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Israel’s ship of state, facing rough seas, is at high risk and requires clearer rules of navigation. During this period of deep complexity, Israel will need to clarify its strategic direction. The terrorists of Hamas are the tip of Iran’s much larger spear. Israel’s current war against jihadist criminality could thus turn into a wider and more damaging war with Iran. Such a war could emerge as a “bolt from the blue” or incrementally. Ultimately, it could involve the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and/or North Korea. How might Jerusalem prevent or manage any such derivative conflicts? Israel must consider whether there is a productive role to be played by the “Samson Option.”
The events of October 7 and Hezbollah's subsequent attacks on Israel’s northern border have renewed the question of whether energy considerations can serve as a lever on Hezbollah's policy towards Israel, as was claimed following the signing of a maritime border agreement by Israel and Lebanon in October 2022. During the months of fighting, reports have emerged of internal pressure being exerted by Beirut on Hezbollah not to enter the conflict against Israel as doing so would likely exacerbate Lebanon's state of deep crisis. This crisis includes frequent power outages in Beirut, unprecedented fuel shortages nationwide, and delays in gas exploration in Lebanon's waters. If Lebanon's energy crisis does lead to the “concentration” of Hezbollah within Lebanon's economic and political arena, it is possible that Israel, through US mediation, could exploit this to undermine Hezbollah and restore stability on the northern border.
Despite compelling logical and historical arguments against a two-state solution, louder and louder demands for a Palestinian state are being voiced worldwide. In response, Israel and its allies should remind global governments and populations that “Palestine” has no intention of ever living peacefully alongside Israel, but intends instead to replace the Jewish State in orchestrated and increasingly violent increments. Any pre-independence Palestinian commitments to remain demilitarized could quickly and even legally be undermined.
Hezbollah began in 1982 as an Islamist organization founded and shaped according to the ideological model of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The organization was founded to establish an Islamist regime in Lebanon and conduct a jihadist war against the enemies of Islam: the West and Israel. Hezbollah gradually “Lebanonized”, meaning it claimed to be limit the military struggle to Lebanese territory, integrated into the Lebanese political system, and established an extensive civil infrastructure. This transformation was accompanied by a new discourse stressing its role as defender of Lebanon. But Hezbollah’s Lebanonization has not in any way diluted or moderated its conception of Israel, with which it believes itself to be in a doomsday war. Hezbollah’s military empowerment since the withdrawal of the IDF in 2000 does not correspond with its discourse about defending Lebanon. Hezbollah's involvement in the fighting since October 8 is not mere lip service but a demonstration of its total commitment to what it perceives as its deterministic conflict with Israel.

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