Corporate Re-entry as an Indicator of the End of the “Age of Wars”

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked not only a military but also an economic turning point in the international order. The mass withdrawal of multinational corporations (MNCs) from Russia demonstrated that geopolitical risk had begun to outweigh the benefits of global economic interdependence. But if corporate exit is one indicator of the beginning of a new “age of wars”, the gradual return of MNCs could be an indicator of its eventual end. Corporate return should not, however, be measured as a binary variable of returned/not returned. It is better understood as a sequence of increasingly costly and difficult-to-reverse commitments. This paper proposes a “corporate re-entry ladder” ranging from renewed institutional contacts and market reconnaissance to direct commercial presence and, ultimately, irreversible capital investment. The critical indicator of geopolitical normalization is therefore not the return of the first Western brand. It is the moment when MNCs once again become willing to risk capital on the assumption that political stability will endure for the next 10–20 years.

BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 37 (October 2026)

In October 2026, the PSCR program’s analytical reports dealt with the political and economic developments across the entire post-Soviet area, including Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the Baltics, and even the Russian-speaking repatriates residing in Israel.

Should Israel’s Navy Have More Than Six Submarines?

The longstanding assumption that six submarines are sufficient for the Israeli Navy is now obsolete. Threats to Israel’s natural gas assets and sea approaches have multiplied across the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, and Turkey is developing its own undersea fleet in an assertive maritime expansion. An eight-submarine force would enable more effective simultaneous activity across all three theaters.

THE GAZA TERROR OFFENSIVE:
“The Ceasefire War”
16 July – 16 October 2026

The increased delay between updates is because the situation is more or less stagnant. Events occur, but they are largely repetitive and changes in the situation are small. All the participants have reduced the intensity of their efforts, with occasional brief and small escalations, and are playing the long game. However, tension remains as a new major escalation is anticipated—especially in the Iranian arena, but also in Lebanon and Gaza. Over the past few days, there have also been reports that the Israeli military is preparing for a possible escalation of Palestinian attacks in Judea and Samaria – perhaps even by the Palestinian Authority itself.

Israel-Sri Lanka Defense Ties

Documents recently declassified in Israel have disclosed the gravity of an arms deal that came into effect between Sri Lanka and Israel in the mid-1980s, a turbulent period during which Tamil militant separatism was severely threatening the short-lived political-economic prosperity of J.R Jayawardene’s government in Colombo. While the relationship between the two countries has long been complex, their defense collaboration has remained nearly constant.

Beyond Ports and Railways:
The India–Israel–Italy Technology Triangle and the Future of IMEC

The Mattei Plan and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) should not be treated as separate but overlapping corridors. Rather, they represent complementary layers of an emerging Indo-Mediterranean connectivity architecture. IMEC provides the east–west spine linking India, the Gulf, and Europe while the Mattei Plan extends European connectivity southward into Africa. Italy sits at the intersection of the two, leveraging its Mare Nostrum strategy to link the economic zones of the Indo-Pacific with those of the Euro-Atlantic by placing an EU leg in IMEC. Within this triangle, India provides technological scale and the eastern anchor, Israel brings a critical security and technological hinge in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Italy ensures a European institutional gateway and linkage to Africa through the Mattei Plan. As geopolitical realignments reshape global trade, connectivity, and data flows, IMEC is emerging as more than a network of ports, railways, and logistics infrastructure. The corridor’s long-term strategic significance will also depend on the digital architecture that underpins it: secure data networks, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, and resilient technological supply chains. The potential emergence of an India–Israel–Italy technology triangle is a critical component of IMEC’s future development.

Hamas Beyond Gaza: The Strategic Significance of the Greece-Cyprus Case

The investigation into a suspected Hamas network operating across Cyprus, Greece, and several other countries highlights a dimension of the Hamas threat that deserves greater attention. Hamas has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to adapt its organizational structure to changing circumstances. As Israel continues to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure and weaken its territorial control in Gaza, the terrorist organization may become increasingly reliant on its external networks. For Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, this possibility requires closer attention to cross-border intelligence cooperation, terrorist financing, and the infrastructure that allows Hamas to regenerate beyond its traditional territorial base.

BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 36 (September 2026)

In September 2026, the PSCRP publications dealt mostly with the issues of geopolitical (re)alignments (in the Baltics and the South Caucasus) and the electoral process (in Russia and Kazakhstan).

Can Israel Connect to Syria’s New Oil Routes?

Syria is reviving plans for major oil pipelines linking Iraq and other Gulf oil producers to the Mediterranean Sea. At first glance, such projects may appear to compete with Israel’s ambitions to become an important link in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This assumption is misleading. While railway and highway projects may naturally compete directly with one another for freight routes, energy pipelines operate with a different logic. Once established, oil and gas pipelines (and future hydrogen pipelines) tend to move continuously through several parallel routes, with additional pipelines providing resilience rather than displacing one another. Israel should not view Syria’s emergence as an oil transit state as a threat in the same way it may view competing regional railway corridors proposed by Turkey. The more useful question is how Israel can ensure future access to, or connection with, the regional oil network that is developing around it. Options may include a physical connection to a proposed Iraqi oil pipeline via Jordan, access to direct maritime deliveries from Baniyas or Tripoli to Ashkelon, or reciprocal energy arrangements in which Israeli gas and electricity flow to Syria and Lebanon while Israel gains access to their emerging oil supply routes. The goal is not to force oil corridors to go through Israel, but to make sure that the new regional oil network does not bypass it completely.

BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 35 (August 2026)

In August 2026, PSCRP analytical materials were largely focused on the developments in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia. The PSCRP team provides an overview of the year that has passed since the joint declaration was signed in Washington between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the same vein, the PSCRP team analyzes the role of the Middle Corridor, officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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