Israel and Lebanon: Analyzing Prospects for Peace
Summer 2026
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel and Lebanon have technically been in a state of war since Israel’s founding in 1948, but recent diplomatic developments indicate that both the Israeli and Lebanese governments increasingly share an interest in cooperating to reduce Hezbollah’s influence and create an opportunity for lasting peace between the two countries. The June 2026 U.S.-backed 14-point framework agreement outlines a phased IDF withdrawal, LAF deployment, and the disarmament of Hezbollah as a path toward Israeli-Lebanese normalization. However, despite the progress, obstacles remain. Iran opposes Israeli-Lebanese normalization because it would weaken Hezbollah and consequently weaken Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Hezbollah rejects disarmament and warns that attempts by the LAF to force it could spark another civil war in Lebanon. To properly implement the 14-point framework agreement and move toward normalization, the LAF must strengthen its military capabilities so that it will be able to counter Hezbollah without further threatening internal stability. Durable peace would make both Israel and Lebanon more secure, but its success will ultimately depend on Lebanon’s ability to restore state sovereignty and counter Iranian interference.
On April 14, 2026, Israeli and Lebanese officials held their first direct talks in over three decades. The talks, which were held in Washington, D.C., aimed at ending the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel and Lebanon do not have diplomatic relations, and the last high-level talks between Israeli and Lebanese officials took place in 1993. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio mediated the April discussion; he called this diplomacy a “historic opportunity” to end Hezbollah’s influence. Several rounds of direct talks have taken place since the initial meeting. These diplomatic developments show a meaningful potential in Israeli-Lebanese relations and suggest that normalization, while still uncertain, could become a real possibility in the future.
Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shiite Islamist militant organization, has engaged in conflict with Israel for decades. Hezbollah formed in the early 1980s, following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War. The Iranian proxy group has a strong influence in Lebanese society. Hezbollah has lawmakers in parliament, ministers in government, and has formed coalitions with other political parties. It has long sought to destroy Israel and has built up significant military power with assistance from Iran and the former Assad regime in Syria. Israel has launched several campaigns intended to defeat Hezbollah. In 2006, a cross-border raid and the capture of two Israeli soldiers led Israel to launch an air and ground operation that lasted for several weeks. This war did not achieve Israel’s aims, as Hezbollah survived and continued to fight Israel periodically. In October 2023, Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel after Israel attacked Hamas in Gaza, in response to the October 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel. This led to a year of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. During this time, the Israeli military killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader. Israel accepted a ceasefire deal in November 2024 that involved a phased Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, along with the withdrawal of Hezbollah to areas north of the Litani River. However, this agreement ultimately collapsed. The latest escalation between Israel and Hezbollah began on March 2, 2026, after Israel and the U.S. killed Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, in late February. Hezbollah fired rockets at northern Israel and in response, Israel carried out airstrikes and sent troops deeper into Lebanese territory. Israel now maintains what the IDF refers to as a “security zone,” 10 kilometers into Lebanese territory. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, more than 4,000 people have been killed in Lebanon during the latest fighting. The Ministry’s published totals do not distinguish between civilians and Hezbollah combatants.
Following the escalation in March, political officials in Lebanon were critical of Hezbollah’s decision to launch rockets at Israel, as the decision only brought more instability to Lebanon. Lebanese officials quickly suggested direct talks with Israel, in an attempt to halt the fighting. However, Israel did not agree to discuss possible de-escalation until April. Hezbollah strongly opposes direct Israeli-Lebanese diplomacy and wants a return to the 2024 agreement, which only involved indirect negotiations, mediated by UNIFIL, the U.S., and France. Israeli officials have repeatedly stated that Israel is at war with Hezbollah only, not Lebanon, stating that Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and seeks peace with the nation. Lebanese officials have called for a ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, and full Lebanese sovereignty over Lebanon.
The recent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed by the U.S. and Iran on June 17, 2026, calls for an end to hostilities in Lebanon. Israeli officials see Iran’s attempt to link the war in Lebanon to the broader conflict in Iran as an attempt to protect Hezbollah. Israel is not a party to the MOU and firmly rejects the linking of these conflicts, stating that Lebanon is a separate issue and that Israel will continue to fight Hezbollah to secure its northern border. Leading Lebanese officials have also rejected Iranian involvement in the Lebanon situation, stating that Lebanon must be sovereign and dictate its own future. Top Lebanese leaders see Hezbollah as an Iranian force obstructing state sovereignty.
Despite the complications arising from the MOU, Israel and Lebanon have continued pursuing their own negotiations. On June 26, 2026, Israel and Lebanon reached a historic 14-point framework agreement regarding de-escalation in southern Lebanon. U.S., Israeli, and Lebanese officials have stated that this agreement separates Iran from the Lebanon situation, allowing Israel and Lebanon to oversee their own relations. The deal includes Israeli withdrawal from two “pilot zones,” with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deploying in place of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The framework commits the Lebanese government to the disarmament of Hezbollah and is meant to be used to create a process for phased Israeli withdrawal, Lebanese military deployment, and a full end to the Israel-Hezbollah war. If successful, this framework deal could significantly reduce Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, allowing for the Lebanese government to have sovereignty over its own nation and paving the way for possible Israeli-Lebanese peace. The language of the framework strongly suggests that Israeli and Lebanese officials envision future normalization. The text states, “as reflected in this Trilateral Framework (“Framework”), and through future agreements, the two countries declare their ambition to end conflict between them, ensure the sovereignty and security of both countries, and establish peaceful neighborly relations between the two countries.”
