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In a coordinated offensive, cyber actors directly linked to the Iranian regime recently executed a series of targeted digital intrusions against water infrastructure in the US. This aggressive campaign focused on the operational technology networks of municipal drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities across seven to twelve states. Unlike traditional cyber espionage campaigns, this unconventional and widespread operation was explicitly designed for real-world physical sabotage of a vital civilian resource.
India’s emerging private space sector is often presented as a story of entrepreneurship and market liberalization, but there is more to it than that. It reflects a broader reorganization of national capability in which commercialization, security imperatives, industrial policy and status ambitions converge. India has evolved from Vikram Sarabhai’s development-oriented vision to an increasingly dual-use space strategy, shaped by China’s 2007 antisatellite test, Mission Shakti in 2019, and the institutional reforms introduced from 2020 onward. Private participation has responded to both ISRO’s capacity constraints and New Delhi’s pursuit of a more resilient and autonomous technological ecosystem, a transformation best understood as state-enabled commercialization: public institutions retain control over regulation, infrastructure, technology transfer and strategic priorities, while private firms assume greater responsibility for design, production, launch services and experimentation. Such a distributed architecture may strengthen redundancy, technological adaptability and resistance to foreign leverage while expanding India’s commercial and diplomatic reach. There are institutional lessons here for Israel, particularly in terms of regulation, shared infrastructure, government procurement and the state’s role as an anchor customer.
Electricity cooperation between Israel and Syria is technically possible, but would be considerably more difficult than the indirect gas exports that are already taking place via Jordan. Unlike natural gas, electricity trade must be balanced in real time, creating immediate dependence on shared infrastructure. A model of small, reversible, and externally monitored electricity links that serve defined civilian projects and are detached from either side’s national grid is therefore the most likely path for the future. The most realistic first step would be a small pilot connection from the Golan Heights to Druze communities in southern Syria, supported by existing wind generation, new solar capacity, and battery storage. Lebanon would also be able to participate through separate solar and storage projects in the south, with a direct Israeli connection considered only after security conditions between the two countries improve. Such projects could support water pumping, hospitals, and municipal services in both Syria and Lebanon while giving Israel influence over regional reconstruction. While such initiatives would likely never lead to a fully integrated regional grid between the three actors, they can become more than just a symbolic peace project. Their success would depend on strict reliability standards, the consent of the local communities, and the ability of each side to disconnect without destabilizing its own grid.
The success of Israel's 2023–2026 campaigns against Iran, its proxies, and its allies should not be judged by simplistic measures of targets destroyed or by the continuing existence or otherwise of the Iranian regime, but by whether or not Iran's grand strategy has been disrupted. Rather than viewing Iran's nuclear program in isolation, we interpret it as one pillar of an integrated strategy that also included the "Ring of Fire" proxy network and long-range missile forces. Following the degradation of much of this regional architecture after October 7, 2023, Iran accelerated its nuclear and missile programs in an effort to restore its strategic position. The Israeli campaigns against Iran itself are therefore best understood as efforts to prevent Iran from reconstructing this integrated military architecture rather than as attempts to achieve either regime change or a decisive military victory. Israel's success should be measured by assessing whether this goal was achieved and by calculating how long it will take Iran to once again pose an existential threat to Israel.
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The Kargil War is remembered in India as a military victory, but its legacy extends far beyond the recapture of positions seized by Pakistani forces in 1999. It was an early test of India's ability to employ conventional military force under the shadow of nuclear deterrence and a turning point in its relations with both Israel and the United States. Israel continued an established pattern of assisting India during times of crisis, but in this instance, it evolved from a discreet supplier into a reliable operational partner, helping adapt precision-strike capabilities in real time according to the campaign's requirements. The United States, for its part, provided diplomatic significance to India's restraint and pressed Pakistan to withdraw. The Kargil War demonstrated that strategic autonomy does not require isolation: India can rely on external partners, integrate technologies from multiple sources, and still retain full authority over how and when to employ military force.
Following the October 7 war and the documentation of the atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, the limited political legitimacy the organization had retained within the Palestinian political system eroded dramatically. The Palestinian elections scheduled for 2026 are being held in a framework of institutional reform intended to align the Palestinian Authority with international requirements as it seeks international recognition of a future Palestinian state. One of the reform's defining features is the deliberate exclusion of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad from the democratic process because of their status as terrorist organizations. The upcoming Palestinian elections are thus a mechanism by which to create a new source of legitimacy for the Palestinian political system—one that no longer rests on Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections but instead on an institutional framework from which the movement is excluded. Despite the public support Hamas continues to enjoy for its October 7 attack, its absence from the forthcoming elections indicates that in practical terms, the organization has lost its status as a legitimate political actor within the Palestinian arena following the war and has been relegated primarily to the role of a militant military organization operating outside the institutional political system.
Israel has had the technological and industrial wherewithal to manufacture its own fighter-bombers since the early 1970s—yet ever since the mid-1980s, Jerusalem has repeatedly passed up this option in favor of continuing to rely on the United States to fulfill the IAF’s manned aircraft requirements. In light of current trends in both Israel and the United States, Jerusalem must urgently revisit this approach. Israel needs to design and build its own fighter-bomber—a Lavi 2.0.
For many years, the Armenian question has constituted one of the most sensitive issues in Israeli–Turkish relations. Although it was never at the core of the bilateral relationship, it repeatedly resurfaced whenever the question of recognizing the Armenian Genocide was raised, confronting Israel with a complex dilemma: how to balance its commitment to historical memory and the struggle against genocide denial with the strategic importance of its relations with Turkey. Over the years, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has regarded the issue primarily as a diplomatic matter with direct implications for relations with Ankara rather than merely as a historical or moral debate. Nor has this tension characterized Israeli policy alone. In recent years, Armenia itself has adopted a more pragmatic approach by advancing a process of normalization with Turkey without making Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide a precondition. The Armenian question therefore reflects a dynamic reality in which both Israel and Armenia are required to balance historical memory against changing strategic interests.

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