In June 2026, the BESA PSCRP authors have analyzed a wide range of regional issues, including the recent developments in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia.
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Israeli gas exports to Syria are already a reality, but they are conducted indirectly, through swap deals and resale arrangements with Jordan and Egypt rather than through a formal Israel-Syria contract. This creates a strategic dilemma for both sides. On the one hand, a direct Israel-Syria gas contract could provide clearer accountability, stronger safeguards against disruptions, and a basis for future energy cooperation that may include Lebanon as well. On the other hand, direct gas trade could be politically premature and expose both sides to domestic criticism: in Israel, because of concerns over dwindling domestic gas reserves after the large export agreement with Egypt in 2025; and in Syria, because of fears that Israel could politicize gas supply or use it as leverage. Indirect contracts through Jordan and Egypt may be easier to implement and deny, but they also blur responsibility and reduce both sides’ control over supply conditions. Israel should approach this question not as a binary choice between formal normalization and continued ambiguity but as a practical debate over which contracting model best serves stability, leverage, deniability, and long-term regional integration.
Any new Israeli government is now legally required to prepare a codified national security strategy within 150 days of its official formation. Though nuclear doctrine and strategy will likely be limited to the highest security-level classifications, nothing could have greater existential impact for Israel. Moreover, at a time when the principal threats to Israel are coming from a still pre-nuclear Iran and certain sub-state proxies, the National Security Council will have to consider wider and more explicit applications of nuclear deterrence. Israel’s decision-makers will need to undertake incremental but prompt shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Otherwise, Jerusalem will have to accept a strategic reality in which Iran and other adversaries continuously threaten Israel with non-nuclear but high-lethality ballistic missiles and/or chemical-biological (CBW) ordnance – an unsustainable reality of interminable war.
Israel has played a notable role in the political discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since October 7, 2023. Israel has served not merely as a target of criticism within Turkish foreign policy but also as a central instrument in shaping Turkey's domestic politics and regional vision. By portraying Israel as a threat to regional and global stability, Erdoğan seeks to position Turkey as the defender of the Palestinians and the leader of the Muslim world. The reasons behind his anti-Israel rhetoric lie beyond the conventional explanation of a need to divert public attention from domestic crises. It has become a permanent component of the political identity Erdoğan has constructed for himself and of the role he envisions for Turkey in the region.
The emergence of an “Age of Wars” is fundamentally reshaping venture capital. Technologies associated with security, resilience, strategic autonomy, and military effectiveness are increasingly replacing consumer-oriented innovation as the primary destinations for investment. As a result, venture capital is becoming progressively intertwined with national security, state policy, and geopolitical competition.
A recent law requires, for the first time, that any new Israeli government prepare a national security strategy within 150 days of its formation. As general elections are to be held no later than October 2026, Israel may soon approve its first official national security strategy. While this represents an opportunity to impose coherence on the country’s misaligned strategic orientation and security doctrine, it comes at a time of strategic and institutional drift following the multi-front wars that ensued in the wake of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. As the National Security Council is too weak to lead the complex effort to write a cohesive and robust national security strategy, a superficial strategy may instead result that squanders the opportunity provided by the new law. Steps must be taken to ensure that the new strategy is shaped in such a way as to ensure continuous reassessment and to foster constant learning and adaptation in the face of the ever-changing regional landscape.
In May 2026, the PSCRP papers addressed a wide array of topics, including the developments in and around Russia, Armenia, and Central Asian states.
Pakistan is attempting to position itself as a mediator in the West Asia crisis during the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. This effort should be viewed not as a neutral peace initiative but as a calculated survival strategy. Islamabad seeks to convert its geopolitical relevance into economic, diplomatic, and security gains against a backdrop of economic fragility, high dependence on external actors, and persistent security threats on its borders. There are three primary motives behind Pakistan’s involvement: the need to curb economic shocks resulting from regional escalation; the fear of instability spreading to the domestic arena, particularly Balochistan; and the need to carefully manage relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran simultaneously. Pakistani mediation does not reflect surplus power or regional decisiveness. It is instead an effort to maintain maneuverability, accumulate legitimacy, and prevent a deterioration that would primarily harm Pakistan itself.
The April 2026 meeting between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi marks a shift in India-South Korea relations from economic engagement to strategic resilience amid a fragmenting international order. While the longstanding economic partnership, highlighted by the 2009 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, laid the groundwork for cooperation, current geopolitical tensions, including the war in the Persian Gulf, emphasize the need for enhanced collaboration in energy security, advanced manufacturing, and maritime stability. Both nations recognize the importance of diversifying partnerships to mitigate strategic vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the success of this partnership will hinge on institutionalizing cooperation and converting strategic intent into tangible industrial and technological advancements.
Iran’s ongoing strategy of leveraging the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical pressure point is widely perceived as a source of strategic advantage. However, this assessment overlooks a fundamental reality: Iran is structurally more vulnerable to sustained disruption of the strait than are its regional adversaries. With the overwhelming majority of its oil exports and trade dependent on this corridor, any prolonged closure would inflict severe economic damage on Iran itself, exacerbating internal instability and limiting its strategic endurance.