PSCRP-BESA Reports No 84 (Sept 19, 2024)
In the context of the new Palestinian-Israeli war, Russia has effectively adopted a pro-Palestinian stance, although its diplomacy tries to present itself as staying above the fray. This is hardly surprising given the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and the de facto break with the West for years to come. To position itself in the Muslim world, Russia needs to openly sympathize with the Palestinians, and close relations with Iran in the energy and military sectors make close ties with Israel difficult.
However, even against the backdrop of growing militarization and entrenched anti-Westernism, an unexpected rapprochement with Hamas is far from natural. Despite the proclaimed “turn to the East” and claims to leadership in the anti-Telegliberal world, Russian society remains socially and culturally oriented towards Europe. Beyond official declarations, Russian officials have made little progress: Iran, Saudi Arabia or North Korea are hardly seen as normative models. The memory of the Chechen wars is still alive in the public, where they are framed in a dominant narrative as a struggle against separatism and Islamism. Terrorist attacks such as the bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow (2000), the hostage-taking at the Dubrovka theater (2002) and at the school in Beslan (2004) are key reference points. Since the mid-2010s, Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war, as well as poorly publicized operations in the Central African Republic and Mali, have been publicly justified as fighting radical Islamism, while propagandists have labeled supporters of political Islam as such.
These contradictions are clearly visible in the rhetoric of Russian online Z-militarists: numerous Telegram channels, whose administrators are directly involved in the Russian-Ukrainian war, are often close to the front line and take a more radical position than the state propaganda in the rear. Their reaction to Israel’s war against Hamas has been quite cynical, accompanied not only by anti-Semitism but also outright Islamophobia.
Israel and Z-Anti-Semitism
Undoubtedly, after October 7, Russian militarists largely sided with Hamas and Hezbollah. The reasons lay in the ideological realm and were rooted in the desire to frame the conflict in a way that would fit their narrative: anti-Western sentiment, criticism of the United States and its allies, demonstration of Russia’s strength, and convincing readers that “in general” Russia was not committing “any particular” war crimes.
The first line of interpretation is geopolitical: another “hot spot” is beneficial to war-torn Russia because it could potentially divert U.S. attention and resources away from Ukraine. Z-blogger Govorít TopaZ, affiliated with the neo-Nazi group Rusich (157,000 followers), wrote in November 2023 about the protracted nature of the confrontation between Israel and Hamas: “It will be hard for them, the load will increase exponentially, so more and more Western aid would go to Israel. And if it goes there, it won’t go to the ‘khokhol’” (a derogatory term for Ukrainians). Moreover, Israel does not support Russia in its war, which prompts sympathy for Hamas and Hezbollah on the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. This is a key reason why militarists refer to these organizations as “allies.”
The most consistent supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah was the Telegram channel Grey Zone, one of the main media outlets of the Wagner group (its administrator was killed in Mali in the summer of 2024). The reasons for this liking, which translates into full acceptance of anti-Israel narratives, lie partly in the administrator’s anti-Semitism, which was extreme even by the Z-community standards. For example, in October 2023, he called Amir Weitman, a Likud member, a “talking soap.” But Grey Zone’s sympathies are rooted in their perception of Hamas as something akin to the Wagner group itself: a community of true warriors united by a common goal of struggle. The rhetoric of the small nation’s anti-colonial resistance plays an important but not decisive, role. Thus, on October 9, Grey Zone directly compared the elite Russian airborne troops to Hamas. It posted videos of Hamas airborne attackers and captioned them with the well-known slogan of the Russian elite airborne troops, “For you! For us! And for the special forces!” adding “Hamas airborne troopers.” A month later, the channel praised Hamas’s high tactical training, reposting related videos. Similar publications continued to appear later.
The anti-Semitism of Russian militarists usually takes the form of anti-Zionism and is rooted in their geopolitical fantasies. A foreign war serves only as an excuse to reinforce their own propaganda line. Militarists deliberately emphasized U.S. aid to Israel to show their readers that the Jewish state is less important to the U.S. than Ukraine. In early October, they pushed the narrative that Hamas was using Ukrainian weapons to make Kyiv look like it was working against the U.S. Some repeat this claim to this day, portraying Ukraine as a global security threat. Next, they moved on to another thesis — that Ukraine is of secondary importance to the U.S. For example, in mid-November, military ‘journalist’ Alexander Sladkov (who has more than over 900,000 followers), discussing the arrival of American ships off the coast of Israel, concluded: “Not to the Black Sea, not to Odesa, but to the Mediterranean. Ukrainians need to understand their role in modern history.”
