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Israel’s recognition of Somaliland was not an isolated diplomatic move but part of a broader strategic process of rewiring the regional order in the Horn of Africa. The Israeli move, which challenges Iranian entrenchment and Turkish and Chinese dominance in the region, fits neatly with India’s concept of “maritime statecraft”. This convergence creates synergy between India’s legitimacy in the Global South and Israel’s technological and operational capabilities. Somaliland can serve as a testing ground for a non-formal regional order that strengthens the sovereignty and resilience of regional actors (particularly Ethiopia) while offering a stable alternative to centralized and coercive models.
On 22 December 2025, Israel, Greece and Cyprus had their tenth trilateral summit in Jerusalem. The three countries are endeavoring to steadily expand their cooperation, and the timing of the recent event is telling. Athens’s and Nicosia’s pragmatic approach to Jerusalem during the Gaza war and the Israel-Iran war served their national interests, and they are pursuing agreements with both the Israeli defense market and the energy sector. The Cypriot and Greek presidency of the EU in 2026 and 2027 can serve as an opportunity to recalibrate EU-Israeli relations following a period of disagreement and strain.
US involvement in Gaza does not reflect a loss of Israeli control but rather a new strategic framework that emerged after Israel's 2022 integration into CENTCOM. This shift enabled unprecedented regional coordination, real-time intelligence sharing, and a multilayered defensive posture against Iran and its proxies. Following the Gaza fighting, a joint US-Israel command structure was established, enhancing operational integration while preserving Israel’s independent decision-making. For years, Israel debated the idea of a formal defense treaty with the United States but hesitated due to the fear of losing strategic autonomy. The current arrangement effectively creates a hybrid model. While not a formal alliance, it provides many of its advantages, including stronger deterrence, coordinated defense, deeper strategic depth, and the capacity for joint action, while maintaining Israel’s freedom of action.
The Red Sea crisis predates the Swords of Iron War, but became a specifically Israeli security threat after October 2023, with the start of a Houthi military-terrorist solidarity campaign with Hamas. The Houthis launched a blockade on Israeli-linked shipping, but also harmed Red Sea maritime traffic in general with attacks on ships, causing a 50% reduction in Suez Canal traffic within a few months and forcing the Israeli Port of Eilat to suffer serious losses. The cessation of Houthi attacks on US vessels in May 2025, following a ceasefire agreement with Washington, did not signal an end to the conflict but rather a shifting of the crosshairs to focus more on trying to blockade Israel from the south. Since the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the Houthis have held their fire against Israel. Reports suggest that the UAE, possibly with the quiet blessing of Saudi Arabia, and anti-Houthi forces within Yemen are building new strategic positions to deal with the ongoing radical Shiite threat from Saana.
RUSI’s annual Military Technology Conference, held in London in October, presented a comprehensive picture of the technological revolution underway in the British Army and in other European militaries—a transformation that reflects the Russian threat and operational lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine. Future force design is transitioning sharply from hardware-centric to AI-driven and autonomous systems, with the strategic objective that by 2035, most combat platforms will be unmanned. Along with announcing massive investments and flagship programs, the conference identified key obstacles: bureaucratic delays, gaps between civilian AI and battlefield requirements, and legal and ethical challenges associated with integrating autonomous systems. The conference highlighted lessons learned from the war in Ukraine in shaping European military analysis, yet scarcely addressed the many lessons to be learned on Middle Eastern battlefields. The conclusion: Britain is undergoing a profound conceptual and operational shift, but its success will depend on overcoming structural barriers, accelerating innovation, and transforming advanced technological capabilities into effective military power within a short time frame.
For nearly a decade, India has been shedding the vocabulary of strategic restraint. The cycle of responses to major Pakistan-based terrorist attacks, including Uri in 2016, Balakot in 2019, and Pahalgam in 2025, made clear that predictable retaliation had not deterred cross-border terrorism. In fact, it enabled it. Restraint, once thought to be stabilizing, had become strategically dangerous. Predictability gave militant groups the space and time to prepare for new attacks. Eventually, Delhi’s belief that terrorism could be contained below the threshold of interstate conflict collapsed. As was made clear in Operation Sindoor, India has crossed a doctrinal threshold. It no longer responds to terrorism with calibrated warnings or waits for international partners to validate its choices. It is building a new operating logic rooted in coercive clarity and a willingness to act first when its citizens are threatened.

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