PSCRP-BESA Reports No 6 (September 27, 2023)
For a significant period, Russian policy in Central Asia has differed from its approach toward Ukrainian or Georgian issues. It was characterized by fewer elements of ideology and greater pragmatism. Pragmatic elements that “softened” Russian foreign policy in the Central Asian direction persisted until 2021, owing to various factors. Russian officials, to some extent, recognized the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian countries, leading to a more accommodating stance toward the region. Central Asia was perceived as having limited prospects for NATO and EU expansion, partly due to the presence of authoritarian regimes and its geographical distance from Europe. This made Moscow’s influence appear less threatened compared to regions like Ukraine. Global strategic considerations compelled Putin to acquiesce both Chinese and Turkish influences in Central Asia. Putin’s personal limited interest in Central Asian affairs and the influence of regional leaders on Russian decision-makers sometimes fostered an atmosphere of pluralism. Russia shared a common enemy in the form of radical Islam with both the West and secular regimes in Muslim countries.
However, after the onset of a full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s policy in Central Asia shifted to a new Cold War style. Central Asia is perceived by the Russian leadership as the far rear of the war in Ukraine. This is evident in the redeployment of Russian troops from Central Asian bases, primarily Tajikistan, to Ukraine. Only the Russian Caspian Fleet is directly involved in the war. The five Caspian littoral states signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (August 12, 2018), stipulating that the sea can only be used for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the Russian Caspian Fleet is participating in missile strikes on Ukraine.
Given the “rear-area status” of Central Asia, Russia’s key efforts are focused on addressing several economic challenges that would enable the continuation of the war. These include the transit (or smuggling) of military goods to bypass sanctions, obtaining certain types of goods lacking in Russia, such as raw materials and food, as well as the transit of Russian gas to new markets amid the suspension of its deliveries to Europe.
In 2022, after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia significantly increased its trade volume with Central Asian countries. From this region, electronics and household appliances began to be re-exported to Russia. Russia needs these not only for civilian consumption but also for the microchips that can be extracted from them and then installed in military equipment, including tanks and missiles. Without these microchips, the Russian defense industry cannot produce modern types of weapons. Previously, these microchips were supplied from the West or China. However, due to international sanctions, Moscow had to establish the supply of this equipment through Central Asia and several other routes (UAE, Turkey, China, South Caucasus).
At the end of October 2022, the American agency Bloomberg published an investigation into the potential use of re-exported electronic components from household appliances in Russia for military purposes[1]. Western governments also claimed that microchips and microcircuits from household appliances, such as refrigerators and washing machines, were found in Russian tanks. EU Special Representative for Sanctions David O’Sullivan stated that the European Union would investigate the increase in exports to Russia’s neighboring countries, suspecting that suppliers were circumventing Western sanctions[2]. It should be noted that Central Asian countries re-export to Russia not only microchips but also other types of goods that can be used for military purposes, such as firearm scopes.
According to Eurostat data, exports from Europe to Russia fell by 47% from March to November 2022 compared to the same period in 2021 after the sanctions were imposed[3]. However, exports of European goods to Russia’s neighboring countries, such as Central Asian countries, Belarus, Armenia, and Georgia, increased by 48% over the same period in 2022. This probably means that goods are being channeled to Russia through these countries.
Experts have a reasonably clear understanding of the volumes of “gray” or “parallel” imports into Russia, bypassing official manufacturers through Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
In January-August 2022, the trade turnover between Russia and Kazakhstan increased slightly compared to the same period last year. However, statistics show a sharp increase in the volume of re-export of certain types of equipment from Europe[4]. The export of televisions, displays, and projectors from Kazakhstan to Russia increased 312 times, computers 215 times, and phones 88 times. Some experts believe that in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has become a hub for re-exporting consumer electronics from the EU to Russia, including for the purpose of extracting chips from them. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have become hubs for re-exporting goods from China to Russia on behalf of Chinese companies that are concerned about direct dealings with Russia due to the risk of secondary sanctions.
In the first eight months of 2022, Uzbek exports to Russia increased by 45.4%[5]. At the same time, there was a sharp increase in the import of goods from China to Uzbekistan. Experts believe that a certain portion of these Chinese products is being re-exported to Russia. Kyrgyzstan’s exports to Russia increased by nearly 87% from January to August 2021.
The trade turnover between Russia and Tajikistan for the first eight months of 2022 was 22% higher than in the same period the previous year. Dushanbe has also started re-exporting certain types of automobiles and their components to Moscow.
In the first quarter of 2022, Russia’s trade turnover with Turkmenistan increased by 45%. However, there is little re-export here; exports mainly consist of local products going to Russia.
The growth in trade between Russia and Central Asian countries was not limited to the re-export of goods from the EU, China, and the USA. Russia’s purchases of certain raw materials and foodstuffs also increased sharply. Food imports from Central Asian countries compensate for the decline in food imports from EU countries. Imports of raw materials are necessary for the Russian military-industrial complex in the context of a sharp increase in military production. Previously, Central Asian countries, in general, had a significant trade deficit with Russia; now this imbalance is being corrected.
