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The war in Gaza has revealed serious weaknesses in the Israeli electricity sector that do not have an immediate solution, and there is no unanimity on the extent of the damage that will be caused if the war in the north expands. Extreme scenarios range from several hours to several days without electricity in the major cities and the center of the country and several weeks of such conditions in the border areas. These scenarios would require the Israeli citizen, who is not used to power outages, to be calm and patient. In the long term, the security of the Israeli electricity sector will require the installation of expensive infrastructures and a significant easing of regulations that will take years to implement and require direct government support. These moves include the search for additional gas fields and the construction of backup gas pipelines, greater decentralization of the electricity sector through solar technologies, upgrading of power transmission lines, promotion of hydrogen technologies for electricity storage, and greater storage of emergency fuels. One bright spot concerns Israel's regional status with regard to connectivity and energy exports. The dependence of Egypt and Jordan on Israeli gas proved to be a moderating factor in the war, and plans to connect pipelines and power lines from the Gulf countries to Europe through Israel received an additional incentive following the Houthi attacks on Bab al-Mandab.
The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict contains a maritime dimension in the Red Sea. The Houthi offensive, ostensibly directed against Israel, is not only targeting Israel itself but also commercial and passenger ships under several flags, thereby creating a critical international strategic challenge. The EU has decided to respond by launching Operation ASPIDES. Unlike the US- and UK-led Operations Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon Archer, ASPIDES is not attacking Houthi targets but intercepting their strikes. While this wholly defensive approach can play a useful role in protecting vessels and can contribute to deterrence, it concerns the Israelis, who fear that the EU’s limited response to the Houthi threat reflects a similar stance toward Iran.
Israel’s ship of state, facing rough seas, is at high risk and requires clearer rules of navigation. During this period of deep complexity, Israel will need to clarify its strategic direction. The terrorists of Hamas are the tip of Iran’s much larger spear. Israel’s current war against jihadist criminality could thus turn into a wider and more damaging war with Iran. Such a war could emerge as a “bolt from the blue” or incrementally. Ultimately, it could involve the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and/or North Korea. How might Jerusalem prevent or manage any such derivative conflicts? Israel must consider whether there is a productive role to be played by the “Samson Option.”
The events of October 7 and Hezbollah's subsequent attacks on Israel’s northern border have renewed the question of whether energy considerations can serve as a lever on Hezbollah's policy towards Israel, as was claimed following the signing of a maritime border agreement by Israel and Lebanon in October 2022. During the months of fighting, reports have emerged of internal pressure being exerted by Beirut on Hezbollah not to enter the conflict against Israel as doing so would likely exacerbate Lebanon's state of deep crisis. This crisis includes frequent power outages in Beirut, unprecedented fuel shortages nationwide, and delays in gas exploration in Lebanon's waters. If Lebanon's energy crisis does lead to the “concentration” of Hezbollah within Lebanon's economic and political arena, it is possible that Israel, through US mediation, could exploit this to undermine Hezbollah and restore stability on the northern border.

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