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Israel has had the technological and industrial wherewithal to manufacture its own fighter-bombers since the early 1970s—yet ever since the mid-1980s, Jerusalem has repeatedly passed up this option in favor of continuing to rely on the United States to fulfill the IAF’s manned aircraft requirements. In light of current trends in both Israel and the United States, Jerusalem must urgently revisit this approach. Israel needs to design and build its own fighter-bomber—a Lavi 2.0.
- Prof. Efrat Aviv
- Paper No. 2397
For many years, the Armenian question has constituted one of the most sensitive issues in Israeli–Turkish relations. Although it was never at the core of the bilateral relationship, it repeatedly resurfaced whenever the question of recognizing the Armenian Genocide was raised, confronting Israel with a complex dilemma: how to balance its commitment to historical memory and the struggle against genocide denial with the strategic importance of its relations with Turkey. Over the years, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has regarded the issue primarily as a diplomatic matter with direct implications for relations with Ankara rather than merely as a historical or moral debate. Nor has this tension characterized Israeli policy alone. In recent years, Armenia itself has adopted a more pragmatic approach by advancing a process of normalization with Turkey without making Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide a precondition. The Armenian question therefore reflects a dynamic reality in which both Israel and Armenia are required to balance historical memory against changing strategic interests.
- Dr. Eado Hecht
- Paper No. 2215
Two issues have dominated the period since the last update: the escalation in skirmishes between the United States military and that of Iran on the one hand, and the declarations that an agreement has been reached between the United States and Iran on the other. However, the contours of the supposed agreement are unclear. Immediately after the two sides declared that they had come to terms, they offered completely contradictory descriptions of what was contained in the agreement. The reality of what was agreed to will become apparent on implementation. The agreement was supposed to be signed on 14 June, but at time of writing this has not yet happened.
We are pleased to invite you to attend our upcoming webinar titled "The Impact of the War with Iran on the Eastern Mediterranean," organised jointly by Strategy International (SI) and the Begin- Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
This webinar brings together leading experts from Strategy International and the BESA Center to examine how the conflict is affecting energy security, regional alliances, and the geopolitical balance among key regional and international actors.
The webinar will take place on Wednesday, 22nd July, at 4:00 PM (Cyprus/Israel time). Please find attached the official banner for the webinar.
- Prof. Edward Luttwak
- Paper No. 2393
The most recent—though highly unlikely to be the last—war between the US and Iran was fought by an American president whose irresolution allowed a critically weakened Iran to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The fear of “boots on the ground”, unjustified though it was by the reality of the conflict, has emboldened America’s most committed and resolute enemy to double down on its catastrophic national and international policies.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a seminal connectivity initiative linking India, the Middle East, and Europe. For it to succeed, its infrastructure, routes, ports, and chokepoints must be effectively protected. This applies across the maritime space stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Eastern Mediterranean. Attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, persistent tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, and the growing vulnerability of undersea infrastructure have highlighted the security challenges facing contemporary trade networks. In the current security environment, Greece, Israel, and India occupy key positions along the corridor. Together, they form a maritime chain linking the Indo-Pacific to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean. The convergence of their strategic interests, geographic locations, and maritime capabilities lays the foundation for a new security architecture conducive to the wider objectives of the IMEC. Through naval cooperation, maritime domain awareness, critical infrastructure protection, and professional military education, these three countries have an opportunity to shape a more resilient East-West corridor extending from Mumbai to Souda Bay.
The scope of the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran is very narrow. The MoU creates an interim state of deescalation between the United States and Iran within a rough, non-binding framework for future negotiations toward a permanent settlement. Despite its limitations, the MoU will serve as the primary strategic driver shaping the Middle East and beyond for at least the next six months. A net assessment of the MoU's implications reveals that while the United States successfully generated distinct advantages through the application of military force and agreed only to a temporary framework that does not forfeit its demands of Tehran, the manner in which the agreement was reached, along with its core content, represents a setback. It erodes Washington's substantive leverage over Iran, a development that will demand significant future American effort—including an increased probability of utilizing military force—to achieve a reasonable long-term arrangement. Regarding US-Israel relations, this is not the first time Washington has leveraged Israeli military achievements to serve its own interests. However, the overarching challenge lies in the future: Donald Trump will likely be Israel’s last unequivocally supportive president.
In June 2026, the BESA PSCRP authors have analyzed a wide range of regional issues, including the recent developments in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia.
Israeli gas exports to Syria are already a reality, but they are conducted indirectly, through swap deals and resale arrangements with Jordan and Egypt rather than through a formal Israel-Syria contract. This creates a strategic dilemma for both sides. On the one hand, a direct Israel-Syria gas contract could provide clearer accountability, stronger safeguards against disruptions, and a basis for future energy cooperation that may include Lebanon as well. On the other hand, direct gas trade could be politically premature and expose both sides to domestic criticism: in Israel, because of concerns over dwindling domestic gas reserves after the large export agreement with Egypt in 2025; and in Syria, because of fears that Israel could politicize gas supply or use it as leverage. Indirect contracts through Jordan and Egypt may be easier to implement and deny, but they also blur responsibility and reduce both sides’ control over supply conditions. Israel should approach this question not as a binary choice between formal normalization and continued ambiguity but as a practical debate over which contracting model best serves stability, leverage, deniability, and long-term regional integration.