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- Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai
- Paper No. 2287
In this article I will present five alternatives for the future of Gaza. Israel’s long-term strategy to ensure its continued existence entails the accomplishment of these goals: destruction of Hamas's military capabilities, abolition of Hamas control in Gaza, and the preservation of good relations with the United States. Less core strategic considerations are the return of the abductees, the crisis on the northern front, relations within the region, and Israel’s legitimacy. The alternatives for Gaza’s future are: the Hamas option, which is the most problematic; the revitalized Palestinian Authority option; the military-civilian option, which seems the most balanced; the chaos option; and the sovereignty option, which is also very problematic. It is essential to conduct a far-reaching discussion on all these alternatives and to avoid attachment to any one of them.
Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past decade have placed Egypt at the center of a regional cooperation system regarding energy and political strategy. Gas discoveries in Egypt's economic waters, significant investments by the Egyptian government in the energy sector, the 2019 establishment in Cairo of a regional gas forum, and the presence of two existing liquefaction facilities in Egypt (in Idku and Damietta) all augur well for Egypt's ambition to be the regional hub for gas exports. The export of gas from Israel to Egypt also contributes to Egypt's energy security, both in terms of the regular supply of electricity to the local economy and the export of a significant amount of gas to Europe in exchange for foreign currency urgently needed in Egyptian coffers. The war in Gaza has added complexity to Egypt's policy towards Israel since the imports of gas from Israel are essential to its energy stability. Moreover, the Houthi attacks have decreased traffic in the Suez Canal and caused serious damage to Egypt’s economy.
The war in Gaza has revealed serious weaknesses in the Israeli electricity sector that do not have an immediate solution, and there is no unanimity on the extent of the damage that will be caused if the war in the north expands. Extreme scenarios range from several hours to several days without electricity in the major cities and the center of the country and several weeks of such conditions in the border areas. These scenarios would require the Israeli citizen, who is not used to power outages, to be calm and patient. In the long term, the security of the Israeli electricity sector will require the installation of expensive infrastructures and a significant easing of regulations that will take years to implement and require direct government support. These moves include the search for additional gas fields and the construction of backup gas pipelines, greater decentralization of the electricity sector through solar technologies, upgrading of power transmission lines, promotion of hydrogen technologies for electricity storage, and greater storage of emergency fuels. One bright spot concerns Israel's regional status with regard to connectivity and energy exports. The dependence of Egypt and Jordan on Israeli gas proved to be a moderating factor in the war, and plans to connect pipelines and power lines from the Gulf countries to Europe through Israel received an additional incentive following the Houthi attacks on Bab al-Mandab.
- Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos
- Paper No. 2275
The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict contains a maritime dimension in the Red Sea. The Houthi offensive, ostensibly directed against Israel, is not only targeting Israel itself but also commercial and passenger ships under several flags, thereby creating a critical international strategic challenge. The EU has decided to respond by launching Operation ASPIDES. Unlike the US- and UK-led Operations Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon Archer, ASPIDES is not attacking Houthi targets but intercepting their strikes. While this wholly defensive approach can play a useful role in protecting vessels and can contribute to deterrence, it concerns the Israelis, who fear that the EU’s limited response to the Houthi threat reflects a similar stance toward Iran.