PSCRP-BESA Reports No 146 (August 11, 2025)
by Anatoliy Romanyuk & Vitaliy Lytvyn
Since regaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine has periodically experienced profound social and political changes that have been closely linked to linguistic identities, ethnicity, and religious aspects, among others. Concurrent with these developments, the Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 and the subsequent full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war since February 2022 have precipitated, engendered, and brought to the fore profound changes and transformations in the internal balance of ethno-national relations. These developments have led to a significant narrowing of the influence of the Russian language, culture, and ethnicity in Ukraine while simultaneously stimulating the processes of active Ukrainianization and the integration of Ukrainian civic and even national identity.
Politicization of ethnic and linguistic social distinctions
Ukraine presents a classical example of evolving the ethnic, national, and culture-linguistic differences within the population into a socio-political cleavage. In this context, the disparities that emerge from the divergent interests, identification, and population of specific macro-regions of Ukraine, as articulated by the various political parties and alliances within the nation. A salient example of this phenomenon is evident in the divergent attitudes and assessments of Russia among these regions, which are determined and even produced by the various political parties and alliances.
The employment of February 24, 2022, as a symbolic date for delineation and analysis, constitutes a rational approach. However, it is noteworthy that only subsequent to this date, which marks the onset of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, did a significant proportion of actors and government officials in Ukraine begin to assert that the war had actually and truly commenced with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, public opinion polls indicate that a substantial proportion of the Ukrainian population’s attitudes toward Russia underwent a shift toward a more moderate stance and a “correction” in the immediate aftermath of the 2014 armed aggression and illegal activities. This shift did not immediately result in a radical transformation in their perceptions, attitudes, or self-identity. A seminal examination of this phenomenon was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in its sociological survey of May 2024. This survey specifically focused on how Ukrainian citizens perceived and responded to pertinent survey questions considering the events and their subsequent treatment. The survey covered the following time periods: a) February 2013 (long before the “Revolution of Dignity,” the annexation of Crimea, and the occupation of part of Donbas); b) February 2022 (after the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of part of Donbas, but before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine); c) July 2022 (a few months after the start of the full-scale war); d) May 2023; and e) May 2024 (even later in a full-scale war).
In their analytical report, the researchers stated that prior to the “Revolution of Dignity,” the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens (70%) aspired to maintain Ukraine and Russia as independent yet friendly states. A mere 15% of respondents asserted that relations should mirror those of other neighboring states, characterized by closed borders, visa requirements, and customs procedures. Furthermore, a substantial proportion of respondents (12%) expressed a preference for the establishment of a unified (union) state. However, in the period following the Crimean annexation and the eruption of the Donbas war, a significant increase in the proportion of individuals who began to advocate for the establishment of relations between Ukraine and Russia analogous to those of other states was observed (from 15% to 44%, respectively).
Concurrently, 48% of respondents expressed a preference for the continuation of amicable relations between the two states, while the proportion of those who endorsed the unification of the two states declined to 5%. In turn, a public opinion poll administered by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology immediately following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine documented an increase to 79% in the proportion of respondents endorsing the closure of borders, visas, and customs with Russia. The protracted war has prompted a modest shift in the perception of Ukrainian citizens, with the proportion of those who hold this perspective reaching 75% in May 2024. Consequently, the percentage of respondents who advocated for friendly relations with Russia accounted for 12%, while only 0.3% of respondents expressed a preference for the unification of the two states. The study also examined regional variations in these attitudes and categorized Ukrainian citizens based on data from different time periods covered by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology’s surveys.
Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the majority of Ukrainian citizens residing in all macro-regions expressed support for amicable relations between the Ukrainian and Russian states. However, researchers observed a discernible regional disparity in the proportion of Ukrainian citizens who endorse the establishment of a unified (union) state, with the highest concentrations of this demographic residing in the Eastern and Southern macro-regions. However, the full-scale aggression that transpired in February 2022 resulted in a shift in the prevailing sentiment across each macro-region. In all macro-regions, a pronounced predominance emerged among supporters of establishing a clear border between Ukraine and Russia, accompanied by the implementation of visa and customs regulations. Concurrently, the proportion of supporters advocating for the unification of the two states experienced a significant decline or even nullification.
