In May 2026, the PSCRP papers addressed a wide array of topics, including the developments in and around Russia, Armenia, and Central Asian states.
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Pakistan is attempting to position itself as a mediator in the West Asia crisis during the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. This effort should be viewed not as a neutral peace initiative but as a calculated survival strategy. Islamabad seeks to convert its geopolitical relevance into economic, diplomatic, and security gains against a backdrop of economic fragility, high dependence on external actors, and persistent security threats on its borders. There are three primary motives behind Pakistan’s involvement: the need to curb economic shocks resulting from regional escalation; the fear of instability spreading to the domestic arena, particularly Balochistan; and the need to carefully manage relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran simultaneously. Pakistani mediation does not reflect surplus power or regional decisiveness. It is instead an effort to maintain maneuverability, accumulate legitimacy, and prevent a deterioration that would primarily harm Pakistan itself.
The April 2026 meeting between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi marks a shift in India-South Korea relations from economic engagement to strategic resilience amid a fragmenting international order. While the longstanding economic partnership, highlighted by the 2009 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, laid the groundwork for cooperation, current geopolitical tensions, including the war in the Persian Gulf, emphasize the need for enhanced collaboration in energy security, advanced manufacturing, and maritime stability. Both nations recognize the importance of diversifying partnerships to mitigate strategic vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the success of this partnership will hinge on institutionalizing cooperation and converting strategic intent into tangible industrial and technological advancements.
- Dr. Eado Hecht
- Paper No. 2215
In theory, there has been a ceasefire in place since 8 April in the war of the United States and Israel versus Iran and of Iran's allies in Iraq versus the United States and Kuwait. There has also purportedly been a ceasefire in place since 17 April in the war of Israel versus Iran's ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah. In fact, these are typical Middle Eastern ceasefires, meaning that fire has not ceased; it has merely reduced in volume.
Iran’s ongoing strategy of leveraging the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical pressure point is widely perceived as a source of strategic advantage. However, this assessment overlooks a fundamental reality: Iran is structurally more vulnerable to sustained disruption of the strait than are its regional adversaries. With the overwhelming majority of its oil exports and trade dependent on this corridor, any prolonged closure would inflict severe economic damage on Iran itself, exacerbating internal instability and limiting its strategic endurance.
- Dr. Elai Rettig
- Paper No. 2382
The global oil shock created by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz obscured a second energy crisis that unfolded much closer to Israel’s borders. The month-long shutdown of Israel’s Leviathan and Karish gas fields, caused by repeated Iranian and Hezbollah missile attacks, was the longest gas export disruption since Israel began supplying gas to Jordan and Egypt. This interruption, the third in the past two years, exposed how dependent Israel’s neighbors have become on Israeli gas for electricity generation, and reinforced a broader strategic lesson for them. Viewing Israeli supplies as unreliable, Jordan, Egypt and even Syria are now more likely to deepen hedging strategies by expanding renewables, maintaining costly backup fuels, increasing LNG flexibility, and looking for alternative regional transport and energy corridors. The bright side is that this shift may strengthen the case for IMEC by reframing it less as a Europe-oriented transit initiative and more as a domestic infrastructure project for ensuring intra-regional energy security.
In April 2026, the PSCR program has prepared analytical materials covering a wide range of developments in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, and Ukraine.
- CDR. David Levy
- Paper No. 2381
Iran has long prepared to close the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a major conflict with the United States, hoping to trigger an energy shock, draw US naval forces into a confined battlespace, and impose enough cost to weaken Washington's will. The US has been fully cognizant of Tehran's intent for decades and planned accordingly. In the recent conflict, rather than accept a direct fight inside the Strait on Iranian terms, Washington and Jerusalem widened the campaign, degraded Iran's command structure, air defenses, naval forces, missile infrastructure, and supporting systems, and only then turned more directly to the Strait itself. Even so, reopening the waterway has proved difficult. The IRGC’s naval capacity, though significantly diminished, is still sufficient to threaten shipping through mines, small craft, and shore-based systems. As a result, the United States has shifted to a broader indirect approach that combines limited military operations in and around the Strait with strikes and threats of further strikes on vital targets, economic coercion, blockade measures, and a diplomatic alternative. Thus far, that approach appears to be working. Iran's Strait strategy has not forced the United States into the kind of fight Tehran had spent decades anticipating.
- Prof. Eitan Shamir
- Paper No. 2380
The popular premise that Donald Trump decided to go to war with Iran because Benjamin Netanyahu asked him to is a misleading distortion. Trump’s decision was the product of a 40-year personal grudge, a hard lesson learned from Kim Jong-un's nuclear immunity in Hanoi, and a cold-eyed calculation about China's cheap Iranian oil lifeline. Trump saw an opportunity to shatter the Iran-Russia-China-North Korea axis in a single blow and to remind the world that American power is by no means in decline. Netanyahu gave the door a push, but it was already wide open.
- Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham
- Paper No. 2379
Alongside Iran’s persistent progress towards nuclear weapons, which was recently stemmed – apparently for good – by Israel and the US, the Islamic regime possesses arsenals of other weapons of mass destruction, specifically chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Now that its nuclear strategy has been largely derailed, the Iranian regime is likely to continue to pursue and to considerably upgrade its ballistic capabilities, particularly in terms of CBW warheads. Ballistic CBW warheads (possibly including radiological weapons as well) will thus constitute Iran's primary strategic offensive alignment.