The second line of interpretation is the military angle: viewing the conflict as a mirror that emphasizes the superiority of the Russian army. Such “comparisons” were particularly popular in the early months of the war between Israel and Hamas, and ranged from attempts at analysis, to claims that the IDF was learning from Russian war-experience, to attempts to demonstrate the weakness of the Israeli army.
However, given the general critical attitude of Russian militarists toward their own military leadership, we also find statements in which Israel’s war becomes a source of examples for direct or veiled criticism.
Thus, the aforementioned Alexander Sladkov noted on October 9 that Israel began its operation by blocking enemy forces: “Not with a broad front offensive, not with focal operations, but with cutting off the borders. Well, damn it, that’s a classic victory strategy”. This comment hints at criticism of Russia’s February 2022 offensive. Blogger Govorít TopaZ wrote in late October, “In other words, we are now watching Israel ruthlessly exterminate Arabs in Gaza, while Muslims around the world stand in traffic are expressing concern, drawing red lines, and issuing China’s final warnings”. The phrases “expressing concern”, “drawing red lines”, and “issuing warnings” are typical formulas used by militarists to criticize Putin’s leadership for refusing to wage a tougher war against Ukraine. In late July 2024, “journalist” Alexander Kharchenko (80,000 followers), discussing the irresponsible treatment of soldiers in the Russian army and advising reliance on FPV drones, stated: “But no, instead of technical progress, we will take pride in tactics used by Hamas.”
The third line is military-humanitarian: using pro-Palestinian propaganda to present Russia in a better light. This embodies the key thesis of Russian propaganda: war, with all its brutality, is the norm for the modern world. This leads to a remarkable willingness to uncritically label Israel’s actions in Gaza as genocide, while simultaneously accusing the U.S. for covering for its ally. However, this hypocritical approach has drawn limited criticism from some militarists. For instance, on October 11, war “correspondent” Astrakhan (35,000 followers) shamed his colleagues: “Not so long ago, fueled by hysteria from some failures and fear after the Ukrainian terrorist attacks, they demanded blood. The phrase “what if they did this to Israel” was constantly repeated. […] And now, four days in, these pussies, these angels are in all seriousness condemning crimes, genocide and all this. The phrase “we are not like that” is being used in all seriousness by the same people who used to use it exclusively alongside the word ‘cuckold.’“
However, this call went unheeded: the most radical Russian militarists, on the contrary, used the old image of the uncompromising Israeli army to urge Russia to abandon all decency in its war with Ukraine. The channel Veteran’s Notes (316,000 followers) unambiguously expressed this in January 2024: “We must crush this viper. Crush it until it’s dead. Russia has everything it needs to solve the Ukrainian question once and for all. We need determination like Israel, which has decided to finish Hamas once and for all and which methodically, systematically, meter by meter eliminates its threat, ignoring any international pressure and law”. At the same time, this didn’t stop the administrator from blaming “American Jews” for the Jewish pogrom in Dagestan in late October.
Despite the general anti-Israeli rhetoric, at least in the early days of the war, there were pro-Israel responses among militarists. For example, on October 8, 2023, the well-known Z-channel Kargach (26,000 followers) republished (and then deleted a few hours later) a pro-Israel post written by another little-known ‘war correspondent’. The post argued that Israel was not a direct supporter of Ukraine, that many Jews had a favorable view of Russians, and the Z-bloggers’ enthusiastic support of Hamas was dismissed as dangerous and pointless support for radical terrorists (deleted posts can be viewed using TGStat, a premium service for Telegram users). This did not stop him from declaring the exact opposite by the end of the month: “All Dagestanis should enlist as volunteers to destroy the Zionist stronghold in Eastern Europe by eliminating the fascist Zelensky, so that his oligarchs can sell the last weapons on the black market to Hamas. After that, veterans of the Special Military Operation (SVO), with the support of all Russians, will be able to embark on jihad against Israel and for the Freedom of Palestine (preferably one-way)”. However, this post reads more like irony, where war is seen as a game, and anti-Semitism coexists with the rejection of pro-Palestinian Dagestanis in Russia.
Kirill Fedorov, another prominent military blogger who fled Latvia for Russia in 2022, posted photos of dead Hamas terrorists with the comment, “Photos of de-Nazified dead Hamas fighters”. In early November 2023, he posted about an IDF soldier who had previously donated to a Z-channel, “Not a single donation came to the Russian Armed Forces from Palestine”. Another popular Z-blogger, Starche Edda (633,000 followers), also maintains a neutral-favorable stance toward Israel. In response to the elimination of Ismail Haniyeh, he commented, “As for Israel, Tel Aviv has once again proved that it is capable of carrying out the most complex special operations, and I am sure they have carefully calculated the consequences”.
