PSCRP-BESA Reports No 123 (April 7, 2025)
Ramzan Kadyrov is seriously ill. The exact diagnoses remain the subject of rumors and speculation, but the fact itself is undeniable. This is evidenced by the changes in the politician’s physical condition — in his appearance, speech and mobility — and by his frequent and prolonged disappearances from the public eye. Thus, this year alone, Kadyrov has been away on vacation at least twice: from January 13 until at least January 29, and then from March 1 and for the entire month of Ramadan, i.e. until March 30. In the interlude between leaves, Kadyrov announced for the first time that he would rule the republic for the rest of his life.
The propaganda machine is trying to conceal Kadyrov’s illness through a variety of “cover-up operations”: from the publication of pre-recorded materials (referred to as “canned stuff” by journalists), i.e. photographs and videos prepared in advance which make it impossible to establish the exact date of the event being covered; the footage of his workouts and other demonstrations of his physical prowess; to diversionary tactics such as the promotion of the beating of Nikita Zhuravel, who was arrested for burning the Quran, in Grozny’s pre-trial detention center by the Chechen leader’s then 15-year-old son Adam. The incident became public as early as mid-August 2023, but Ramzan Kadyrov bragged about his son’s act only a month later amid reports of a sharp deterioration in his condition and his being treated at the Central Clinical Hospital in Moscow. After that, the teenager was showered with awards, and not only in Chechnya, drawing public attention to himself. It should be noted that such cover-up operations involve not only the Chechen authorities, but also federal officials, in particular the Minister for Emergency Situations Alexander Kurenkov and even, indirectly, Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Of course, the ineptitude and obvious staging of the propaganda materials have the opposite effect: instead of convincing the audience that the rumors about Kadyrov’s illness are groundless, they only reinforce their conviction. This is obvious to journalists and critics of the regime, as well as to elites in Chechnya itself and the country’s political leadership. However, there are no reliable public estimates of the Chechen leader’s condition, his possible life expectancy and his ability to remain in active service as a politician; nor is it known whether Kadyrov himself, his doctors or the Kremlin have any such estimates.
The uncertainty of the time frame complicates attempts to outline possible scenarios for the transit of power in Chechnya. The only assumption that can be considered more or less established is that Ramzan Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya is likely to end before Vladimir Putin’s rule in Russia, which means that the successor will come to power under the existing regime and will be appointed in Moscow. At the same time, Kadyrov has no “ideal” successor.
Issue
Ramzan Kadyrov has seven adult children (including his third son, Adam, who will turn 18 later this year). Until recently, the highest-ranking among them was the eldest daughter, 26-year-old Aishat: she occupied the post of deputy prime minister of the republic, but at the end of February she unexpectedly resigned, claiming that such a job was “more suitable for a strong man”. Two weeks later, Aishat became sole owner of the Chechen Mineral Waters company with assets of 3 billion rubles, and soon the records of herself, her sister Tabarik, and later of the official wife of the head of Chechnya, Medni Kadyrova, were sealed from the register of legal entities.
In the first half of March, the radical Islamist telegram channel Niyso, which is in opposition to the Kadyrov regime, quoted sources as saying that Kadyrov’s other daughters — Khadijat (Khadija, Karina), who served as first deputy head of the administration of the Chechen head and government, and Khutmat, who held the post of deputy head of the Chechen head’s secretariat — had also left their posts. (Tabarik was also mentioned, but this is a mistake, Tabarik has never held a civil service position.) The Niyso information is not confirmed by other sources, but the official Chechen media have indeed stopped reporting on them. Khadija was last mentioned on March 3 in connection with a trip to the UAE, while Khutmat was mentioned only in connection with Islamic events, and while on February 27 the state-run news agency Chechnya Segodnya still named her position, on March 13 she was presented only as the author of a project concerning women in Islam.
The reasons for the removal of one, or possibly three, of Kadyrov’s daughters from the civil service are unknown. The assumption that it may be connected with the transition of power in Chechnya does not seem credible: society in the republic is too patriarchal to accept a woman as the top official, and it is difficult to imagine a woman in charge of the security forces, which are now controlled by Kadyrov personally.
