PSCRP-BESA Reports No 114 (February 11, 2025)
In the ongoing geopolitical conflict between Iran and Israel, Iran’s relations with post-Soviet states—especially those with which it shares a direct border—play a crucial role. The tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, coupled with Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel, are well-known to experts. Similarly, Iran’s close ties with Armenia are also widely acknowledged. However, a less frequently discussed yet highly significant aspect is the nature of Iran’s relationship with the third post-Soviet state with which it shares a border—Turkmenistan.
Officially, Turkmenistan maintains a policy of neutrality. However, the interpretation of this neutrality shifts in response to changing geopolitical realities. Currently, several factors indicate a gradual realignment of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy towards the Iran-Russia-China axis, a development that runs counter to Israeli interests. This article explores the domestic and international factors driving this shift.
Foreign Policy Factors: Declining U.S. Influence, Russia’s Growing Interest, and Chinese Debt Settlements
The foreign policy approach of Serdar Berdimuhamedow, who assumed the presidency in 2022, largely follows the path set by his father, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow. The elder Berdimuhamedow still wields significant influence over Turkmenistan’s policies, holding the titles of National Leader of the Turkmen People, Chairman of the People’s Council of Turkmenistan, and even the honorary title of Protector (Arkadag), a designation reminiscent of other authoritarian figures in Central Asia.
One of the key turning points in Turkmenistan’s geopolitical orientation occurred in June 2021, when the country completed the repayment of Chinese loans used to finance the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline and the development of the Galkynysh gas field. The sale of gas through this pipeline remains the primary source of foreign currency revenue for Turkmenistan. However, prior to 2021, a significant portion of these earnings was directed toward repaying China, a financial arrangement many analysts likened to a form of neocolonial resource-extraction dependency.
While the precise amount of the repaid debt was never officially disclosed, earlier reports from Turkmen media suggested that China had extended loans amounting to $8.1 billion for Turkmen energy projects. Despite this repayment, Turkmenistan remains one of China’s largest natural gas suppliers. Bilateral trade between the two nations remains robust, reaching over $10.5 billion in 2023—a figure that vastly exceeds Turkmenistan’s trade volume with Russia or the European Union.
Turkmenistan’s ability to alleviate Chinese financial pressure was, in part, made possible by increasing cooperation with Russia, spanning trade, credit agreements, and even informal security guarantees against potential threats from Afghanistan. Historically, Ashgabat had sought to reduce its reliance on Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom by prioritizing gas exports to China. However, given the shifting geopolitical landscape, Russian energy dominance no longer poses the same threat to Turkmenistan’s economic independence. Consequently, in 2019, Turkmenistan resumed gas exports to Russia.
Following the unprecedented Western sanctions on Moscow in 2022, Russia has aggressively pursued deeper ties with Central Asian nations, including Turkmenistan. Gazprom has expressed interest in using Turkmenistan’s pipeline infrastructure to facilitate the transit of Russian gas exports to China. However, Ashgabat remains cautious, citing past experiences and emphasizing its sovereignty over its gas transit network.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2021 significantly reduced Western influence in Central Asia, limiting Turkmenistan’s ability to balance between major powers. Additionally, the scale of Turkmenistan’s economic engagement with China and Russia far outweighs its cooperation with Western nations.
The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 further reinforced Moscow’s scrutiny over the foreign policies of its regional neighbors, ensuring that they do not drift towards the West. However, despite the growing influence of Russia and China, Turkmenistan has attempted to maintain its neutral stance. For instance, Ashgabat continues to explore Western-backed energy projects, such as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. Nonetheless, strong opposition from both Russia and Iran leaves the project’s future uncertain.
In July 2023, Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated—contradicting the positions of both Tehran and the Kremlin—that no legal or technical barriers exist to the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. The ministry emphasized the project’s economic viability and its potential contribution to Eurasian energy security. While this declaration signals Turkmenistan’s willingness to engage with Western partners, the geopolitical realities of Russian—and particularly Iranian—resistance present significant challenges. In March 2024, Turkmenistan renewed its proposal to transport natural gas to Turkey via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, citing the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which permits the laying of pipelines along the seabed with the agreement of the coastal states.
Strengthening Authoritarianism and Ideological Convergence with Iran and Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan
Many experts initially speculated that Serdar Berdimuhamedow, following the example of his father, would adopt a strategy of relative liberalization to gain popular support before gradually tightening control. Additionally, reforms in neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—both of which have improved relations with Turkmenistan—gave some hope for moderate liberalization of the Turkmen regime.
However, these expectations proved mistaken. There has been no repetition of the “Turkmen thaw” that occurred during the early years of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s rule. Instead, following the ascension of the country’s third president, Turkmenistan has experienced a growing trend toward “state conservatism”—a trend that is widespread in contemporary Central Eurasia.
Under Serdar Berdimuhamedow, the government’s control over both public and private life has only intensified. Restrictions on women’s personal freedoms have expanded, including bans on cosmetics, eyelash extensions, hair dyeing, and other beauty treatments deemed inappropriate by state standards. Female government employees have been subjected to compliance inspections based on their appearance and social media posts. Women’s rights to wear clothing outside of the approved dress codes have also been curtailed. Additionally, obtaining permission to leave the country has become increasingly difficult, especially for women. The state has also tightened internet censorship, particularly targeting youth, and introduced more ideological content into schools and universities, including the mandatory study of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow’s works.
