It is likely that France does not have enough resources to prioritize both Ukraine and Armenia at the same time. Concentrating on two tracks at once, especially when resources are scarce, may lead to their inefficient allocation across both tracks.
Search Results for: Post-Soviet Eastern Europe and Eurasia
After the Second Karabakh War (2020) and especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2022), France saw a number of new diplomatic opportunities opening up for it in the southern post-Soviet space as Russia's traditional influence waned.
On the morning of October 7, 2023, when several thousands of heavily armed fighters from the radical Islamist terrorist group Hamas attacked Israel from the Gaza Strip, invading Israeli border settlements and other communities in the south of the country, a significant number of samples of weapons and equipment used by the group's Iran-trained military wing fell into Israeli hands right then.
- Emil Avdaliani
- Paper No. 1106
The geopolitical divorce of Russia and Europe is not confined to the military or economic realms. Over the past several years, the differences have been ideological as well. A good example is the death of a once major political project, the โEconomic Space from Lisbon to Vladivostok.โ
- Emil Avdaliani
- Paper No. 953
Russia under Putin falls neatly into the Russian historical cycle. When the old state is in decline, chaos ensues, and a new, powerful leader emerges to rebuild Russia. There are plenty of comparisons from Russian history that echo Putinโs rise and success โ but there are crucial differences, too, which help explain his inability to transform Russia into a truly global power.
All the countries of the South Caucasus are in anticipation, waiting for Russiaโs withdrawal from the war with Ukraine. It is clear that it will emerge from this conflict weakened, but it is not known to what extent
The active synthesis of old communist ideology with far-right nationalist and anti-Semitic views in Russia has been going on for a long time, since Soviet era (for example, through the activities of the so-called unofficial nationalist and conservative โRussian Partyโ in the late Soviet period). We will consider only three examples of individuals from the Russian security services who played a significant role in promoting anti-Semitic ideology in the post-Soviet period, giving it a pseudo-intellectual character. The analysis of these three consecutive cases shows a gradual increase in the tolerance of the Russian state of open anti-Semitism on the part of influential figures with background in security services. This situation, as we will analyze in the second part of the paper, has also begun to influence legal practice in Russia.