hamas in power in Gaza.
Washington is taking a similar approach to the northern front. On June 28, US defense officials were quoted by Middle East Eye as stating that an Israeli ground offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon could “further ignite Iran’s allies in the region and cement Tehran’s military cooperation with Russia.”
It is, however, possible to argue that the US’s own attempt to contain Iran has emboldened it and the IRGC’s region-wide terror-promoting elements, thereby also boosting Iran’s ally, Russia, which has become deeply dependent on Iranian firepower in its war against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, in Lebanon, the US has been involved in a series of failed efforts, led by mediator Amos Hochstein, involving talks with the formal Lebanese government (which holds no power whatsoever over Hezbollah). The goal is to create a diplomatic off-ramp for the northern conflict. Yet none of these efforts contain any clear proposed enforcement mechanism of UN Security Resolution 1701, which bans Hezbollah from being militarily active in southern Lebanon.
UN Security Resolution 1701 came into effect upon the conclusion of the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Yet Hezbollah spent the intervening 18 years turning some 200 southern Lebanese villages into Iranian-backed military-terror bases and building up a firepower arsenal larger than that of most NATO armies. It did this with no pushback from the UN whatsoever and no attempts to enforce the resolution.
For months, American officials have expressed alarm over prospects of full-scale war with Hezbollah and leaked assessments that cast doubt on Israel’s capabilities, similar to American assessments of IDF capabilities in Gaza.
As long ago as January 7, the Washington Post reported that “Israel’s talk of expanding war to Lebanon alarms [the] US”. The report contained references to “an American intelligence assessment” that found that it would be “difficult for Israel to succeed in a war against Hezbollah amid ongoing fighting in Gaza.” The target audience of those reports could well have been the Israeli public itself.
More recently, an American official was quoted by Israeli journalist Barak Ravid as saying that a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah could have “catastrophic and unforeseen consequences,” as Israel would need to shift growing numbers of military units from the Gaza front to the Lebanese border and Hezbollah would continue to bombard northern Israel and keep 60,000 Israelis internally displaced.
While an open discussion about the dangers of a full-scale war against Hezbollah and potentially Iran is welcome, there is little reason to continue to pretend that American and Israeli security interests in the Middle East are identical. The US long ago decided to seek de-escalation as its primary goal. Israelis should think twice before automatically accepting the claim that Washington’s regional agenda and public statements always promote Israel’s own critical security needs.
Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS, and is a research associate at the Miryam Institute and the Alma Center.