PSCRP-BESA Reports No 181 (February 09, 2026)
By Alexander Shpunt
On January 31, 2026, Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Commission published the first official draft of a new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This is not merely a set of amendments but a thoroughly revised version of the Basic Law, with changes affecting roughly 84% of the text (about 77 out of roughly 101 articles in the current version).
The draft was prepared by the Constitutional Commission chaired by Constitutional Court Chair Elvira Azimova, based on thousands of proposals from citizens, political parties, NGOs, experts, and discussions at the National Kurultai.
Over six months, as the authorities state, large-scale public debates on constitutional reform were conducted. More than 2,000 citizen initiatives were received through electronic platforms from citizens, lawyers, experts, attorneys, political parties, NGOs, and professional and business circles.
Substance of the Reform
According to Deputy Chair of the Constitutional Court Bakyt Nurmukhanov, the draft constitutional reform includes a preamble, 11 sections, and 104 articles.
Two new sections are proposed: “People’s Council” and “The Process of Amending the Constitution.” In addition, it is proposed to rename four existing constitutional sections: “General Provisions” to “Foundations of the Constitutional System,” “Person and Citizen” to “Fundamental Rights, Freedoms, and Duties,” “Parliament” to “Kurultai,” and “Courts and Justice, Prosecutor’s Office, Commissioner for Human Rights” to “Justice, Prosecutor’s Office, Human Rights Mechanisms.” Nurmukhanov stated that amendments are proposed to 77 constitutional articles, comprising 84% of the text.
A transition to a unicameral parliament is proposed: the Kurultai of the Republic of Kazakhstan would consist of 145 deputies elected by proportional party-list system for a five-year term.
Kazakhstan’s representative to the OSCE, Kairat Malaev, noted that parliament will consist of 145 deputies elected on party lists under proportional representation for a five-year term. The 30% quota for youth, women, and persons with disabilities on party lists, as well as the 5% electoral threshold, will remain in force. Meanwhile, the People’s Council will consist of 126 deputies representing ethno-cultural associations, major public organizations, local representative bodies, and regional public councils—reflecting the broad diversity of Kazakhstani society.
The post of State Secretary is being abolished, and, following a referendum, an institute of Vice President of the Republic of Kazakhstan will be created. Tokayev noted that the president himself will appoint the vice president, with the Kurultai’s consent, by a simple majority vote.
Speaking at the 5th session of the Ulttyk Kurultai (National Assembly) on January 20, 2026, the president proposed establishing a vice-presidency with constitutional status. This initiative is presented as the logical conclusion of a political architecture gradually built in recent years and intended to enhance governability and institutional resilience.
The Constitutional Court will be empowered to assess whether the implementation of decisions by international organizations and their bodies complies with the Constitution. On such matters, petitions to the Constitutional Court may be filed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Chair of the Kurultai, at least one-fifth of the total number of Kurultai deputies, the Prime Minister, and the Prosecutor General.
Another key reform will be the creation of “Halyk Kenesi”—a high-level consultative body intended to represent the interests of Kazakhstan’s citizens. It is expected to include representatives of ethno-cultural associations, civil society organizations, and regional public councils. “Halyk Kenesi” will be empowered to develop and submit recommendations on domestic policy priorities, promote national values, and formally submit draft proposals for consideration by state institutions. Its legal foundations, composition, and operating procedures will be defined by a separate constitutional law.
Four Years Back
On June 5, 2022, Kazakhstan held a constitutional referendum. This was the third referendum since independence in 1991 and the first since the 1995 referendum that adopted the current constitution.
The amendments were introduced after fierce civil unrest in early January, triggered by worsening economic conditions and subsequent calls for rapid political reforms. The referendum changed 33 of the document’s 98 articles.
The amendments covered a wide range of issues, including, among other things, abolition of the death penalty, a ban on senior officials joining political parties, a ban on the president’s relatives holding government posts, and new operating principles for the Constitutional Court. Under these amendments, the president would appoint only 10 senators instead of 15, five of whom would be recommended by a political body called the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.
The Central Election Commission announced that 77.18% voted in favor of the amendments, which, among other things, stripped former president Nursultan Nazarbayev of the status of “national leader.” Turnout was 68.06%.
The constitutional reform of June 2022 enabled Tokayev to run for a new seven-year term, which he secured triumphantly in early elections in November 2022.
The final term—unless new reforms are undertaken.
Tokayev’s Fall–Winter Collection
On September 8, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered his annual State of the Nation address in front of Kazakhstan’s parliament building. In a wide-ranging speech Tokayev touched on topics as diverse as artificial intelligence, electric scooters, inflation, nuclear power development, scandalous behavior by women, and the need to transition to a unicameral parliament via a future constitutional referendum. He also proposed holding, in 2027, a national referendum on transitioning Kazakhstan to a unicameral legislature—thus abolishing the Senate, the upper chamber.