With Israel and the Lebanese government both opposing Hezbollah, the two nations are highly incentivized to cooperate to rid Lebanon of Hezbollah’s influence. If the conflict between Hezbollah and the IDF ends, and Lebanon and Israel officially end their decades-long conflict, Lebanon could rebuild destroyed buildings and infrastructure. Additionally, the Lebanese government would have full national sovereignty, displaced residents of Lebanon’s south and Israel’s north could return home, and both countries would have one less border that is at constant risk of becoming a conflict zone.
Based on only the words and actions of the Israeli and Lebanese governments, establishing peace between Israel and Lebanon and an end to the permanent state of war between the two nations is possible. The issue, however, is that Israeli-Lebanese peace would go against Iranian interests by undermining Iran’s most powerful proxy. Iran is very much against Israeli-Lebanese normalization, and this opposition creates obstacles that could stand in the way of a peace treaty.
Iran is strongly incentivized to disrupt the Israeli-Lebanese peace process because normalization between Israel and Lebanon would significantly weaken what Iran calls its “Axis of Resistance” against Israel, which includes Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas. Maintaining the “Axis of Resistance” is likely a priority for Iran, as shown by the Islamic Republic’s linking of the MOU with the U.S. to the termination of Israeli operations against Hezbollah. It is possible that as negotiations between Israel and Lebanon progress, Iran may instruct Hezbollah to carry out attacks against Israel, prompting Israel to occupy more Lebanese territory and/or attack Hezbollah outside of the IDF-established “security zone,” effectively undoing the progress made between Israel and Lebanon.
Hezbollah also outwardly refuses to abide by the 14-point agreement reached by Israel and Lebanon. Despite Israeli and Lebanese officials declaring that Hezbollah will be disarmed, Hezbollah has made it clear that it will not willingly give up its military power. One Hezbollah lawmaker even stated that civil war will erupt in Lebanon if the Lebanese government attempts to forcibly disarm the organization. The IDF has declared numerous times that withdrawal from southern Lebanon is contingent upon Hezbollah’s disarmament. This puts the Lebanese government in a difficult position, possibly forcing it to choose between continued conflict with Israel or facing conflict within its own country. Many see the idea that any Israeli-Lebanese normalization could lead to political crisis in Lebanon as a legitimate concern. Lebanon’s political landscape has long been divided between two coalitions: one that is supported by Western powers and another that is led by Hezbollah and supported by Iran. Official Israeli-Lebanese peace would most likely deepen these political divisions. While Israel insists that the LAF disarm Hezbollah, the risk of a civil war between the LAF and Hezbollah is likely still a concern for the Israelis. Civil war in Lebanon would not be in Israel’s best interests because the LAF lacks military strength, making it a real possibility that Hezbollah could win the civil war and fully take over Lebanon. This would put Israel’s national security at an even higher risk.
Due to Israel’s stated conditions for an IDF withdrawal from Lebanese territory, the disarmament of Hezbollah is likely necessary for the establishment of Israeli-Lebanese peace, as Lebanon is unlikely to establish any official relations with Israel while the IDF is still occupying parts of Lebanese territory. Since Hezbollah refuses to disarm, Iran aims to keep it strong, and the LAF is currently too weak to challenge Hezbollah effectively, the LAF must either enhance its military strength to disarm Hezbollah without risking a civil war it could lose, or Lebanese leadership must negotiate a political agreement with Hezbollah to ensure its disarmament. A political deal to disarm Hezbollah is unlikely, as preserving Hezbollah’s military capabilities is a priority for Iran. The IDF is much stronger than the LAF, and in theory, could work with the LAF to successfully disarm Hezbollah. However, the LAF rejects any direct military coordination with the IDF, as this would lessen the legitimacy of the LAF among the Lebanese people because of opposition to working with Israel.
To gain strength, the LAF could seek more military assistance from the U.S. to improve its capabilities. In addition, it could be helpful for the IDF and the LAF to establish secret, unofficial military coordination. Israel and Saudi Arabia, like Israel and Lebanon, do not have diplomatic ties, but they have been working together for years, secretly sharing intelligence to counter Iranian threats through a U.S.-led regional security network. This has helped the security of both Israel and Saudi Arabia by providing both nations with more information regarding hostile Iranian actions. A similar arrangement between the IDF and the LAF could strengthen both Israeli and Lebanese security while allowing the governments of both countries to avoid the political consequences of overt cooperation.
The more effective the LAF can be in combating Hezbollah, the less directly involved the IDF will have to be in operating against the non-state militant group. As Hezbollah becomes less of a threat, the IDF will be able to withdraw from more Lebanese territory, in accordance with the Israel-Lebanon 14-point framework agreement. The current diplomatic situation between Israel and Lebanon represents the most significant opening for improved Israeli-Lebanese relations in decades. Whether this important opportunity can be seized depends on whether Lebanon will be able to gain the military strength and the political will to combat Hezbollah and counter Iranian interference in Lebanese affairs.
Talia Sydney DeCoursey is an undergraduate at the American University and a Summer 2026 intern at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
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