However, for obvious reasons, there has been no split among Z-militarists regarding Israel. Immersed in their own war, they see no point in consistently opposing the general pro-Palestinian state line, let alone criticizing their anti-Semitic colleagues.
Z-Islamophobia
Recognizing Hamas as a tactical ally does not mean that Russian militarists fully empathize with them or are willing to invest in promoting an alliance between Russia and the Islamic world. The reasons lie in the deep-rooted Islamophobia that is fundamental to their worldview. On the one hand, they constantly reproduce the image of Russia as a country of “friendship of peoples”, emphasizing the frontline heroism of the “right” Muslims. On the other hand, they compare them with “wrong” Muslims who pose a constant threat to the country.
Even before October 7, some militarist publications expressed negative attitudes towards Hamas. For example, in July 2022, “war correspondent” Roman Saponkhov compared it to Ukraine: “The AFU is shelling Russian territory in the same fashion that Hamas is shelling Israeli territory — to demonstrate its presence and intimidate the civilian population. In the same way, the missiles fly simply in the direction of the territory, with no military target or without hope of hitting said target.”
This rhetoric continued after October 7. Thus, one of the largest militarist channels, Readovka Explains (716,000 followers), called for maintaining distance regarding the Middle Eastern conflict, equating Hamas with Chechen terrorists: “The sector is effectively run by a terrorist movement; this is indeed a collective Shamil Basayev.”
In late October, despite sympathizing with the Palestinians and seeing them as allies in the geopolitical struggle, war correspondent Saponkhov burst into xenophobic rhetoric: “Israel will always defeat the Arab world, if only because the average IQ of Jews is above 80. All it takes is making their kids memorize the multiplication table every night before going to bed, instead of sending them to wrestling clubs.”
At the same time, “war correspondent” Alexander Kharchenko recalled that Russia had also fought against Hamas in Syria, predicting a protracted war for Israel based on the experience of battles in Damascus: “No, we did not bomb the Gaza Strip, but the specialists of this Palestinian movement fought against government forces near Damascus. I found photos of the tunnels in Gaza and caught myself thinking that they are identical to those I saw in Eastern Ghouta.”
While top bloggers generally adhered to the pro-Palestinian propaganda narrative, less influential militarists did not shy away from expressing more divergent views. For example, in mid-October, the Telegram channel Russian Patriot (10,000 followers) spoke out against supporting Hamas, calling them uncontrolled Islamists and urging against repeating the mistakes of the US in supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the USSR. In July 2024, the far-right conservative-monarchist channel Sons of Monarchy (blogger Roman Antonovsky, 71,000 followers) echoed similar sentiments. According to him, Russians should not support anyone in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, presenting it as a conflict between two Old Testament tribes: “Hamas can also be very loosely classified as Muslims. They are pure Islamists who emerged as a Salafi cell of the Muslim Brotherhood in opposition to the secular leftist PLO. So if you are a Muslim but not a Salafist, you shouldn’t worry about Hamas.” The dislike of Israel stems from its closeness to the United States and the perception that Judaism is far from Orthodox Christianity.
In the fall of 2023, Russian propagandists were increasingly alarmed by the Jewish pogrom in Dagestan and the rise of pro-Palestinian sentiment among Russian Muslims, which they viewed as a blatant betrayal of the Russian world and a refusal to fight for Russia’s interests. They were equally concerned about the return of Russian citizens and their families who had lived in Palestinian territories prior to October 7. Linked to this rhetoric was a critical attitude toward Chechnya and the Chechen units on the frontline, which were repeatedly branded as ‘TikTok troops’: the entire burden of fighting falls on the ethnic-Russian soldier, while the ‘undeserving Chechens’ only know how to promote themselves with their achievements.
The private Z-channel Heroism of Donbas (access to publications is possible via TGStat), which directly linked to the Donbas separatists, took a sharp stance against friendship with Hamas. In mid-November, its administrator sarcastically commented on reports that Hamas had lost control of the Gaza Strip: “There is still hope for Chechens, who have repeatedly intended to go to Gaza to defend their Muslim brothers. They are probably on their way already, especially Kadyrov’s son. He’s going to tear the entire Israeli army to shreds in hand-to-hand combat”. Even harsher comments followed when, in January 2024, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov announced plans to build a separate settlement for Palestinian refugees: “It’s immediately clear who our state cares about: The residents of Donetsk and Belgorod can only dream of such generosity.”
The neo-Nazi channel Govorít TopaZ was equally skeptical of the Palestinians. It drew attention to the Arab world’s refusal to provide military aid to Hamas, reproducing a racist image of cowardly Muslims: “There is a word popular among Caucasian peoples, quakebuttock (‘очкошники’). It very succinctly describes the reason why Hamas is still fighting alone”. In other instances, pro-Palestinian statements by Russian Muslims were caricatured.