Shortly thereafter, on October 8, the president signed a decree establishing a working group on parliamentary reform in line with his key proposal to move to a unicameral parliament as set out in his September 8 address. The group was tasked with developing proposals to strengthen parliamentary institutions and ensure a more efficient legislative process. According to the presidential decree, the head of the group is State Counsellor Erlan Karin. Its members include representatives of the Mazhilis (lower house), the Senate (upper house), the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, and leaders of parliamentary party factions in the Mazhilis.
Two months later, on December 1, 2025, Tokayev announced that the planned transition to a unicameral parliament would abolish the president’s quota for appointing members of the legislature. At that time, Kazakhstan’s parliament had two chambers: the Mazhilis, with 98 deputies elected under a mixed electoral system, and the Senate, with 50 members—some elected by regional maslikhats (local representative bodies), others appointed by the president. Under the current system, the head of state appoints 10 senators, half of whom are nominated by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.
Political “Security” for the Reform—As Understood in the Post-Soviet Space
As is customary across the post-Soviet space, prior to undertaking institutional reforms, the political leader—President Tokayev—consistently secured his power by judicially removing the leaders of the legal opposition from the political scene. The illegal opposition in a country where the forceful suppression of protests has a decades-long history is not a serious threat to presidential power.
In the snap elections of March 2023, Tokayev’s party, Amanat, won 62 seats in the Mazhilis. Auyl won 8, Respublika and Ak Zhol won 6 each, the People’s Party of Kazakhstan won 5, the National Social Democratic Party won 4, and independent candidates won 7. Although more parties entered the lower chamber than in the previous term, none of them in practice represented any serious opposition to Tokayev.
In this piece, we will omit the critical assessments by Freedom House and other international observers — they were fairly moderate; it was emphasized that technical violations existed, but they could not decisively affect the election results.
Half a year after the elections—in order to ensure that a judicial crackdown on the opposition would not appear to be an attempt to obtain an electoral outcome and thereby cast doubt on it—Kazakhstani authorities stepped up efforts to suppress opposition political activity. Following the conviction in November 2023 of opposition leader Marat Zhylandbayev, sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on charges of “financing extremist activity” and “participation in the activities of a banned extremist organization,” the authorities jailed two more government critics on the same charges. Several months later, on August 2 and 16, 2024, Kazakhstani courts sentenced Duman Mukhammedkarim, an independent journalist and activist, and Asylbek Zhamuratov, another public activist, to seven years’ imprisonment each; they also banned Mukhammedkarim from public activity for three years and Zhamuratov from political activity for five years.
In June 2024, Kazakhstan adopted a new media law that threatens freedom of speech and the right to information. The law expands the definition of mass media to include online publications, requiring their registration and a physical presence in Kazakhstan, and grants the government broad powers to deny accreditation to foreign media representatives if their materials contain unspecified “propaganda of extremism.”
The new law was not directly repressive. Rather, it introduced long-awaited regulation into the country’s new networked communications space, which had been marked by anarchy, lack of oversight, and legal vacuum—while simultaneously creating mechanisms for the authorities’ manual control over the content of online communications and the composition of their participants.
These actions created tools of total governmental control over actors’ presence in both the political sphere and the media sphere.
A telling example: Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice has refused to register the opposition group “Alga, Kazakhstan”—the successor to the party “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan,” designated an extremist organization in 2012—no fewer than 24 times, most recently in April 2024. In late November, the group submitted a registration application for the 25th time. As of November 2025, the chair of the party’s organizing committee, Amangeldy Dzhakhin, has been arrested and is charged with participation in an “extremist organization” and “financing extremism.”
The “security” of implementing a radical reform—understood as it is in the post-Soviet space—can be considered ensured.
Transition or Rebranding?
The proposed change in Kazakhstan’s parliamentary system will likely accelerate lawmaking and could be economically advantageous. But above all, it signifies a shift in the model of power transition.
In Kazakhstan today, the line of succession in the event of the president’s absence or incapacity is as follows: Speaker of the Senate, then Chair of the Mazhilis, then the Prime Minister. A unicameral parliament would reduce this pool.
Formerly known as Otan and then Nur Otan, the party was long associated with Nazarbayev. Although Tokayev officially left the party in 2022, Amanat retained its dominant position, quickly adapting to the new political reality. Erlan Koshanov, an experienced civil servant and the current Chair of the Mazhilis, has earned a reputation as a loyal operative—precisely that—of President Tokayev. Before becoming speaker, he headed the Presidential Administration.
Ultimately, Tokayev’s proposed reform is unlikely to significantly alter the party balance. Amanat remains dominant and, barring unexpected events, will likely continue to shape the legislative agenda. The real question is whether Erlan Koshanov will remain at the helm of the new parliament—or whether Tokayev has in mind a more strategically advantageous candidate.
For example, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.
Given that Tokayev’s presidential mandate expires in 2029—and there is no possibility of reelection under the 2022 constitutional changes—the proposed reform takes on added significance, raising questions about planning for the retention of real power in Tokayev’s hands and about the political landscape of the post-presidency era.
Russia’s Influence
On the second day of 2022, January 2, Kazakhstan experienced its largest unrest since the sudden doubling of liquefied gas prices.