The Chechen leader’s sons do not look like real candidates for succession either. The eldest, 19-year-old Akhmat, is Chechnya’s minister of sports; the second son, Eli (Zelimkhan, Ali), is not in the civil service at all, but chairs the republic’s boxing federation and the “Akhmat” sports club; and Adam, still a minor, has been put in charge of the tailor-made positions of Chechen head’s “security department” and “supervisor” of security units, including the so-called “special forces university” in Gudermes, where mercenaries are trained for the war against Ukraine.
Sources familiar with the situation in Chechnya as well as experts unanimously assume that all three of them do not have the ability (and Eli does not have the desire) for political and administrative work in high-ranking positions. In this context, their early marriages to girls from families close to the Kadyrov clan and their personal introductions to Vladimir Putin look rather like a move to secure the future of the teenagers and obtain symbolic guarantees of their safety than milestones on the route to the position of the top leader.
The Chechen constitution stipulates that only a person who has reached the age of 30 can be the head of the republic. Although this norm can be changed fairly quickly if necessary, the lack of any propaganda campaign for such an amendment also indirectly indicates that Kadyrov’s children are not seen as his possible successors, at least for now.
Recently, the publication “Vazhnye Istorii”, citing several sources, reported that Kadyrov was conducting secret negotiations about his family’s security with Middle Eastern monarchies behind the Kremlin’s back — a development that is said to have caused a cooling in his relations with Putin. His right-hand man Adam Delimkhanov has also fallen into disgrace.
Adam Delimkhanov
Adam Delimkhanov is a distant relative of Ramzan Kadyrov, one of his closest associates and a member of the State Duma. In 2009, Kadyrov himself called Delimkhanov his successor, but these words can hardly be considered relevant today given the long time that has since passed.
Delimkhanov has been linked to the persecution of human rights advocates, activists and critics of the current head of Chechnya, as well as to a number of contract killings and assassination attempts. The most notorious are the murders of the Yamadayev brothers and Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov (https://zona.media/chronicle/nemtsov-chronicle) next to the Kremlin walls in 2015. However, the full list of crimes which have mentioned Delimkhanov is much longer. Essentially, he is responsible for all “operations” against real or imagined enemies of Ramzan Kadyrov and the regime in Chechnya, and the promotion of their interests outside the republic, acting as a power broker; suffice it to mention his role in the conflict over the Wildberries marketplace.
Back in 2021, opposition activist Ilya Yashin called him “the most dangerous deputy” of the Duma, and soon investigative journalist Elena Milashina said that she “doesn’t even know who is more dangerous”, Kadyrov or Delimkhanov.
In terms of influence in Chechnya, the Delimkhanov clan is second only to the Kadyrov clan. For example, the Geremeyev family is related to the Delimkhanovs: Suleiman Geremeyev is a member of the Federation Council, while the investigation materials suggest that Ruslan and Vakha Geremeyevs were directly involved in the assassination of Nemtsov.
Adam Delimkhanov himself has three brothers, all of whom are law enforcers. For example, Alibek is the first deputy commander of the North Caucasus District of the Rosgvardia and holds the rank of lieutenant general; Sharip is the commander of the regiment for the protection of the oil and gas complex of the Chechen Interior Ministry and the head of the Rosgvardia Department in the republic, with the rank of major general of police; the lesser-known Amkhad also works in the police.
In 2011, Delimkhanov’s fortune was estimated at $300 million; more recent data are not available. Two years later, during a brawl in the State Duma with another deputy, Alexei Zhuravlev, a golden pistol slipped out of Delimkhanov’s pocket.
Despite Delimkhanov’s obvious political assets and “resourcefulness,” the Kremlin may fear that he will become too powerful if he ascends to the Grozny throne. The reason for this is the deputy’s extensive criminal ties (they are the reason why Delimkhanov was placed under U.S. sanctions back in 2014, not because of his involvement in the repressions): Moscow may see them as a threat, obviously not in terms of reputation, but in terms of the risk of organized criminal groups gaining political influence.
Magomed Daudov
Like Delimkhanov, Daudov has long been one of Ramzan Kadyrov’s closest associates, but has never quite become “one of his own”. He has also been involved in large-scale human rights violations, including torture in secret “gay prisons”. He is under international sanctions.
