PSCRP-BESA Reports No 212 (June 22, 2026)
The architecture of Eurasian connectivity is currently undergoing a fundamental transformation, driven by the systemic destabilization of traditional trade routes. As sanctions and geopolitical risks render the Northern and Southern corridors increasingly unreliable, the Middle Corridor is probably evolving from a supplementary diversification tool into an indispensable land artery linking the markets of the East and West. Furthermore, the potential integration of the Middle Corridor with the Indo-Israeli “Spice Route” creates a new “Eurasian arc of connectivity”. In this framework, Israel can emerge as a vital technological hub and “intellectual integrator,” bridging regional logistics through innovation. This analysis explores how these intersecting interests can forge a resilient, multilateral network of interchangeable nodes, where the stability of transit states becomes the cornerstone of Eurasian and global economic security.
The Collapse of Traditional Eurasian Connectivity: Implications for China, the U.S., and the EU.
For decades, the architecture of Eurasian logistics within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has leaned primarily on the Northern (via the Russian Federation) and Southern (via Iran) land routes. During this period, the Middle Corridor was largely perceived by China as merely a supplementary diversification tool, essential only for safeguarding primary arteries. However, the current geopolitical landscape, defined by sanctions pressure on Russia and the heightened risks of military escalation involving Iran, has radically shifted this balance, rendering traditional trajectories critically unreliable for trade between Asia and Europe. From the perspective of Chinese strategists, the development of this route is a pivotal element in overcoming the “Malacca Dilemma”—the PRC’s excessive reliance on maritime routes that are vulnerable in the event of a conflict with the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
For Washington, the Middle Corridor has consistently been regarded as a strategic instrument for reinforcing the sovereignty of Central Asian and South Caucasian states. Under the current administration, this geopolitical objective is increasingly complemented by an economic agenda focused on supply chain resilience and fiscal efficiency. Consequently, Washington is incentivized to ensure the corridor maintains a multilateral character, preventing the emergence of a closed infrastructural system under the exclusive control of Beijing.
The European Union occupies a pivotal position in the emerging Eurasian landscape, navigating a dual-pronged strategy that bridges the geopolitical objectives of the United States and the geo-economic imperatives of China. For Brussels, the Middle Corridor is a strategic necessity, serving both to bolster the sovereignty of Central Asian states and to preserve vital commercial links with Beijing. This dualism allows the EU to align with Washington’s goal of securing infrastructural independence of the states of Central Asia and South Caucasus while simultaneously mirroring China’s interest in ensuring the resilience of global supply chains.
Regional Agency: Kazakhstan and the States of the Transit Arc
Within the emerging architecture of Eurasian connectivity, the nations of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are undergoing a fundamental transformation of their role in the global system. For decades, this region was perceived primarily as a periphery of great powers; today, it is evolving into a network of intersecting nodes where the interests of global actors no longer merely collide but have become functionally dependent on the stability of local states. The Middle Corridor creates conditions in which no major power can fully realize its objectives without considering the interests of transit countries, significantly enhancing their political value and strategic agency.
The common interests of the states along the transit arc lie in strengthening national sovereignty and expanding foreign policy autonomy through deep integration into global supply chains. For these countries such the development of the corridor is not only an economic project but a strategic instrument of multi-vectorism, enabling simultaneous cooperation with the U.S., EU, China, Russia and other nations of the West and the East without falling into exclusive dependence on any single actor. The primary priority for regional actors remains the maximization of cargo flows while maintaining the openness and de-politicization of the route, which transforms infrastructure into a mechanism of protection against destructive great-power confrontation.
The specificity of Kazakhstan as the “central gateway” of the Middle Corridor is defined by its unique geographical position and its capacity to serve as a political mediator. Unlike many other participants, Kazakhstan possesses a critical resource: political trust from all centers of power. Astana, probably, most successfully of all the actors of the region, maintains a multilateral dialogue by developing pragmatic engagement with Washington and Brussels, while simultaneously deepening its partnership with Beijing and preserving traditional relations with Moscow. This allows Kazakhstan to function as a “translator of interests”, understanding the logics of various players and moderating their intersection across the Eurasian space.
Kazakhstan’s strategy regarding the Middle Corridor is anchored in the principle of “complementarity, not substitution” relative to traditional routes. This approach stems from Astana’s established multi-vector foreign policy, which prioritizes constructive engagement with all major Eurasian stakeholders. To prevent the project from becoming a source of systemic friction with Moscow, Astana consistently frames the corridor as a tool for diversification while developing the Caspian Sea as a zone of joint coordination rather than a line of geopolitical rupture. Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), with its common market and industrial coordination, facilitates seamless access for Russian firms to the Kazakh segment of the Middle Corridor, effectively integrating them into the broader regional ecosystem.
By maintaining the balance between different great powers, Astana avoids entanglement in anti-Chinese or anti-Russian coalitions, which would be inherently hazardous for a state positioned as a neutral actor. Instead, Kazakhstan focuses on its role as a systemic mediator working to transform contemporary global conflicts into opportunities for positive-sum regional cooperation and long-term stability. This can potentially turn Kazakhstan’s bet on regional connectivity into the foundation for a new, more resilient transport architecture for all of Central Eurasia.
Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s strategic course is focused on the consistent de-politicization of transport infrastructure. It is critically advantageous for Astana to avoid the use of military or sanctions rhetoric regarding the routes, steadily shifting international focus exclusively toward pragmatic issues of commerce and logistics. This approach allows the country to effectively maintain a balance of interests and prevent the monopolistic dominance of any external player, minimizing the likelihood of political pressure from great powers. In the long term, Kazakhstan strives to transform into an institutional hub for Eurasia, in which Kazakhstan acts not as a passive transit territory, but as one of its key architects and systemic moderators.