Each of the Central Asian countries has its own specialization in trade with Russia, although some types of goods are similar (food, cotton, wool, textiles, and footwear). Kazakhstan has significantly increased the sale of raw materials: bauxites for aluminum production — 2.5 times, untreated zinc — 2.1 times, and uranium — 2 times. Uzbekistan supplies Russia with cotton, textile products, fruits, and nuts. Kyrgyzstan exports clothing, footwear, honey, vegetables, fruits, dried fruits, dairy products, and fish. Tajikistan supplies Russia with fruits and vegetables, eggs, dried fruits, walnuts and cotton. Turkmenistan exports textiles, clothing, footwear, foodstuffs, sheep wool, and petrochemical products.
Russia has a significant interest in the region’s gas transportation infrastructure and gas supplies to it. Gazprom has significantly reduced gas sales to Europe, and the remaining gas needs to be sold elsewhere. This can be done in China if additional infrastructure through Central Asia is found, and new gas buyers can also be found in Central Asia.
Starting from October 1, 2023, Uzbekistan plans to buy Russian gas in the amount of nine million cubic meters per day, with annual imports of about 2.8 billion cubic meters. Uzbekistan produces approximately 52 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year, imports four billion cubic meters, and exports 2.7 billion cubic meters to China. Unlike its neighboring countries, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan doesn’t have enough of its own gas to simultaneously meet the needs of its rapidly growing economy and population while supplying gas to China[6]. Thus, the situation has reversed from the 1990s and the early 2000s when Russia received gas from Central Asian countries for its own consumption and redirected its gas to Europe.
Russia attempted to use gas supplies to Uzbekistan and its close relations within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with Kazakhstan to propose the political idea of a “trilateral gas union” between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. In general, the response to this proposal was that these countries were willing to trade with Russia but not to create any form of political organization. On November 30, commenting on the proposal to create a gas union, Roman Vasilenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, emphasized that “Kazakhstan’s fundamental position is that Kazakhstan does not allow its territory to be used to bypass sanctions.[7]” Uzbekistan’s Minister of Energy, Jurabek Mirzamakhmudov, indicated that “to meet demand and ensure domestic consumption… we are currently negotiating to import gas and electricity from neighboring countries, not through any alliance or union.” The Uzbek representative clarified that Tashkent is “ready to cooperate on the basis of a commercial contract, buying and selling.[8]” After this, Dmitry Peskov, the press secretary of the Russian president, clarified that there would be no talk of “gas in exchange for political conditions,[9]” meaning that the Kremlin decided to abandon the idea of politically formalizing cooperation in the gas sphere.
In August 2023, Turkmenistan followed suit. Despite its interest in promoting bilateral trade, it refused to grant Russia access to its gas pipeline to China. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are interested in exporting their natural gas to China without any Russian interference. This interest has a historical explanation, as the construction of gas pipelines from Central Asia to China once helped new countries reduce their dependence on Russian monopolist Gazprom. By using Central Asian gas, China creates competition for pipeline gas from Russia, thereby lowering domestic gas prices and increasing its own energy security.
In oil trade, the situation is different; Russia and Kazakhstan have struck a deal, “swapping” their markets. Specifically, Kazakh oil goes through Russia to Europe, including via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route to the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. This gives Kazakhstan access to more lucrative markets. Russian oil, on the other hand, goes through Kazakhstan’s infrastructure to China, helping Russia avoid sanctions.
In addition to addressing various economic issues during the war period, Russian policy in Central Asia in 2022-2023 is trying to resolve a number of other problems, including the demographic crisis in Russia. Thus, another tool related to Central Asia that Russian leadership is trying to use to support the war in Ukraine is labor migration. Labor migration is a significant factor in the national income for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan. In 2022 and early 2023, there were approximately 1.5 million citizens of Uzbekistan, 1 million citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and 700,000 citizens of Tajikistan in Russia. Additionally, this number includes those who have obtained Russian citizenship, such as another half a million citizens of Kyrgyzstan. Given the shortage of human resources, Russian authorities are making active efforts to send these individuals to war, either in exchange for Russian citizenship (sometimes in exchange for retaining the existing citizenship) or simply for money. Central Asian states and civil societies actively resist this.
The most important place in contemporary Russian foreign policy is occupied by the search for ways to compensate for the international isolation of the Russian leadership, which began after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops in 2022. Therefore, attempts are being made to demonstrate to the world and the Russian population the existence of countries “friendly” to Russia. This, for instance, was facilitated by the participation of Central Asian presidents in the May 9, 2023 parade in Moscow. Additionally, Russia is trying to put pressure on Central Asian countries to vote in the UN on Ukrainian and other key issues, if not in favor of Russia, then at least not against it. As a result, the countries of the region either abstain or do not participate in the relevant votes at all.
Russian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with the multi-vector foreign policies of the region’s countries and the economic and political reforms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Russia is intensifying its propaganda of anti-Westernism and anti-liberal ideology everywhere, including in Central Asia. This is important because Russian informational influence remains significant in a number of countries in the region. This is especially true in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where many people speak Russian and watch Russian television.
Thus, the following directions of Russian policy in Central Asia aimed at supporting the war in Ukraine can be distinguished:
- Import of goods to circumvent sanctions and meet the needs of the Russian military industry and population during the sanctions period.
- Attempts to establish exports and transit of gas made available by the cessation of trade with the EU.
- Use of migrant labor in combat operations.
- Attempts to gain support in international organizations.
- Attempts to secure symbolic and ideological support for both external and domestic propaganda purposes.
Andrei Kazantsev (Vaisman), PhD, Dr.Sc., PSCRP research fellow, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University