The protests began in the gas-producing city of Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan, but on January 3–4 spread to Almaty and other cities. Protesters shifted from economic demands to political ones, including the government’s resignation and the withdrawal from politics of the country’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. By January 4–5, protests in Almaty escalated into mass riots, including arson attacks on government buildings and looting, and the authorities lost control of the city. The former presidential residence and the akimat (city hall) were burned down, and protesters seized Almaty airport.
The next day, the CSTO Collective Security Council decided to deploy a peacekeeping contingent to Kazakhstan. This decision was a response to an official request by President Tokayev to CSTO leaders to “assist in neutralizing the terrorist threat.” Russia’s peacekeeping contingent within the CSTO in Kazakhstan included units from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, the 98th Airborne Division, and the 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade—Russia’s most combat-capable airmobile units at the time. CSTO communications stated that units from Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan also formed part of the CSTO forces sent to Kazakhstan in January 2022, but there is no reliable information about their actual numbers—or even confirmed evidence of their presence in Kazakhstan at that time.
Russian paratroopers saved Tokayev in January 2022. They remain his primary political fear.
The China Factor
Tokayev is seeking to resolve this dilemma by shifting his reliance from a political alliance with Russia to a political alliance with China.
As one of Kazakhstan’s largest trading partners and investors, China, according to observers, prioritizes economic relations rather than political loyalty and “the shared Soviet past.” At the same time, given instability in Afghanistan and the growing securitization of Xinjiang, China is increasingly interested in ensuring security in Central Asia—something it can obtain from the leader of the region’s strongest country: Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev. This increases Tokayev’s value in Beijing’s eyes.
Kazakhstan, notes the U.S. Congressional Research Service, is viewed as a key country in the overland Silk Road Economic Belt—one of the main corridors of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative—and has received significant financing from Chinese companies for the construction of transport and energy infrastructure.
The Council on Foreign Relations, on December 2, 2024, noted that Kazakhstan skillfully balances the competing influence of Russia and China by diversifying trade partnerships, fostering economic growth, and using its strategic position to protect its sovereignty and autonomy.
Change Shoes in the Air
It should be noted that, according to analysts, Tokayev must pursue policy amid complex internal dynamics among economic actors.
This includes the residual influence of elements of the Nazarbayev-era “old guard” and the dissatisfaction of “new champions,” especially regarding the aggressive expansion of Chinese competitors—curbed to a much lesser extent by Tokayev for political reasons than during Nazarbayev’s rule and that of his clan. Meanwhile, Russia continues to pressure Kazakhstan to limit its independent foreign policy, possessing an extensive toolkit for doing so. Moscow’s leverage includes much of Kazakhstan’s business sector, whose commercial interests pass through Moscow to a disproportionately greater extent than through Washington, Brussels, or Beijing. This Kazakh business has become one of the world’s main beneficiaries of the “Iron Curtain” around Russia’s economy, and the Kremlin’s favorable attitude toward Kazakh schemes and routes is critically important to it.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, in one of its texts, writes: “We may be witnessing the restoration of a personalist regime, now headed by the second president rather than the first, leaving little chance for democratic transition in the near or medium term….. By positioning himself against the negative image of the first president Nazarbayev and abolishing Nazarbayev’s constitutional privileges, Tokayev managed to preserve all presidential power and reinforce his legitimacy through the referendum.”
Tokayev would not be the first Central Asian president to change the rules in order to reset presidential term limits on his own terms.
In comments, Kazakh political scientist Dimash Alzhanov suggested that this is precisely the trick. “The constitutional amendments will most likely pursue the goal of renewing presidential terms… We still do not know the full list [of planned] changes. But under the pretext of amending the Constitution to create a unicameral parliament, they can quietly push through more important changes, such as resetting the presidential term or introducing the post of vice president,” he said.
The Atlantic Council (February 2025) notes another vector of turbulence in Kazakhstan’s political landscape: “Rising social conservatism accompanying an Islamic revival could pose a serious challenge over the next ten years.”
As we can see, there are many uncertainty factors in the future of the constitutional reform initiated and driven by President Tokayev. And the main one is Tokayev himself: a Soviet diplomat, Deputy Secretary-General of the UN and Director-General of the UN Office in Geneva, long-time chair of Kazakhstan’s Senate under President Nazarbayev, also Nazarbayev’s prime minister—and, at the same time, the initiator of stripping Nazarbayev of his status privileges….
There is no shortage of scenarios for Kazakhstan’s future. But all scenarios converge on one point: the keys to the republic’s political future are in the hands of one—and only one—person.
Alexander Shpunt is an Israeli and Russian researcher and expert in the theory and practice of information and analytical work in the field of politics and resides in Haifa. Since 2016 he has served as a professor at the National Research University “Moscow Higher School of Economics. In 1999–2011 he also served as the executive director of the “Effective Policy Foundation”, the largest think tank in the RF at that time, and in 2011 founded and headed the Institute of Political Analysis Tools, specializing in systems for monitoring political behavior.