Some pundits contend that in the absence of a direct threat from state armies, and in a situation where terror, guerrilla and rocket threats predominate, Israel no longer needs heavy maneuvering formations. This study argues the contrary.
Unlike many previous chiefs-of-staff for Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF), whose appointments were shadowed by controversies, the nomination this past week of Maj. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot as the 21st commander of the IDF has been widely welcomed.
Against an implacable, well-entrenched, non-state enemy like the Hamas, Israel needs to “mow the grass” once in a while in order to degrade enemy capabilities
Dramatic cuts to the IDF budget have forced the army to reduce its ground forces capabilities. This is a mistake, as the IDF still must rely on its ground forces to deal with its threats, specifically Hamas and Hizballah.
“Mowing the Grass” is Israel’s strategy for a protracted intractable conflict. Only after showing restraint in its military responses does Israel act to destroy enemy capabilities, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect to create quiet along its borders.
The operation also proved Israel’s determination to act forcefully in the post “Arab Spring” environment. However, the lack of a ground offensive allowed Hamas to craft a victory narrative and gave it the potential to re-arm.
The Oslo diplomatic process is the starkest strategic blunder in Israel’s history and one of the worst calamities ever to have afflicted Israelis and Palestinians. Twenty three years after its euphoric launch on the White House lawn, the Oslo ‘peace process’ has substantially worsened the position of both parties, and made the prospects for peace and reconciliation ever more remote.
This study looks at the aggressive new posture in Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin, in the wake of its intervention in Syria and the Crimean peninsula.
A review of the four rival camps into which the Middle East is today divided. 1. Iran with her proxies and allies; 2. Salafi Jihadists, currently dominated by the so-called Islamic State; 3. Muslim Brotherhood movement in its various manifestations, including Hamas, supported by Qatar and by Erdogan’s Turkey; 4. The “forces of stability” — all those who fear and resist the rise of the first three camps, with Israel an active and important player in this latter camp.
The storms now convulsing the Middle East are civilizational shifts of historical proportions. Anyone from the outside trying to influence these regional upheavals in a positive direction will find the task very difficult. Israel must focus narrowly on the greatest threat looming in its vicinity — the Iranian drive for nuclear weaponry.
