Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman
PSCRP-BESA Reports No 5 (September 26, 2023)
Common trends in Russia’s relations with Central Asian countries during the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The analysis of the positions of the Central Asian states regarding the Russia-Ukraine war is important from the perspective of Western coalition interests for three reasons:
- These states do not want to be directly involved in the war on Russia’s side and are seeking international support in this matter.
- Increasing pressure on these countries from the EU and the US, similar to Russia’s pressure, could help reduce Russia’s ability to bypass sanctions through Central Asian territory.
- If Central Asian states receive the necessary international assistance, they could potentially play a crucial role in safeguarding Europe’s energy security, particularly concerning gas supply, especially in situation when supplies from Russia are largely disrupted.
For Israel, studying the positions of these respective states is of additional interest, as they are among the few states within the Muslim historical tradition that have traditionally maintained good relations with Israel.
Three Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan — are nominally Russia’s military allies through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO.) Russian military bases and facilities are located on their territory. Two countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) along with Russia. The other two countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) are heavily dependent on Russian military aid and subsidised fuel supplies. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are dependent on Russia due to the significant number of their labour migrants working there. Kazakhstan, especially in the northern border regions, has a sizeable Russian-speaking minority. The Russian language and Russian media continue to wield significant influence in this part of the world.
Nevertheless, Central Asian elites have always pursued a so-called multi-vector foreign policy, balancing Russia’s influence with that of China, the West (USA and EU), Turkey, and Arab countries. This allowed these countries to receive economic assistance and security guarantees from various sources without becoming entirely dependent on any of the great powers.
Now, the situation is beginning to change. Russia, as a guarantor of security, is becoming less and less attractive to Central Asian elites and is increasingly perceived as a source of threat (especially for Kazakhstan in light of the question of ownership of the northern territories). Russia is also trying to pressure Central Asian countries to openly support its side in the war with Ukraine, which they do not want to do. This would mean the end of their multi-vector policy and the establishment of total dependence on the Kremlin.
Nevertheless, Central Asian countries are actively involved in supplying Russia with various types of military materials to circumvent international sanctions (this is particularly relevant for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and to some extent Uzbekistan). They are also actively exploiting the opportunities offered by expanding trade with Russia, attracting Russian investment, receiving highly skilled labour that fled the war, and conducting banking operations for Russian companies and citizens.
This ambivalent position of the Central Asian states was clearly manifested in two series of diplomatic events. On the one hand, observers attentive to symbolic details that carry considerable weight in Asian diplomacy noted that during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) on 15-16 September and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Astana (Kazakhstan) on 13 October 2022, Central Asian presidents actively demonstrated to Putin that his status was now lower than that of Chinese President Xi Jinping and even Turkish President Erdogan. In addition, during the Russia-Central Asia summit in Samarkand in September 2022 and at the trilateral meeting of the presidents of Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in Astana on 13 October 2022, the Central Asian presidents demonstrated to Putin that the era when Central Asian leaders treated him with pronounced subservience is over. In both cases, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon played a central role in this demonstration. Some sources suggest that this was not without an element of personal revenge, as Putin had previously kept Rahmon waiting unusually long times in his reception hall.
On the other hand, during the 9 May military parade on Red Square in 2023, five of the seven leaders of post-Soviet countries participating in the event were from Central Asia. Thus, Central Asian leaders demonstrated their solidarity with the symbols of the past that have become central to Russian war propaganda.
Strategically, all Central Asian countries want to maintain official neutrality and somehow capitalise on this neutrality. Of course, there are many nuances in Russia’s relations with different Central Asian countries. Let us analyse them in depth.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan, an immediate neighbour of Russia with one of the longest borders in the world (second only to the Canada-US border), finds itself in a particularly precarious position. It is very difficult for Kazakhstan to remain relatively neutral in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as it is officially Russia’s CSTO ally, and it was President Nazarbayev who initiated the creation of the EAEU.
Russia is constantly pressuring Kazakhstan for this position. This pressure is expressed in statements by Russian officials, which then trigger a harsh response in Kazakhstan. This situation has persisted for many years, going back even to Nazarbayev’s time. Many semi-official statements by the Russian elite, as well as unofficial statements by Russian experts, are quite rightly perceived in Kazakhstan, especially within the context of the Ukrainian events, as potential territorial claims.
For example, in 2014, Putin publicly stated that Nazarbayev had created a state on territory where no state had ever existed[1]. This was followed by an information campaign in Kazakhstan to counter this statement, and the following year Kazakhstan officially began to celebrate the ancient anniversary of the founding of Kazakh statehood, dating back to the successor states of Genghis Khan’s empire. This meant that Kazakh statehood was older than Russian statehood.
