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The First Post-Heroic American War: The “Boots on the Ground” Syndrome

The most recent—though highly unlikely to be the last—war between the US and Iran was fought by an American president whose irresolution allowed a critically weakened Iran to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The fear of “boots on the ground”, unjustified though it was by the reality of the conflict, has emboldened America’s most committed and resolute enemy to double down on its catastrophic national and international policies.

Greece, Israel, and India: The Emerging Maritime Security Architecture of the IMEC

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a seminal connectivity initiative linking India, the Middle East, and Europe. For it to succeed, its infrastructure, routes, ports, and chokepoints must be effectively protected. This applies across the maritime space stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Eastern Mediterranean. Attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, persistent tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, and the growing vulnerability of undersea infrastructure have highlighted the security challenges facing contemporary trade networks. In the current security environment, Greece, Israel, and India occupy key positions along the corridor. Together, they form a maritime chain linking the Indo-Pacific to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean. The convergence of their strategic interests, geographic locations, and maritime capabilities lays the foundation for a new security architecture conducive to the wider objectives of the IMEC. Through naval cooperation, maritime domain awareness, critical infrastructure protection, and professional military education, these three countries have an opportunity to shape a more resilient East-West corridor extending from Mumbai to Souda Bay.

The Implications of the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding and Its Consequences for Israel

The scope of the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran is very narrow. The MoU creates an interim state of deescalation between the United States and Iran within a rough, non-binding framework for future negotiations toward a permanent settlement. Despite its limitations, the MoU will serve as the primary strategic driver shaping the Middle East and beyond for at least the next six months. A net assessment of the MoU's implications reveals that while the United States successfully generated distinct advantages through the application of military force and agreed only to a temporary framework that does not forfeit its demands of Tehran, the manner in which the agreement was reached, along with its core content, represents a setback. It erodes Washington's substantive leverage over Iran, a development that will demand significant future American effort—including an increased probability of utilizing military force—to achieve a reasonable long-term arrangement. Regarding US-Israel relations, this is not the first time Washington has leveraged Israeli military achievements to serve its own interests. However, the overarching challenge lies in the future: Donald Trump will likely be Israel’s last unequivocally supportive president.

Israeli Gas Exports to Syria:
The Dilemma of Formalizing Direct Gas Cooperation

Israeli gas exports to Syria are already a reality, but they are conducted indirectly, through swap deals and resale arrangements with Jordan and Egypt rather than through a formal Israel-Syria contract. This creates a strategic dilemma for both sides. On the one hand, a direct Israel-Syria gas contract could provide clearer accountability, stronger safeguards against disruptions, and a basis for future energy cooperation that may include Lebanon as well. On the other hand, direct gas trade could be politically premature and expose both sides to domestic criticism: in Israel, because of concerns over dwindling domestic gas reserves after the large export agreement with Egypt in 2025; and in Syria, because of fears that Israel could politicize gas supply or use it as leverage. Indirect contracts through Jordan and Egypt may be easier to implement and deny, but they also blur responsibility and reduce both sides’ control over supply conditions. Israel should approach this question not as a binary choice between formal normalization and continued ambiguity but as a practical debate over which contracting model best serves stability, leverage, deniability, and long-term regional integration.

Creating Israel’s National Security Strategy: The Nuclear Dimension

Any new Israeli government is now legally required to prepare a codified national security strategy within 150 days of its official formation. Though nuclear doctrine and strategy will likely be limited to the highest security-level classifications, nothing could have greater existential impact for Israel. Moreover, at a time when the principal threats to Israel are coming from a still pre-nuclear Iran and certain sub-state proxies, the National Security Council will have to consider wider and more explicit applications of nuclear deterrence. Israel’s decision-makers will need to undertake incremental but prompt shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Otherwise, Jerusalem will have to accept a strategic reality in which Iran and other adversaries continuously threaten Israel with non-nuclear but high-lethality ballistic missiles and/or chemical-biological (CBW) ordnance – an unsustainable reality of interminable war.

From Karagöz and Hacivat to Israel: Erdoğan’s Political Theater

Israel has played a notable role in the political discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since October 7, 2023. Israel has served not merely as a target of criticism within Turkish foreign policy but also as a central instrument in shaping Turkey's domestic politics and regional vision. By portraying Israel as a threat to regional and global stability, Erdoğan seeks to position Turkey as the defender of the Palestinians and the leader of the Muslim world. The reasons behind his anti-Israel rhetoric lie beyond the conventional explanation of a need to divert public attention from domestic crises. It has become a permanent component of the political identity Erdoğan has constructed for himself and of the role he envisions for Turkey in the region.

Venture Capital in the Age of Wars: Geopolitical Competition and the Transformation of Innovation

The emergence of an “Age of Wars” is fundamentally reshaping venture capital. Technologies associated with security, resilience, strategic autonomy, and military effectiveness are increasingly replacing consumer-oriented innovation as the primary destinations for investment. As a result, venture capital is becoming progressively intertwined with national security, state policy, and geopolitical competition.

The Challenge of Formulating Israel’s First Official National Security Strategy

A recent law requires, for the first time, that any new Israeli government prepare a national security strategy within 150 days of its formation. As general elections are to be held no later than October 2026, Israel may soon approve its first official national security strategy. While this represents an opportunity to impose coherence on the country’s misaligned strategic orientation and security doctrine, it comes at a time of strategic and institutional drift following the multi-front wars that ensued in the wake of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. As the National Security Council is too weak to lead the complex effort to write a cohesive and robust national security strategy, a superficial strategy may instead result that squanders the opportunity provided by the new law. Steps must be taken to ensure that the new strategy is shaped in such a way as to ensure continuous reassessment and to foster constant learning and adaptation in the face of the ever-changing regional landscape.

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