In March 2024, the PSCRP program of the BESA Center covered in its materials the regional developments in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as well as particular problems related to Ukraine and Russia.
Andrey Kazantsev-Vaisman keeps abreast of the Central Asian policy towards the ongoing war in the Middle East. He observes that the countries of the region see Israel as an important element of the Western world, therefore, even if they might formally take on a pro-Palestinian position to please China and Russia, the emphasis is still on pragmatism. Kazantsev-Vaisman also points to the importance of the Shia-Sunni divide in Islam for Central Asian countries’ attitude toward Iranian policies, and to the fact that pan-Islamic solidarity is rather weak there, compared to the neighbors. Openly pro-Hamas statements and actions are and will be suppressed as a part of the local efforts to combat religious extremism. However, though “the majority of the region’s population remains fairly indifferent to the Middle Eastern conflicts,” there still are militants being actively recruited to fight Israel by “anti-Israeli activist groups associated with various countries, primarily Iran.”
Vladimir Mesamed, in his two papers, continues the Central Asian theme, focusing on the Iranian influence in the region. First, he analyzes the drivers and drawbacks of the cooperation between Iran and the states of Central Asia within the framework of the Organization of Islamic Conference, pointing at the factor of relations with Israel as one of this cooperation’s stumbling blocks.
Then, Mesamed proceeds to compare the Iranian foreign policy toward three states of the region, namely, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The relations between Iran and Kazakhstan are rather stable and might be characterized as a “balanced partnership,” though Kazakhstan does not want to further increase the already existing cooperation so as not to irritate the US and Europe. “Astana is trying to postpone or leave unanswered numerous cooperation proposals put forward by Iran, focusing only on the attractive transit potential of Iranian territory and increasing its exports to Iran, and is sceptical about major projects of a long-term nature.” In relations with Uzbekistan, “there is still a chill of mutual distrust, which is explained by the religious factor”: the Uzbek authorities are very suspicious of any manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism. That is why, even though trade ties are increasing, the political dialog between the two countries remains limited. Also, the “Iranian leadership has been repeatedly alarmed by Uzbekistan’s unconditional support for U.S. foreign policy moves.” Tajikistan has structured relations with Iran in almost all spheres, including with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, “the most Islamized and fanatical component of the Iranian power bloc.” These relations are envisioned as a part of building a “Union of Persian-speaking states” and are backed by the “peculiar pro-Iranian stratum” consisting of religious figures, intelligentsia, and officials. However, the Tajik authorities are also concerned by the fact that Tajik students in Iran “study terrorism and extremism rather than religious sciences.”
The “Iranian” theme is continued with another material by Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman, focusing on the Iranian attempts to regain its sway in the South Caucasus. He scrutinizes the Iranian interests in a situation of geopolitical vacuum emerging out of the Russian influence’s gradual demise in Armenia. Iran “seeks to become Armenia’s new patron,” while objecting to the increasing role of the West and Turkey in the region. Tehran, at the same time, “wants to further strengthen cooperation along the Tehran-Moscow-New Delhi-Yerevan axis” and “does not object to the expansion of Chinese influence.”
A broader overview of the geopolitical and conflictual dynamics in the South Caucasus is presented in the two materials prepared by Gela Vasadze. He points at the attempts for Georgia’s integration into the European geopolitical space that is occurring now and underlines the problems personal interests, ties with Moscow, and the right-conservative image might create for the country’s strategic development. Writing about the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, Vasadze enumerates the most pressing problems that prevent a conflict resolution: the negotiable state borders, Zangezur corridor (a link between the “mainland” Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan autonomy), and the refugee issue. He concludes with overviewing the possible external partners and allies for each of the three South Caucasian countries.
In his second paper, Vasadze addresses the influence the war in Ukraine has so far had on the South Caucasian “zone of conditional stability”. He maintains that “the Georgian authorities are comfortable with a state of cold war with the Ukrainian authorities combined with statements of political support for Ukraine as a victim of Russian aggression.” Azerbaijan’s policy “towards Russia is aimed at finding a balance between using the current situation to advance its own interests and maintaining constructive relations to ensure security and achieve its goals through dialog.” And for Armenia, “supporting Ukraine has become a way to demonstrate its loyalty to the West (…), as well as some degree of independence from Russia.”
Moving westwards, to Ukraine itself, Joseph Epstein analyzes the Biden administration’s policy towards the ongoing war. He concludes that, as a result of Putin’s efforts to disrupt the US support for Ukraine through nuclear threats and misinformation campaign, “the hesitancy by the Biden administration to withhold advanced weaponry damaged the Ukrainian counteroffensive and may have led to Russia’s current upper hand in the conflict.” Velvl Chernin balances the foreign policy analysis with an ethnopolitical examination of the internal Ukrainian problem of Hungarian ethnic minority accommodation. He highlights the negative influence of the Ukrainian law “On Education” and diplomatic scandals on the relations between Hungary and Ukraine, and claims that the tensions surrounding the Hungarian ethnic group’s status in Transcarpathia are not going to fade away soon.
Finally, BESA could not ignore the huge terror attack that occurred in late March in Moscow. Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman has summarized the attack’s background factors and main versions surrounding the possible organizers. He concludes that the terrorist act in “Crocus City Hall” was most likely organized by ISIS-Khorasan and that “Russian security services demonstrated very low effectiveness” during the events. Also, “Russian authorities will probably exploit the terrorist attack for their own purposes, such as using it as a pretext to tighten the political regime within the country or to conduct more active attacks against Ukraine.”
This month was very productive for our program at BESA, and we hope to continue providing up-to-date analysis of the current developments in the post-Soviet space.