Then there were statements by Vyacheslav Nikonov, head of the state-sponsored Russian World (“Russkiy mir”) Foundation and State Duma deputy from the ruling party “United Russia”, who said that Kazakhstan had never existed and that Kazakhstan had appropriated Russian lands. This position was supported by State Duma deputy from the ruling party Evgeniy Fedorov, who stated in the media, “Give back our territory and build Kazakhstan in America”. The reaction to these statements in Kazakhstan was, of course, openly hostile.
There were several other scandals: accusations against Kazakhstan of oppressing Russian-speaking citizens, of reducing the status of the Russian language, etc. In summer 2023 the court in Uralsk, Kazakhstan, passed a verdict on Denis Rudny and Kristina Kolchenko in a case related to incitement of hatred and separatist activities. This happened after they expressed support for Putin’s “special military operation” on the Chatroulette service. The court in Petropavlovsk sentenced a local resident to three years of imprisonment. She, during a conversation with an interlocutor from Russia on the same service, requested to “take over” the North Kazakhstan region, similar to what had been done with Crimea[2]. Similar case happened in 2015. A woman was sentenced to 4 years in prison because she wrote that Kazakhstan should become a part of Russia, similar to Crimea, which Moscow had annexed in 2014[3]. A member of the Parliament of Kazakhstan who supported Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has been stripped of his mandate[4].
Prior to the actions of Russian nationalists in Kazakhstan connected to the war in Ukraine, their activities had been primarily associated with the National Bolshevik Party (NBP). Twice, in 1997 and 2001, they attempted to organize armed uprisings in Kazakhstan. In 1997, NBP volunteers arrived in Kokshetau to support the uprising of the Cossacks of Kokshetau for the secession of Kokshetau region from Kazakhstan. Afterward, the National Bolsheviks left through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Tajikistan, to the location of the 201st Russian Division. In the years 2000-2001, the National Bolsheviks attempted to organize a partisan detachment in the Russian Altai mountains for operations in Kazakhstan, but this attempt failed due to actions by the Russian authorities, who themselves considered NBP at that time as a dangerous extremist organization.
After the war began, there was a discussion around the Ukrainian ambassador to Kazakhstan, who allegedly called for the killing of Russians, shifting the Russian-Ukrainian conflict into an ethnic context[5]. In response, Kazakhstan requested that Kyiv recall the envoy. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry demanded that the recall of the Ukrainian ambassador be expedited, which also sparked a strong negative reaction in Kazakhstan. Representatives of the Kazakh elite said that they were independent and decided for themselves whom and when to expel from the country. In August 2023, Russia was forced to recall its consul in Kazakhstan, who said that the country was downgrading the status of the Russian language and reducing its role in education.
Kazakhstan also irked Russia by imprisoning people for engaging in mercenary activities, especially those who fought on Russia’s side in Ukraine. This policy began already after 2014. The Kazakh authorities unofficially purged law enforcement officials and officials who could potentially side with Russia, a policy that began during Nazarbayev’s presidency. The main objective of this policy was to demonstrate to Russia the unity of Kazakhstan’s elite and its strong support for the country’s independence.
After the political crisis in Kazakhstan in January 2022, when Tokayev managed to retain power only thanks to the deployment of Russian troops in the framework of the CSTO, it seemed that he was heavily dependent on Moscow. However, after the withdrawal of CSTO troops and the invasion of Ukraine by Russian military forces, Tokayev managed to turn the tide. Now he is once again behaving in a semi-independent manner from Putin.
As early as 2019, Tokayev said he would not use the word “annexation” in relation to Crimea, but did not recognise Crimea as part of Russia[6]. In June 2022, a crisis emerged in the relationship between Putin and Tokayev. At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in Russia, in Putin’s presence, Tokayev said that the pseudo-statehood of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the “Lugansk People’s Republic”, LNR, and the “Donetsk People’s Republic”, DNR, ranked alongside “the pseudo-statehood of Taiwan”[7]. Kazakhstan will never recognise their independence. At the same time, Tokayev has explicitly hinted that he relied on China for his position of distancing himself from Russia. In June 2022, Tokayev declined to accept Russia’s Order of Alexander Nevsky[8].
