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Hezbollah began in 1982 as an Islamist organization founded and shaped according to the ideological model of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The organization was founded to establish an Islamist regime in Lebanon and conduct a jihadist war against the enemies of Islam: the West and Israel. Hezbollah gradually “Lebanonized”, meaning it claimed to be limit the military struggle to Lebanese territory, integrated into the Lebanese political system, and established an extensive civil infrastructure. This transformation was accompanied by a new discourse stressing its role as defender of Lebanon. But Hezbollah’s Lebanonization has not in any way diluted or moderated its conception of Israel, with which it believes itself to be in a doomsday war. Hezbollah’s military empowerment since the withdrawal of the IDF in 2000 does not correspond with its discourse about defending Lebanon. Hezbollah's involvement in the fighting since October 8 is not mere lip service but a demonstration of its total commitment to what it perceives as its deterministic conflict with Israel.
Hamas's surprise attack on October 7 and the Swords of Iron War that followed have implications for the countries of the Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, China has clearly taken an anti-Israeli stance. It has essentially abandoned its neutral position in the region, stood against the United States, and strengthened the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis. But India, as well as Japan and South Korea to some extent, have stood by Israel’s side. This represents a clear expression of the (mainly security-related) rapprochement that has occurred among India, Japan, and Israel in recent years. It also reflects growing concern about the strengthening anti-Israel axis and raises questions about global stability and the future of Taiwan. Another issue troubling these countries is the potential impact of the war on energy stability.
Unit 8200 in the IDF - © IDF Spokesperson
After Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the entrenchment of the Hamas terrorist organization there, a war of attrition commenced between Hamas and Israel that has lasted for almost two decades. As Israel’s defense doctrine leans heavily on technological superiority, it has depended primarily on its numerous technological assets to manage this conflict. By contrast, Hamas, which is significantly disadvantaged in terms of technology, has pursued a strategy designed to neutralize Israel’s technological superiority through the use of terror tactics against civilian populations and the employment of low-tech and readily available means of warfare. The success of the surprise attack initiated by Hamas on October 7, 2023, demonstrated that Israel’s overreliance on technology in a conflict like this one was a flawed and even perilous concept.

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