Confessional identification as an additional factor in the transformation of the ethnic and linguistic grouping of Ukrainian citizens
The confessional factor is unlikely to function as an isolated agent capable of provoking social and, even more so, socio-political cleavages in the structuring of social relations in Ukraine. Rather, it possesses the capacity to contribute to the ethnic and linguistic structuring of the population and its politicization in Ukraine, with a notable degree of dependence on and intersection with ethnic and linguistic factors, thereby substantially reinforcing them. This phenomenon is particularly evident in instances when and where representatives of a specific religious denomination reside in densely populated areas or possess a regional affiliation that is (or was) both significant and noteworthy, particularly in the context of the ethnic and linguistic differences previously discussed. Consequently, the transformation of the ethno-linguistic factor can exert a significant influence on the confessional dimension, and vice versa.
Ukraine is a multi-confessional society. For instance, as of 2015, the State Department for Nationalities and Religions of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine (now the State Service of Ukraine for Ethno-Politics and Freedom of Conscience at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine) reported that there were 33,781 religious or confessional organizations of more than 50 faiths operating within Ukraine. According to the Religious Information Service of Ukraine (2015) portal, as of 2015, the largest religious groups in terms of the number of religious communities included the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP, with 12,241 communities), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP, 4,738 communities), the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC, 3,769 communities), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC, 1,225 communities), in descending order. In December 2018, a unification council of hierarchs and followers of the UOC-KP and UAOC was convened in Kyiv, where the establishment of the unified Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was proclaimed. In January 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople officially granted the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, a significant event that profoundly impacted the religious landscape of the country. This act represented the culmination of a protracted process that ultimately led to the attainment of autocephaly for Ukrainian Orthodox believers and churches. This process was initiated by President Viktor Yushchenko in 2008 and subsequently continued by President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine, who signed an appeal from the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Parliament) to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, requesting the bestowal of the Tomos of Autocephaly.
These events have been and continue to be of significant importance in the context of the transformation of the ethno-linguistic factor in Ukraine, particularly in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian War. In the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, along with the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, has refrained from issuing any condemnation of Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine. Moreover, there have been persistent reports in the media regarding the collaboration of priests belonging to the UOC-MP with separatist organizations in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR, respectively), as well as with Russian invaders. The initial passive acceptance or silence of the UOC-MP regarding Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, did not even contrast with the overt support of Russian aggression expressed by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. However, this view changed slightly due to mounting political, public, and clerical pressure.
This position culminated in the Council on May 27, 2022, where the UOC-MP condemned the war. The council also partially distanced itself from the Russian Orthodox Church. Ultimately, the council declared the UOC-MP’s full independence and autonomy. The resolutions of the council in question stipulated the following: “… We disagree with the position of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus on the war in Ukraine … The Council adopted appropriate amendments to the Statute with regard to the Administration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), all of which testify to the full independence and autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”
To assess the significance of the factor of confessional affiliation, including in the context of the transformation of ethno-linguistic processes in Ukraine before and after the outbreak of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethno-Politics and Freedom of Conscience’s data on the number of religious and confessional communities in the oblasts of Ukraine were used. The organization of the oblasts was conducted in relation to the macro-regions of Ukraine identified at the onset of the present study. For the purposes of this analysis, the data as of January 1, 2021, was utilized (Derzhavna sluzhba Ukrainy z etnopolityky ta svobody sovisti, 2021). This particular data point was selected because it was obtained prior to the outbreak of a full-scale war. Conversely, the data as of January 1, 2024, was also examined (Derzhavna sluzhba Ukrainy z etnopolityky ta svobody sovisti, 2024). It is noteworthy that the data from 2024 was obtained approximately three years after the commencement of the full-scale. In certain instances, and within specific territories, our capacity to operate with sufficient or any data was impeded.