Following this, as a pressure tactic, Russia suspended the operation of the main export pipeline carrying oil from Kazakhstan to Europe, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)[9]. The pipeline was restarted after Kazakhstan announced that it would sell oil through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan rather than through Russia. Thereafter, Kazakhstan has continued not to recognise Russia’s annexation of any territories, including a referendum on the annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia regions. However, Kazakhstan has not stopped significant flows of various goods (including those that can be used for military purposes) through its territory to Russia[10]. In principle, because of Kazakhstan’s membership in the EAEU (the same can be said of Kyrgyzstan), it is not easy to do anything to halt this flow. At the UN, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries tend to vote more like China than Russia on issues related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, either abstaining or not voting.
In general, Kazakhstan’s elite has shifted its perspective, no longer viewing Russia as the main provider of security guarantees. On the contrary, a significant part of Kazakhstan’s political and economic elite (although not universally) now perceives Russia as a potential threat to the country’s security. Nevertheless, the Kazakh elite is also not inclined to turn towards the West. Instead, it tends to pursue a balancing foreign policy, making ad hoc deals with both Russia and the West and seeking informal political guarantees from China and Turkey, major players in Asia. This approach allows Kazakhstan to maintain a multi-vector foreign policy.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s leadership is much less dependent on Russia compared to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan does not share a common border with Russia. It is not a member of the CSTO or the EAEU (joining the EAEU was under consideration until 2022, but has now been postponed indefinitely). Uzbekistan depends to some extent on remittances from Uzbek labour migrants working in Russia, although this dependence is not as great as in the case of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Also, Uzbekistan is landlocked and dependent on Russia for trade with Europe.
After coming to power in 2016, President Mirziyoyev attempted to normalise relations with Russia, which had deteriorated during President Karimov’s rule. This was done primarily to expand mutual trade, but also because Russia provides the crucial transport route for Uzbekistan to Europe.
Outside the official channels, there was also a convenient channel of personal communication to improve Uzbek-Russian relations, which is very important in the Russian system under Putin. Mirziyoyev had a good relationship with Alisher Usmanov, a Russian oligarch of Uzbek origin. Usmanov’s ex-wife, Irina Viner, was a famous gymnastics coach that trained world champion Alina Kabaeva, who is rumoured to be Putin’s unofficial partner. Usmanov, in his turn, was rumoured to have been used by the Russian and Uzbek leaders for secret negotiations when complex issues needed to be resolved. However, in 2022, he moved to Uzbekistan, divorced Irina Viner, and used his political connections in Uzbekistan and Hungary to ask the EU to lift sanctions against him. In January 2023, Usmanov announced his retirement in Russia and stopped participating in the Russian Council of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, the main body representing the interests of Russian oligarchs[11]. Currently, Usmanov is trying to position himself not as a Russian oligarch, but as an investor in Silicon Valley startups[12].
Uzbekistan wants to trade with Russia but does not want to become dependent on Russia, be subject to secondary Western sanctions because of ties to Russia, or openly support Russia over the conflict in Ukraine.
In March 2022, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov publicly stated at a parliamentary hearing that his country recognises the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and does not recognise the sovereignty of the LNR and DNR.
“Firstly, the situation around Ukraine is a matter of serious concern in Uzbekistan. Secondly, we advocate a peaceful solution to the current situation and settlement of the conflict through political and diplomatic means. But for this, first and foremost, an immediate cessation of hostilities and violence is necessary,[13]” Abdulaziz Kamilov said.
Also, according to Kamilov, “Uzbekistan historically has traditional comprehensive ties with both Russia and Ukraine. We will continue mutually beneficial co-operation with these two countries based on our national interests. On the one hand, Russia is Uzbekistan’s leading trade partner, and we have strategic partnership and allied relations with it. On the other hand, we co-operate with Ukraine in various fields…”[14].
In addition, Uzbekistan sent 28 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Ukraine in early 2022, for which it received gratitude from the United States and Ukraine[15].
Russia was extremely displeased with this situation. Subsequently, Kamilov allegedly “fell ill” and then was removed from his post “due to transfer to another job”. Russia reportedly put pressure on Uzbekistan by suspending the transport infrastructure through which much of Uzbekistan’s trade flows. After Kamilov’s ouster, the pressure stopped.
The new Uzbek foreign minister also did not recognise Russia’s annexation of new territories, and there were no other changes in official position on the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan is a member of the CSTO and the EAEU. It has always been highly dependent on Russian economic support, primarily fuel supplies and remittances from Kyrgyz labour migrants. In addition, the Russian airbase in Kant and other military facilities are located on Kyrgyz territory.
President Atambayev has informally expressed support for the 2014 Crimean referendum, but has not officially recognised Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the annexation of new territories following the 2022 referendum.