The most prominent reaction came from one of the mixed martial arts fighters from Dagestan, who recorded a video in which he expressed his readiness to go to Gaza to fight for his fellow believers. The administrator of the Z Operation channel (13,000 followers), exposing the cowardice of Palestinian supporters, labeled them all as Islamists: “And to all Islamists out there, if you’re so brave, go to Gaza and help your fellow believers. Instead, you’re making a lot of fuss with all these calls for Russia to support Hamas”.
Even more irritating was the prospect of Palestinian refugees receiving Russian citizenship through a simplified procedure (45 people by the end of 2023), while many Russian-speakers who support or even participate in the war against Ukraine had to wait for months. “War correspondent” Kots (625,000 followers) limited himself to merely raising the issue. Propagandist Andrei Medvedev provided several examples, including one fighter from the PMC Wagner who received an award for his efforts in Bakhmut: “All these people speak Russian. They love Russia. They even fight for it. They are Russians. But their path to citizenship is difficult. What is the merit of the Palestinians who are now receiving Russian citizenship en masse?” The administrator of Heroism of Donbas noted the growth of domestic terrorist threats due to refugees: “They are not going to their like-minded brothers in Makhachkala, but to our unfortunate capital. Now these terrorists are with us, ready to join the ranks of local Islamists and aggressive migrants, of whom there are already plenty.”
In 2024, three events triggered anti-Islamist and anti-migrant rhetoric: a major terrorist attack in Moscow (March 22), the takeover of detention centers in Rostov-on-Don (June 16) and in Surovikino (Volgograd region) (August 23) by Islamists, and another attack in Dagestan against an Orthodox church and synagogue (June 23). Official Russian propagandists have sought to link the activities of the Islamic State to the West and Ukraine, conflating the two discourses and redirecting discontent toward diasporas and prisons where terrorist cells are forming.
In response, the militarist community fomented various domestic conflicts, which were of varied natures, but were invariably interpreted as migrants rampaging against Russians. Thus, in May there were reports of migrants extorting property from a “special operation” veteran’s family in Rostov-on-Don and of migrants beating up a State Duma deputy. In mid-July, news broke of an FSB officer being assaulted in Moscow and an attack on a woman with a child in Yekaterinburg. The channel War Obsessed (789,000 followers) provided an ironic xenophobic interpretation: “In Yekaterinburg, a Russian skinhead girl with her skinhead child attacked a valuable foreign specialist; he just ran after her and wanted to give her a friendly hug, he probably just wanted to get to know her better and culturally enrich her”.
The list of such conflicts could go on, but it clearly indicates what Russian militarists are genuinely concerned about. In this context, news such as the September reports of a newly opened school in France operating under Sharia law expanded the narrative. Thus, a general image of the Islamic threat was created, it has not fully developed only because of the general focus on the war against Ukraine.
Hate Rhetoric
The rhetoric of Russian militarists is a mixture of cynical pragmatism, geopolitical fantasies, and hatred of all forms of otherness. It is not surprising, therefore, to see simultaneous negative attitudes to both Israel and the Palestinians, although the nature of these attitudes is different. Z-anti-Semitism is rooted primarily in geopolitics and the rejection of anti-war Russians who have moved to Israel. Propagandists are willing to take any opportunity to create a positive image of Russia and its army, yet overall, they respect only strength and, despite their outward or genuine sympathy for Palestinians, they look at the Israeli state with some envy.
Geopolitical fantasies that portray Hamas as an ally cannot override the general disdain for Islamism, political Islam and migration. Even their criticism of the West is intertwined with an aversion to liberal migrant policies. Russian militarists are, first and foremost, Russian nationalists who distrust the state and constantly fear its betrayal. From fragmentary news reports and brief comments, a generalized image emerges: a Russian man at the call of his country goes to fight an external enemy, while Russian cities are filled with newcomers who oppress Russians. This leads to an increase in internal tensions, which the Russian state must address. Pressure on diasporas and tougher immigration laws, including a proposed bill to ban migrant workers from moving with their families, are part of this response. However, in the context of a protracted war, the authorities cannot do without an influx of cheap, largely disenfranchised labor.
This makes the migration issue one of the most acute and pressing in the foreseeable future, which is likely to lead to an increase in Islamophobia. Against this backdrop, any tactical alliances or attempts at rapprochement with Islamist forces in foreign policy will increasingly risk domestic discontent. The question is how long the resource of geopolitical fantasies and justifications for and of Russian nationalists will last.