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Syria is reviving plans for major oil pipelines linking Iraq and other Gulf oil producers to the Mediterranean Sea. At first glance, such projects may appear to compete with Israel’s ambitions to become an important link in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This assumption is misleading. While railway and highway projects may naturally compete directly with one another for freight routes, energy pipelines operate with a different logic. Once established, oil and gas pipelines (and future hydrogen pipelines) tend to move continuously through several parallel routes, with additional pipelines providing resilience rather than displacing one another. Israel should not view Syria’s emergence as an oil transit state as a threat in the same way it may view competing regional railway corridors proposed by Turkey. The more useful question is how Israel can ensure future access to, or connection with, the regional oil network that is developing around it. Options may include a physical connection to a proposed Iraqi oil pipeline via Jordan, access to direct maritime deliveries from Baniyas or Tripoli to Ashkelon, or reciprocal energy arrangements in which Israeli gas and electricity flow to Syria and Lebanon while Israel gains access to their emerging oil supply routes. The goal is not to force oil corridors to go through Israel, but to make sure that the new regional oil network does not bypass it completely.
Increasingly well-coordinated and deadly rebel assaults on Pakistani security forces in Balochistan have revealed the extreme vulnerability of the Pakistani military in the province. The enormity of the territory, lack of local support, inability to commit sufficient forces, and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan render the Baloch challenge to the Pakistani army nearly impossible to counter. The violence is spilling into the Sistan and Balochistan province of Iran, which is experiencing its own Baloch insurgency.
The “era of wars” in which we now live has reshaped the global economic order, and corporate strategy in the advanced industrial technologies sector has changed along with it. Post-Cold War assumptions of inevitable globalization no longer apply as renewed authoritarianism, regional conflict, financial fragmentation, and institutional weakening have transformed the operating environment for multinational firms. Companies at the intersection of civilian and military technologies are shifting away from efficiency-driven globalization and toward resilience, political alignment, and integration with national security priorities. Israel’s experience after October 7, 2023 demonstrates that geopolitical instability must be treated as a permanent, core business risk if a company is to enjoy long-term corporate survival and profitability.
The recent US military attack on Venezuela constitutes a turning point in the evolution of the international system. Contrary to claims that such actions are now “business as usual” in an anarchic world, the Americans’ unilateral and officially acknowledged use of military force for regime change without international authorization marks a profound erosion of the post-World War II international order. Unlike Cold War-era covert interventions, the Venezuelan case signals the breakdown of a key normative barrier separating indirect influence from overt coercion. This development undermines the legal and normative arguments employed by the West in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, revealing a structural similarity in strategic methodology irrespective of political intent or outcome. The attack on Venezuela is part of a wider American grand strategy centered on consolidating control over the Western hemisphere while reducing global engagement, and it will accelerate the transition toward a fragmented, multipolar, and increasingly anarchic international system.

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