Current President Sadyr Zhaparov has an uneasy personal relationship with Putin. There are two leaders in the CIS that Putin dislikes but has to tolerate for strategic reasons. Both leaders came to power as a result of overthrowing corrupt elites linked to Russia during the so-called “colour revolutions”, but their countries remain strategically dependent on Russia. They are Sadyr Zhaparov in Kyrgyzstan and Nikol Pashinyan in Armenia.
Public sentiment towards Russia in Kyrgyzstan has deteriorated significantly due to conflicts with Tajikistan (as Russia previously supplied more weapons to Tajikistan) and attempts to encourage Kyrgyz labour migrants to join the Russian army after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Additionally, compared to many other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan is characterised by a relatively free press and residual elements of free speech inherited from the more liberal political regime of the past. Therefore, public support for the Ukrainian cause in this country, as in neighbouring Kazakhstan, is notable.
Tajikistan
Although Tajikistan tries to avoid making any public statements regarding the territories annexed by Russia, in fact, it does not officially recognise them. President Rahmon has never mentioned words like “Crimea” or “Donbass,” “LNR” or “DNR” publicly.
Relations between Tajikistan and Russia have been slowly deteriorating for many years. At one time Tajikistan was economically heavily dependent on Russia (remittances from Tajik labour migrants to Russia accounted for up to two-thirds of the country’s GDP, and it received cheap fuel and other military and non-military aid from Russia). Politically, Rahmon retained his power in the face of internal conflicts, conflicts with Uzbekistan and conflicts on the Afghan border thanks to the presence of Russia’s 201st military base in the country.
Over time, however, Russian aid has been replaced by Chinese, Arab and Iranian aid. Tajikistan is still a member of the CSTO but has declined to join the EAEU (the issue has been officially “under consideration” for many years).
After the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Rahmon once again became heavily dependent on Russian military aid. However, Rahmon was irritated by Russia’s position on Afghanistan, its secret contacts with the Taliban and open attempts to establish friendly relations with them. After the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Russia was forced to withdraw a significant number of its troops stationed in Tajikistan, which further alienated Rahmon.
In addition, Russia does not support Tajikistan in its conflict with Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley, although Tajikistan previously received more arms from Russia, which gave it an advantage in border clashes with the Kyrgyz.
Turkmenistan
In the early 2000s, under President Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s relations with Russia were quite difficult. Under President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, relations began to improve, and they remain relatively good today under his son Serdar Berdymukhamedov. Turkmenistan receives loans from Russia and has some unofficial security guarantees. Moreover, in the context of the New Cold War, the most authoritarian regimes like that of Turkmenistan are more acceptable to the Russian elite for ideological reasons. Officially, however, Turkmenistan maintains a neutral status. Neutral status is approved by the UN and mentioned in the national constitution. Neutrality is also very important from the point of view of national identity. The day of neutrality, 12 December is considered as one of the most important national holidays. Therefore, Turkmenistan does not recognise Russia’s annexation of new territories.
The main conflict between Russia and Turkmenistan revolves around their competition in the natural gas market. In its standoff with Russia, Ashgabat has traditionally emphasised its interest in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline that could solve Europe’s energy security problems. This idea has always found support from Azerbaijan, Turkey, the EU and the US. For Russia and Iran, this pipeline would be a serious blow to their potential markets, so they even hinted at the possibility of military pressure in case of an attempt to build this pipeline. China has taken a largely neutral stance on this issue, although in principle it is interested in monopolising access to Turkmen gas to diversify gas supplies from Russia, especially in the face of war and possible political instability in Russia. In 2022, China imported 35 billion cubic metres of gas from Turkmenistan through three existing pipelines, paying $10.3 billion for it. Russian supplies through the Power of Siberia pipeline, launched in 2019, totalled 16 billion cubic metres and the price was about 2.5 times lower at around $4 billion[16]. In August 2023, Turkmenistan refused to allow Russia access to its gas pipeline to China.
Therefore, the analysis of both the general and specific features of the policies of the Central Asian states shows that they are all striving, to varying degrees of success, to address three interconnected tasks amidst the war.
- They are making every possible effort to resist Russia’s pressure and maintain official neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war.
- They are trying to maintain dialogue with the Russian leadership to avoid provoking further pressure.
- They are using the current situation to receive maximum economic benefits from trade and other forms of cooperation with Russia.
Undoubtedly, this Realpolitik strategy could be justly criticized by those who advocate for higher ethical standards in global politics. However, it cannot be denied that it is optimal for strengthening the sovereignty of Central Asian states in a high-risk environment.
Andrei Kazantsev (Vaisman), PhD, Dr.Sc., PSCRP research fellow, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University