Potential Synergy of the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route as an Interest of Israel
The integration of the Middle Corridor and the Indo-Israeli connectivity project, known as the “Spice Route”, or India–Middle East–Europe Corridor, represents an effort to forge a qualitatively new “Eurasian arc of connectivity” linking East Asia, Central Eurasia, and the Mediterranean. Within this architecture, Israel is no longer perceived merely as a terminal destination but is transformed into a strategic crossroads for two of Eurasia’s largest logistical systems.
For Jerusalem, the development of the Middle Corridor carries a profound geopolitical dimension that extends far beyond mere logistics. Israel has a vital interest in strengthening and expanding relations with the neutral and relatively friendly states of the Turkic world that form the backbone of the trans-Caspian route.
This partnership gains particular significance from Kazakhstan’s stated support for the “Abraham Accords”, which could theoretically facilitate their logical expansion into the Central Asian region. Such a rapprochement would foster a fundamentally new international environment in Eurasia friendly to Israel, potentially creating a “belt of stability” stretching from the Caucasus to the borders of China. Strengthening ties with Turkic states along the Middle Corridor provides Israel with necessary strategic depth and allows it to diversify its foreign policy pillars beyond the traditionally conflict-prone Middle Eastern region.
Within the framework of Eurasian connectivity between the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route, Israel increasingly seeks to position itself as a technological hub and a key logistical gateway. The primary value of Israeli participation lies not necessarily in physical transit, but in its role as an “intellectual integrator” of the two corridors. Israeli expertise can address a critical challenge facing both the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route: management fragmentation and high administrative barriers.
Israel’s contribution to these systems could include:
- AI-driven logistics to optimize multimodal routes and reduce transit times;
- Supply chain cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure from digital threats;
- “Smart Customs” and digital port management systems that integrate Indian, Central Asian, and European platforms into a single network.
This agenda could be integrated into the future activities of the Negev Forum as a mechanism for the practical implementation of the Abraham Accords.
Potential Synergy between Israel and Kazakhstan: Aligning Two “Bridges” in the Context of the Abraham Accords Development
From a global geographical perspective, Kazakhstan and other countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus can be viewed as a natural northeastern extension of the Spice Route, connecting the Indo-Mediterranean axis with East Asian markets via the Caspian Sea. This creates a situation where Israel, on one side, and the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, on the other, do not compete for transport flows but jointly capitalize on their roles as “interest translators” between various power centers.
The interaction between Israel and Kazakhstan can be built on the principle of mutual complementarity of two “bridge states.” Kazakhstan, along with several other Central Asian and South Caucasian states, can serve as a Central Asian “entry point” for Israeli technology and investment. In turn, Israel can provide Kazakhstan with access to emerging Spice Route networks and the markets of India and the Persian Gulf countries. Due to the complex histories of their peoples, both countries are compelled to conduct sophisticated multi-vector diplomacy and organize complex international business schemes, making them natural partners in designing a new Eurasian architecture.
There is a certain degree of route variability and flexibility in this scheme of cooperation, as connection paths between the two routes can be utilized through Turkey, or bypassing Turkey — via Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. In this instance, the convergence of the two routes enhances transport stability and renders it independent of the complex relations between Israel and the Hellenic states (Greece and Cyprus) on one side, and Turkey on the other.
India, seeking strategic depth in its confrontation with Pakistan and China and therefore, striving for access to Central Eurasia, also acquires a stable bypass route. The latter will remain operational even if:
- instability in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the Kabul-Islamabad conflict, and the Indo-Pakistani conflict block India’s access to Central Asia through Afghanistan;
- conflicts surrounding Iran disrupt the functioning of the North-South Corridor, jointly established by Russia, Iran, and India.
Thus, the emerging Indo-Israeli partnership will receive an additional stimulus. The development of such a model will also benefit the U.S. within the framework of its Indo-Pacific Strategy.
The transport alignment of the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route could form a hypothetical model of a unified “Eurasian arc of connectivity.” A key difference between this geo-economic model and classical geopolitics is the transition from a struggle for route control to the creation of a network of interchangeable nodes. Such an arc does not require constant maintenance costs from an external hegemon (e.g., the U.S.), which is important in the context of modern American foreign policy’s drive toward cost minimization, and will be effective simply if its participants adhere to common standards of openness. The stability of this system directly depends on the resilience of key transit states, turning them into vital systemic actors in the global economy.
The main challenge for such a project remains the necessity of decoupling politics from logistics. Furthermore, a significant role could be played by making the project as inclusive as possible, ensuring that economic benefits are distributed among all players, regardless of their geopolitical disagreements.
Conclusion
Potential convergence of the Middle Corridor and the Spice Route may signal a fundamental paradigm shift in the governance of Eurasian trade. In this new landscape, the security of global supply chains would be no longer guaranteed by a single hegemon, but by a resilient network of interchangeable nodes, where the stability of transit states becomes a collective global interest.
The success of this “Eurasian arc of connectivity” rests upon the sophisticated strategic agency of regional actors. Kazakhstan, acting as a systemic mediator and “central gateway,” has demonstrated that a committed multi-vector policy can transform a transit territory into an institutional hub capable of local moderation of great-power interests.
Simultaneously, Israel’s role as an “intellectual integrator” can provide the necessary technological layer — through AI-driven logistics and digital security — to bridge the administrative and physical gaps between the Indo-Mediterranean and Trans-Caspian systems.
Ultimately, the primary challenge remains the consistent de-politicization of logistics. By decoupling trade infrastructure from ideological and military confrontations, the states of the “transit arc” can ensure that economic benefits are distributed across all global players. This potential architecture offers more than just a logistical bypass; it provides a blueprint for a polycentric Eurasian order where cooperation is driven by pragmatic interdependence and mutual trade benefits.