After the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine, Daudov has taken over the provision of soldiers and security forces from the republic; he is also responsible for training “volunteers” who are recruited from all over Russia.
Last May Daudov unexpectedly resigned as speaker of the republican parliament, a post he had held for almost nine years, which caused a wave of rumors and speculation about its causes and his future fate. However, the intrigue was soon resolved: Daudov became head of the Chechen government. This should be considered a promotion: according to the constitution, it is the prime minister who replaces the head of Chechnya during the latter’s leave or illness. However, in the event of the death of the head of the republic or his early resignation from office for other reasons, it is the president of Russia who appoints a provisional head.
Daudov is good at handling the administrative tasks he has been entrusted with and acts as an effective organizer — this, as well as his good command of the Russian language, may factor in his favor when the Russian authorities consider Kadyrov’s successor. On the other hand, he has no real influence among the siloviks, whose subordination and manageability is vital for the Kremlin, and his administrative resources are limited. Islamists from Niyso insistently name Daudov as the main candidate for the succession, but their assessments should be taken with caution, as they may not so much reflect the real state of affairs, but may be aimed at instigating conflicts in the Chechen leadership based on Kadyrov’s suspiciousness.
Apti Alaudinov
According to analysts and sources of Novaya Gazeta-Europe, Apti Alaudinov, commander of the Chechen unit “Akhmat” involved in the war against Ukraine and deputy head of the main department for military and political work of the Russian Defense Ministry, is the most favorable successor for the Kremlin. Alaudinov has a good education (he is a lawyer); he can speak coherently and ad-lib in good Russian; he is known outside Chechnya as one of the main spokesmen on the war against Ukraine, and on the whole he departs from the image of the stereotype “Chechen thug” that irritates the Russian leadership and the public — although he is known to be involved in extrajudicial executions and reprisals against the undesirables. Alaudinov’s appointment to a senior position in the Defense Ministry in April 2024 clearly indicates the approval and some kind of credit given to him by the federal authorities.
However, Alaudinov has no political or any other capital of his own in Chechnya. He himself was long in disgrace after he allegedly mockingly dope-slapped a portrait of Ramzan Kadyrov in 2019. He was forgiven only after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and thanks to his active participation in it. However, it was his subordinates who gained notoriety as “TikTok troops”. This disparaging nickname is used both by Ukrainians and critics of the Chechen regime, as well as by Russian pro-militarist bloggers with whom Alaudinov regularly clashes.
The Kavkaz.Realii website, citing sources and experts, wrote that Alaudinov is not an independent figure, his political fate is completely determined by Kadyrov, and he is “not integrated into the general structure of the Chechen military machine” and has no authority in the republic.
Unsafe region
Moscow realizes that the slightest “loosening of the screws” in Chechnya could lead to catastrophic consequences. The region’s history — from the Caucasus War, through Stalin’s deportation of the Vainakhs, to the two recent wars — does not exactly make the population inclined to be loyal to the Russian authorities. Kadyrov’s regime is also hated by the population — for chronic poverty, systemic extortion, regular abductions and torture of people even on the slightest suspicion of critical sentiments; forcibly sending people to war in Ukraine and destroying the traditional teip, or tribal structure of society and Vainakh customary law, Adat. It rests on the “stick” of the omnipotence of Kadyrov-controlled security forces and the “carrot” of federal transfers with which the center buys their loyalty.
Despite Kadyrov’s claims that Chechnya has allegedly become “the only region in the world where terrorism has been eradicated”, attacks on security forces are still carried out in the republic; radical Islamism, which opposes the traditional Sufi version of Islam in the Caucasus, is spreading, especially among young people, and an Islamist underground is evidently active in neighboring Ingushetia and Dagestan. Even if there are no active cells in Chechnya itself, at the slightest sign of uncertainty and discord they can emerge in a matter of days.
The regime cannot afford a “third Chechen war”, so after Kadyrov it will continue its policy of extremely harsh crackdowns and bribery of local elites. Since Kadyrov has no unconditional and universally recognized successor, it is possible that attempts will be made to build complex combinations based on a balance of interests of a number of key figures, with the federal center retaining the role of arbiter. Given the personal qualities of these figures and their habit of violent conflict resolution, the sustainability of such schemes seems doubtful.
PSCRP team