Firstly, the number of religious communities subordinate to the UOC-MP was approximately double the number of religious communities of the UOC-KP (OCU) as of 2021. The preponderance of religious communities of the former was particularly evident in the Eastern and Southern macro-regions and, to a lesser extent, in the Central (Northern) macro-region. By contrast, the Western macro-region displayed a more balanced distribution between the two churches. Secondly, in the macro-regional comparison, the total number of religious and confessional communities of the UOC-MP was paradoxically two to three times higher in the Western and Central (Northern) macro-regions than in the Eastern and Southern macro-regions. This phenomenon is primarily attributable to the substantially higher number of oblasts and even populations in the Western and Central (Northern) macroregions. Thirdly, during the full-scale war, the number of religious communities of the UOC-MP has remained relatively stable in the Eastern macro-region, while exhibiting a proportional/commensurate decrease in all other macro-regions of Ukraine as of 2024.
Fourthly, a substantial increase in the number of religious communities belonging to the UOC-KP (OCU) was observed exclusively in the Western and Central (Northern) macro-regions. Conversely, a decline in religious communities of this denomination was documented in the Eastern and especially Southern macro-regions. Therefore, based on the available data, it can be concluded that the number of religious communities of the UOC-MP is significantly higher than those of other confessions and churches. The aforementioned pattern is particularly evident in the Eastern macro-region, where the number is almost five times higher than that of the UOC. A similar trend is also observed in the Southern and Central (Northern) macro-regions, where the number is notably higher than that of the UOC. Nonetheless, the number of church parishes and religious communities may not be directly proportional or commensurate with the number of parishioners. Furthermore, a considerable number of parishes may be inactive.
In any event, on August 20, 2024, the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) of Ukraine passed, and on August 24, 2024, enacted the Law “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations.” The act itself stated that the grounds for its adoption were “the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the support of this aggression by the Russian Orthodox Church, and … the numerous illegal actions of the Russian Orthodox Church and its subordinate religious organizations on the territory of Ukraine pose a threat to national and public security, the rights and freedoms of the citizens of Ukraine.” Article 3 of the Law stipulates that “considering the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church is an ideological extension of the regime of the aggressor state, an accomplice to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the name of the Russian Federation and the ideology of the ‘Russian world,’ the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine are prohibited.” Finally, the law required returning state property from legal entities (such as the UOC-MP) associated with foreign religious organizations whose activities were banned in Ukraine within six months of the law’s enactment. Given the assessments and determinations stipulated within the legal framework in question, it can be posited that the UOC-MP functioned, or had the potential to function, as a mechanism for the exercise of ethnic and linguistic political influence by Russia in the Eastern and Southern macro-regions of Ukraine. Consequently, this dynamic had the potential to intensify calls for Russia to adopt a more pronounced orientation within these macro-regions, thereby reinforcing the role of the Russian language and ethnic components.
In summary, it can be posited that the contemporary shifts in the ethno-linguistic terrain of Ukraine are attributable to a confluence of internal dynamics, namely the escalating national or civic consciousness, and external factors. This intricate process, which possesses both historical and contemporary dimensions, is likely to influence and persist in shaping the nation’s socio-political dynamics. Therefore, it is imperative to comprehend and observe the subsequent transformations of the ethno-linguistic or, at the very least, linguistic factor, as they will exert an influence not only on the cultural sphere but also on the political stability and international orientation of Ukraine.
Anatoliy Romanyuk is Professor of Politics and Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Ukraine. He specializes in political institutions and systems, party systems, elections and modern political doctrines. He holds a PhD in history and a Habilitation in political science. He is the author of over a hundred academic research publications.
Vitaliy Lytvyn is Professor of Politics and Head of the Department of Political Science at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Ukraine. He specializes in contemporary political regimes, political institutions and systems, party systems, elections, and European political processes. He is the author of about one hundred academic research publications.
This article is a part of extended chapter, submitted by the authors for publication in the Volume Post-Soviet Conflicts: Politics, Ethnicity and Warfare, forthcoming in the BESA series at the Rutledge Publishers