BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 21 (June 2025)

By July 2, 2025
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USSR symbol (Gemini-generated)
USSR symbol (AI Generated)

In June 2025, the PSCR program published analytical papers on the political and economic developments in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Ukraine, and Russia.

The PSCRP team sheds light on the broader context of the free trade agreement signed by Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which has come into force recently. The authors regard this as a part of Iran’s strategy to build stronger ties with Central Asian states while Russia, the traditional powerful actor in the region, is distracted by the war. In this power vacuum, the Iranian government’s attempts to create additional regional alignments appear to be part of its “Look East” geopolitical strategy, which does not aim to establish durable alliances. Among other things, Tehran may offer control over key transport routes that are alternatives to those controlled and offered by Russia. Iranian economic influence manifests itself not only in trade numbers but also in the emerging joint ventures between Iran’s industry and its neighbors. These developments seem risky in terms of the ayatollah regime’s possibilities of creating proxy networks, evidenced by its track record in Middle Eastern countries. Also, excessive influence from Tehran might affect voting patterns at international forums and non-participation in sanction regimes.

Ze’ev Khanin provides his perspective on the complex relationships between Israel and the countries of the “Great Middle East.” He describes the context of the possible continuation of the “Abrahamic Alliance” initiated during Trump’s first term in office and weighs possibilities for Saudi Arabia to join this group. At the same time, Khanin emphasizes Azerbaijan’s constructive role in the region and Baku’s strategic partnership with Israel, thereby stressing the need to include the country in multilateral configurations. Particularly important are Baku’s efforts to mediate some rapprochement between Jerusalem and Ankara, which, however, still seem far away; the complicated bilateral dynamics between Israel and Turkey were further catalyzed by the Oct. 7th massacre (and its aftermath) and the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria. Khanin concludes with cautious optimism regarding the (re)establishment of Jerusalem-Baku “working relations,” although not meaning either sustainable cooperation or a strategic partnership.

The PSCRP team compares the positions taken by the governments and societies in Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding the war between Israel and Iran (the IDF operation “Rising Lion”). Azerbaijani politicians have immediately taken a neutral stance (while sending messages to the Israeli leadership not to target Iran’s regions inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis, and denouncing false claims about Azerbaijan’s territory being used by the Israeli air force), and some major media outlets have taken an openly pro-Israeli position. In contrast, all major Armenian actors, including the government, opposition parties, media, and diaspora—most notably the ANCA—have condemned the Israeli operation, expressing varying degrees of emotional intensity. Apart from this, numerous fake news narratives were spread by the Armenian media and Telegram channels, most of them originating from the Iranian outlets and social networks affiliated with the IRGC. However, in Iran, the target of these fakes was their citizens, to explain why Tehran’s vaunted military might was eventually so easy to destroy. On the contrary, in Armenia, the target audience was external: fakes were spread to “foment hostility towards Azerbaijan in Iran and gain support among left and right-wing critics of Israel by tying in Israel’s strikes on Iran to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.”

The PSCRP team analyzes the background and causes of the spontaneous protests in Dagestan. The Dagestani phenomenon is that these protests are quite frequent, populous (compared to the other regions), and normally do not result in waves of repression. However, land disputes and infrastructure problems primarily trigger these protests, rendering them apolitical and exploiting power disparities among various levels. In contrast, the protests against military mobilization and the infamous pogrom at Makhachkala airport—both of which are nearly unique in Russia—were violently suppressed due to their potential for politicization. The authors ascribe the Dagestani protests’ uniqueness to the ethnic and cultural patchwork of its population that demands constant balancing of various interests, the remnants of independent civil society institutions, the republican government’s relatively weak capabilities of running Dagestan effectively, and the republic’s comparatively young population (which is considered a driver of social unrest). However, the protests are unlikely to become a threat to the regime: the “authorities will likely continue to tolerate some level of local protest, as long as it remains fragmented and focused on mundane issues. Larger demonstrations, especially those with any political overtones, will be suppressed.”

Velvl Chernin provides his view of what the future of the Russia-Ukraine war can be through the lens of postcolonialism studies. The author claims that, since the Trump administration’s peace plans are somewhat delayed and since several European actors have intensified direct military support to Kyiv, the prospects for Russia’s disintegration might be analyzed, at least from a theoretical perspective. Chernin highlights the diverging positions on this issue by Ukrainian and Western politicians, as the former must form any kind of alliances, while the latter do not face an existential threat and may hope for a peaceful resolution with the current Kremlin regime. At the same time, even if some new states are to be formed on Russia’s territory, not all of them will likely adhere to the standards of Western liberal democracy: at least a part of the “potential states,” with a traditional Muslim majority, might get influenced by the ideas of radical Islam.

Dmitry Kovchegin shares his view of the problem often neglected by the political analysts in the context of the ongoing war: the operation of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities. He stresses the fact that Ukraine has one of Europe’s most extensive nuclear power programs, comprising four active nuclear power plants, the decommissioning site in Chernobyl, and several nuclear research facilities. The author points to the (limited) direct attacks against Ukrainian nuclear sites; high risks from off-site disruptions of the facilities that provide critical infrastructure; problems faced by the nuclear plants’ personnel under the war situation and, in some cases, direct military occupation; and the IAEA’s limited possibilities to protect the nuclear sites. Kovchegin concludes that “current legal frameworks are inadequate when faced with state-level military aggression, highlighting inherent weaknesses and the urgent need for comprehensive reform of both international humanitarian law and nuclear security arrangements.”

And as usual, Alexander Shpunt presents his monthly monitoring of analytical publications focused on post-Soviet conflicts, summarizing the five most interesting papers/monographs, in the author’s assessment, covering politics and economy in the post-Soviet region.

Stay tuned—much else is still to be explored in post-Soviet politics.

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