Although officially framed as a domestic nationalist policy, these measures also serve a foreign policy function. The trend toward “state conservatism” and the promotion of “traditional values” align with the ideological narratives of Turkmenistan’s key geopolitical partners—Russia and China—but resonate particularly well with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle and the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan.
This growing authoritarianism and social conservatism isolate Turkmenistan from the West, where issues of human rights and gender equality have always been major foreign policy priorities. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western influence in the region has diminished, prompting Turkmenistan to align its policies more closely with the values of its immediate neighbors.
From a foreign policy perspective, Turkmenistan’s domestic conservative policies under Serdar Berdimuhamedow are also driven by a desire to harmonize relations with Iran’s conservative elite and Afghanistan’s Taliban government. Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Turkmenistan quickly re-established ties with the group. Afghanistan remains an important partner in the TAPI gas pipeline project (Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India) and in transport corridors connecting Central and South Asia.
Maintaining good relations with the Taliban is also crucial for Ashgabat due to Afghanistan’s demands for a larger share of water from the Amu Darya River. If Afghanistan were to succeed in securing greater water resources, it could significantly impact Turkmenistan and worsen the ecological crisis in the Aral Sea region, already affecting Uzbekistan. This water dispute is expected to escalate in the coming years.
Turkmenistan’s conservative social policies, particularly regarding women’s rights and public morality, may serve as a means of reducing cultural contradictions with the Taliban and building trust in bilateral relations. A similar logic may apply to Turkmenistan’s interactions with Iran.
However, despite Turkmenistan’s ideological alignment with Iran, characterized by the strengthening of authoritarian and even totalitarian tendencies, Ashgabat has not engaged in significant strategic cooperation with Tehran. The two nations lack the necessary economic and military potential for deep collaboration. For instance, Turkmen gas is only relevant to Iran for supplying its remote northern regions, which are far from Iran’s major gas fields. Additionally, Turkmenistan does not possess significant Soviet-era military infrastructure, making military cooperation with Iran unappealing.
For Tehran, however, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy neutrality remains highly valuable. Unlike Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan does not cooperate with Israel or the United States in the security sphere. Iran also fully supports Turkmenistan’s isolationist policies, as they help ensure Iran’s strategic security. Any security collaboration between Turkmenistan and Western powers—especially Israel—would intensify Iran’s geopolitical encirclement, significantly increasing pressure on Tehran. A situation similar to the U.S. military presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan in the past—which created a sense of encirclement for Iran—could reemerge if Turkmenistan were to align with anti-Iranian forces. However, it is worth mentioning that during the period of U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, the threat to Iran was mitigated due to certain unofficial agreements, particularly regarding Iraq.
Although Turkmenistan officially maintains a policy of neutrality, its geopolitical stance could theoretically change. During the peak of U.S. engagement in Central Asia, negotiations were held regarding the possibility of using the Mary-2 Soviet-era military airbase in Turkmenistan. Additionally, Turkmenistan once had active economic cooperation with Israel due to historical factors. Notably, the first president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi), had personal ties to the Jewish community, as he was married to a Jewish woman. Moreover, a key behind-the-scenes figure in his administration, Alexander Zhadan, was an ethnic Jew who once served as Chief of Staff of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan.
Israeli businessman Joseph (Yossi) Maiman played a crucial role in Israeli-Turkmen economic relations. As the founder of the Merhav Group in 1975, Maiman led major projects in Turkmenistan, including the modernization of a refinery. He also served as Israel’s Special Ambassador to Turkmenistan, fostering diplomatic ties. Even after the death of Turkmenbashi, Maiman continued to play a significant role in relations with Turkmenistan. However, his passing in 2021 created a gap in Israel’s ability to engage with Turkmenistan effectively.
Future Prospects: Can the West Engage Turkmenistan?
While Turkmenistan officially adheres to a policy of neutrality, its recent foreign policy adjustments indicate a gradual tilt toward the Russia-Iran-China axis. Nonetheless, Turkmenistan still seeks to balance its relations by exploring Western energy projects such as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, though significant obstacles remain. As Turkmenistan’s geopolitical stance continues to evolve, it will be crucial to monitor how far Ashgabat is willing to align with Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing—and whether it will continue to uphold its proclaimed neutrality.
Turkmenistan might engage with anti-Iranian forces and distance itself from the Moscow-Tehran-Beijing axis—but only if it receives significant strategic incentives in return. Ashgabat has repeatedly hinted that an attractive proposal could be the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. This project would undermine Russia’s and Iran’s ambitions in the European energy market while also limiting China’s ability to monopolize Central Asian gas supplies. Additionally, it would strengthen cooperation between Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, through which gas would be transported to Europe.
Recently, the EU, Turkey, and Azerbaijan have shown growing interest in advancing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, and Israel could strategically support the project to counter Iran’s influence. However, engaging with Turkmenistan carries significant reputational risks for Western actors, given its highly authoritarian domestic policies. Nevertheless, theoretically, under certain circumstances, the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline and engagement with Turkmenistan could become one of the priorities of a future Trump administration in Central Eurasia.
Thus, Turkmenistan remains at a geopolitical crossroads, maintaining formal neutrality while leaning toward an alliance with Russia, Iran, and China. However, if sufficiently incentivized, Ashgabat might reconsider its stance, presenting an opportunity for Western and Israeli diplomatic engagement.