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The BESA Center is pleased to announce that Brigadier General (res.) Eran Ortal has joined us as a senior researcher. Gen. Ortal served as commander of the Dado Center and in a variety of positions at IDF General Headquarters in the fields of force deployment and design. His areas of expertise are national security, military thought and military innovation.
Over the past six weeks there has been an escalation in Israeli air strikes against Iranian, Hezbollah, and other pro-Iranian militia locations in Syria. The most powerful strike, on 1 April, killed the commander, the deputy commander, and several staff members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard force coordinating the actions of all the allied and proxy Iranian forces operating against Israel. These are the highest-ranking Iranian officers to have been killed since the 2020 assassination by the US of Qassem Soleimani, who was chief of the Iranian al-Quds organization and responsible for all Iranian operations outside Iran aimed at the US, Israel, and pro-western Arab states. The targets of the 1 April strike were convening in a building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus. The Iranians claim the building was in fact a consulate, so Israel placed its embassies across the world on alert for a tit-for-tat retaliation. During the night of 13-14 April, after two weeks of threats, the Iranians retaliated with their first-ever direct attack from Iranian territory into Israel. The operation is called "The True Promise." According to Israeli officials, Iran launched a barrage containing 185 explosive drones (nicknamed โ€œsuicide-dronesโ€), 36 cruise missiles, and at least 110 ballistic missiles. In addition to the direct Iranian action, their various allies and proxies โ€“ the Houthis in Yemen, Iraqi Hezbollah forces in Iraq and Syria, and the Lebanese Hezbollah โ€“ also fired at Israel.
Israelโ€™s ship of state, facing rough seas, is at high risk and requires clearer rules of navigation. During this period of deep complexity, Israel will need to clarify its strategic direction. The terrorists of Hamas are the tip of Iranโ€™s much larger spear. Israelโ€™s current war against jihadist criminality could thus turn into a wider and more damaging war with Iran. Such a war could emerge as a โ€œbolt from the blueโ€ or incrementally. Ultimately, it could involve the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and/or North Korea. How might Jerusalem prevent or manage any such derivative conflicts? Israel must consider whether there is a productive role to be played by the โ€œSamson Option.โ€
The events of October 7 and Hezbollah's subsequent attacks on Israelโ€™s northern border have renewed the question of whether energy considerations can serve as a lever on Hezbollah's policy towards Israel, as was claimed following the signing of a maritime border agreement by Israel and Lebanon in October 2022. During the months of fighting, reports have emerged of internal pressure being exerted by Beirut on Hezbollah not to enter the conflict against Israel as doing so would likely exacerbate Lebanon's state of deep crisis. This crisis includes frequent power outages in Beirut, unprecedented fuel shortages nationwide, and delays in gas exploration in Lebanon's waters. If Lebanon's energy crisis does lead to the โ€œconcentrationโ€ of Hezbollah within Lebanon's economic and political arena, it is possible that Israel, through US mediation, could exploit this to undermine Hezbollah and restore stability on the northern border.

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